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But I would expect that in the long term, having nuclear used at 75% instead of 90% is still cheaper than a lot of baseload gas-fired power, and a lot better for the environment than the same capacity from coal-fired plants... In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
Could you write more about this? My understanding was that France could 'balance' big using its exports to Italy and Spain, and other than that, whole plants were powered down for longer periods of time; no regulation in 5-minute, 15-minute or even one-hour regimes. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
Maybe Pierre or Francois can comment if they are around... In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
The cheapest and cleanest way to fix the UK short term energy shortage is, as someone already suggested, to build pumped storage facilities and time shift French surplus night time generation to UK daytime consumption, since unused nuclear capacity is for all intents and purposes free electricity, but the problem is of course that the french will charge a non-zero amount of money for this, and it only goes so far, at some point the frogs will catch on and build their own electric mountains, forcing the UK to build their own nukes in any case.
(Honestly, financially speaking? Fuck wind. Costs too much per tonne of co2 displaced. Nukes and pumped storage is where its at.)
Now, in some places, it will be cheaper to build 110 % of average demand in wind, hydro, biochar, waste incinerators, solar or some combination of all the above options.
Nuclear simply isn't always cheaper pr. MWh, even when you include the load-balancing costs of wind and solar. In some places it will be cheaper, and in some places it will not be. It would, after all, be silly to suppose that any single power source is always and everywhere cheaper than everything else.
- Jake Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.
All costs of nuclear capacity are fixed, save fuel, and fuel costs essentially nothing.
Well, no:
Particularly not when you consider waste post-processing and final storage (which normally faces substantial cost overruns). And it is not altogether self-evident that current storage solutions can be scaled up arbitrarily without hitting a point of escalating costs, as they are every bit as dependent on limited geological resources as oil extraction is.
Oh, and uranium prices do not necessarily reflect the full social and ecological cost of extraction, when said extraction is done in third-world countries where both life and pollution are cheap.
And while we're at it, nukes also require idling backup plants, because you cannot expect to always be able to schedule maintenance in periods where the plants are not needed (and that's just the scheduled maintenance - any emergency shutdowns, which kinda by definition cannot be scheduled, come on top of this). Since nuclear comes in somewhat bigger chunks of generating capacity, it is not really self-evident that nuclear needs less backup capacity than wind.
And it is not altogether self-evident that current storage solutions can be scaled up arbitrarily without hitting a point of escalating costs, as they are every bit as dependent on limited geological resources as oil extraction is. Not in the slightest. Good enough bedrock is by no means rare. They are limited in the same way the global supply of gravel is finite. Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
Since nuclear comes in somewhat bigger chunks of generating capacity, it is not really self-evident that nuclear needs less backup capacity than wind.
Furthermore, because it comes in such large chunks, with such long lead times for installation nuclear is always behind or ahead of the demand curve and spends of lot of time stranded. Whereas, wind and solar can be added almost continuously with demand making them even more attractive.
Not installing wind turbines which will begin to be delivering power later in year one of the build-out on the promise that in four years the first power will begin to be delivered and in ten years you'll be getting close to your target is just a substantially different case to evaluate than not building wind turbines on the promise that in four year you'll be getting about the amount of power you want from nuclear. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
Furthermore, lead times need not at all be long. In a national effort with a solid competence base the plants will be built in about 5 years.
Four years is the minimum time to build one reactor.
We've gone from a statement that in the most direct reading suggests that all reactors desired may be built by a country "with a solid competence base" in about five years, so long as its part of a national effort, to one that makes it clear that four is an absolute bare minimum time to build one reactor.
Whether fifteen years is a long or short time, it is appreciably longer than five years. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
Wind makes less sense in France than elsewhere, given the given capacity, but that's certainly not true elsewhere. In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
Wind will not cut it. It is, simply, too fracking fickle.
Load balancing is an issue, but not an insurmountable one, as the Danish experience demonstrates. It will probably prevent 100 % wind penetration, but nobody within shouting distance of sanity will want to base their entire energy supply on a single set of technologies anyway...
The basic point I obviously did not communicate clearly enough is that when name plate capacity exceeds demand, actual production will also exceed demand on windy days.
This means that your total build of wind capacity cannot exceed a nameplate capacity equal to your base demand unless you are willing to throw part of your electricity production away, or have a way to store that surplus.
And the gap between average output and nameplate capacity always gets filled by gas.
Thus a decision to rely on wind, is in fact a decision to rely mostly on gas, with some wind power thrown in, and this will hold true until the day someone invents a battery far beyond anything we have.
I am and I do.
The point which I have apparently repeatedly failed to get across is that even including the pumped storage facilities and the losses on windy days a good wind location will provide cheaper MWh than nuclear plants.
Pumped hydro. Gravitational potential energy is the lowest-loss energy storage known to man.
Eh, well, it appears you are wrong. At least in europe. The eocd, EU, and IEA studies I just googled again to check, all site prices per kwh for new nuclear a bit below that of wind, and while both wind and nuclear really do require pumped storage for optimal operation, the storage needed for nuclear should be much smaller, and thus cheaper than that needed for wind. The numbers I can find for the US look a heck of a lot more favorable for wind than the european ones, I will freely grant, but we have neither a great plains to place windmills on, nor a legal system that allows opponents to increase capital costs via nusiance lawsuits.
There are extant examples of wholly carbon free electricity grids. They all rely on favorable geology (hydro, geotermal) and nuclear. And these technologies can be scaled up to meet a future with very high electricity demand, so these are the technologies we should deploy. We know this will work, because it already does. In this context, wind is, basically, nothing but a distraction. The concrete in the bases would be better poured into containment domes, and the steel better used in pressure vessles.
(note that I am not really a fan of the extant nuclear industry either. Its not ambitious enough, by far. We need to increase our build rate by orders of magnitude)
double plus good... 'The history of public debt is full of irony. It rarely follows our ideas of order and justice.' Thomas Piketty
"doing some good", "gradual improvements", "20 % decrease in carbon emmisions"- all these are things that strike me as "Not fracking good enough". Carbon has to be entirely removed from electricity production, because nothing can really be done to clean up transport, industry or heating without clean electricity.
