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Has WWIII already started? | 60 comments (60 topical, 0 editorial, 0 hidden)
Not necessarily ... (4.00 / 5)
... the period as a rising economy begins to overtake the current economic hegemon tends to be tumultuous ...

For instance, the Second Boer War at the last turn of the century, as Britain was being overtaken by the US, or the American War of Independence as Britain was threatened with being overtaken (but in the event was not ... the hegemon does not always get passed at the end of a Long Cycle, after all).

However, the World Wars tend to follow a little later in the cycle ... the Napoleonic wars after Britain re-established its position, the Great World War from 1914-1945 after the US had passed Britain.

And of course, there's no guarantee that it will be China that both passes the US and becomes the hegemon ... it could be that the Chinese leadership do not successfully hurdle structural problems that always come with rapid growth, and the new hegemon turns out to be Europe, or India.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Sun Apr 27th, 2008 at 01:37:01 PM EST
Or most likely (none / 1)
no hegemon. A world hegemon looks rather unnatural to me. Only the historically unpreceeded technological developement of the west led to this kind of world hegemony. In the future we will have a much more levelled playing field and no single blog will have the power to impose its will on most of the others.

Der Amerikaner ist die Orchidee unter den Menschen
Volker Pispers
by Martin (weiser.mensch(at)googlemail.com) on Sun Apr 27th, 2008 at 06:53:34 PM EST
[ Parent ]
In the Long Cycle theory ... (none / 0)
... we have hegemony precisely because no one power has the ability to impose its will. When a power can impose its will, then within the area within which it can impose its will, that is no mere hegemon in a system of competing states, but rather the metropole of an Empire.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Mon Apr 28th, 2008 at 12:04:16 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Re: In the Long Cycle theory ... (none / 0)
It is a matter of degree, but a hegemon has to be superior in a sense. As well there is the question if a military and economic superior country is seeking for direct commanding power or not. It becomes pretty difficult to pretend to be the good guys, when you use your military power directly to enforce your will.
Would you deny that during the cold war the US was a hegemon in western Europe or that western European states have never done anything purely because they were urged to do so by the US?

I think, as you can see now in Africa, today and more so in the future countries will simply change their partners when one partner demands things which seem to be unbearable. That was close to impossible in the past and especially the US was so important for everybody that nobody really can turn his back on it.

Der Amerikaner ist die Orchidee unter den Menschen
Volker Pispers

by Martin (weiser.mensch(at)googlemail.com) on Mon Apr 28th, 2008 at 07:58:01 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Re: In the Long Cycle theory ... (none / 1)
Precisely.

I think, as you can see now in Africa, today and more so in the future countries will simply change their partners when one partner demands things which seem to be unbearable.

That is exactly why this phase in the Long Cycle has always been fairly tumultous ... its been a time when it is much easier for semi-peripheral countries to contemplate playing one core economy off against another, because the prevailing hegemon has lost much of its edge.

Just as, for example, the American colonies played the British and the French off against each other (though as it turned out to the greater eventual damage to the French government that was our ally than to the British government that was our adversary).


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Mon Apr 28th, 2008 at 09:07:36 AM EST
[ Parent ]
OK, (none / 0)
so can explain why this phase should come to an end? I know it is a bit easy to predict the future will just be the extrapolation of ongoing trends, but I can't see what should end this phase, except the diary becomes true, which I don't see as a likely outcome.

I'm not a fan of Hegelian automatism in history prediction, except their is a reason. Many historic phases have had 'cycles', which finally came to an end, so just pattern recognition really is not such a reason, if other parts of the historic situation are completely different.

Der Amerikaner ist die Orchidee unter den Menschen
Volker Pispers

by Martin (weiser.mensch(at)googlemail.com) on Mon Apr 28th, 2008 at 10:04:36 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Re: OK, (none / 1)
Because it would be such an incredible coincidence if two great powers were exactly evenly matched in the first place, and even more if they stayed exactly evenly matched for a long period.

