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Beware the bear trap
Britain, like most of Europe, is at risk of being the target of Russia's energy export weaponry

Yesterday, a "highly placed source" in Moscow was reported as saying the Kremlin intends to turn off the oil export pipeline to the EU on Monday, so great is Russian ire about the rhetoric in Brussels and warships in the Black Sea. If this is true, we are entering a whole new ball game in what has come to be called "energy security". Even if the report proves false, the west should be on red alert about energy export weaponry.

We've been fantaisizing so much about Russia's "energy weapon" that it's no wonder rumors about it abound. But the twist here is that Russia would cut oil rather  than gas.

The fact is, every single oil exporter has the "energy weapon" of withholding sales. in a tight globlal market, such supply reduction causes an immediate need for demand destruction, and thus price hikes.

But hey, let's join the Russia Is Evil fearmongering. It's fun!


Barely noticed in the runup to the crisis in Georgia, Russia signed a deal that gives its energy giant Gazprom control over gas supply from neighbouring Turkmenistan - one of three former Soviet satellite states around the Caspian sea on which Europe is pinning its hopes for a future gas supply. This Turkmen coup deepens Britain's possible energy dependence on Russia as North Sea production falls away.

Sigh. The Turkmenistan deal do not change a thing - no Turkmen gas can go anywhere but Russia, because that's where the pipelines go - and no other pipeline can be built, given that the one to Russia is not full (Russia can always undercut an outside buyer that has to incorporate the cost of a new pipeline in its price).

But Russia signs such deals ever year, and commentators get the vapors each time.


Coyly worded press releases on Gazprom's website shine a faint light on its Kremlin-driven machinations but stop short of illuminating the whole story. Gazprom is on its way to achieving dominion over Caspian gas, and the Kremlin is making overtures to the other states in the region, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. They in turn must be watching events in Georgia and wondering how they can refuse those advances.

Gazprom has ALWAYS had dominion over Capsian gas, and that cannot be changed. When will people get that?


At the same time, Moscow is cosying up to Beijing on energy and security: Russia and China signed an energy collaboration treaty before the G8 summit, and their armed forces have conducted joint exercises. Caspian gas may yet end up heading eastward, not westward. Gazprom has already threatened to withhold gas exports from Europe should Brussels try to stop it buying up European gas firms. Ten EU states are already largely dependent on Russian gas.

The obstacles to gas going to China from Turkmenistan are the same as those for Europe. In addition, people tend not to realize the distance gas needs to travel within China, in addition to the long distance from the Caspian - which adds to the price of gas for end-users, who usually have access to "cheap" coal as an alternative.

Gazprom has not "threatened" to withhold gas form Europe. it has said that it would fulfill all contracted sales, but would look to diversify its client base if Europe was so bent on diversifying its suppliers. If diversification is good for us, surely it is also good for Russia, right?


The Kremlin has a strategy to control a vast slab of the world economy via oil and gas. Dmitry Medvedev, lest we forget, used to run Gazprom. The Georgia crisis, if not a planned piece in the strategy, certainly fits. The EU intended to build a pipeline across the Caucasus, avoiding Russian soil, but the sudden unavailability of Turkmen gas, on top of war in Georgia, makes that unlikely now.

Again: Nabucco is not viable without Russian gas. Full stop. But the fiction that it might be is alive and well.


In the oil sector, all the major companies have been drawn into the Kremlin's new great game. Shell has lost majority ownership of its vast Sakhalin project; Total has been reduced to the status of a services company; BP seems on the verge of having 25% of its reserves expropriated by Russian oligarchs. Would it be too cynical to suggest they might be acting as proxies for a company formerly run by the president? A company, it must be noted, that is actually quoted on the London Stock Exchange.

Shell had always wanted to bring Gazprom into the project, and it got a fair price for the share it sold; it is still operator of the project because Gazprom does not have the requisite expertise to pull it off.

Total got a tough deal, but at least it got a deal. How many countries with oil are still open to oil majors? Maybe it's better to have a "service contract" than no contract at all?

As to BP, they're being outsmarted by cunning billionaires (note that this is not the first time it happened: their earlier purchase of Sidanko had a similar fate; only in that case, they were blamed for their naivety as much as the oligarchs that pulled it off were blamed; in this case, Putin makes a convenient outside scapegoat).


The UK, meanwhile, has no energy strategy, and what plans there are will not come to fruition before the end of the next decade, when it will be too late to escape the Russia trap. We should be urgently embarking on a national clean-energy mobilisation. The government should create investment conditions that allow City capital to flow into efficient-energy technologies that can be delivered in short order.

Ok, we're getting into safer ground. Leggett is much better on that side.

But there's a imple solution here: feed-in tariffs. It works everywhere it's implemented, and in Germany and Denmark, it brings benefits that are now bigger, in pure monetary terms (in the form of lower prices when wind blows), than it costs.


It is a strange kind of capitalism that takes pension contributions from people and invests them in an agency of a foreign power quoted on the LSE, despite the risk that pensioners will freeze because the foreign power delivers on threats to turn off the gas taps.

