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I see no case where Icelandic taxpayers should have to pay anything. In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
I see no case where Icelandic taxpayers should have to pay anything.
I couldn't agree more: the Icesave debt is pretty "odious" debt.
But whether debt is rightly due or not - and Hudson refers to Latvia's troubles as well - why cannot a sovereign state issue Units of National Equity carrying a dividend, rather than debt?
Other than the fact that this debt is the convention, of course.
I'd be interested on your thoughts in respect of that point, since we have recently seen both Nicholas Taleb (in the FT) and Willem Buiter (in his FT blog) recognising the point that since global debt is unsustainable, it is in a new approach to equity that the solution to the Credit Crunch must lie. "The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson
why cannot a sovereign state issue Units of National Equity carrying a dividend, rather than debt?
That concedes the point - the crucial point - debt of a private company is backed by the inhabitants of the country where that company is physically located.
There is a (weak) case to be made the inhabitants of the country are obligated for the debt their government contracted. There is no case for having them being obligated for a private company. She believed in nothing; only her skepticism kept her from being an atheist. -- Jean-Paul Sartre
I agree totally that socialisation of private losses is unacceptable, but unfortunately we are seeing government after government doing just that.
I propose that sovereign governments should be able to create unconventional undated Equity obligations, as well as conventional dated Debt.
This would change the dynamics of international finance in very interesting ways, with great potential, I believe. "The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson
Difference in orientation.
I'm immediately 'move to' (Read: obsess about) the Communication aspects of a situation/problem. Your experience and expertise is different thus, your concerns are different. She believed in nothing; only her skepticism kept her from being an atheist. -- Jean-Paul Sartre
What has been done will just prolong the pain and cause more collateral damage in the form of foreclosures and bankruptcies of other entities which would have survived otherwise. En un viejo país ineficiente, algo así como España entre dos guerras civiles, poseer una casa y poca hacienda y memoria ninguna. -- Gil de Biedma
To me, that means that whoever receives some sort of public guarantee, limitation of liability, or insurance, should actually pay something for it, if they are able. "The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson
FT.com | Willem Buiter's Maverecon | Ruminations on banking
(3) The repatriation of cross-border banking ... This means that conventional border-crossing banks and other systemically important financial institutions will become a thing of the past. We will not see the kind of cross-border branch banks that we have seen during the past decades for very much longer. These foreign branches are not independently capitalised, have no independent, ring-fenced sources of liquidity, are often effectively managed from the home country (the country of the parent bank), are regulated and supervised by the home country regulator and supervisor, with lender-of-last-resort support (if any) from the home country central bank and fiscal support (if any) from the home country Treasury. ... There will no doubt continue to be cross-border banking subsidiaries. These will, however, be independently capitalised. Their liquidity will not be pooled between parent and subsidiaries, but will have to be ring-fenced for each subsidiary. They will be regulated and supervised by the host country (as they often are today). Lender-of-last-resort support, if any, will be provided by the host country central bank (as it often is today) and fiscal support when insolvency threatens will be provided by the host country fiscal authority. The reason for host country supervision and regulation is simple: the pain is local, so the control will have to be local. The reason for host-country bail-outs is even simpler: tax payers are national. They will not accept the use of their taxes in bail-outs of foreign shareholders, unsecured creditors and counterparties. The US authorities have been able to channel somewhere between $40 bn and $50 bn of US tax payers' money to foreign counterparties of AIG, but that is unlikely to be the new status quo. They got away with it, thus far, because the foreign bail-outs by the US tax payer was hidden in obscure, indeed barely comprehensible financial transactions.
...
This means that conventional border-crossing banks and other systemically important financial institutions will become a thing of the past. We will not see the kind of cross-border branch banks that we have seen during the past decades for very much longer. These foreign branches are not independently capitalised, have no independent, ring-fenced sources of liquidity, are often effectively managed from the home country (the country of the parent bank), are regulated and supervised by the home country regulator and supervisor, with lender-of-last-resort support (if any) from the home country central bank and fiscal support (if any) from the home country Treasury.
There will no doubt continue to be cross-border banking subsidiaries. These will, however, be independently capitalised. Their liquidity will not be pooled between parent and subsidiaries, but will have to be ring-fenced for each subsidiary. They will be regulated and supervised by the host country (as they often are today). Lender-of-last-resort support, if any, will be provided by the host country central bank (as it often is today) and fiscal support when insolvency threatens will be provided by the host country fiscal authority.
