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Its posted over at Firedoglake

http://firedoglake.com/2009/03/21/james-k-galbraith-reponds-to-geithners-toxic-asset-plan/


"Once in awhile we get shown the light, in the strangest of places, if we look at it right" - Hunter/Garcia

by whataboutbob on Sat Mar 21st, 2009 at 02:00:07 PM EST
Here's the last part of his statement:


If I were a member of Congress, I would offer a resolution blocking Treasury from making the low-cost loans it expects to offer the PPIPs, until GAO or the FDIC has conducted an INDEPENDENT EXAMINATION OF THE LOAN TAPES underlying each class of securitized assets, and reported on the prevalence of missing documentation, misrepresentation, and signs of fraud. In the absence of a credible rating, this is the minimum due diligence that any private investor would require.

I hope what I'm driving at, here, is clear.

Sounds pretty clear, stay tuned...

"Once in awhile we get shown the light, in the strangest of places, if we look at it right" - Hunter/Garcia

by whataboutbob on Sat Mar 21st, 2009 at 02:02:21 PM EST
[ Parent ]
He is explicitly blowing the whistle - am I wrong, or could this blow up into something very big?

"Once in awhile we get shown the light, in the strangest of places, if we look at it right" - Hunter/Garcia
by whataboutbob on Sat Mar 21st, 2009 at 06:14:19 PM EST
[ Parent ]
It depends on whether congresscritters read firedoglake...

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Mar 21st, 2009 at 06:23:32 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I have a feeling there are going to be some faxes and emails going out from FDL...

"Once in awhile we get shown the light, in the strangest of places, if we look at it right" - Hunter/Garcia
by whataboutbob on Sun Mar 22nd, 2009 at 04:51:34 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Looking around for the meaning of "loan tapes" I found the following article at Huffintong Post:
...

The widespread claim that nonprime loan originators that sold their loans caused the crisis because they "had no skin in the game" ignores the fundamental causes. The ultra sophisticated buyers knew the originators had no skin in the game. Neoclassical economics and finance predicts that because they know that the nonprime originators have perverse incentives to sell them toxic loans they will take particular care in their due diligence to detect and block any such sales. They assuredly would never buy assets that the trade openly labeled as fraudulent, after receiving FBI warnings of a fraud epidemic, without the taking exceptional due diligence precautions. The rating agencies' concerns for their reputations would make them even more cautious. Real markets, however, became perverse -- "due diligence" and "private market discipline" became oxymoronic. These two documents are enough to begin to understand:

  • the FBI accurately described mortgage fraud as "epidemic"
  • nonprime lenders are overwhelmingly responsible for the epidemic
  • the fraud was so endemic that it would have been easy to spot if anyone looked
  • the lenders, the banks that created nonprime derivatives, the rating agencies, and the buyers all operated on a "don't ask; don't tell" policy
  • willful blindness was essential to originate, sell, pool and resell the loans
  • willful blindness was the pretext for not posting loss reserves
  • both forms of blindness made high (fictional) profits certain when the bubble was expanding rapidly and massive (real) losses certain when it collapsed
  • the worse the nonprime loan quality the higher the fees and interest rates, and the faster the growth in nonprime lending and pooling the greater the immediate fictional profits and (eventual) real losses
the greater the destruction of wealth, the greater the (fictional) profits, bonuses, and stock appreciation
  • many of the big banks are deeply insolvent due to severe credit losses
  • those big banks and Treasury don't know how insolvent they are because they didn't even have the loan files
  • a "stress test" can't remedy the banks' problem -- they do not have the loan files
More on "accounting/regulatory fraud" here and here.


Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sun Mar 22nd, 2009 at 05:54:31 AM EST
[ Parent ]
That's the dead wildebeest on the table - and the one place Obama isn't going to go.

The financial industry is a criminal enterprise. It's that stark, and that simple.

The more interesting question is why Obama is shilling for the industry.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Sun Mar 22nd, 2009 at 08:14:29 AM EST
[ Parent ]


Any idiot can face a crisis - it's day to day living that wears you out.
by ceebs (ceebs (at) eurotrib (dot) com) on Sun Mar 22nd, 2009 at 08:30:34 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The NYT article points out that pools of RMBS can be sold for about 30 cents on the dollar now. But banks are unwilling to sell for less than 60 cents -- either because they really think the loans will experience only a 40 percent loss rate, or because they fear that  acknowledging market value will put them into insolvency.  Which it might very well.
I remember reading elsewhere that the problem of the toxic assets is not lack of buyers but lack of sellers: the banks can't sell without becoming instantly insolvent.

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Mar 21st, 2009 at 05:57:48 PM EST
[ Parent ]
If I'm right and the mortgages are largely trash, then the Geithner plan is a Rube Goldberg device for shifting inevitable losses from the banks to the Treasury, preserving the big banks and their incumbent management in all their dysfunctional glory. The cost will be continued vast over-capacity in banking, and a consequent weakening of the remaining, smaller, better- managed banks who didn't participate in the garbage-loan frenzy.
This much is clear, bank bailouts protect first and foremost the management, then the shareholders, then the holders of junior debt, then the holders of senior debt, then finally (and unnecessarily given FDIC insurance) the depositors.

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Mar 21st, 2009 at 05:59:49 PM EST
[ Parent ]

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