Then I flatly fail to comprehend why you take issue with wind and solar. To achieve that target - which seems like a sensible and responsible thing to do - you'll need to mobilise a considerable fraction of our industrial capacity. Ignoring an entire class of energy technology strikes me as a poor way to mobilise industrial capacity swiftly.
any decrease in electricity consumption your gain from more efficient appliances and tvs, ect is going to evaporate when you plug in your electric car to your mains
Cars are never going to be economical for bulk transportation over middling to long distances. The thermodynamics favour rail and water too massively for that. So no, there will not be a massive migration to electrical cars. There will be a considerable migration to electrical trains, but they are more energy-efficient than cars pr. person-km and ton-km. By around an order of magnitude...
not to mention what asking industry to burn as little gas and coal as possible will do to demand.
Presuming that industrial production continues at its present pace and energy intensity. Which is a dubious assumption, since we are entering a century of widespread raw material scarcity (not just energy, though that is certainly the most pressing constraint).
And, frankly, much of what is being produced is worthless garbage that we would be better off without.
The International Energy Agency (which I'd described as mildy pro-nuke, and mildly anti-wind) provided this in its 2007 outlook:
So: fairly comparable costs for wind and nukes.
French numbers (by the DGEMP) tend to be lower, but French numbers are critically dependent on public or quasi-public cost of funding for the investment - and using such cost of funding for wind would also do wonders for its cost (and thus my recommendantion to do such public funding in both sectors).
Altogether, I'd say that well-run, publicly funded nuclear MWh are somewhat cheaper than wind, but the range for nuclear cost, both for uncertainty and to discount for less-well run organisations, is much higher for nuclear. In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
firstly, as you scale up wind to a bigger proportion of the grid, the quality of your sites degrades quickly
So what? That's an argument against trying for 100 % wind, which is a crude straw man that nobody is defending.
You propose a 0/0/80/20 mix.
I tell you that this is unlikely to be economical, and is susceptible to all the normal risks of monocropping vis-a-vis systemic failures.
A 80/0/0/20 mix is equally unlikely to be economical, but that is irrelevant, because no sane person proposes this mix. Personally, I could see a 45/25/10/20 mix, if solar matures rapidly, or a 45/10/25/20 mix if it does not. Give or take ten to twenty percentage points.
Alternatively, one can consider the marginal cost of adding capacity. Since nuclear has already harvested all the economies of scale that are likely to apply, you are facing constant or increasing marginal cost as you add nuclear to the energy mix. Wind has harvested much but not all of its economies of scale, so for a while you're going to see declining marginal cost before they start going up again.
Now, in any scenario where you have two or more factors of production that all have constant or rising marginal cost, it makes sense to diversify. This is really, really simple arithmetic...
There is an issue around nuclear power: some people see it in terms of cost benefit analysis and some simply believe that the risks are such as to exclude it - they effectively belief the costs are unbounded. You can't solve that by talking about cost.
Two problems with this: firstly, as you scale up wind to a bigger proportion of the grid, the quality of your sites degrades quickly, and this is really bad for their economics (this is why nearly all current danish build is at sea or replacement of existant turbines, all quality sites are in use) Secondly.. Eh, well, it appears you are wrong. At least in europe. The eocd, EU, and IEA studies I just googled again to check, all site prices per kwh for new nuclear a bit below that of wind, and while both wind and nuclear really do require pumped storage for optimal operation, the storage needed for nuclear should be much smaller, and thus cheaper than that needed for wind. The numbers I can find for the US look a heck of a lot more favorable for wind than the european ones, I will freely grant, but we have neither a great plains to place windmills on, nor a legal system that allows opponents to increase capital costs via nusiance lawsuits.
1. Quality of sites degrade quickly, using tiny Denmark as an example? Straw man AND false. Of course in Europe coastal sites have stronger mean annual winds, but "degradation" doesn't equal unviable. Long-term cost of energy calculations for wind include the less productive inland sites, which also have lower O&M costs. Secondly, the industry has developed a generation of multi-megawatt scale turbines to take advantage of inland winds, with shifted power curves and larger rotors. Third, even in northern Germany, so-called packed, there's enough virgin sites remaining for years of intense build-out. The situation is actually a socio-political one, solved as people become more at ease living with windparks.
There is barely a replacement industry in Denmark, and it's because of government policies, not lack of sites. Reality is the political and utility will has CHOSEN to go offshore, partly because we need to anyway, but also to avoid the socio-political issues. And inland sites don't have "bad economics" when properly sited, simply not as good as coastal areas, which have other mixed use problems. Further, for those who constantly analyze actual data, a significant portion of "degradation" comes from poor siting, which is easy to remedy.
US costs "heck of a lot more favorable for wind than European ones?" Europe and the US both have a wide mix of wind resources, even if the Great Plains is the US's Saudi Arabia. When one factors in proximity to load, transmission issues and grid upgrades, and distance in general, Europe has it all over the US. Further, turbines in Europe are currently 2-5% more efficient than when the same turbines are placed in the US, when adjusting for wind differences. This is because of turbulence (minor) and infrastructure (major.) The European infrastructure advantage will disappear over time, but turbulence issues will remain.
Bottom line on costs, as Colman pointed out, I'm one who uses the costs that are current, knowing that there's a huge margin of error remaining. In the case of nuclear, it never goes down, and no one can yet assume externalities are properly accounted for.
5. "increase capital costs via nuisance lawsuits?" Wave your true colors here, Thomas. We're not talking about customers not knowing how to hold a cup of hot coffee. We're talking about the right of the citizenry to demand true accounting, and science-based environmental impact statements which include real assessment of externalities. That's only a nuisance in dictatorships, or perhaps centralized control of power generation. Say what you will, the nuclear industry has been guilty of lying and malfeasance throughout the world, on a major scale, to this day. It's even too soon to know if France is the exception or not, but everywhere else in the world the evidence is in, and the track record of deceit is appalling. Every month for the past three decades another example of lies and cover-ups is reported, the latest being yesterday's fine to Babcock and Wilcox for not reporting an emergency according the US NRC regulation.