The reason for host country supervision and regulation is simple: the pain is local, so the control will have to be local. The reason for host-country bail-outs is even simpler: tax payers are national. They will not accept the use of their taxes in bail-outs of foreign shareholders, unsecured creditors and counterparties. The US authorities have been able to channel somewhere between $40 bn and $50 bn of US tax payers' money to foreign counterparties of AIG, but that is unlikely to be the new status quo. They got away with it, thus far, because the foreign bail-outs by the US tax payer was hidden in obscure, indeed barely comprehensible financial transactions.
As a result of the current crisis, I expect that cross-border bank branches will become a thing of the past, and that the only cross-border subsidiaries we will continue to see will be independently and fully capitalised entities, regulated and supervised by the host country regulator and with recourse to the resources of the host country central bank and fiscal authority on the same terms as `domestic' banks in the host country, that is, host-country banks that are not wholly owned by some foreign bank. The Eurozone is in a bit of a pickle here, because although it has a central bank with supposed uniform access to its resources for all Eurozone banks, regulation and supervision remain national and fiscal bail-outs (recapitalisation by the state, guarantees, insurance, loans or whatever provided by the sovereign) definitely remain national. When the central bank acts as market maker of last resort, as the Banca d'Italia is now doing in the Italian interbank market, it takes on significant credit risk which requires a fiscal back-up - the Italian Treasury. But that undermines the principle of equal treatment of banking institutions across the Eurozone, and makes a mockery of the claim that general eligibility criteria for counterparties to national central banks "are uniform throughout the euro area". So there we are. If we are to avoid the balkanisation of the Eurosystem, and its degeneration into 16 national sub-systems, with different conditions of access to central bank resources, we will need some form of common European fiscal authority.
As a result of the current crisis, I expect that cross-border bank branches will become a thing of the past, and that the only cross-border subsidiaries we will continue to see will be independently and fully capitalised entities, regulated and supervised by the host country regulator and with recourse to the resources of the host country central bank and fiscal authority on the same terms as `domestic' banks in the host country, that is, host-country banks that are not wholly owned by some foreign bank.
The Eurozone is in a bit of a pickle here, because although it has a central bank with supposed uniform access to its resources for all Eurozone banks, regulation and supervision remain national and fiscal bail-outs (recapitalisation by the state, guarantees, insurance, loans or whatever provided by the sovereign) definitely remain national. When the central bank acts as market maker of last resort, as the Banca d'Italia is now doing in the Italian interbank market, it takes on significant credit risk which requires a fiscal back-up - the Italian Treasury. But that undermines the principle of equal treatment of banking institutions across the Eurozone, and makes a mockery of the claim that general eligibility criteria for counterparties to national central banks "are uniform throughout the euro area".
So there we are. If we are to avoid the balkanisation of the Eurosystem, and its degeneration into 16 national sub-systems, with different conditions of access to central bank resources, we will need some form of common European fiscal authority.
This means that conventional border-crossing banks and other systemically important financial institutions will become a thing of the past.
To which I respond, "so what?"
We will not see the kind of cross-border branch banks that we have seen during the past decades for very much longer
Good.
If a financial institution wants to become a presence in a country they can damn well follow the banking (and tax!) regulations of that country. She believed in nothing; only her skepticism kept her from being an atheist. -- Jean-Paul Sartre
The US authorities have been able to channel somewhere between $40 bn and $50 bn of US tax payers' money to foreign counterparties of AIG, but that is unlikely to be the new status quo. They got away with it, thus far, because the foreign bail-outs by the US tax payer was hidden in obscure, indeed barely comprehensible financial transactions.
And because they represent less than five percent of the total bailout theft...
- Jake Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.
If you have an account with a UK bank, building society or credit union then your deposits are covered up to £50,000. Banks from outside Europe are required to set up a UK subsidiary if they wish to operate in the UK and those subsidiaries have to be members of the FSCS, so your deposits there would also be covered. A more complicated situation arises if you have an account with a bank from somewhere in the European Economic Area (EU members plus Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein) in which case your bank may be covered by their home scheme.
Banks from outside Europe are required to set up a UK subsidiary if they wish to operate in the UK and those subsidiaries have to be members of the FSCS, so your deposits there would also be covered.
A more complicated situation arises if you have an account with a bank from somewhere in the European Economic Area (EU members plus Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein) in which case your bank may be covered by their home scheme.
The 'poor little Icelander' frame is ridiculous given that Iceland was just recently praised to high heavens for being one of the richest western countries, and the people who made their money running these scams are still sitting on it. The British and Dutch should ask for a share of expropriations from the Joly investigation...
The fact that Icelandic citizens have to pay up has to do with the actions of the previous Icelandic government, which decided to nationalise the banks and apply for an IMF credit rather than letting the banks and the country simply go bankrupt and wipe out the savings of Icelanders and foreigners alike.
