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Perhaps I'm overstating it, but I think this is the abridged version of the Bush Administration's perspective on how we got into the financial mess we find ourselves in. You might ask why I focus on the ideas of the outgoing government. Well, it's because I'm confident that this will be a thesis pushed by some commentators eager to absolve previous policymakers of blame [1]. And indeed (as Mish points out), this view has apparently adherents in high places.
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Econbrowser: A New Meme: Blame It on Beijing (and Seoul, and Riyadh...)
Well, I think this last point leads us to my critique. Was it really sophisticated capital markets in the US, or a mania in which either agents made implausible assessments of future risk/return tradeoffs, or were engaged in "looting" the system by exploiting implicit guarantees and building up contingent liabilities for the taxpayers, that sucked in capital from the rest of the world. Three years ago, I'd surely have a difficult time convincing people that US capital markets weren't completely self-regulating and self-correcting. Maybe it's time to revisit the "saving glut" hypothesis, and say that perhaps capital "sucked" into America, rather than "pushed" into America. Even if one were to say that the excess saving from East Asia -- and the oil exporters as we enter 2005-08 -- drove the bubble (and I'm willing to admit that there is something to the argument that global imbalances exacerbated domestic imbalances, especially related to the housing sector), I have two big caveats. The argument that the saving glut led to low interest rates is not unambiguously accepted. [2], [3], [4], [5] [6] [7]. Consider Wright's work [pdf] on how the conundrum can be explained without resort to a central role for international factors (although he allows for some; see also this post). Also consider the correlation between low interest rates and the US current account. Below is a graph from a post two years ago. Figure 1: The Net Export to GDP ratio and the ten year constant maturity yield (end of quarter) yield minus the ten year ahead (median) expected CPI inflation rate. Source: FRED II and Philadelphia Fed. But, thinking again about exogeneity, why were funds flowing to the US. Some of it was low national saving. And why was that saving low? Because we were piling tax cuts upon tax cuts (admittedly I'm sounding like a broken record here: [8] [9]). But then add to this question why did the oil exporters start building up current account surpluses of enormous magnitudes? Because demand for oil rose in China, and the US (some observers conveniently ignore the US and focus on China, but it was adding substantial amounts of incremental demand up to 2005 or so). But some of that Chinese demand for oil was "derived demand", driven by US consumption of Chinese made goods.
Well, I think this last point leads us to my critique. Was it really sophisticated capital markets in the US, or a mania in which either agents made implausible assessments of future risk/return tradeoffs, or were engaged in "looting" the system by exploiting implicit guarantees and building up contingent liabilities for the taxpayers, that sucked in capital from the rest of the world.
Three years ago, I'd surely have a difficult time convincing people that US capital markets weren't completely self-regulating and self-correcting. Maybe it's time to revisit the "saving glut" hypothesis, and say that perhaps capital "sucked" into America, rather than "pushed" into America.
Even if one were to say that the excess saving from East Asia -- and the oil exporters as we enter 2005-08 -- drove the bubble (and I'm willing to admit that there is something to the argument that global imbalances exacerbated domestic imbalances, especially related to the housing sector), I have two big caveats.
The argument that the saving glut led to low interest rates is not unambiguously accepted. [2], [3], [4], [5] [6] [7]. Consider Wright's work [pdf] on how the conundrum can be explained without resort to a central role for international factors (although he allows for some; see also this post). Also consider the correlation between low interest rates and the US current account. Below is a graph from a post two years ago. Figure 1: The Net Export to GDP ratio and the ten year constant maturity yield (end of quarter) yield minus the ten year ahead (median) expected CPI inflation rate. Source: FRED II and Philadelphia Fed.
But, thinking again about exogeneity, why were funds flowing to the US. Some of it was low national saving. And why was that saving low? Because we were piling tax cuts upon tax cuts (admittedly I'm sounding like a broken record here: [8] [9]). But then add to this question why did the oil exporters start building up current account surpluses of enormous magnitudes? Because demand for oil rose in China, and the US (some observers conveniently ignore the US and focus on China, but it was adding substantial amounts of incremental demand up to 2005 or so). But some of that Chinese demand for oil was "derived demand", driven by US consumption of Chinese made goods.
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