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The 'suspected nuclear-component smuggler' is of course another former KGB agent, Alexander Talik, whose framing by Scaramella and Litvinenko was discussed at length by de Gondi.  The clear implication of Epstein's comment would seem to be that, although Talik was framed by Scaramella, he is suspected of involvement in nuclear smuggling.  By whom is not made plain -- as elsewhere in his article, Epstein makes an elliptical comment which suggests that he has much more information than he as yet feels in a position to make public.

Considering his talent, I do hope that Epstein's allusion to a "suspected nuclear-component smuggler" does not refer to Alexander Talik. There is an individual previously condemned in Italy as an agent provocateur for arms and nuclear smuggling who is linked to a vast network, also involved in international criminal activity, of which the Berlusconi witch-hunts and disinformation campaigns are part. However it is unlikely that he or his accomplices would be set up to be framed like Talik. Quite to the contrary.

As for Talik, there is really no information available, despite the suggestive Guardian piece, that would have him as some sort of sleeper capable of organizing a murder on commission with an exotic weapon, much less to be involved in an international criminal organization. He appears very much a small fry caught up in an intrigue far beyond himself and his capabilities.

With Scott-Clark and Levy we are requested to lay faith in their sources (Italian security services), a notoriously dodgy concession when dealing with deception in Italy. All the more so when some of the information they offer is characterized by suggestive atmospheres and omissions, when not misrepresentation. One does wonder how the authors had access to the so-called Litvinenko files, presumably in the vaults of the Mitrokhin commission, while there was on-going opposition in the recent legislature to making them available to public scrutiny. It would also have been kind on their part to inform the reader that the Berlusconi Senator Gian Paolo Pelizzaro, presented as a consultant for the Mitrokhin commission, theorizes rightwing fringe conspiracies that were perfectly in keeping with the commission's agenda. It is certainly not a question of Pelizzaro's opinions but a matter of contextualizing them. One does hope that Scott-Clark and Levy did not rely on Pelizzaro or his entourage to get in contact with the "Italian security services."

At what point should the Litvinenko dossier be taken seriously? On March 3, 2005 (Repubblica, 26 November 2006), Litvinenko declared on tape that after each interrogation session with Scaramella he would sign the transcripts translated into Italian without knowing if they faithfully reflected his declarations. Further, Scaramella emailed prefabricated documents to Litvinenko expressly asking him to print and sign them, and send them back (Repubblica, 29 December 2006).

The matter of the so-called Limarev document alleging an assassination plot that prompted Scaramella's trip to London has long since been denied and debunked by Limarev as reported here and here . The same goes for the unverifiable assertion attributed to Trofimov that Prodi was their man in Italy, which in Guardian article morphs into a declarative sentence. Coincidently the phrase "Prodi is our man" was suggested by Guzzanti to Scaramella in a taped conversation of 28 January 2006. Guzzanti, who is well known for his uncanny capacity to imitate voices, is apparently also capable of making the dead talk. Because the tapes involved a Senator they could not be used by prosecutors without prior consent by the Senate. The past legislation never freed the tapes of this obligation.

Talik's mishaps at the hands of Scaramella and Litvinenko are far more mundane than what the authors would like us to believe. Scaramella and his "personal assistant" Andreij Ganchev, much like the cat and the fox of Pinocchio fame, promised Talik pipe dreams of fast money if he collaborated with them. Talik and Ganchev eventually had a falling out over a vacation resort get-rich scheme that saw the two haggling over € 1200. Nor were relations with Scaramella fruitful. The resourceful Scaramella eventually felt that Talik could serve as a fall guy in his mad scheme to frame Prodi  and create a media event in which he and Guzzanti could be billed as would-be martyrs.
Aspects of the case can be grotesque. Scaramella's denouncement of Talik and the two vans at the Dante commissariat in Naples (not Rome) immediately aroused suspicion in the police. They determined that Scaramella placed several phone calls to the vans on his cell phone as the vans drove down the Adriatic coast. It is uncommon for a self-designated victim to call up his would be assassins to see how their trip is getting along. It is no wonder then that the Naples investigation of Talik never lead to his arrest. It is a curious twist that Talik called Scaramella for advice on what to say when he was summoned for a police interrogation in November 2005. And it was the clumsy bragging of Litvinenko to the Ukranian press at the end of November that rightly outraged Talik as you have so well described.

