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How would one go about explaining what oil prices have been doing and predicting where they might be headed next? This paper explores three broad ways one might approach this. The first is a statistical investigation of the basic correlations in the historical data. The second is to look at the predictions of economic theory as to how oil prices should behave over time. The third is to examine in detail the fundamental determinants and prospects for demand and supply. Reconciling the conclusions drawn from these different perspectives is an interesting intellectual challenge, and necessary if we are to claim to understand what is going on. In terms of statistical regularities, the paper notes that changes in the real price of oil have historically tended to be (1) permanent, (2) difficult to predict, and (3) governed by very different regimes at different points in time. From the perspective of economic theory, we review three separate restrictions on the time path of crude oil prices that should all hold in equilibrium. The first of these arises from storage arbitrage, the second from financial futures contracts, and the third from the fact that oil is a depletable resource. We also discuss whether commodity futures speculation by investors with no direct role in the supply or demand for oil itself could be regarded as a separate force influencing oil prices.
In terms of statistical regularities, the paper notes that changes in the real price of oil have historically tended to be (1) permanent, (2) difficult to predict, and (3) governed by very different regimes at different points in time.
From the perspective of economic theory, we review three separate restrictions on the time path of crude oil prices that should all hold in equilibrium. The first of these arises from storage arbitrage, the second from financial futures contracts, and the third from the fact that oil is a depletable resource. We also discuss whether commodity futures speculation by investors with no direct role in the supply or demand for oil itself could be regarded as a separate force influencing oil prices.
Take-home messages:
It means that they are far more dependent on oil, oil purchases representing a much larger share of their GDP, and that, as a consequence, prices have a much larger effect on their activity, a rise creating a much larger demand destruction aka recession. They don't have a output "surplus" they can reallocate to oil purchases that would allow them to weather a price increase for a long time while they switch to other sources by infrastructure changes as developed countries can do.
If oil prices stay high, we must expect a very, very deep recession in the bottom half of the world economic ladder. We'll hurt too but it'll be nothing compared to them.
Regarding the last point, don't see it as a superior "virtue" that "poor, frugal countries" would hold against "rich, wasteful countries". It doesn't mean that poor countries are more adaptable to high oil prices, quite the contrary. It means that they are far more dependent on oil, oil purchases representing a much larger share of their GDP, and that, as a consequence, prices have a much larger effect on their activity, a rise creating a much larger demand destruction aka recession. They don't have a output "surplus" they can reallocate to oil purchases that would allow them to weather a price increase for a long time while they switch to other sources by infrastructure changes as developed countries can do.
The idea was to look at net oil imports as a fraction of a country's GDP, as a measure of "vulnerability to oil price shocks". Also of interest would be a country's currency reserves as they can be used to access the oil market in an emergency "auction" situation. Nationmaster truly sucks as they don't seem to have updated their GDP data since 2005, so I partly resorted to wikipedia (NM's oil import/export data is still better, though). Of the countries for which I had net oil import data, the most vulnerable were Guatemala and Panama. So this confirms the idea that it will be poor countries that will suffer the most, as they don't have the resources to compete in the global oil auction that is upon us.
My contention to kcurie was that I expected south-east asia to fare worse than Europe or the US because they are now going through a phase of oil-based industrialization and they won't have time to complete it and reduce oil's share of their GDP before peak oil starts biting. For instance, Indonesia recently announced its intention to quit OPEC as it can no longer expect to be a net exporter. So I expected China to be more vulnerable than the US - the data seems to indicate that they're about as vulnerable, though. I also expected India to fare worse than China...
By the way, does anyone know an up-to-date and as complete as possible list of countries' net oil imports? When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done. — John M. Keynes
Also, I wouldn't expect it to be a linear relationship. Beyond a certain point essential services stop working, so catastrophic social failure is more likely than linear degradation.
For example - beyond $200/bl a small but significant proportion of commuters in the UK will no longer be able to afford to drive to work. Beyond $300/bl that starts to become a serious problem, and at $400/bl fuel costs for an average 10,000 miles/year - which is less than many commuter runs - will be between £350 and £1000 per month, depending on efficiency.
Which is not a good thing when the median income is around £24k.