  • Hegemonic wars start because different great powers, seeing the fading of the importance of what used to be dominant power resources, have different views of where they stand relative to the other great powers.
  • The hegemonic war settles which power resources really are the dominant combination.
  • Winning the hegemonic conflict puts the hegemon in a position to work on reforming the previous world order, normally in its interests, and that reinforces the hegemon's position.
  • But ongoing social and technological change ensures that no set of dominant power resources is permanent, so sooner or later the benefit of the power resources that lead to the dominance of the hegemon begins to fade.
  • It is one of those powers that are gaining under the new conditions that is most likely to pass the incumbent hegemonic power to become a new hegemon, but of course its always possible that the existing hegemon develops the power resources that end up being critical in the next cycle.

So like cycles in economics, its a standing wave ... not driven by exogenous shocks, or by some kind of interplay of ideal underlying forces, but a self-perpetuating dynamic system.

Its most closely associated with the rise of Europe (and then a former European settler colony) from LDC backwater status pre-1500 to world dominance. There is of course much dispute (that is much of the relevance in the fight over the dash and capitalization between world-system theory and World System Theory) whether that's an extension of an older pattern or a pattern that was launched in the second half of the previous millenium. For Wallerstein, it is a pattern that is typical of the European world-system, which grew from a region of the world in 1500 to nearly encompass the world by the 1800's, others have other views on that.

And it is certainly not seen as the only possible historical pattern ... for example, if a hegemon continues rising in power to the point that it establishes an Empire, then the dynamic of rival powers vying for their position in a system of state does not apply, and that would break the standing wave.

Indeed, one of the concerns of both world-system and World System theorists is how to disrupt the perpetuation of the pattern so that we can avoid having "the next" hegemonic war ... which in an age of nuclear and biological weapons is a terrible thing to contemplate.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Mon Apr 28th, 2008 at 11:05:45 AM EST
[ Parent ]
So it is a possibility (none / 1)
but not a determination.
I would say what makes the time pretty unique is, that
  • the most advanced economies have a demography which simply does not need nor sustains empire like expansion. The Romans wanted an empire in 0. Napoleon wanted it, the German Kaiser, Hitler, and Stalin wanted it, Dshingis Khan, the Ottoman califs,.... Most people in the current developed world don't.
  • distances in todays world still matter. A world hegemon is by far not a self evident outcome compared with more regional developments. The EU e.g. shows, that this has not to be violent. Sure the EU is unique in a sense up to now, but ASEAN or the AU perhaps take a similar direction. Long range transport of military equipment is very energy intensive, especially if it must be fast. (FAZ wrote last weekend, that inland water transport has an energy need proportional to speed^(3.5)) That's really nasty for oversea military operations.
  • the weapons you named make it nonsense to start open conflict. So far leaders have acted very reasonable.
  • there can be more than 2 parties, which cancel each other out. UK was not a hegemon in Europe in 1900. With a simple politics of balance of power - ally with the weaker - there is no need for a hegemon. Sure, this is not necessarily a long-term stable situation, but today there are so many international contracts, that I guess it is much more stable than ever before.
The outlined problem in the diary is resolved in a capitalistic system. You give the resource to the person who is paying the most. My personal guess is, that the European countries with their very low level of military spending as a share of GDP are doing exactly the right thing. There will be no serious war in the foreseeable future and the big armies some other countries have are just resource drags.

Der Amerikaner ist die Orchidee unter den Menschen
Volker Pispers
by Martin (weiser.mensch(at)googlemail.com) on Mon Apr 28th, 2008 at 11:39:17 AM EST
[ Parent ]
A few points ... (none / 1)
... China quite definitely cannot continue with its current political economy based on the resources of its region alone, so it must look to project influence abroad ...

... and hegemony is not empire. An "empire" could be a participant in a system of states, but if the entirety of a relevant arena of power conflict is within an Empire, like the Mediterranean world under Rome at its height, then that is not hegemony. Hegemony is something less than imperial power, but something more than equality.

... the UK could not be a hegemon in Europe in the 1900's because at the time Europe was part of a larger international system, and the UK nothing more than a medium power in that international system.

... more than two great powers is the situation of all of the hegemonic wars of the last 500 years, so the existence of more than two great powers does not seem to be a great consolation.

... on the other hand, the weapons of mass destruction could well be a game changer. In the end it is often observed by protagonists of hegemonic wars that few participants were winners ... by the time that the hegemonic war is well underway, all that many participants are hoping for is survival. If more political elites are more convinced at the outset that nobody will be the winner of a war, will it be possible to avoid the war?