The main principle here is discrimination. The Icelandic government saw fit to protect savers in Iceland itself but not foreign savers. This is not something you can do in an 'economic area' where your companies can operate abroad without subjecting themselves to the protection regimes abroad.
The British and Dutch are already letting Iceland off the hook for pragmatic purposes, they would be in a good legal position to ask for than what they are getting.
Trying to sort this out for myself, this statement confused me.
If Iceland had let the banks go bankrupt, would they not have had to pay for some savings anyway as deposit guarantees? And is deposit guarantees not exactly what the present conflict is about?
Another thing that confuses me is, what did the icelandic government do when they took over the banks? Did they a) put the banks into receivership? b) take over the stocks and continue running the operations? c) transfer the debt of the banks to the government?
If a or b they could still let the banks default on their debts, and if they need to start a new bank for those icelandic savings and loans operations. If c they are criminally insane, like their US counterparts. Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se
Or the Irish. En un viejo país ineficiente, algo así como España entre dos guerras civiles, poseer una casa y poca hacienda y memoria ninguna. -- Gil de Biedma
The situation is complicated by the position of so-called "wholesale" depositors. In the United Kingdom, 123 local authorities and other public bodies had a total of £920 million (1.1bn) deposited with Icelandic banks.[68] Even the Audit Commission, the independent body responsible for overseeing local government finances, admitted having £10 million deposited with Landsbanki and its subsidiary Heritable Bank.[69] In the Netherlands, 22 local authorities had a total of 220 million deposited in Icelandic banks,[70] with the province of North Holland being the most exposed. The complication is that both the UK and the Netherlands exclude local authorities and larger private corporations from their deposit insurance schemes, as is possible (but not obligatory) under Directive 94/19/EC, on the grounds that larger organizations should have more capacity to judge (and absorb) risk than the general public. Iceland makes a much more sparing use of this provision, so its definition of a guaranteed deposit is wider: "Deposit" [...] refers to any credit balance resulting from financial deposits or transfers in normal banking transactions, which a commercial bank or savings bank is under obligation to refund under existing legal or contractual terms. However, this guarantee does not extend to bonds, bills of exchange, or other claims issued by a commercial bank or savings bank in the form of securities. Deposits, securities and cash owned by Member Companies, their parent and subsidiary companies for their own account, and deposits, securities and cash connected with convictions of money-laundering, are not covered by the guarantee [...] - Paras. 3 and 6 of Article 9, Act No 98/1999 This means that Icelandic local authorities and corporations had their deposits (not including bonds) guaranteed at 100% by the Icelandic government, while British and Dutch organisations in the same situation had no cover whatsoever. The Dutch government was forced to use a royal decree to prevent North Holland from attempting to seize Landsbanki assets through the courts outside the Netherlands: speaking on 7 November, Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations Guusje ter Horst said "Their behaviour is hindering the difficult and complex discussions with the Icelandic government."[71]
The complication is that both the UK and the Netherlands exclude local authorities and larger private corporations from their deposit insurance schemes, as is possible (but not obligatory) under Directive 94/19/EC, on the grounds that larger organizations should have more capacity to judge (and absorb) risk than the general public. Iceland makes a much more sparing use of this provision, so its definition of a guaranteed deposit is wider:
"Deposit" [...] refers to any credit balance resulting from financial deposits or transfers in normal banking transactions, which a commercial bank or savings bank is under obligation to refund under existing legal or contractual terms. However, this guarantee does not extend to bonds, bills of exchange, or other claims issued by a commercial bank or savings bank in the form of securities. Deposits, securities and cash owned by Member Companies, their parent and subsidiary companies for their own account, and deposits, securities and cash connected with convictions of money-laundering, are not covered by the guarantee [...]
- Paras. 3 and 6 of Article 9, Act No 98/1999
This means that Icelandic local authorities and corporations had their deposits (not including bonds) guaranteed at 100% by the Icelandic government, while British and Dutch organisations in the same situation had no cover whatsoever. The Dutch government was forced to use a royal decree to prevent North Holland from attempting to seize Landsbanki assets through the courts outside the Netherlands: speaking on 7 November, Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations Guusje ter Horst said "Their behaviour is hindering the difficult and complex discussions with the Icelandic government."[71]
We might start wondering what this single market in the EU is actually about.
General regulation of finance is where the British government is a problem. Maybe the Dutch government too, although I don't really think so at the moment. So on a karmic or moral level I don't know about the British beef with Iceland. Legally, though, they are fully in their right to insist on equal deposit protection for their citizens.