For many of these runs, there's no alternative transport. Trains certainly aren't an alternative because they're already more expensive - never mind in the future. Buses are too intermittent or unavailable.
So - some people will buy hybrids or very efficient cars, some will buy motorbikes, some will buy mopeds.
And many will stop coming in to work altogether - which will happen all over the world, proportionally.
So a more realistic model would look at critical paths in the economy, rather than GDP as a whole.
I'd guess that's going to reveal some essential dependencies which aren't being considered seriously yet.
Trains certainly aren't an alternative because they're already more expensive - never mind in the future.
Why would their prices increase? Relatively speaking, they will soon look a lot cheaper. In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
Anyway, aren't the UK railways due for renationalisation soonish?
From earlier discussions (granted, of high-speed rail, not of commuter rail) it appears that as soon as you have two or three people per car they may become more energy efficient than rail. If all the energy is fossil carbon anyway...
Re: renationalisation, you'd need an Old Labour government. Give it 10 years, at least? When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done. — John M. Keynes
But the DfT literally has no clue about managing a railway - or anything else. Whitehall is full of neo-liberal drones, and I'd guess renationalisation is about as likely as Boris coming clean about being a secret Socialist Worker's Party mole.
The specification for the replacement for the UK's High Speed Trains - which are thirty years old, but a relative success - still includes a diesel option.
Whitehall doesn't believe in electrification. Electrification has been talked about for more than fifty years now, and it's still patchy and not planned for areas where it hasn't already happened.
But Whitehall does believe that hydrogen will save everyone. Since this is the same Whitehall which is costing its plans on the basis of oil costing $50/bl into the far future, competence doesn't seem likely.
As for car sharing - it's not a panacea when you have both workers and employers spread over a wide area. People often live on estates, and employers often live on trading estates and business parks, but there's no neat mapping between the two.
You'd get some savings that way, but it's not magically going to make the problem go away. It would also cause a lot of extra last-mile congestion as people swarm around dropping each other off.
Why not? Don't they all have "management" degrees?
On the driving thingy... how long do you have to drive to your nearest supermarket? When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done. — John M. Keynes
It's doable by bike if I'm feeling energetic and it's not cold and wet outside.
When I was without a car for a couple of weeks last year I did the public transport thing, and it reliably added a couple of hours to a round trip - about the same time for a bike, but not as wet.
I think that at this point you are selectively filtering evidence in support of a conclusion you've already arrived at.
I did a car share thing in one of my old jobs, I was always the one driving and it had to be done otherwise 2 of my colleagues would have been consistently late every day. So it worked in that sense but only because largely we did all need to be at work at the same time.
No, I think you're the one who hasn't made any effort at all to think this through.
The evidence is the stats which show that you'll get something like a 15-40% ride reduction with car pooling because it's impossible to get everyone from where they want to be to where they need to be without adding extra journeys and creating congestion at each end. And there are some journeys it doesn't work at all for. The real figure is likely to be around 30%.
Expecting 75% has no connection with reality, because the probability of someone near you doing a journey close enough to the one you both need to make it worth sharing - assuming perfect communication which guarantees you can find each other - isn't anywhere close to 1.
You can increase the probability by allowing larger 'compatibility areas' at each end, but as you do you're making the total journey longer, and the saving smaller.
Likewise with busses, which I'll leave as an exercise for the reader. (M4 corridor - 150 miles long - more than a million commuters a day - how many busses are going to be needed, and how will they be scheduled and organised?)
Could you give us a link?
it's impossible to get everyone from where they want to be to where they need to be without adding extra journeys and creating congestion at each end.
Congestion at each end? How in the hell? As for 'impossible', I'm no expert on car-sharing at all, except remembering occasions when one car transported both my parents to work and me and my two siblings towards three different schools; so I will only say I believe that car-sharing efficiency is a matter of organisation. Planning of the route, and coordination of how people spend their time. In the era of cell phones, that should not be difficult at all. (Thinking of more recent experiences, I don't drive nor have a cell phone, but on the rare occasions I hitch a ride, I was never left stranded...)
Well, as a start, as Migeru said: this is ridiculous, buses have a much larger passenger per route mile density... To continue, I don't think buses should take the bulk of it. (I'm of course thinking trains, and not a single line.)