It is scandalous that the dossier of the Naples investigation took fifteen months to get to Teramo where the four Ukrainians were held in custody for smuggling weapons. It was an authentic coup de théâtre when the Naples evidence was produced in court. Just as the testimony (Repubblica, 07 March 2007) of the ex-functionary of the Ukrainian secret services, Vladimir Kobik, who declared that Scaramella had approached him asking him to either procure weapons of war for the Mitrokhin commission or indicate how to procure them. Following Kobik's refusals,  Scaramella then asked him if he would be willing to vouch for the provenance of the weapons were Scaramella to procure them on his own. Kobik's testimony was confirmed by evidence found in Scaramella's personal computer as well as paper trails imprudently left by Scaramella. The court immediately suspended the trial and ordered the release of the four Ukrainians. At the final hearing on May 22, 2007, the judges took all of 30 minutes to declare the defendants not guilty "for not having committed the crime."

In this light, phrases of the following tenure are misleading:

The trial of the six [sic] Ukrainians who had been arrested with the grenades, and who had been in custody since October 2005, collapsed for lack of evidence.

Trial transcripts are public. The authors have had plenty of time to verify what sort of "lack of evidence" they have in mind. Before the 1989 reform of the criminal code a sentence could be given with the formula "not guilty for lack of evidence," definitely not the case in the Teramo trial. Evidence abounded. Alas, phrases of such tenure evoke the sort of illations Senator Guzzanti has accustomed us to.

In September 2007, after nine months in police custody, Scaramella was placed under house arrest at his family's villa near Gaeta, a seaside town north of Naples. He denies the charges.

On February 14th, 2008, two weeks after the Guardian article, Mario Scaramella plea bargained a guilty sentence for aggravated and continuous calumny, smuggling of weapons of war and violation of official secrets. He was sentenced to four years imprisonment. He had already spent 14 months in custody and house arrest. Scaramella was immediately released thanks to the benefits of the Prodi-Mastella indulgence law expressly written to condone all criminal activity conducted before and during the Berlusconi (XIII) legislature 2001 through May 2006. Mario Scaramella is currently charged with embezzlement for having pocketed one million euro in government funds for the false demolition of 23 abusive buildings in the Vesuvius National Park. He is also involved in a case of attempted embezzlement of 500,000 euro under similar circumstances in the Gargano National Park in Puglia.
Whatever Scaramella may have to face in the near future, it is unlikely he will be out of work. He is a very resourceful individual who had no problems continuing his activities after the Mitrokhin Commission. Police raids turned up a stash of $ 20,000, brand new, in a series that did not originate in Europe. The recovery of his computer revealed documents with false charges sent to an American destination, all contrived in mid-2006.

You have rightly brought attention to the Niger forgeries in this context. I can only add that in the sophisticated art of deception, forgeries can actually be far more effective if they are badly made. What counts in the final analysis is the impact and controversy in the media. What is missing or barely suggested draws attention and leads to fascination. The polarization of public opinion is very persuasive, and the first victim is fact. A perfect forgery would imply that a chain of authority would have to assume responsibility for its contents and effects. The Niger forgeries case will remain as one of the most extraordinary and effective disinformation campaigns since the gift of Constantine. In the end it hardly matters who actually forged them.

by de Gondi (publiobestia aaaatttthotmaildaughtusual) on Sun May 4th, 2008 at 06:31:32 AM EST
I'd like to go into detail on the so-called "Italian security services" and their alleged documents as evoked by Scott-Clark and Levy:
If Scotland Yard have been restricted in their investigations, the Italian security services have no such inhibition - and felt able to show us the results of their inquiries. They were watching Litvinenko long before he came under scrutiny in London, and gathered a vast dossier of material on him, including phone tap transcripts, affidavits, photographs and emails, court depositions and police interrogations; it charts how, driven by money worries, Litvinenko had been secretly cultivating a new project in Italy.

At the time the two Italian state security services that could have investigated Litvinenko and Scaramella were the military secret services, the SISMI, which in theory is to operate outside Italian territory or against foreign menaces within states borders, and the SISDE, which operates on Italian territory. The SISMI was run by General Pollari at the time, the SISDE by General Mori. When the Scaramella-Litvinenko affair broke, members of parliament asked the government and the then heads of the services if they had gathered information related to the Mitrokhin commission and the two figures. The SISDE reply was a categorical "no" while Pollari's reply was ambiguous.

The Minister of Interior Giuliano Amato, interrogated by the Copaco, the IS oversight committee, declared that neither of the services nor the police had collaborated in any way with the Mitrokhin commission.