Given the half-lives involved in the technology, calling what remains of the system of legal redress a "nuisance" denotes a certain lack of reality in your viewpoint, or at best a world view needing some enlightenment.
Though you won this round, as I spent over nearly three hours reading and writing here, when i should have been focused on reality. "Life shrinks or expands in proportion to one's courage." - Anaïs Nin
Adressing a few of your points: I include pumped storage because I am in no way interested in what the cost of a given energy source is in a grid that loadbalances with natural gas. I consider natural gas burning for power a grossly unacceptable waste of a valuable resource, a irresponsible risk to the climate, and absurdly expensive. With current technology, that means supply-side loadbalancing has to be done with hydro or throtthling of nukes. If we invent a cheaper solution for energystorage, that would be wonderful, but its not really relevant for generation.
The US economics are more favorable because the US is less densely populated, which means that all else equal, it has more good wind sites per capita. Mackay made a very illustrative graph about this, sec.. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/29/business/energy-environment/29iht-sustain.html
Increasing nuclear cost via nusiance lawsuits was, and remains, an explicit strategy of american anti-nuclear activists. They do not hide or deny this. I can go qoute hunting, but it isnt very relevant for a discussion of global energy strategy as it is simply an unique economic hazard specific to the US nuclear industry, and equating it to due dilligence hearings in europe or elsewhere would be wholly false, in either direction.
Externality studies are an obsession of mine, and ExternE is in fact what converted me to a nuclear advocate, because it put numbers on exactly how much damage our current, coal and gas based grid is doing year in, year out. Every coal plant in operation is a slow-motion disaster. and looking at the actual methods used, arguing with a straight face that these studies are in any way lowballing the damage of nuclear is impossible. There are uncertainties, yes. But they are of the "we have no good feel for how much we are overstating the danger of nuclear here". kind.
.. Waste heat ecological impact? Ehh.. there is one. Any heat engine of this size is going to heat the water body it uses for cooling, which shifts ecological balances of which species thrive in that strech of water. For plants near the sea, this essentially doesnt matter, because the sea is too big a heat sink to affect, and if you are directly replacing a coal plant with a nuke plant in the same location, it doesnt matter either, since after decades of operation, the local water system will have adapted to the warmer water, and removing the heat source would be the disruptive act. This is not, in general, a very worrysome type of enviormental impact, however. as the footprint is minute, and non-toxic.
Disallowing nuclear power is not the only conscious political choice Denmark has made. Disallowing new wind farms is another conscious political choice. Banning congestion charges is another conscious political choice. Building two new highways every time we do maintenance on one railway line is a conscious political choice.
So let's not pretend that Denmark is an example of a wind/conservation strategy. That was almost true in the 90s, but elections have consequences. Specifically, the election of the current crop of anti-wind, pro-car, anti-conservation, neoliberals had disastrous consequences.
Thomas' position is not unusual, including his tone. Do you remember Ustenzel? En un viejo país ineficiente, algo así como España entre dos guerras civiles, poseer una casa y poca hacienda y memoria ninguna. -- Gil de Biedma
So, irrespective of the cost to Danish generators (and you should be happy about coal-plants oweners losing money, right?); it's a positive to Danish consumers and taxpayers.
3) that's an argument not to do anything. In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
The energy debate in Denmark post the 70s oil crisis was explicitly between a bet on nuclear and a bet on renewables. Looking at the actual consequences of the choice made, when compared to the people who came down on the other side of the fence, IE: Sweden, France, the wrong side won in Denmark.
The decisions not to expand wind further in denmark have a hell of a lot to do with the costs of loadbalancing it.
The decision not to continue expanding wind in Denmark has nothing to do with engineering and everything to do with the fact that Fogh and that useful idiot he installed as minister for the environment hated Sven Auken's guts. Therefore, any project that Sven Auken liked was bad simply by virtue of the fact that Sven Auken liked it. Sven Auken liked wind. Therefore, wind was bad.
(Yes, for more than half a decade, Denmark based our policy in a vital strategic sector like energy supply on "not invented here" and personal animosity towards the outgoing administration. Yes, Danish right-wing politicians really are that petty and stupid.)
efficiency is shiny, but it tends to induce jevrons paradox effects
Only under laissez-faire. In a properly managed industrial production economy, there is nothing which prevents you from adjusting product taxes to compensate for lower cost.
And as far as heat and electricity goes, Jevron's effects are minor to negligible, because heat and electricity are infrastructure, not consumer goods.
If mankind is still about in a thousand years, noone is going to be dying from cancer
And by 2010, we'll have nuclear-powered airplanes. Oh, wait...
Are you open to changing your views when confronted with evidence, i am.
But i'm betting you have some better goal in life, and that tech support is not it, it's just a job for now. What do you want to be doing in ten years?
Poor phrasing, yeah, grant you that. "Life shrinks or expands in proportion to one's courage." - Anaïs Nin
Yeah, right, just in your previous comment you were questioning his motives. En un viejo país ineficiente, algo así como España entre dos guerras civiles, poseer una casa y poca hacienda y memoria ninguna. -- Gil de Biedma
We have a lot of arguments to defend the qualities of wind power and critique some of the claims made by Thomas, so let's focus on these rather than on ad hominems. While partial to nuclear, Thomas' arguments are rational and follow traditional lines that we are all-too-familar with, so let's just respond as we know we can rather than question his motives or good faith.
Don't forget that even within the wind industry, many of the points we regularly make here on ET are not that well known (such as the size of merit-order effect on prices of wind). In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
i think i'll just leave it alone. "Life shrinks or expands in proportion to one's courage." - Anaïs Nin
3. efficiency is shiny, but it tends to induce jevrons paradox effects, so I dont trust it as a solution to AGW. Better energy efficiency will make mankind richer, it will only reduce actual energy use if future generations behave in ways no past generation of mankind ever has, and use machines less while they get cheaper to use.