But as a comparison for this traffic load: the 988 buses of the main Hungarian long-distance bus company Volánbusz carried 97 million passengers for a traffic load of 1708 million passenger-km in 2006. That's average trips of around 11 miles, and on average [weekends, holidays included] 266,000 daily passengers. I don't see a requirement of much more than 10,000 buses for the M4 as you describe from this.
As a high estimate, let's assume that all commuters have to be taken into town over the duration of the shortest bus trip, thus no round trips. With articulated long-distance buses (50+ seats), you'd need 20,000 buses. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
For many of these runs, there's no alternative transport. Trains certainly aren't an alternative because they're already more expensive - never mind in the future. Buses are too intermittent or unavailable. So - some people will buy hybrids or very efficient cars, some will buy motorbikes, some will buy mopeds. And many will stop coming in to work altogether - which will happen all over the world, proportionally.
My point is probably that The West™ is largely post-industrial already, and Francois just pointed out that still largely pre-industrial countries will not suffer much. But there is a large franction of the world's population who is now living in a bout of oil-fuelled industrialization and if that screeches to a halt, they-re the ones who are going to hurt. When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done. — John M. Keynes
The real difference is in the infrastructure (in the largest meaning, physical, intellectual) and in the modes of productions, which are CAPEX intensive in the WestTM - lots of money upfront but highly efficients on inputs (particularly, labor and energy) - and OPEX intensive in emerging/newly industrializing economies - cheap on upfront investments but very expensive on inputs, including oil, the way the WestTM was 50 years ago.
The country is so heterogeneous in conditions. A good part is not better off or even worse off than it was in the 80s and somewhat comparable to an India average while the other part is more in the situation of South Korea in the 70s, right smack in the eye of the cyclone of oil-fueled hyper-growth. So, which part of the country are we talking about?
But they also have a tradition of central planning which is actually a good thing for adapting infrastructure quickly (if the planners are smart) and a lot of cash reserves to burn through to smooth things out in the transition. So they may be OK at the cost of a huge trade deficit with oil producing countries.
And, of course, whenever talking about China, there's always the incoming great demographic clusterfuck.
I've read something very funny a few weeks ago about the booming comeback of camels in India as draught animals for farming. Replaced by tractors over the last decade but suddenly very much back in fashion. Long-scorned camel raisers are doing like bandits*.
My hunch is the vulnerability vs. development curve is more or less a bell, skewed towards high vulnerability in the middle half of the scale, with probably some bumps in the middle, with various stages where adaptation is more or less painful because of more or less invested in existing infrastructures so less or more to adapt.
I think overall Europe will do among the best: already adapted to high fuel costs through taxation, dense, highly industrialized hence capable to invest and rebuild its infrastructure where it needs to. I'm not too worried about the US either, no matter what Kunstler bleats about.
(* a good thing 'cause camels are just great, nearly as great as giraffes).
The other two unlabelled points above the line are microstates: Gibraltar and the Netherlands Antilles When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done. — John M. Keynes
I'm not saying that you are necessarily wrong, but I would dearly like to see a somewhat more convincing figure, because all that this one seems to show is that there is a powerlaw relation between GDP and oil imports.
- Jake Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.
Now, as anyone who has ever played poker will know, being on the unfortunate end of the statistical noise can be rather painful, so in that sense that observation is relevant. But I think that there are more convincing arguments to be made than a bad roll of the demographic dice, if we want to draw geopolitical conclusions.
When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done. — John M. Keynes
The upper-left corner contains countries spending an unusually large fraction of GDP on energy imports, and having relatively small currency reserves. These countries are not only exposed to the higher oil price risk but also don't have the hard currency to buy oil in the open market in an emergency. This category includes Moldova, Tajikistan, Eritrea and Luxembourg.
At the opposite end of the spectrum are countries with a relatively small fraction of GDP spent on energy imports, as well as relatively high currency reserves. These countries not only have a low economic exposure to oil prices but they have the reserves to shield the blow if necessary. This category includes China, Peru, Brazil and the UK (though I think since 2005 the UK has become more dependent on oil imports because of the decline in Scottish North Sea production, so it has moved up in the chart.
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