At this point it may be a case of "plausible denial" especially in the case of the SISMI. High officials of the SISMI were deeply involved in illegal activity such as the Telecom-SISMI scandal which involved the massive production of disinformation and illegal domestic espionage through off-shot security covers. One of the "gate-keepers" in the scandal was the Polis D'Istinto security company which was linked to another 52 security services. Apparently security services were in hot demand during the Berlusconi years.

As far as government intelligence services are concerned a simple question may be raised, ignoring the stumbling block of it being a crime: Why would such a wealth of documentation be shown to two foreign reporters if ever it existed, all the more so when both services officially deny any involvement? Sure, the English press has a vast audience and prestige. But the Italian press knows its Italy and all that has passed here. An English article, even if it is critical, makes a great bouncing board.

It is no secret that the judiciary branch investigated Scaramella, each procura for its own reasons. Teramo, Naples, Bari, Rome. But investigative judges do not hail from "security services."

Scott-Clark and Levy offer a list "including phone tap transcripts, affidavits, photographs and emails, court depositions and police interrogations..." which raises serious problems. Had Litvinenko personally made court depositions or had been subject to police interrogations, it would be public knowledge by now. More likely he may have been cited in court depositions and police interrogations in the only trials or pending trials that involve Scaramella. As a defendant, Scaramella and his lawyers, are the only ones that had access to that material before trial. Once a trial is underway, the material becomes public. But then Scaramella was the protagonist, not Litvinenko.

Throughout Scaramella's handling of Litvinenko and Limarev, he made shows of authority in front of shills in unidentified offices, alleging that they were IS covers, even CIA covers.  Limarev describes him as presenting himself in SUVs with six Israeli bodyguards. An entire building in San Marino under court seizure was magically open and running when Limarev was escorted there. Scaramella was even hired by the Republic of San Marino to manage state security.

Litvinenko's interrogations (affidavits?) were described as follows in a taped declaration in the London offices of Berezovsky on March 3, 2005.

[...] At the beginning of 2004, I received a call from my friend Viktor Suvorov, Viktor is an ex-official of the GRU (Soviet Military Counter-Intelligence) and now lives in Bristol where he plays at being a famous writer. He asked me if I had anything against talking to a friend of his, an Italian judge, Mario Scaramella, who works for the Mitrokhin Commission. Mario called me and asked me if I could tell him everything I knew about the KGB's operations and contacts in Italy. I told him right off that I didn't know Mitrokhin and knew nothing about his archive, but if he wanted a list of possible Russian contacts on the argument and my consultation to understand the criminal mechanisms of the KGB and the FSB, their links to organized crime, I was available. We agreed that I would come to Italy at the end of February 2004.

Then, suddenly, something happened then that I, unfortunately, didn't understand then. I have a brother named Maxim. He's 21 and has been in Italy for the past four. He lives in Rimini where he's a university student and works as a cook in restaurant that specializes in steak alla brace. Well, a month before I arrived in Italy, Maxim called me up in desperation. The police no longer considered his student visa valid and menaced to expel him back to Russia. I asked Mario for help, and he said not to worry. He told me that Berlusconi had been told about my impegno with the Mitrokhin and that Maxim shouldn't worry. If I collaborate bringing the evidence the commission asks for, Maxin will get political asylum. Maxim confirmed that Mario went to Rimini and talked to the police. But in the end my brother had to do it all by himself to get his visa. The episode was certainly a way to get me to collaborate.

[...]

At the beginning of March 2004 I arrived at Fiumicino where I found Scaramella waiting for me with an interpreter and a driver. We got in Mario's car, a brown Land Rover, and drove straight to Naples. The driver told me he was a penitentiary cop and I suppose he was because he travelled armed. The interpreter introduced himself as André. He was a Russian citizen and I was surprised he had no documents to stay in Italy. No visa permit, no political asylum. I said to Mario: "How do you expect to protect this person? The things he'll hear from me about the KGB and the FSB accuse Putin and therefore put his life in danger..." Mario told me to mind my own business. In Naples I stayed in the hotel "Britannia" or "Britanique" on the "hill" (in Naples in Corso Vittorio Emanuele, there exists a hotel called Britanique. The hotel is on the slopes of the Vomero. Ed.) Mario paid my room, the airplane ticket and the expenses of my brother who spent the last two of the five days I was there. The days were all alike. I waited in the hotel until they came to pick me up. They took me to a house not far from the hotel towards the sea. The apartment was on the first floor of a low building which overlooked the courtyard of a big school with a volleyball field. A woman transcribed my declarations on paper and at the end of each work day, I was asked to sign. Now I don't know what I signed because the texts were in Italian and I can't swear that the interpreter didn't make any errors. We worked late into the night. I decided to collaborate after I was reassured. [...]