The Jevons paradox goes beyond a normal division of the gains of efficiency between demand and supply to an increase in quantity demanded of the final product exceeding the efficiency gain.
However, where Jevon first observed it, it was in a market for a product where large numbers of low income consumers faced a tight budget constraint, and reduction of the price of coal-fired heat allowed switching to coal burning furnaces from, eg, wood.
Its a common abuse of the Jevon's paradox itself, as well as the far more common cases where Jevon's effect does not apply but the reduction in consumption of the input is less than the efficiency gain, to take it from arguing against sole reliance on efficiency gains - the techno-cornucopian position - to arguing against the benefit of pursuing efficiency gains at all.
We already know that efficiency gains alone are not going to be enough, because as we mine the easiest to reach inefficiencies, the result is a more efficient system with less inefficiency to be mined.
But that is no argument against replacing policies that support and encourage inefficient energy use with policies that support and encourage more efficient use. Its just an argument that efficiency on its own is not sufficient. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
Demonstrably, utterly false. Why do you keep pushing this fantasy? The policy decisions of the Fogh cabinet (which I listed in a previous comment, and which you didn't deny but switched to criticise the present policy of parties) and their justifications are well known, as are their effects. And it is also well known that the Danish public utilities themselves prepared studies already back then showing that wind with 50% grid penetration can be easily be integrated in the current grid.
Gas has to go.
Yes, and before it, coal. While gas plants are less CO2 intensive and cheaper for load balancing than coal or oil, on the long run we need CO2-free peaker plants/energy storage, whatever will provide baseload. Now: are you advocating inaction on baseload until 100% replacement of peaker plants is possible?...
wind is a less appropriate technology in tokyo than it is in Texas
This is not an argument but flashy rhetoric. Europe is not one single megapolis like Tokyo, and suburban sprawl USA (including large swathes of Texas) is not a wilderness area like you imagine Texas. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
If those lawsuits are without merit, and the activists lose them, then it's the activists' costs that increases, not that of nuclear. If the lawsuits are with merit, then what exactly are you complaining about? They are only turning externalities into internalities. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
What deterred US nuclear build for decades had little or nothing to do with activist tactics, rather cost and safety issues, as well as little utility desire to counter the prevailing zeitgeist. Add to that the ease of developing various nat gas, because of artificially low fossil prices, and ease and cost of financing.
Please feel free to rejoin reality at any time. "Life shrinks or expands in proportion to one's courage." - Anaïs Nin
If those lawsuits are without merit, and the activists lose them, then it's the activists' costs that increases, not that of nuclear.
Not necessarily. Not all American states have anti-SLAPP statutes on the books, and the winning side is not always awarded compensation for their costs.
Sigh. That was the nighties. Then came the naughties, and Anders Fogh Rasmussen made sure to change the credits system so that on-shore installations practically stopped (they only had a second boost thanks to a time-limited repowering programme, which proveed uncomfortably successful for the government); and he halted the projecting of the next off-shore farms in the schedule made law by the previous SocDem government, with the excuse that Denmark already reached the foreseeen share of renewables. (Yes, projecting began again five years later, but you'll see its effects on Denmark's CO2 emissions only in the coming years.) *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
(I watched bits of connie hedegårds confirmation hearing this morning. Depressing as fuck, as she was standing by the danish consensus on energy policy, and it is a consensus that has failed to deliver)
SF has a coal phaseout policy.
Now, if you subscribe to the theory that SF is firmly installed in S' back pocket, that doesn't matter. But if you subscribe to that theory, you really rather need to take a look at the last EP and municipal elections...
Don't mix past and present. I don't know what the parties current plans are, but the overall failure over the past decade can be blamed 100% on Fogh. The previous SocDem plan was all-out. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
have a way to store that surplus.
that's where the electric cars in everyones' garages come in, topping up all night long.
or have downtown daytime charging stations for all the office workers' parked cars, that themselves are charged up during the windy nights.
having 300% of nameplate would also lower the price to the public, no?
lowered tax revenue from utilities' lower income could be boosted in compensation, by schemes like industrial locations to attract new business investment in low footprint businesses, offering extra low electricity rates, especially for night time automatised production facilities.
i don't see why a simpler, lower-tech version could be offered to small, poor countries with wind too, with weights lifted through electrical power at night, left to descend during the day, and geared to turbines that would charge transport batteries or generate current for daytime use on windless days.
all the shoreline communities with exposure to the trade winds would qualify, i imagine.
in a planet that is moving into a more active seismical cycle, might it not be foolish to think we know the future costs of storing nuclear waste are going to remain stable? 'The history of public debt is full of irony. It rarely follows our ideas of order and justice.' Thomas Piketty
in a planet that is moving into a more active seismical cycle
What?
i installed that quake extension for firefox, it is quite eye-opening, though i set it low at 3.
i'm not that far from l'aquila, and in a 400 year old house, so i do think about it a lot.
i don't have the stats, do you?
the fact that it's prophesied by numerous seers from many cultures is not adding to my concern, at least on a conscious level, lol.
try the extension, the popups are interesting enough as you realise how much rocking is going on globally.
when the screen starts shaking, (local quivers), as it has the last two days in a row here, i start coiling my muscles, ready to spring somewhere safe(r).
i know science can't predict earthquakes very well yet, but it's getting good at linking the information. having indonesia and l'aquila last year, and haiti this year may be no formal trend, but it's walking and quacking, i'll be thinking about statistics i'm sure as i leap from a window!
ireland is unusually blessed with stability in this regard... 'The history of public debt is full of irony. It rarely follows our ideas of order and justice.' Thomas Piketty
It sounds like you're saying that because you're more aware of quakes there must be more of them, which would be bullshit. I assume that's not what you mean.
Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. En un viejo país ineficiente, algo así como España entre dos guerras civiles, poseer una casa y poca hacienda y memoria ninguna. -- Gil de Biedma
Are Earthquakes Really on the Increase?