No need to blame the financial regulator - blame the energy regulator that encourages the construction of gas-fired power plants.

Of course, gas-fired power plants provide lots of jobs for financiers and, more importantly, for energy traders and M&A bankers; so maybe it is the financial regulation that is at stake...


We have technologies to rid ourselves of the need for gas. But we do next to nothing. Energy efficiency is low priority, and our renewable generators languish in cottage industries. Energy dependency could turn a new cold war red hot. Energy independence would allow east and west merely to trade insults. Let us start the independence movement in earnest, energy wise.

We'll still need Russian gas - just as they need our money. It is a fair trade. But if we had a decent energy policy, we'd need no scapegoats, and no need to put the blame for our failures on Russia.

It's a pity that Leggett, who sees the policy failures so well, cannot see the blame game here - he IS distracted.

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes

by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Sun Aug 31st, 2008 at 03:03:16 PM EST
Again: Nabucco is not viable without Russian gas. Full stop. But the fiction that it might be is alive and well.

Can't you fill Nabucco with Azeri or Iranian gas? Or Turkmen gas, when/if that export pipeline to Russia exports at full capacity and a new could be built across the Caspian?

It is a strange kind of capitalism that takes pension contributions from people and invests them in an agency of a foreign power quoted on the LSE, despite the risk that pensioners will freeze because the foreign power delivers on threats to turn off the gas taps.

As I've remarked before, nuclear power plants seems to be the perfect investment for pension funds and pension schemes. Very long time horizons, steady returns, large capital requirement... a marriage made in heaven.

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
by Starvid on Sun Aug 31st, 2008 at 03:41:49 PM EST
[ Parent ]
  • there's only 5-10bcm/y of Azeri gas that can be procured (no prodction to speak of beyond that, after taking into account local needs) - and it's already sold to Turkey;
  • Iran has huge reserves, but not much production capacity, relatively speaking - and most of the gas is used domestically (as reinjections to support oil production, or for domestic use). It has been unable to come to terms with the requirements of long term supply contracts. It has very little infrastructure going towards Turkey (and it's really hard to get them to build more, for various reasons. There is one pipeline, and one contract to Turkey, and supplies have been notoriously unreliable. so, not an option in the medium term, even without the context of the sanctions;
  • Turkmenistan does not have the productino capacity to fill up the Russian pipeline... it has been very difficult to negotiate with, making commitments to various parties that are obviously incompatible.


In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Sun Aug 31st, 2008 at 04:43:02 PM EST
[ Parent ]
  • Is the lack of Azeri gas because of a lack of reserves or because of a lack of investment? Because if it is the latter, we have a solvable issue. I haven't gotten the impression the Azeris are impossible people.

  • How much gas is Nabucco supposed to ship anyway? 50 bcm/y?

  • [Iran] has been unable to come to terms with the requirements of long term supply contracts.
    Why is this?

  • If the Turkmens for some reason become reasonable, do they have enough reserves to fill the unfilled pipeline and support Nabucco if enough capital was invested in their gas industry?


Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
by Starvid on Sun Aug 31st, 2008 at 04:58:45 PM EST
[ Parent ]
  • lack of reserves
  • current plans are for 30bcm/y
  • don't ask me. I suspect it is about losing control of the overall chain to a Western major (like on Sakhalin energy, Shell is still the operator of the project): majors are needed because the core requirement is not having enough money, it's having contractual credibility.
  • a big, overwhelming, if. But the answer would be yes.


In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Sun Aug 31st, 2008 at 05:34:43 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I'm curious about why there is such mainstream confidence, nay certitude, that Azeri gas would be able to fill Nabucco.

See this recent Reuters piece, also talking about Georgian transit issues and Baku's increased siding with Moscow/Gazprom: http://tinyurl.com/5axtg2

by MaBozza (greig.aitken AT gmail.com) on Mon Sep 1st, 2008 at 01:09:08 PM EST
[ Parent ]
this piece from EurActiv undercuts the Reuters piece, even if the headline masks that the project was kinda pie in the sky before the Georgia crisis


Nabucco: 'Pie in the sky' after Georgia crisis?


Steve Mufson of the Washington Post writes that one European oil company executive told him that the Nabucco project was simply "not a doable project because there is not enough gas to justify the investment," at least without Iranian gas coming into it. "The only thing that can make it viable is by using Iranian gas," the oil executive further elaborated, adding that otherwise it is a "pie in the sky." American policymakers, he said, "want to have their cake and eat it too. They want to keep Europe from using Russian gas and they want to keep Iran in a corner too".
by MaBozza (greig.aitken AT gmail.com) on Mon Sep 1st, 2008 at 04:01:16 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I know that the WaPo has to have an American angle, but WTF do "American policymakers" think they ought to have a stake in - much less a say in - European energy deals with those of our neighbours with whom we decide to maintain friendly relations for our mutual benefit?

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Mon Sep 1st, 2008 at 04:24:49 PM EST
[ Parent ]

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