Now the only people that could have all of this documentation, including documents effectively signed by Litvinenko, are Mario Scaramella and whoever he passed it on to, whether it was the Mitrokhin commission or  private security services, for example.

Whatever is written in these Litvinenko files should be weighed with caution. Even the presence of names such as Mogilevich.

by de Gondi (publiobestia aaaatttthotmaildaughtusual) on Mon May 5th, 2008 at 03:50:47 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I have made a lapsus in the above translation which should include the following phrase (in my bold):
The police no longer considered his student visa valid and menaced to expel him back to Russia. Which would have meant his death sentence. I asked Mario for help, and he said not to worry.

Of course, steak alla brace means grilled over wood charcoal. impegno means "committment" or "pledge to cooperate" in this case.

My apologies.

by de Gondi (publiobestia aaaatttthotmaildaughtusual) on Mon May 5th, 2008 at 04:37:04 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I am grossly ignorant about Italian politics -- and also very conscious of the need not to jump to conclusions in these murky affairs.

But the natural hypothesis to which your comments seem to lead is that by 'security services' Scott-Clark and Levy mean the SISMI.  While the SISDE's categorical 'no' is hardly definitive evidence that they were not gathering information about Litvinenko and Scaramella, Pollari's ambiguous reply would seem strongly to suggest that the SISMI was.  And the past activities of the SISMI to which you have referred do incline one to think that it could very easily have collaborated with the Mitrokhin Commission -- despite Amato's denials.

I certainly don't think Scott-Clark and Levy are lying, so we can assume that a 'wealth of documentation' really existed -- although of course the possibility that documents are being fabricated, or the reporters have simply accepted claims about what they say, cannot be ruled out.  (I do not know whether they read Italian, or had the services of someone who did.)

So -- why should this have been shown to two foreign reporters?

Particularly given the record of the SISMI, and the many problems of the suggestion that Talik instigated Litvinenko's murder, disinformation seems overwhelmingly likely.

There would seem to be two possibilities -- although these are hardly mutually exclusive.

It could be that the instigators of the disinformation are in Italy -- and that the purposes it serves are Italian.  Your conjectures as to the possible purposes are obviously immensely better informed than mine.  But to an ignorant outsider, what you say about Pelizarro points to the possibility that it could be convenient to suggest that certain activities of the Mitrokhin Commission were due to the 'loose canon' Scaramella, Litvinenko, and Limarev -- so diverting attention from the responsibility of others.

But then, Scott-Clark and Levy could simply have started investigating Litvinenko's activities in Italy -- an obvious enough line of inquiry -- and someone in Italy could have decided that it would be sensible for SISMI to point them in certain directions and found means of engineering this.

But then again, it could be that SISMI -- or whoever -- are involved in a disinformation operation instigated by people outside Italy.  What would seem to make this at least possible is the fact that the accusation against Talik looks like another in a series of false trails, designed to prevent people asking obvious questions about the death of Litvinenko.  One such false trail was based upon the famous emails -- of disputed provenance -- which Scaramella was said to have brought to London, which refer to the organisation named 'Dignity and Honour':  Sixsmith sleepwalks along this route.  

Another highly dubious trail laid not long after Litvinenko died had the former KGB operative Yuri Shvets claiming that Litvinenko was murdered because of a 'due diligence' dossier he produced on a prominent Kremlin figure:  Tom Mangold on BBC Radio recycled this interpretation, without mentioning that Shvets has been associated with Berezovsky.  Mangold worked for the BBC 'Panorama' programme for many years, and an exchange of emails relating to an article he was writing recycling British intelligence disinformation about Iraqi WMD featured in evidence to Lord Hutton.

It also worth bearing in mind Epstein's suggestion that one of the purposes of the request for Lugovoi's extradition was to prevent people taking seriously his account -- according to which Litvinenko was working for MI6, and that organisation used private security companies to attempt to recruit him.  The disinformation supplied to Scott-Clark and Levy at the London end looks as though it was designed to stop them contemplating the possibility that at least some of what Lugovoi says is true -- if so, it succeeded.

In that case, the original source could very well be within the Berezovsky circle -- note that Scott-Clark and Levy seem to have talked extensively to Goldfarb, whose history as a Soviet-era human rights activist makes him an ideal channel for disinformation.  The source could also have been in British intelligence, or indeed the police, although both seem less likely.

