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Role of the SPV To understand the role of the SPV, we need to understand why a corporation would want to raise funds via securitization rather than simply issue corporate bonds. There are four principal reasons why a corporation may elect to raise funds via a securitization rather than a corporate bond. They are: The potential for reducing funding costs To diversify funding sources To accelerate earnings for financial reporting purposes For regulated entities, potential relief from capital requirements We will only focus on the first of these reasons in order to see the critical role of the SPV in a securitization.2 ---- 2For a discussion of the other reasons, see W. Alexander Roever and Frank J. Fabozzi, "Primer on Securitization," Journal of Structured and Project Finance, Summer 2003, pp. 5-19.
To understand the role of the SPV, we need to understand why a corporation would want to raise funds via securitization rather than simply issue corporate bonds. There are four principal reasons why a corporation may elect to raise funds via a securitization rather than a corporate bond. They are:
Wikipedia: Frank J. Fabozzi
Frank J. Fabozzi is the Frederick Frank Adjunct Professor of Finance at Yale School of Management. He has taught at Yale University since 1994. Fabozzi, an investment management expert, is a Wall Street authority and editor of the Journal of Portfolio Management. He is a consultant to several financial institutions. He was inducted into the Fixed Income Analysts Society Hall of Fame in November 2002. He is also a Fellow at the Yale International Center for Finance.
Wikipedia: Special purpose entity
Often it is important that the SPE not be owned by the entity on whose behalf the SPE is being set up (the sponsor). For example, in the context of a loan securitisation, if the SPE securitisation vehicle were owned or controlled by the bank whose loans were to be secured, the SPE would be consolidated with the rest of the bank's group for regulatory, accounting, and bankruptcy purposes, which would defeat the point of the securitisation. Therefore many SPEs are set up as 'orphan' companies with their shares settled on charitable trust and with professional directors provided by an administration company to ensure there is no connection with the sponsor.
This is in the same league with accounting fraud. It is usually discovered after something bad like bankruptcy or embezzlement happens, and the forensic accountants go back and determine that, no, those accounts should never have been approved a few years back. The fact that they were doesn't remove the accounting fraud.
I am not a lawyer, a regulator or a forensic accountant, but to me, intentional skirting of banking regulation is clearly a crime.
I don't buy the personal failing of bankers angle. I don't believe in Sin. But if you follow the banking regulation and creative accounting thread you might eventually be able to point to a specific bank(er) and say "they made the decision to avoid regulation". Where does the buck stop when a bank decides to securitise for the purpose of avoiding regulatory capital requirements? Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
accountants who didn't do their job
Anyway, the banks were in a curious position, as exemplified by the famous quote
But Mr. Prince used an interesting metaphor to describe his company's situation as a major provider of financing for leveraged buyouts. "As long as the music is playing, you've got to get up and dance," he told The Financial Times on Monday, adding, "We're still dancing."
However, in this case the argument doesn't really hold water. Spanish banks were still posting double-digit year-on-year profit increases even with the regulatory damper of not being able to take assets off the balance sheet, as described by Gillian Tett above. So, banking executives could always have made the decision not to get into certain business lines. Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
Spanish banks were still posting double-digit year-on-year profit increases even with the regulatory damper of not being able to take assets off the balance sheet
So where was this money coming from? If they weren't having to resort to being highwaymen of the futures returns, is it a moralistic sleight of hand to disguise an indirect profit from other peoples schemes? Any idiot can face a crisis - it's day to day living that wears you out.
FT.com: Spain's banks weather credit crisis (Gillian Tett, January 31 2008)
According to Mr Ortiz, several years ago a clutch of Spanish banks discretely approached the Spanish central bank and asked permission to do what other international banks were doing at the time - namely set up networks of SIVs. However, Madrid took a dim view of this and demanded that Spanish banks post an 8 per cent capital charge against SIV assets. That essentially killled the business stone dead by removing incentives to create these creatures.At the time, this stance provoked predictable grumbles from Spanish financiers. After all, back then almost every other Western regulator was encouraging its banks to get their assets off the balance sheet as fast as you can say "Basel I".
However, Madrid took a dim view of this and demanded that Spanish banks post an 8 per cent capital charge against SIV assets. That essentially killled the business stone dead by removing incentives to create these creatures.
At the time, this stance provoked predictable grumbles from Spanish financiers. After all, back then almost every other Western regulator was encouraging its banks to get their assets off the balance sheet as fast as you can say "Basel I".
Either you take the view that there was fraud and then the regulators are guilty of collusion, or you take the view that there wasn't fraud because the regulators said so at the time, and then what you have is a case of criminal negligence on the part of the regulators. Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
Instead we'll lynch a few bankers and pretend the problem is solved.
Cunning.
As in:
Gaianne:
seizing the banks as criminal enterprises--which they are--freezing their activities, and seizing their cash on hand to re-open a government-managed series of commercial banks so that farmers can take out loans to plant crops THIS YEAR
Definitely fraud. Certainly actionable. It is just that the DAs and the Department of Justice do not WANT to prosecute. They have already been turned. The Fates are kind.
I hate being redundant, but, of course, it was buried in a thread and easily missed. So I repost.
Thank you for finishing the repost for me. The Fates are kind.
SPVs were shown to be fraudulent as used by Enron. That should serve as the basis for a prima facie assumption of the possibility of fraud for any case in which they are used by a bank to avoid scrutiny.
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