I would have been more optimistic on this score before the Bush Residency. The US military industrial complex may be in the same position as the military establishment built up by Napoleon after he seized power in France, of being an unsustainable system that requires external wars of aggression in order to keep things running.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Mon Apr 28th, 2008 at 11:58:35 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Re: Or most likely (4.00 / 4)
no single blog will have the power to impose its will on most of the others.

Damn, I thought that was the ET plan. Will have to be reworked.

Un roi sans divertissement est un homme plein de misères

by linca (antonin POINT lucas AROBASE gmail.com) on Mon Apr 28th, 2008 at 04:45:17 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Oh, I thought the plan was to be such a ... (none / 1)
... compelling source of material that ET would emerge as the unparalleled opinion leader on the issues within its remit.

Since bloggers are often lazy beasts at heart, and if you make good material available to them, they will copy it and riff on it.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Mon Apr 28th, 2008 at 11:14:31 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Re: Not necessarily ... (none / 0)
What is the Long Cycle theory? What do you mean by hegemon?

When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done. — John M. Keynes
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Mon Apr 28th, 2008 at 05:17:23 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Re: Not necessarily ... (none / 1)
What is the Long Cycle theory? What do you mean by hegemon?

In economics, Long Cycle Theory is the theory that there are regular cycles (but not with mechanical regularity) of international economic activity, encompassing multiple trade cycles. People dating long cycles have tended to find periods on the order of eighty to a hundred years. There is, of course, much controversy over whether they exist, over the period of history for which they exist (if they do), and what are the proper ways to measure them (if they exist).

In political geography, there are a variety of competing theories about the system of competing states that can appeal to this economic long cycle, on one or more variant (several of them arrived at independently) of the argument put forward by Organski in 1958, Power Transition Theory (wp), which is that:

War is most likely, of longest duration, and greatest magnitude, when a challenger to the dominant power enters into approximate parity with the dominant state and is dissatisfied with the existing system. Similarly, alliances are most stable when the parties to the alliance are satisfied with the system structure.[3] This leads to the view that when the balance of power is unstable (ie. one or two nations have taken a dominant role in geopolitics), the likelihood of war is less.

Different versions of the argument go under the headings in political geography of World Systems theory and World-Systems theory.

The closely related Long Cycle Theory does not rely as heavily on the economic theory of the Long Cycle, since it focuses heavily on maritime projection of power and so is more about arguing about counts of ships and bases.

With nation states divided between great powers, which typically possess power projection beyond their region, middle powers that are influential in their region but with little influence beyond and therefore little ability on their own to challenge the existing system structure, and small powers with little influence in their region.

The hegemon is then the term used for the leading power among the great powers, based on the prevailing power resources of the day. Under any version of power transition theory, a period of balance of power is a tumultuous period likely to have a lot of conflict, and then hegemonic wars occur after a period of balance of power when a potential new hegemon has emerged, and one or more dissatisfied challengers make a move to carve out a stronger position for themselves in the emerging international system.

One of the concerns of some students of the cycles of hegemonic wars in political geography are how to establish a system were we can avoid having hegemonic wars.

In terms of ability to project power beyond their own region, it would seem that the great powers of the day are the US, China and the EU, with India being the only obvious candidate medium power with the prospect for emerging as a great power.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Mon Apr 28th, 2008 at 09:38:52 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Re: Not necessarily ... (none / 0)
The problem with this theory is that it doesn't take into account resource monopolies. The Saudis have effectively been running US foreign policy for the last couple of decades. Iraq was as much about keeping oil in the ground and oil prices high - and also settling a few personal scores - as it was about a naked resource grab by the US.

US policy is also seems to be strongly influenced by the Israeli lobby - which might seem paradoxical, but when the interests of Israel coincide with the interests of the Saudis, war-like things often seem to happen.

I'd be tempted to consider Organski a cold-war artifact. I'd guess he's suggesting that war with the USSR is likely in his near future, which was very much the establishment dogma of the day.

Today we don't just have nukes, we also have multinationals. Overt war is far less likely than economic war - which China has already won, because it could bankrupt the US tomorrow if it decided it was in its best interests.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Mon Apr 28th, 2008 at 04:52:03 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Huh what? (none / 1)
WWII was finished in 1945 ... a little late for a hegemonic war, but the US dragged its feet on pushing the structure of the international political order after WWI ... Organski  wrote in the 1950's, so regarding ...