The list is I agree puzzling.  Just possibly, Scott-Clark and Levy could have been referring to materials already in the public domain as a result of the court hearing concerning Talik, which the 'security services' just happened to have collected.  But if the material relates to Scaramella one would indeed tend to conclude that the information came either from him or from his lawyers, through the Mitrokhin Commission or through a private security company.

I agree that if anyone has the documentation referred to in the La Repubblica transcript of the taped declaration by Litvinenko on March 3, 2005, it is likely to have been sourced through Scaramella.  The denial by Litvinenko that he knew what he was signing is obviously likely to be in some sense true -- but he could have been giving himself deniability, should he want later to disassociate himself from claims he had actually made by blaming Scaramella.

It would certainly be interesting to be clear as to whether we have adequate reason to believe that the supposed tape from October 2005 in which Litvinenko discusses Mogilevich exists.  If it does, it could well be a pack of lies.  But then even what Litvinenko said was pure disinformation, the fact he said it could be of very great relevance to the mystery of how he died.

The only publicly accessible information relating to this Ukrainian Moriarty-figure which Scott-Clark and Levy mention is the suggestion by Talik in court proceedings that the purpose of his framing was to get him to provide information on Mogilevich -- by which they may have meant to play the role of a plausible source of disinformation.  It is not clear whether these are the same proceedings where the tape of his threats against Litvinenko is reported to have been played.  But whether or not they are, this information is presumably in the public domain, and it would be interesting to know precisely what Talik said.

I certainly agree that one needs to weigh all information in this case with caution.  But I also think that one needs to put these shenanigans in Italy alongside Litvinenko's dealings with private security companies in London -- in particular Erinys.  This company could well be interested in Mogilevich, for all kinds of reasons -- including his involvement in RosUkrEnergo.  They could also have been the victims of disinformation by Litvinenko.  Never underestimate the gullibility of today's Brits.

by djhabakkuk (david daught habakkuk at o two daught co daught uk) on Fri May 9th, 2008 at 11:25:58 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I have covered the issue of the services manipulating reporters in this diary, The Italian Uranium Forgeries- Adventures in Manipulation. I refrained at the time of expressing my point of view why Buongiorno and Farina wrote their articles on Rocco Martino. The tone of their articles and the paradoxical false newsbit on Rocco's possible fate leave little space for interpretation. Rocco got the message loud and clear. So did we.

As the reporter and editor Giuseppe Fava once wrote, "One of the jobs in our business is, to put it banally, to read newspapers. Now, usually- and I'm not saying always- it isn't difficult to read what the papers write, it's more difficult to read what they don't write. It's more complicated, but it's usually more instructive."

Formally, neither the Sismi nor the Sisde collaborated with the Mitrokhin commission. In the parent scandal, the Telekom-Serbija commission scandal, I suspect that the Sisde worked as a spoiler.

The Sismi were most likely aware of Scaramella's frauds and may have played a role indirectly through the illegal Mancini, Tavaroli, Cipriani networks.

Whatever the two state services may have gathered was on their own initiative without concerning the commissions. Of course, if they were to feel the urge to share it with reporters, it would likely follow the same old script I described in the above mentioned diary.

The "sources of proof" are only available to the investigative judge and his office as well as to the defence. It is only with the trial that "sources of proof" are accepted as evidence and then made public. Since Scaramella never underwent a public trial, whatever documentation concerning him and his alleged crimes could only have come from him or his lawyers.

Transcripts of Talik's conversations as well as his testimony could have been admitted as evidence in the Teramo trial, and therefore are public. But the evidence would only be pertinent to the trial which excludes all irrelevant Litvinenko files.

Thus any Litvinenko files shown to the Guardian reporters most likely originated as we have come to agree: through Scaramella or to whom he may have given them. The only other possibility is that some of them may be extraneous forgeries thrown in with the package deal. That is standard fare.

by de Gondi (publiobestia aaaatttthotmaildaughtusual) on Fri May 9th, 2008 at 01:57:16 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I have found the references to Mogilevich in conversations between Scaramella and Guzzanti. They are summarized in the Prosecutor's request of authorization to use wiretaps involving a member of parliament as a source of proof. (The authorization was denied on February 19th, 2008).

I will give a full translation of relevant passage as soon as possible. In brief, the source is Scaramella who attributes the accusations to Litvinenko. Scaramella links Mogilevich, Bin Laden and various mafias to an effort to recover phantomatic Soviet nuclear weapons that Mario asserts are in the Bay of Naples.

