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In the US, when we want to pretend that the Fed can not act as public lender of last resort, we put in place regulations restricting the Fed to purchasing of bonds on the open market, and force the Treasury to pretend that it is selling the bonds to private holders, who turn around and sell to the Fed in pursuit of their Federal Open Market Committee actions in defense of their target cash rate.
But that pretense is a policy decision, not a structural requirement, and if it were to become inconvenient at a time when it was politically feasible, could readily be reversed ~ we have at some points since WWII have had direct purchases of Treasury security by the Fed, which is the above without the pretense (note that the pretense is useful for transactions income for the FIRE sector).
If an NCB was to purchase its own Treasury's securities to maintain a target long term interest rate, from private holders, that would make a market for the Treasury to sell those securities.
And in a self-fulfilling prophecy, if they act to make that market, the Treasury securities up to the amount that they elect to purchase will be worth precisely the interest rate terms at which they purchase it.
The moral hazard for a district central bank buying public non-sovereign debt from a provincial government is whether it can afford the debt service. In a conventional central bank, surplus income is returned to Treasury, so when it holds sovereign debt, there is no question of being able to afford the debt service.
So the question is: if an ECB member NCB has a surplus of revenue over costs, does it still return the surplus to its national Eurozone government? If so, it seems like it ought to be able to make a market in the debt of its own national government. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
So the question is: if an ECB member NCB has a surplus of revenue over costs, does it still return the surplus to its national Eurozone government?
Yes. ECB profits flow to the NCBs, but not the other way around.
But the NCBs take marching orders from Frankfurt.
- Jake Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.
But I don't know how much of that was the typical theatre between Frankfurt and Silvio Corruptioni and how much of it was serious policymaking.
I guess I am missing something...what?
A pleasure I therefore claim to show, not how men think in myths, but how myths operate in men's minds without their being aware of the fact. Levi-Strauss, Claude
In the case of cross-border banking you need central banks to clear payments with each other. The ECB might act as a clearinghouse for payments among national central banks. If that is the case and the ECB refused to clear payments with the Italian Central bank, the Italian monetary system might become cut off from the rest of the EU.
At least as I understand the situation. Of all the ways of organizing banking, the worst is the one we have today — Mervyn King, 25 October 2010
In Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority oversees the centralised clearing system in which all the Hong Kong clearing banks (also note issuers) participate. Because Hong Kong's is a 'real-time' settlement system, there is no need for a central counterparty as a 'risk intermediary' because there is no risk.
I explicitly referred to this some ten years ago when the implications sank in of 'Peer to Peer' connectivity - and a decentralised, dis-intermediated 'Market 3.0' - in the aftermath of a market-centric Dot Com I set up.
Market 3.0: the final version
In a spot transaction the two functions take place contemporaneously and the exchange of value is conditional: if I don't have the shares, I can't offer them for sale, and if I don't have the money, I can't bid for the shares. The consequence of this is that for true real-time settlement of a spot transaction, there is no requirement for a risk intermediary such as a central counterparty because there is no risk. Where there is an element of time between the conclusion of the contract and its settlement, then this introduces the requirement for risk management, and the interpolation of a risk intermediary such as a central counterparty or insurer.
In a spot transaction the two functions take place contemporaneously and the exchange of value is conditional: if I don't have the shares, I can't offer them for sale, and if I don't have the money, I can't bid for the shares.
The consequence of this is that for true real-time settlement of a spot transaction, there is no requirement for a risk intermediary such as a central counterparty because there is no risk. Where there is an element of time between the conclusion of the contract and its settlement, then this introduces the requirement for risk management, and the interpolation of a risk intermediary such as a central counterparty or insurer.
Because Hong Kong's is a 'real-time' settlement system, there is no need for a central counterparty as a 'risk intermediary' because there is no risk.
There is no way to completely eliminate settlement risk. Of all the ways of organizing banking, the worst is the one we have today — Mervyn King, 25 October 2010
You still have to deliver banknotes to settle balances occasionally? There is no way to completely eliminate settlement risk.
There is no way to completely eliminate settlement risk.
The clearing banks issue Hong Kong Bank Notes, except for the lowest denomination HK $10 notes which are issued by the HKMA.
These notes get credited to bank accounts when paid in to a branch, thereby generating a (real time) credit in the system. While they are circulating, the issuers benefit from the Seigniorage.
The only settlement risk here is of counterfeit currency notes.
This is slightly different from the situation in Scotland, where Scottish Bank Notes must be matched - during the working week - by funds deposited with the Bank of England. Over the week-end the Scottish banks benefit from the Seigniorage....an interesting hybrid. "The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson
The fact that payments clear at the central bank means that if the central bank can always clear Treasury checks by accepting the IOU of the Treasury as an asset and increasing Central Bank liabilities by adding an equivalent amount to the Treasury account.
If the Central Bank for reasons of political theater is not allowed to do that, but it has an interest rate target to maintain, the Treasury auctions those IOU's, with payment ending up in its account at the Central Bank, and then that the Central Bank more or less ends up buying up those bonds to stabilize interbank interest rates.
The reason that the action of a conventional Central Bank action ends up (either directly or after the fact) eliminating the debt service burden on the Treasury is that the Central Bank is either owned by the government or chartered by the government as a not-for-profit, with any surpluses going back to the Treasury. So once Central Bank operating expenses are covered out of interest income on Treasury bonds they hold, all the excess goes straight back to Treasury.
Its the combination of the clearinghouse function and surplus on income over operating costs returning to the Treasury that ensures that Treasury checks never bounce. If the ECB can interfere with an NCB clearing payments, it can interfere with the NCB operating as a clearinghouse for payments across national borders, making reserve assets of commercial banks held in that NCB's accounts a second-class citizen, only good for clearing payments within the country.
That's why the question of whether the ECB is by treaty required, allowed, or not allowed to interfere with cross-border clearances between NCB's is of interest. And IANL, so even if I had the text, I could only guess how it would be interpreted by a court.
And whether an NCB in the Eurozone can get away with freelancing in this way ~ and I suspect that the Bundesbank had good enough lawyers to make sure that one way or another, the treaty terms do not allow that kind of freelancing ~ given the unsustainability of multiple cash rate policies in a single currency zone ~ that's what led to the formation of the Federal Open Market Committee in the US ~ there's also a quite reasonable argument that an NCB should not be allowed to engage in this kind of action.
I still prefer a system of determining the shortfall from full output, allocated on a per capita basis, and the ECB buying individual member state bonds on the open market equivalent to that amount ~ which would be a confederalization of fiscal policy. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
it's the story, and i sense a denouement approaching. 'The history of public debt is full of irony. It rarely follows our ideas of order and justice.' Thomas Piketty
if an ECB member NCB has a surplus of revenue over costs, does it still return the surplus to its national Eurozone government?
Deutsche Welle: Germany's Bundesbank Posts Huge Profits for 2008 (10.03.2009)The entire sum earned is being transferred to the federal government -- which is something of a novelty. In previous years, portions of the Bundesbank's earnings have had to be used to pay off debt from the former East Germany, but now that the debt is gone, the bank's profits will flow into state coffers.
The entire sum earned is being transferred to the federal government -- which is something of a novelty. In previous years, portions of the Bundesbank's earnings have had to be used to pay off debt from the former East Germany, but now that the debt is gone, the bank's profits will flow into state coffers.
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