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Currency reserves may be important for a soft currency country worried about whether it can ride out a short term oil price spike, but its not an indication of ability to cope with ongoing high and rising oil prices. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
And what would be the proper indicator of the ability to cope with ongoing rising prices?
Anyway, the fact that China's reserves can buy 10 years' worth of its energy imports at current oil prices has to count for something. When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done. — John M. Keynes
Those foreign exchange reserves are not savings, they are a side-effect of policies to discount the yuan/renminbi. And that is the real key to the extra degree of freedom that the Chinese have in facing an oil price shock ... since they are forcing the buying power of their currency down now, they are free to permit the value of their currency to rise if they find that the benefits of a cheap yuan policy are outweighed by the problems caused by energy price inflation.
Its not easy trying to find a capability for response to changing conditions in configurations of values in the various external accounts and publicly available trade figures, because those are values from the systems operating under current conditions, and two economies could well function in a very similar way under current conditions, but still have quite different capacities to cope with a particular kind of financial stress.
Now, one good measure of one particular vulnerability to an oil price shock is foreign debt denominated in terms of foreign currency ... this was what hammered the Brazilians in the first oil price crisis.
But as far as a general measure ... I'd have to cogitate on that. Plus also read what other people are saying, of course ... the more grist for the mill, the better it works. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
Now here's an interesting question. Suppose China wants to continue increasing their energy use at a few percent per year, using its currency reserves if necessary. How fast and how high and in how much time would the price of oil go, and who else would be deprived of that oil given that global supply has peakedis in an undulating plateau?
What data do I need for that? Total energy use (or domestic production) as well as imports, but how about the demand elasticity of the oil price? When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done. — John M. Keynes
But its a balancing act, because allowing the value of the yuan to rise too far, too fast will undermine the position of Chinese exporters in overseas markets and cut into China's current account surplus, and China requires those exports in order to purchase a wide range of commodity inputs ... not just oil, but iron ore, natural gas, coal, aluminum, concrete, etc., etc.
"Spending its foreign exchange reserves" is reasoning as if foreign exchange reserves are a dragon's treasure in a cave, somewhere. That is, as if the FX reserves are something that is intrinsically valuable in its own right, as opposed to a standing future monetary claim on future international income flows.
"Spending from Foreign Currency Reserves" implies a massive change in China's FXR policy ... that is, something like a doubling of value of the (indirect) FXR of the yuan/renminbi, going on a rough, back of the envelope reckoning that the yuan/renminbi is at something like 1/4 of its purchasing power parity value, and if it were to operate under a dirty float it would be more like 1/2 of its PPP value.
You are using "spending a bit out of FXR" as if it is an incremental change from the current FX rate policy stance, when the incremental change is to ease up on the steep discount of the yuan renminbi by not accumulating Foreign Exchange reserves at quite the same rate. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
Currency reserves may be important for a soft currency country worried about whether it can ride out a short term oil price spike
IOW, you get large currency reserves as a side-effect of pursuing the neo-mercantalist policy of discounting the cost of your domestic resources in overseas markets by depressing your currency exchange rate.
The US, EU and Japan can't do that, because their's are the currencies that the neo-mercantalists are targeting. Its not possible for everyone to depress the value of their Foreign Exchange Rate against everyone else, because the FXR of currency B against current A is the inverse of the FXR of currency A against currency B.
A more useful 2-way breakdown would be net energy imports as a percentage of total current account inflows excluding energy exports, and current account outflows excluding energy imports as a percentage of total current account inflows excluding energy exports. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
The US, EU and Japan can't do that, because their's are the currencies that the neo-mercantalists are targeting.
Why surely? I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
And then there is this: How Japan financed global reflation
In 2003 and the first quarter of 2004, Japan carried out a remarkable experiment in monetary policy ? remarkable in the impact it had on the global economy and equally remarkable in that it went almost entirely unnoticed in the financial press. Over those 15 months, monetary authorities in Japan created ¥35 trillion. [...] The Bank of Japan gave the ¥35 trillion to the Japanese Ministry of Finance in exchange for MOF debt with virtually no yield; and the MOF used the money to buy approximately $320 billion from the private sector. The MOF then invested those dollars into US dollar- denominated debt instruments such as government bonds and agency debt in order to earn a return.
[...]
The Bank of Japan gave the ¥35 trillion to the Japanese Ministry of Finance in exchange for MOF debt with virtually no yield; and the MOF used the money to buy approximately $320 billion from the private sector. The MOF then invested those dollars into US dollar- denominated debt instruments such as government bonds and agency debt in order to earn a return.
Of course when the Japanese adopted a full accommodation monetary policy stance in the 90's, that resulted in a lower Yen (indirect) FXR, but that the way floating exchange rates are expected to work when a country has a sluggish economy and adopts a loose monetary policy.
Mind you, Japanese corporations went through a structural transition in the imported/domestic composition of their exports during the 1990's ... a major factor in the sluggish domestic economy in the 1990's ... so I guess someone could argue that they are embedding the neo-mercantalist monetary policy embedded in the Chinese and Southeast Asian into their exports via the imported component of their exports. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
Upshot is that they can - and do, as I can state from personal experience - make manufacturing/import/export decisions based on their analysis of the mid-term, relative financial trends between their domestic economies and those of their 'clients'. paul spencer
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