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What is the Long Cycle theory? What do you mean by hegemon?

In economics, Long Cycle Theory is the theory that there are regular cycles (but not with mechanical regularity) of international economic activity, encompassing multiple trade cycles. People dating long cycles have tended to find periods on the order of eighty to a hundred years. There is, of course, much controversy over whether they exist, over the period of history for which they exist (if they do), and what are the proper ways to measure them (if they exist).

In political geography, there are a variety of competing theories about the system of competing states that can appeal to this economic long cycle, on one or more variant (several of them arrived at independently) of the argument put forward by Organski in 1958, Power Transition Theory (wp), which is that:

War is most likely, of longest duration, and greatest magnitude, when a challenger to the dominant power enters into approximate parity with the dominant state and is dissatisfied with the existing system. Similarly, alliances are most stable when the parties to the alliance are satisfied with the system structure.[3] This leads to the view that when the balance of power is unstable (ie. one or two nations have taken a dominant role in geopolitics), the likelihood of war is less.

Different versions of the argument go under the headings in political geography of World Systems theory and World-Systems theory.

The closely related Long Cycle Theory does not rely as heavily on the economic theory of the Long Cycle, since it focuses heavily on maritime projection of power and so is more about arguing about counts of ships and bases.

With nation states divided between great powers, which typically possess power projection beyond their region, middle powers that are influential in their region but with little influence beyond and therefore little ability on their own to challenge the existing system structure, and small powers with little influence in their region.

The hegemon is then the term used for the leading power among the great powers, based on the prevailing power resources of the day. Under any version of power transition theory, a period of balance of power is a tumultuous period likely to have a lot of conflict, and then hegemonic wars occur after a period of balance of power when a potential new hegemon has emerged, and one or more dissatisfied challengers make a move to carve out a stronger position for themselves in the emerging international system.

One of the concerns of some students of the cycles of hegemonic wars in political geography are how to establish a system were we can avoid having hegemonic wars.

In terms of ability to project power beyond their own region, it would seem that the great powers of the day are the US, China and the EU, with India being the only obvious candidate medium power with the prospect for emerging as a great power.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Mon Apr 28th, 2008 at 09:38:52 AM EST
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The problem with this theory is that it doesn't take into account resource monopolies. The Saudis have effectively been running US foreign policy for the last couple of decades. Iraq was as much about keeping oil in the ground and oil prices high - and also settling a few personal scores - as it was about a naked resource grab by the US.

US policy is also seems to be strongly influenced by the Israeli lobby - which might seem paradoxical, but when the interests of Israel coincide with the interests of the Saudis, war-like things often seem to happen.

I'd be tempted to consider Organski a cold-war artifact. I'd guess he's suggesting that war with the USSR is likely in his near future, which was very much the establishment dogma of the day.

Today we don't just have nukes, we also have multinationals. Overt war is far less likely than economic war - which China has already won, because it could bankrupt the US tomorrow if it decided it was in its best interests.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Mon Apr 28th, 2008 at 04:52:03 PM EST
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WWII was finished in 1945 ... a little late for a hegemonic war, but the US dragged its feet on pushing the structure of the international political order after WWI ... Organski  wrote in the 1950's, so regarding ...

I'd guess he's suggesting that war with the USSR is likely in his near future ...

... the clear implication of his argument would be that war with the USSR was unlikely in his near future. No guessing required. In any of the long cycle theories, great powers do not start a new hegemonic war so soon after the previous one has finally concluded.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Mon Apr 28th, 2008 at 05:25:38 PM EST
[ Parent ]
One of the concerns of some students of the cycles of hegemonic wars in political geography are how to establish a system were we can avoid having hegemonic wars.
To what extent did the UNSC work to avoid a hegemonic war by giving all world powers a veto on the legitimate use of force? Then, UNSC veto power becomes the definition of world power, and the tension between a hegemon and an aspiring hegemon is replaced by the tension between the current group of recognised world powers and aspiring world powers.

For instance, Britain and France can hardly claim to be individually as powerful as they were after WWII when they retained their colonial empires. However, we have the EU slowly configuring itself as a world power to replace Britain/France and (thankfully) avoiding the question of Germany as a world power.

The breakup of the Soviet Union has also somewhat diminished Russia, but it seems fanciful to claim Russia is not a world power given its size, its resources, its level of development and its military.

Then there's India which is not recognised as a world power but might well be. A UNSC with the US, EU, Russia, China and India as veto-wielding members would make a lot more sense than the current one. So maybe the biggest potential conflict is actually between Britain/France and India/Germany, and the EU could help resolve that peacefully if Britain decided to finally blend in.

In my opinion neither Russia nor China have any interest to start an overt confrontation with the US: that's just the US neocon propaganda in search of an adequate bogeyman.

The real problem with the current world system is that the hegemon, the US, has been busy dismantling it since the end of the Cold War.

When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done. — John M. Keynes

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Apr 29th, 2008 at 06:01:30 AM EST
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... how the hegemon at the end of a hegemonic war gets a big influence in the form of the international order. The United Nations was something that quite clearly needed looking after, and the Security Council was established to prevent the General Assembly from being an arena where an effective political counterweight to the hegemon could be developed.

Allowing the objective of establishing the United Nations to be subverted is the whole point of the Security Council. China not ending up as a frontline containment state for the USSR was kind of an oops, but.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Tue Apr 29th, 2008 at 02:47:44 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Allowing the objective of establishing the United Nations to be subverted is the whole point of the Security Council.

How's that?  The primary objective of the establishment of the UN was to prevent direct armed conflict between the great powers. Allowing it to act against the will of one of those powers would have the reverse effect.  

In any case, I don't see the moral case for greater GA power. One country one vote is inherently undemocratic as is the representation of authoritarian governments.  But that's fine, justice, fairness, and democracy  aren't the point here.

I agree with Mig that the composition of the permanent members group is out of date and that you'd want a merger of the British and French seats into one EU one while giving India a seat.  But the original make up was sensible. The US, France, UK, and Soviet Union were clearly the most powerful countries in the world at the time. China was hobbled by civil war, but as the most populous state it also got in. Who else would you have wanted - Brazil? Canada?  (Germany and Japan were out for obvious reasons, India was still a colony)

by MarekNYC on Tue Apr 29th, 2008 at 03:20:05 PM EST
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... GA power ... I had not idea there was a moral case for greater GA power, but preventing the GA from having power was the point of the Security Council.

The issue at hand in the mid-40's was not, of course, the make-up of the Security Council ... the system of permanent members consisting of the main victorious allies in WWII was pretty much automatic as soon as someone came up with it, and the system of rotating memberships with watered down voting rights fairly obviously the most that the other members could hope for ... but the powers of the Security Council.

Whether the institution as actually established was more effective in its role than it would have been otherwise ... quite possibly. Just because the US got its way does not mean that it was an unalloyed disaster that it did.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Tue Apr 29th, 2008 at 03:33:34 PM EST
[ Parent ]

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