Are Earthquakes Really on the Increase? We continue to be asked by many people throughout the world if earthquakes are on the increase. Although it may seem that we are having more earthquakes, earthquakes of magnitude 7.0 or greater have remained fairly constant. A partial explanation may lie in the fact that in the last twenty years, we have definitely had an increase in the number of earthquakes we have been able to locate each year. This is because of the tremendous increase in the number of seismograph stations in the world and the many improvements in global communications. In 1931, there were about 350 stations operating in the world; today, there are more than 8,000 stations and the data now comes in rapidly from these stations by electronic mail, internet and satellite. This increase in the number of stations and the more timely receipt of data has allowed us and other seismological centers to locate earthquakes more rapidly and to locate many small earthquakes which were undetected in earlier years. The NEIC now locates about 20,000 earthquakes each year or approximately 50 per day. Also, because of the improvements in communications and the increased interest in the environment and natural disasters, the public now learns about more earthquakes. According to long-term records (since about 1900), we expect about 17 major earthquakes (7.0 - 7.9) and one great earthquake (8.0 or above) in any given year.
We continue to be asked by many people throughout the world if earthquakes are on the increase. Although it may seem that we are having more earthquakes, earthquakes of magnitude 7.0 or greater have remained fairly constant.
A partial explanation may lie in the fact that in the last twenty years, we have definitely had an increase in the number of earthquakes we have been able to locate each year. This is because of the tremendous increase in the number of seismograph stations in the world and the many improvements in global communications. In 1931, there were about 350 stations operating in the world; today, there are more than 8,000 stations and the data now comes in rapidly from these stations by electronic mail, internet and satellite. This increase in the number of stations and the more timely receipt of data has allowed us and other seismological centers to locate earthquakes more rapidly and to locate many small earthquakes which were undetected in earlier years. The NEIC now locates about 20,000 earthquakes each year or approximately 50 per day. Also, because of the improvements in communications and the increased interest in the environment and natural disasters, the public now learns about more earthquakes.
According to long-term records (since about 1900), we expect about 17 major earthquakes (7.0 - 7.9) and one great earthquake (8.0 or above) in any given year.
Also, some stats here.
The stats are interesting - numbers for catastrophic quakes remain relatively constant, very small earthquake numbers have dropped, and there was a trend and spike for mid-sized earthquakes that peaked in 2008.
I'm not totally convinced that was an effect of improved monitoring. You'd need to check info about the total number of monitoring stations to know for sure.
This was 2000 to 2010 only. Numbers for previous decades are available, if anyone wants to dig through them.
apologies to all for not being fact based, and thanks to Colman for calling it out. 'The history of public debt is full of irony. It rarely follows our ideas of order and justice.' Thomas Piketty
In the larger cities of most low income countries (and in most low income countries, electric grids are most commonly in place in the larger cities), the excess in demand over supply capacity is addressed by system wide brown-outs and rolling black-outs, and as a result, there is widely dispersed energy storage to cope. If substantial wind capacity is added, the intermittent brown-outs become less frequent, as does the number of days per month that any given neighborhood is blacked out. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
The obvious hole in the logic is that no one - not even Jerome - is suggesting that wind should supply 100% of average power.
The less obvious hole is that if you apply simple conservation strategies - insulating houses and buildings, adding smart distribution systems, hanging people who buy kw plasma TVs from lamp posts, forcing everyone who works on Wall St to get a proper job - the required average load can be decreased significantly.
Add microgeneration, or even basic passive solar for hot water, and you can create local energy independence which enhances national and international energy policy.
Unreliability isn't an issue for wind. If you have a network of ten or more farms with reliable but intermittent wind profiles, the statistical distribution more or less guarantees a supply that's steady enough for the base load.
Consider a hypothetical system: 50GW peak demand, 25GW annual average (219TWh). This requires 55.6GW of dispatchable plant to secure the demand based on a 90% average capacity credit (50GW/0.9). This plant has a combined average utilisation or capacity factor of 45% (25GW/55.6GW). Consider a target of 10% of energy from wind with a capacity factor of 30%. This requires 8.3GW of installed capacity (21.9TWh). The wind has a capacity credit of 10% which means we can rely on 0.83GW at time of system peak. This requires 54.6GW (49.17GW and 90% cc) of dispatchable generation to secure the peak demand. The wind contributes 1.7% to the system peak demand. The dispatchable generation has an average utilisation of 42%. Taking this up a level, consider a target of 50% of energy from wind based on the same system and numbers. 50% wind energy means 109.5TWh or 41.5GW of installed wind capacity. At time of system peak we can rely on 4.2GW or 8.4% of system peak demand. This therefore requires 50.9GW (45.8GW/90%) of dispatchable generation. This generation has an average utilisation of 25%. If in the 50% scenario you have about 15GW of nuclear running at 80% capacity factor (105TWh) and 90% capacity credit, then the remaining 35GW of plant will have an average utilisation of 1.5% (4.5TWh). The total system margin is around 92GW to service a 50GW peak or 25GW average system demand. Demand reduction measures can be brought in to these scenarios to flex the demand up or down, as can wind constraints for the cases when the wind exceeds the demand (+ interconnector capacity and external market sink). However to address the usage of capacity factor and capacity credits I hope that the above is clear and helpful. For those of you with CapEx, fuel and O&M costs, plug these plant type capacities into a spreadsheet and calculate the cost per kWh produced. That will give you a good baseline for scenario comparisons. There are a range of other factors such as maintaining minimum fault levels, system inertia, spinning reserves and reactive reserves that are not factored in here that complicate, but do not detract from, the principles described here.
50GW peak demand, 25GW annual average (219TWh).
This requires 55.6GW of dispatchable plant to secure the demand based on a 90% average capacity credit (50GW/0.9). This plant has a combined average utilisation or capacity factor of 45% (25GW/55.6GW).
Consider a target of 10% of energy from wind with a capacity factor of 30%. This requires 8.3GW of installed capacity (21.9TWh).