The prosecutor notes that Scaramella's claims to Guzzanti are in contrast with wiretaped conversations between Litvinenko and Ganchev as well as between Talik and his wife.

With the caveat that Litvinenko may have later signed claims similar to Scaramella's claims, it does cast a shadow over any document allegedly by Litvinenko that may have been shown to Scott-Clark and Levy.

by de Gondi (publiobestia aaaatttthotmaildaughtusual) on Fri May 9th, 2008 at 05:43:44 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The following passage may be found on page 7 of the request for authorization to use wiretaps:
3) - 4) - 5) - 6) - 7) - 8) - 9) conversations that took place on number [omissis] on December 1st, 2005, at 16:10:08 # 833, 16:43:40 # 848, 17:13:02 # 856, 17:56:45 # 860, 18:15:48 # 861, 19:56:22 # 867, 20:20:50 # 873, containing precise references to the campaign organized by Scaramella and Litvinenko to support the thesis of a conspiracy to assassinate Guzzanti, attributing the responsibility to TALIK and elements of the Russian mafia, the camorra and Russian and Ukrainian secret services, with the indication of relevant documents acquired by Scaramenlla and sent to Senator Guzzanti, or to be acquired and transmitted. The conversations are of particular relevance if confronted with intercepted conversations in the acts between Litvinenko and Ganchev on one part and between TALIK and his wife on the other, having as their object the same facts albeit their reconstruction appears quite different, as noted in the motivations behind the arrest warrant emitted against Scaramella (Scaramella calls Guzzanti and tells him that at least ten different press agencies in Ukraine have mentioned the assassination attempt against Guzzanti, including the declarations of Litvinenko as referred by him. Litvinenko received dozens of calls from Ukranian reporters and Litvinenko mentioned Talik's name. Guzzanti tells Scaramella that he received a letter in Russian from Litvinenko; Scaramella will send the translation which corresponds to the registration but omitting all references to Mario Scaramella. Guzzanti notes that there is a problem since in the letter Litvinenko asserts that he works for the Commission; Scaramella says that Litvinenko had in precedence undertaken activity concerning nuclear [?] in Italy that they [the commission] had acquired; at the London meeting, official missions, documents countersigned by Bukowsky, Gordievsky, Svorov and Palombo. Conversations intercepted between CUCHMA (he lost the elections against Yushenko) and MOGILEVICH/FSB. SHVEZ, ex-president of the KGB took the material [?] to the USA. Scaramella tells Guzzanti that in Ukraine there is an agency, "the fifth element," probably close to Berezovsky, that follows the work of a commission similar to the Mitrokhin Commission that investigates facts of Soviet Union espionage. This agency had interviewed Litvinenko, and Scaramella sent the article to Guzzanti. In the interview Litvinenko talks about the Ukrainian aspects and also mentions Guzzanti (indicated as Paolo Guzzante), Talik, etc. They study the article together even if it is in Russian or Ukrainian. A passage on Simon Moghilevic and an agreement between the camorra to search for nuclear weapons lost during the Cold War to be consigned to Bin Laden, a revelation made by the Israeli. According to Scaramella the circle closes: camorra, Moghilevic- Russian mafia- services- nuclear bombs in Naples.)

The Naples Bay nuclear weapons hoax was a favorite of Scaramella. Lou Palumbo, an ex-CIA agent worked as a consultant for the Florida based Incident Management Group. Lou introduced Filippo Marino to the IMG where Marino rose to become senior consultant. Marino is Scaramella's associate in their company the ECPP.

by de Gondi (publiobestia aaaatttthotmaildaughtusual) on Fri May 9th, 2008 at 07:20:31 PM EST
[ Parent ]
It would be interesting to find out in what Ukrainian publication(s) the Litvinenko allegations appeared (November 2005).

It is not the first time the Ukrainian press was used as a conduit for bogus information in tandem with the Berlusconi commissions.

by de Gondi (publiobestia aaaatttthotmaildaughtusual) on Fri May 9th, 2008 at 07:30:33 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Absolutely fascinating.

I think that SHVEZ, who took the material to the U.S., is probably the same person as Shvets who was the source of the disinformation about how Litvinenko died which was recycled uncritically in Tom Mangold's programme on BBC Radio.

by djhabakkuk (david daught habakkuk at o two daught co daught uk) on Sat May 10th, 2008 at 02:39:43 AM EST
[ Parent ]

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