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Both Paulson and Bernanke have made statements that bear on moral hazard. Even the great god Milton Friedman's beliefs are being questioned in some quarters.
So I thought it was appropriate to look at the idea of moral hazard as a viable concept altogether. I find myself these days discussing (well not actually discussing, since I never get any replies) many of the terms that economists use without defining.
I've dealt with "savings" vs "spending" before, without much luck. A good sample of what the mood is like can be gathered from following Paul Krugman's NY Times blog. He's liberal, but likes to comment on the conventional (conservative) wisdom, while never questioning the fundamentals of market capitalism itself.
Resume discussing mustard, which, by the way, no longer comes in an all metal can (at least around here). Policies not Politics ---- Daily Landscape
Moral hazard is the prospect that a party insulated from risk may behave differently from the way it would behave if it were fully exposed to the risk. Moral hazard arises because an individual or institution does not bear the full consequences of its actions, and therefore has a tendency to act less carefully than it otherwise would, leaving another party to bear some responsibility for the consequences of those actions. For example, an individual with insurance against automobile theft may be less vigilant about locking his car, because the negative consequences of automobile theft are (partially) borne by the insurance company. Moral hazard is related to asymmetric information, a situation in which one party in a transaction has more information than another. The party that is insulated from risk generally has more information about its actions and intentions than the party paying for the negative consequences of the risk. More broadly, moral hazard occurs when the party with more information about its actions or intentions has a tendency or incentive to behave inappropriately from the perspective of the party with less information. A special case of moral hazard is called a principal-agent problem, where one party, called an agent, acts on behalf of another party, called the principal. The agent usually has more information about his actions or intentions than the principal does, because the principal usually cannot perfectly monitor the agent. The agent may have an incentive to act inappropriately (from the view of the principal) if the interests of the agent and the principal are not aligned.
Moral hazard is related to asymmetric information, a situation in which one party in a transaction has more information than another. The party that is insulated from risk generally has more information about its actions and intentions than the party paying for the negative consequences of the risk. More broadly, moral hazard occurs when the party with more information about its actions or intentions has a tendency or incentive to behave inappropriately from the perspective of the party with less information.
A special case of moral hazard is called a principal-agent problem, where one party, called an agent, acts on behalf of another party, called the principal. The agent usually has more information about his actions or intentions than the principal does, because the principal usually cannot perfectly monitor the agent. The agent may have an incentive to act inappropriately (from the view of the principal) if the interests of the agent and the principal are not aligned.
You also underestimate the awareness in ET of the current 'discussion' in the US on financial matters, we had a stream of diaries on that.
So as I read it, it's the misapplication that is the point--so, if I've got this right (big if there! ;) if one looks at the concept "moral hazard" one discovers that the hazard is of being ripped off by those with more power; and companies may have power, but it is only such that individuals can benefit--with no humans left, the companies could get by on their own, with that dog-deer-humans-dancing-falling-over- animal they've built that Loefing posted--those will be their pets--the ones that built their masters--
So--I see it (robert's diary) as an attempt to deconstruct the concept such that its key elements are clear, and then look at how they can be put together--so faults are with the construction or the deconstruction (might be destruction either way--);
I'm interested in the (de)construction, it makes sense at times to stop and have a look at something, carefully work out the various parts, how they interact.
So if the theme is moral hazard, then yeah, you have to be responsible for your mistakes.
But as that tends to go very heavy on the population--no traffic lights, no glasses, no--
Why no glasses? Because the concept of being made to pay for your every last mistake is biblical in its judgements--ye have all sinned! Rather, those in power should simply and every day face the risk of dealing--unarmed, unprotected by any coteries, retinues, armies, militias, or other forms of armour--with the average person--maybe me or you or Robert--such that we personally can hold them to account via the laws of the land--there go those pigs--
Coz lawyers protect you from moral hazard--and they all work for the rich because money also protects you from moral hazard, as does a small milita--unless someone else turns up with better lawyers, more money, and a bigger militia.
Whereas, social structures that teach and practice best practice--praxis--should generate best practice, which can then improve and a virtuouso spiral riseth.
Would be how I'd put it, which is why I don't comment much in these kinds of diaries--all terms (for me) are attempts to nail down water. Or wood, or rock, or plastic, so sometimes nails are good--they fix things into position, with precision, and the sound is whack whack whack,
I dunno....I think the idea in robert's diaries is to move a step back from the he said/she said and make sure we're all in agreement about what the terms we're using mean, so he sets up his stall and other viewpoints can set up theirs in the comments--maybe I got it all wrong--probably!
Me, I always bang my fingers when using heavy hammers, and if there are rocks, stones, or other sharp and heavy objects I bang into them--
Heh! Nanne! I hope you don't mind me going tangential below your comment, and robert, I'm sure I got it all wrong, but I hope you both like these:
Don't fight forces, use them R. Buckminster Fuller.
There is some good stuff in rdf's diary, like on institutional learning. It's good to think about that.
Free marketeers will reply that the institutional learning comes from businesses failing, others succeeding, ignoring that a systemic crisis which causes a severe downturn once every 30 years cannot exactly set any kind of incentives for the day to day business of a stock company.
We've had that discussion, I think.
The thing is that the institutional rules set down as a case of learning are also baggage and their dissolution is therefore lobbied. And the political system in the US is institutionally corrupt. New regulation will collapse again in this setting.
What we'd need is a fundamental change in thinking that emphasises long-term viability and resilience at least as much as efficiency.
rdf and I pretty much agree on that, I suppose.
And I don't know about glasses, but we really do need no driving lights.
This sort of commentary is usually the preserve of right wing media or racist comments which imply that other people are not like "us" and abuse "our" generousity. There may indeed be a legitimate area of debate - particularly in economic theory - but most people avoid the topic because of its racist, moralistic, class warfare or neo-liberal overtones.
Most would start off on the basis that people have certain entitlements as of right, it's nobody else's business to question their motivations, or integrity; and that if the concept of moral hazard is to be applied at all, it should be applied to corporate entities which act to maximise their benefits for any given level of risk, and who would therefore be more likely to act irresponsibly in the absence of effective sanctions for so doing.
So I'm not surprised that few Europeans would engage with you on what might seem to them a morally dubious right wing agenda item insofar as it tends to be applied to those in need of social supports. The issue of speculative investors being sheltered from the risks they have taken on would be viewed in a different light entirely. "It's a mystery to me - the game commences, For the usual fee - plus expenses, Confidential information - it's in my diary..."
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