The question is, which regulator and deposit insurance scheme covers a branch located in a foreign country? En un viejo país ineficiente, algo así como España entre dos guerras civiles, poseer una casa y poca hacienda y memoria ninguna. -- Gil de Biedma
The case relates to ING. ING has a subsidiary called ING Direct, which markets no-thrills, low-fees, at some time high-yield (but not so much so today) online banking services. The brand is operated worldwide, but the legal framework is not everywhere the same.
In France, ING Direct is a branch of the Dutch ING Direct. It is not a french-incorporated subsidiary, and it is not registered as an "établissement de crédit" at the Banque de France. It is only registered as a branch of a foreign bank from the EC.
As such, ING Direct.fr was NOT (and still isn't) covered by the "Caisse de Garantie des Depots" scheme (of 7Ok per depositor and per bank at the time, Sarko talked of raising it to 100k but I don't think it's actually in place yet). The website of CGD makes it very clear that depositors in such situations would have to file cross-border claims with the deposit insurance of the home country (The Netherlands in this case). At the time, the Netherlands offered only 20k per depositor in insurance (this has subsequently been made an EC-mandated minimum, but it wasn't even in place in the UK during the NR run).
EC does not mandate equal treatment in insurance for branches and subsidiary, nor for local or foreign banks. What it does mandate is that depositors from any EC country in a given bank, should be given equal treatment by all regulators concerned by a failure of this bank. Enrolment in deposit insurance may or may not be mandatory for cross-border operations, it is a mess. Pierre
Thus, the UK and the Netherlands paid the amounts above 20,887 to an amount equal to their domestic deposit insurance, but Icesave also paid insurance for those amounts.
In this particular case, then, the lack of clarity was not that harmful for depositors.
The question is whether something like the 'passport' system can be made mandatory by a national regulator, or if banks will just in general prefer it because having pointed out that your savings are insured to a lower amount than those of other banks is bad advertising.
Banks are special
aah, nice to see it written out so concisely.
reminds me of my old sig, 'lobbyists are people too'.
we mere mortals bow our heads at the new reality, counting ourselves fortunate to have representatives of such divinely mandated agents and entities deigning to sully their fine leather soles in our refuse-strewn streets.
good thing they hover 30 cm above the ground, but the smell must be terrible for their delicate olfactories.
what luck, they are gods amongst monkeys, special just begins to cover it. 'The history of public debt is full of irony. It rarely follows our ideas of order and justice.' Thomas Piketty
Banks are special aah, nice to see it written out so concisely. reminds me of my old sig, 'lobbyists are people too'.
the two interpetations of 'special' are orthogonal, not mutually exclusive or contradictory in this case.
the money-men's victory in this duplicitous gaming of the regulation process, and corruption of the legislature, risks bring our whole system to its knees, as almost happened last october, when the biggest bandaids in the planet's history were assiduously used to cover up the necrosis.
what will this october bring, i wonder? is that the whetting of a giant scythe i hear yonder?
as we see the first world's coherence dissolve into mumbo jumbo gibberish, perhaps it's worth remembering that to the billions suffering poverty, this is a levelling of the playing field, not some vengeful god's revenge, as it might seem to the paranoid wing of our societies, (creating the need for the islamic scapegoat). 'The history of public debt is full of irony. It rarely follows our ideas of order and justice.' Thomas Piketty
Icesave dispute - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The Directive imposes a minimum guarantee of 20,000 per depositor: moves to increase this minimum to 50,000 or even higher had been agreed politically before the Icelandic crisis, but had not been incorporated into EU law, much less into EEA law. The Tryggingarsjóður guarantees 1.7 million krónur on the basis of a fixed euro-króna exchange rate, equivalent to 20,887.[61] The Netherlands and the UK have higher guarantee levels, 100,000 and £50,000 (approx. 60,000) respectively: Landsbanki was a member of the Dutch and British compensation schemes for the purposes of guaranteeing this difference in cover, an arrangement known in Britain as the "passport system",[64] and commonly used by banks throughout the EEA. In addition, the UK Treasury has exceptionally guaranteed retail deposits in excess of £50,000 which were held in Icelandic-owned banks in the UK at the time of the crisis, at a cost of some £1.4 billion (1.7bn).
What am I missing? En un viejo país ineficiente, algo así como España entre dos guerras civiles, poseer una casa y poca hacienda y memoria ninguna. -- Gil de Biedma
In the Icesave case the government of Iceland is liable for the 20,887 for private deposits that it has settled for with the British and Dutch.
It could legally have been liable for more (the equal amount that it guaranteed for its own citizens and organisations), but since there is a settlement, that is no longer relevant.
As long as the UK hasn't put people in prison for fraud over this (and confiscated their assets - all their assets), the UK has no claim on Iceland's debt repayments - they have not shown any inclination to prevent similar frauds and pyramid scams in the future.
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