I'd guess he's suggesting that war with the USSR is likely in his near future ...

... the clear implication of his argument would be that war with the USSR was unlikely in his near future. No guessing required. In any of the long cycle theories, great powers do not start a new hegemonic war so soon after the previous one has finally concluded.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Mon Apr 28th, 2008 at 05:25:38 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Re: Not necessarily ... (none / 0)
One of the concerns of some students of the cycles of hegemonic wars in political geography are how to establish a system were we can avoid having hegemonic wars.
To what extent did the UNSC work to avoid a hegemonic war by giving all world powers a veto on the legitimate use of force? Then, UNSC veto power becomes the definition of world power, and the tension between a hegemon and an aspiring hegemon is replaced by the tension between the current group of recognised world powers and aspiring world powers.

For instance, Britain and France can hardly claim to be individually as powerful as they were after WWII when they retained their colonial empires. However, we have the EU slowly configuring itself as a world power to replace Britain/France and (thankfully) avoiding the question of Germany as a world power.

The breakup of the Soviet Union has also somewhat diminished Russia, but it seems fanciful to claim Russia is not a world power given its size, its resources, its level of development and its military.

Then there's India which is not recognised as a world power but might well be. A UNSC with the US, EU, Russia, China and India as veto-wielding members would make a lot more sense than the current one. So maybe the biggest potential conflict is actually between Britain/France and India/Germany, and the EU could help resolve that peacefully if Britain decided to finally blend in.

In my opinion neither Russia nor China have any interest to start an overt confrontation with the US: that's just the US neocon propaganda in search of an adequate bogeyman.

The real problem with the current world system is that the hegemon, the US, has been busy dismantling it since the end of the Cold War.

When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done. — John M. Keynes

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Apr 29th, 2008 at 06:01:30 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The Security Council is an example of ... (none / 0)
... how the hegemon at the end of a hegemonic war gets a big influence in the form of the international order. The United Nations was something that quite clearly needed looking after, and the Security Council was established to prevent the General Assembly from being an arena where an effective political counterweight to the hegemon could be developed.

Allowing the objective of establishing the United Nations to be subverted is the whole point of the Security Council. China not ending up as a frontline containment state for the USSR was kind of an oops, but.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Tue Apr 29th, 2008 at 02:47:44 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Re: The Security Council is an example of ... (none / 1)
Allowing the objective of establishing the United Nations to be subverted is the whole point of the Security Council.

How's that?  The primary objective of the establishment of the UN was to prevent direct armed conflict between the great powers. Allowing it to act against the will of one of those powers would have the reverse effect.  

In any case, I don't see the moral case for greater GA power. One country one vote is inherently undemocratic as is the representation of authoritarian governments.  But that's fine, justice, fairness, and democracy  aren't the point here.

I agree with Mig that the composition of the permanent members group is out of date and that you'd want a merger of the British and French seats into one EU one while giving India a seat.  But the original make up was sensible. The US, France, UK, and Soviet Union were clearly the most powerful countries in the world at the time. China was hobbled by civil war, but as the most populous state it also got in. Who else would you have wanted - Brazil? Canada?  (Germany and Japan were out for obvious reasons, India was still a colony)

by MarekNYC on Tue Apr 29th, 2008 at 03:20:05 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I don't know about the moral case for greater ... (none / 1)
... GA power ... I had not idea there was a moral case for greater GA power, but preventing the GA from having power was the point of the Security Council.

The issue at hand in the mid-40's was not, of course, the make-up of the Security Council ... the system of permanent members consisting of the main victorious allies in WWII was pretty much automatic as soon as someone came up with it, and the system of rotating memberships with watered down voting rights fairly obviously the most that the other members could hope for ... but the powers of the Security Council.

Whether the institution as actually established was more effective in its role than it would have been otherwise ... quite possibly. Just because the US got its way does not mean that it was an unalloyed disaster that it did.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Tue Apr 29th, 2008 at 03:33:34 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Has WWIII already started? | 60 comments (60 topical, 0 editorial, 0 hidden)
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