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If I were a member of Congress, I would offer a resolution blocking Treasury from making the low-cost loans it expects to offer the PPIPs, until GAO or the FDIC has conducted an INDEPENDENT EXAMINATION OF THE LOAN TAPES underlying each class of securitized assets, and reported on the prevalence of missing documentation, misrepresentation, and signs of fraud. In the absence of a credible rating, this is the minimum due diligence that any private investor would require. I hope what I'm driving at, here, is clear.
I hope what I'm driving at, here, is clear.
Sounds pretty clear, stay tuned... "Once in awhile we get shown the light, in the strangest of places, if we look at it right" - Hunter/Garcia
... The widespread claim that nonprime loan originators that sold their loans caused the crisis because they "had no skin in the game" ignores the fundamental causes. The ultra sophisticated buyers knew the originators had no skin in the game. Neoclassical economics and finance predicts that because they know that the nonprime originators have perverse incentives to sell them toxic loans they will take particular care in their due diligence to detect and block any such sales. They assuredly would never buy assets that the trade openly labeled as fraudulent, after receiving FBI warnings of a fraud epidemic, without the taking exceptional due diligence precautions. The rating agencies' concerns for their reputations would make them even more cautious. Real markets, however, became perverse -- "due diligence" and "private market discipline" became oxymoronic. These two documents are enough to begin to understand: the FBI accurately described mortgage fraud as "epidemic" nonprime lenders are overwhelmingly responsible for the epidemic the fraud was so endemic that it would have been easy to spot if anyone looked the lenders, the banks that created nonprime derivatives, the rating agencies, and the buyers all operated on a "don't ask; don't tell" policy willful blindness was essential to originate, sell, pool and resell the loans willful blindness was the pretext for not posting loss reserves both forms of blindness made high (fictional) profits certain when the bubble was expanding rapidly and massive (real) losses certain when it collapsed the worse the nonprime loan quality the higher the fees and interest rates, and the faster the growth in nonprime lending and pooling the greater the immediate fictional profits and (eventual) real losses the greater the destruction of wealth, the greater the (fictional) profits, bonuses, and stock appreciation many of the big banks are deeply insolvent due to severe credit losses those big banks and Treasury don't know how insolvent they are because they didn't even have the loan files a "stress test" can't remedy the banks' problem -- they do not have the loan files
The widespread claim that nonprime loan originators that sold their loans caused the crisis because they "had no skin in the game" ignores the fundamental causes. The ultra sophisticated buyers knew the originators had no skin in the game. Neoclassical economics and finance predicts that because they know that the nonprime originators have perverse incentives to sell them toxic loans they will take particular care in their due diligence to detect and block any such sales. They assuredly would never buy assets that the trade openly labeled as fraudulent, after receiving FBI warnings of a fraud epidemic, without the taking exceptional due diligence precautions. The rating agencies' concerns for their reputations would make them even more cautious. Real markets, however, became perverse -- "due diligence" and "private market discipline" became oxymoronic. These two documents are enough to begin to understand:
The financial industry is a criminal enterprise. It's that stark, and that simple.
The more interesting question is why Obama is shilling for the industry.
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