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Very good diary, but some objections. I think that you're ignoring a few things in the Kosovo case.

  1. The marginalization of the moderates on the Albanian side wasn't simply a result of the KLA's actions, but of the Serb ones as well, or lack thereof. That is, the inability of Rugova's strategy to achieve any tangible progress.

  2. The belief that without a decisive intervention on the Albanian side, the KLA would continue their strategy of provoking the Serbian side. That combined with the full knowledge provided by Bosnia of how the Serbs would react meant you needed military control of Kosovo with a pro-Albanian stance.
by MarekNYC on Tue Mar 10th, 2009 at 02:51:43 PM EST
If you go to Rambouillet, where the Serbs agreed to leave Kosovo, then that is indeed a tangible result, which Rugova could have worked with. In other words, the Serbs capitulated.

Your point 2 essentially supports what I'm saying. Groups such as the KLA can--through force of arms--force other nations into humanitarian interventions, by riling things up so. Look at the PKK and Turkey. If Turkey were not so indispensable, if instead Turkey were on the opposite side of the ledger when it comes to alliances with the US, NATO, Europe, then the PKK would be an optimal lever for pressuring Turkey's foreign policy.

I also would not compare Bosnia to Kosovo so easily. In Bosnia, the problem was that the dissolution of Yugoslavia without accounting for ethnic divides (the large number of ethnic Serbs in the province) created a real mess. Albania was more uniform ethnically. The question is, what could/would the Serbs do in Kosovo? If you go by the level of fighting, the numbers of killed, it simply doesn't compare.

by Upstate NY on Tue Mar 10th, 2009 at 02:58:03 PM EST
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