The wind has a capacity credit of 10% which means we can rely on 0.83GW at time of system peak. This requires 54.6GW (49.17GW and 90% cc) of dispatchable generation to secure the peak demand. The wind contributes 1.7% to the system peak demand. The dispatchable generation has an average utilisation of 42%.
Taking this up a level, consider a target of 50% of energy from wind based on the same system and numbers.
50% wind energy means 109.5TWh or 41.5GW of installed wind capacity. At time of system peak we can rely on 4.2GW or 8.4% of system peak demand. This therefore requires 50.9GW (45.8GW/90%) of dispatchable generation. This generation has an average utilisation of 25%.
If in the 50% scenario you have about 15GW of nuclear running at 80% capacity factor (105TWh) and 90% capacity credit, then the remaining 35GW of plant will have an average utilisation of 1.5% (4.5TWh). The total system margin is around 92GW to service a 50GW peak or 25GW average system demand.
Demand reduction measures can be brought in to these scenarios to flex the demand up or down, as can wind constraints for the cases when the wind exceeds the demand (+ interconnector capacity and external market sink). However to address the usage of capacity factor and capacity credits I hope that the above is clear and helpful.
For those of you with CapEx, fuel and O&M costs, plug these plant type capacities into a spreadsheet and calculate the cost per kWh produced. That will give you a good baseline for scenario comparisons. There are a range of other factors such as maintaining minimum fault levels, system inertia, spinning reserves and reactive reserves that are not factored in here that complicate, but do not detract from, the principles described here.
That is, you are assuming that when wind turbines are added, each wind turbine is receiving exactly the same wind at each moment in time. That is not true even for a single wind farm, and less true for multiple wind farms across a wind resource, and less true for multiple wind resources.
Say that average yield is 35% of nameplate capacity. A study of the Southwestern Great Plains wind resource in the US indicated that wind farms spread widely enough across the wind resource would be yielding under 10% of installed capacity about 10% of the time, though each wind turbine would be yielding under 10% of installed capacity well over 10% of the time.
So shifting to average yield as the benchmark, about 30% of the yield of that resource backed by an equal capacity providing about 3% of the yield as power could be treated as baseload.
And the wind is always blowing somewhere - tap multiple wind resources with widely dispersed wind farms in each wind resource, and the energy required to firm a given share of the average year continues to drop.
And of course the division of energy supply between baseload and peak is not intrinsic to electricity supply, but imposed by the technologies in place, and then social institutions have been developed and evolved to accommodate those technologies. When those institutions interfere with adopting a new technology that is less expensive in terms of full economic cost, that's normal institutional lag, and the solution is to develop new institutions that accommodate the new technology, and then as it is adopted additional institutions will be modified or evolve to accomodate it. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
The big open pond pumped hydro site in Michigan was built, after all, to shift nuclear power across both daytime and seasonal swings in demand.
And then I'll toss in the point that its not a genuinely sustainable technology unless its internationally reproducible, which entails an ability to establish the power plans in locations where effective implementation of anti-proliferation activity cannot be taken for granted. If the ability to throttle up and down is only available with fuel cycles that are proliferation risks, its a stop-gap solution at best. OTOH, if it is available with low proliferation risk fuel cycles like some of the thorium fuel cycles, that is far more promising as part of a long run sustainable portfolio.
If its known that there is a substantial component required to have more dispatchable capacity than energy supply, one approach may be to throttle the generating capacity without throttling the energy supply with heat storage such as molten salts. While that adds to total capital investment, it could mean more capacity utilization of the most expensive part of the capital investment and a better business model. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
And then I'll toss in the point that its not a genuinely sustainable technology unless its internationally reproducible,
I'm not sure I'd go quite that far.
Different countries have different energy mixes - in Denmark, it makes lots of sense to have lots of wind (Denmark is a windy country, as one finds out when architects from other places design buildings that work as natural wind tunnels...). It makes markedly less sense to have lots of large-scale hydro in Denmark, on account of the fact that Denmark has no mountains. Similarly, hydro makes a lot of sense in Norrbotten, while solar... not so much.
The institutions to manage the technology will, of course, always have to be adopted from local ones or adapted to fit the local institutional network. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
Obviously, if the technology carries a proliferation risk, the construction and maintenance of the supporting infrastructure will carry a proliferation risk, simply because more people will have the necessary know-how. But I don't find it self-evident that this risk is impossible to manage responsibly.
And you use libya as if the proliferation point is only an issue with a few, extreme cases, when there are, for instance, few nations in sub-Saharan Africa where one would feel secure seeing proliferation-risk fuel cycles in use. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
Now, the fact that proliferation risks may make the technology inaccessible to large parts of the world is certainly a strike against nuclear. And it remains to be seen whether such a technological imbalance is sustainable.
But there's some way from "not an unproblematic technology" to "only a stopgap measure." Large-scale hydro projects are not unproblematic either and that does not lead us to conclude that they are only a stopgap measure. (Incidentally, in much of Central Africa and the tropical parts of Latin America, you should think not once or twice but three times before building large hydro, on account of the fragility of the local biosphere and the risk of soil disruption caused by damming up a river).
Wealthy countries putting a lifestyle on display that cannot be sustainably emulated by other countries, whether because it relies on technology that cannot be allowed to be used in those countries, or because it relies on the net import of material resources, is not a long term sustainable position. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
Read that again. Not only do non-weapon states have the legal right to nuclear power, under the relevant treaties, the weapon states are obligated to help them.
Denying anyone access to nuclear power out of fear of proliferation is clear violation of international law, and very directly weakens the only effective framework we have for limiting the spread of nuclear weapons.
Secundus: Even if we assume that the NPT is a dead letter, which I am not ready to grant, there is also the fact that the countries that already possess nuclear technology and the countries responsible for AGW are sets that overlap very, very greatly. The states that currently possess nuclear weapons are responsible for somewhere in the region of 70% of all CO2 emmisions, and clearly, a weapon state building (more) nuclear power plants is not increasing the risk of proliferation, the horse has left that barn, and burned it down on the way out. Add on the states that have reactors, but no bombs, and we are talking 80% of all emmisions. If those countries, and only those countries turned their electricity production sectors into copies of the french one, that would, indeed, solve global warming. Or at least, halve the size of the problem. It would also be nessesary to transition shipping to nuclear, and automotion to electric, but saying that proliferation makes nuclear an impractical solution to AGW is just wrong.
But in practice, it does not actually mean that all nations gain access to nuclear power technology, does it? Certainly all the nations "that matter" do, but lots of nations fall into the "they can be ignored" category.
Except climate chaos is a global problem, and as we proselytize Western lifestyles with movies and other entertainment, we cannot safely presume a perpetual global underclass that produces less than the average CO2 per person, and consumes less than that as they export to fill in material deficits by the "have" countries of the world.
Neoliberalism (aka Globalization, when people wish to distract from the fact that it is a policy choice) rests on that presumption, but dominance over the medium term is not evidence of sustainability over the longer term - a longstanding lesson we have just had repeated in the context of financial markets.
And the Modern Liberalism which Neoliberalism supplanted was premised on less developed nations accepting their place in return for receiving development assistance to improve the standard of living of people in countries in that place - but that is not tenable if the technological basis for improving the standard of living is not one that can be reproduced. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
that is not tenable if the technological basis for improving the standard of living is not one that can be reproduced.
or god forbid it makes them dependent on maintenance wot ain't there.
great point, Bruce, one that seems obvious, but isn't mentioned enough. 'The history of public debt is full of irony. It rarely follows our ideas of order and justice.' Thomas Piketty
But stating the tacit assumption reveals the problem: that would be a silly reading of history. All institutional change involves unintended consequences, and the more wide-reaching the change, the greater the potential for some of the unintended consequences to be both strong and malignant.
And even if it were an entirely deliberate choice, there is still the "Dear Liza" conundrum - if it were possible to identify precisely the institutional changes required to make the society functional in that respect, implementing those changes in precisely the way required would itself require a foundation of an institutional capacity for institutional improvement which, by observation, does not exist.
IOW, there's a hole in the bucket, and you need the bucket to fetch the water to wet the whetstone to sharpen the knife to cut the straw to patch the hole in the bucket.
Following the experience of post-WWII reconstruction in Europe and Japan, there were high hopes in the 50's and 60's of lending the bucket to allow new buckets to be made (so to speak - no we are out of the range of the song and use sharpened axes to cut down trees and sharpened saws to cut them into timber) ... but it turns out that reconstructing in a society that was already a functioning industrial society and developing industrial capacities in nations that were not previously functioning industrial societies are quite different challenges.
And as it turned out, the most successful industrial development in the past fifty years occurred in a country that was locked out of the mainstream development program in the 50's and 60's, but which had a massive agrarian revolution in the 50's and 60's following a massive land reform and which was developing in a society which previously had a highly developed commercial economy. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
Colombia has greater insolation than the subarctic. So they can, ceteris paribus, obtain more energy from solar power. Canada has more stable and trustworthy institutional safeguards against nuclear proliferation than Colombia. So they can, ceteris paribus, obtain more energy from nuclear power.
There's no demand for nuclear power - there's a demand for electricity (and, in the colder regions of the world, for heating). The fact that some parts of the world can't use nuclear power won't be a problem if there are other sustainable technologies for them to obtain electricity (respectively heat).
Incidentally, it is not obvious that nuclear is even a desirable technology for countries that are heavy proliferation risks. High-risk countries for proliferation are typically those without a functioning central government and/or with active militias, or whose governmental institutions are chronically incapable of keeping up their end of a deal.
Centralised power generation requires the capability to construct and maintain a centralised power grid (and provides nice, big sabotage targets for the aforementioned militias...). And if the central government is institutionally incapable of sticking to an agreement, there's a case to be made for decentralised power on institutional grounds - namely that it removes leverage from the incompetent/corrupt/bigoted central government.
Then you have countries like Iran which are proliferation risks not because they can't be held to an agreement, but because The West refuses to enter into serious negotiations with them. But that is not a sustainable situation in any case, nuclear power or no nuclear power.
Similarly, given the tendency for the world to follow the 'most advanced countries', would this make the poor countries discount wind/solar as options if the rich discounted them? Typical colonial mindset. Brown and yellow people can think for themselves, they don't need us to tell them what to do. Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
As I noted upthread, nobody within shouting distance of sanity will want to go all-wind, all-nuclear or, indeed, all-anything. For the same reason that you won't want to go all-wheat or all-rice or all-potato when it comes to food production. Monoculture is inherently vulnerable to systemic shocks.
And in terms of wind, solar and hydro R&D, a 35/20/30/15 wind/solar/nuclear/hydro mix isn't substantially different from a 44/30/25 wind/solar/hydro mix.
That's an inconvenient fact, but it's something that has to be considered.
Wind has the advantage that the only carbon costs are the building and (relatively) minimal maintenance costs. Once the blades are spinning, there's no carbon being generated. (Apart from the pile of dead birds at the base of every windmill, and the babies that windmills sneak out to eat at night. But anyway.)
I've never seen a complete carbon budget for a nuclear station, including everything from building, mining and fuel management, decommissioning, and spent fuel storage/reprocessing. Considering the amount of effort needed to keep spent fuel out of circulation - has the spent fuel problem been solved at all, for permanent, static and maintenance-free values of solved? - it's difficult to believe that the total carbon cost isn't significant.
Hydro has the problem that dammed areas of still water in warm climates tend to develop large areas of rotting vegetation.
Indeed. In fact, the carbon footprint is arguably the least of the problems with that large pile of rotting vegetation. Soil loss and disruption of river habitats are at least as serious. Quoting myself from upthread:
Incidentally, in much of Central Africa and the tropical parts of Latin America, you should think not once or twice but three times before building large hydro, on account of the fragility of the local biosphere and the risk of soil disruption caused by damming up a river.
The waste issue has been solved. Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
So far as I know, the UK is still storing most of its waste in ponds. Says the inevitable Wiki quote:
Radioactive waste - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
In the United States alone, the Department of Energy states there are "millions of gallons of radioactive waste" as well as "thousands of tons of spent nuclear fuel and material" and also "huge quantities of contaminated soil and water."[1] Despite copious quantities of waste, the DOE has stated a goal of cleaning all presently contaminated sites successfully by 2025.[1] The Fernald, Ohio site for example had "31 million pounds of uranium product", "2.5 billion pounds of waste", "2.75 million cubic yards of contaminated soil and debris", and a "223 acre portion of the underlying Great Miami Aquifer had uranium levels above drinking standards."[1] The United States has at least 108 sites designated as areas that are contaminated and unusable, sometimes many thousands of acres.[1][2] DOE wishes to clean or mitigate many or all by 2025, however the task can be difficult and it acknowledges that some may never be completely remediated. In just one of these 108 larger designations, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, there were for example at least "167 known contaminant release sites" in one of the three subdivisions of the 37,000-acre (150 km2) site.[1] Some of the U.S. sites were smaller in nature, however, cleanup issues were simpler to address, and DOE has successfully completed cleanup, or at least closure, of several sites.[1]
Admittedly these are pounds, not tons, but it's still a lot of trash to take out and bury.
As I've said before, the most telling argument against nuclear is political - you simply can't trust governments and market-run economies to build nukes sensibly with a mature safety culture, or to clean up after themselves.
The fact that this may be possible in Sweden doesn't necessarily mean the problem has been solved elsewhere.
The liquid waste on the other hand is often pretty radioactive or chemically toxic, but that generally originates from legacy weapons manufacture, not power generation. Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
This would change by orders of magnitude if global nuclear capacity would be significantly expanded, necessitating the exploitation of to lower concentration uranium ore. (Then again, going for lower concentration uranium ore would also face problems similar to those ignored by Peak Oil sceptics arguing with oil shales and sands: the amount of reserves is one thing, running up the rate of production to a level similar to that from present high-grade ores is another.) *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
Hm? Even you acknowledged that even the Swedish method has its questions -- not to speak of other countries (like Germany in that diary of mine). *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
and in that case if safety standards are lower in that sector of construction, why should there be any confidence in other parts of construction or operation? Any idiot can face a crisis - it's day to day living that wears you out.
*The way this number is calculated is absurd. A population of 9 billion people is assumed, as are cancer survival rates identical to todays. That is not a possible future - If we maintain a technological civilization, cancer is not going to kill anyone in 400 years. If we do not, the population will be rather a heck of a lot lower than nine billion, and the number of cancer cases will be correspondingly lower.
My focus lies not with uranium mining per se, but with the coal industry.
How does that support the argument that a complement of technologies including nuclear power that allows a country to be energy sufficient in support of its standard of living is as reproducible internationally as a complement of technologies other than nuclear power that allows a country to be energy sufficient in support of its standard of living?
It seems as if you are taking physical limitations on the energy that can be obtained from a particular technology in the complement as equivalent to social limitations, when of course natural systems are prior to human societies, and the constraints imposed by Natural System will always be respected by technology - by consequence, when not by design.
Of course, "nuclear" is too broad a category here: for instance, the way that some potential Thorium fuel cycles are described by advocated would permit designs that are not prone to proliferation risks in transport of either new or spent fuel. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
How does that support the argument that a complement of technologies including nuclear power that allows a country to be energy sufficient in support of its standard of living is as reproducible internationally as a complement of technologies other than nuclear power
It doesn't, because it isn't. The more components you add into an energy supply mix, the less reproducible the whole package will be. The point is that the whole package doesn't have to be reproducible, so long as large enough parts of it are.
Or, to put it another way: If a citizen of the Democratic Republic of Congo can have light on demand from electricity produced by a dam or a windmill, why should he care that a citizen of the Federal Republic of Germany can have light on demand from electricity produced by a nuclear reactor? Light on demand is light on demand - the electrons don't care where the potential gradient comes from, and neither does most of the end users.
It seems as if you are taking physical limitations on the energy that can be obtained from a particular technology in the complement as equivalent to social limitations
In the short term, they are.
In the medium term, social limitations are more amenable to betterment than physical limitations.
In the long term, we're all dead.
That is, a particular concentrated thermal solar power technology is at a cost point that makes it an appealing choice for installing large plants in the US Southwest for peak power demands in Southern California. That same technology is only a niche player in another setting, and is not adopted at all in a third.
But if its feasible in the third, and not implemented because there are technically superior choices in those conditions, that means its reproducible technology for that country, and indeed with further technical development may come into the frame for adoption. Its availability at its Energy Return on Investment in that context provides part of the baseline for all settings where its Net EROI is positive, and where it is not implemented is where a superior Net EROI is available.
The specific point about proliferation-prone nuclear fuel cycles is not about whether its a feasible technique for acquiring power from the Natural System within which the economy exists, but whether we can confidently promote its use everywhere that it is technically feasible. Its an additional constraint, over and above the fact that yields of different techniques in a technological complement will vary in different settings, so the reliance on one technique will be higher in one setting and the reliance on a different technique will be higher in another setting.
And its a different type of constraint, because when a renewable energy harvest technique is pushed aside by another renewable energy harvest technique with better Net EROI, that implies that some other technique with better EROI exists. When some particular nuclear power fuel cycle is ruled out because the society does not have the institutional capacity to transport virgin fuel to or spent fuel from the plant without ongoing substantial proliferation risks, that does not imply that there is some other technique with some better Net EROI.
The present-day core economies, resting on the dependency of the other economies of the world on us for productive equipment, cannot therefore rest satisfied that they have developed an adequate technological complement for energy sufficiency for ourselves until it also includes an adequate technological complement that is internationally reproducible.
Since we cannot, after all, move the core economies en masse to another planet with a more benign climate, and since the channels of technological development will tend to follow the track of those lines that we choose to pursue. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
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