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The Irish central bank virtually redundant. (I have an acquaintance who used to be a senior official with the bank and who spent his time skulling pints and attending conferences. There was never any pretence at real work)
A credit crunch and liquidity squeeze is instead the time for central banks to get their hands dirty and take socially necessary risks which are not part and parcel of the art of central banking during normal times when markets are orderly. Making monetary policy under conditions of orderly markets is really not that hard. Any group of people with IQs in three digits (individually) and familiar with (almost) any intermediate macroeconomics textbook could do the job. Dealing with a liquidity crisis and credit crunch is hard. Inevitably, it exposes the central bank to significant financial and reputational risk. The central banks will be asked to take credit risk (of unknown) magnitude onto their balance sheets and they will have to make explicit judgments about the creditworthiness of various counterparties. But without taking these risks the central banks will be financially and reputationally safe, but poor servants of the public interest.
A military analogy would be, how do you maintain combat-readiness in your defence forces after two generations of peace? And if you don't, who do you turn to when the unthinkable happens and you're invaded? Of all the ways of organizing banking, the worst is the one we have today — Mervyn King, 25 October 2010
Patrick Honohan - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Before pursuing postgraduate research, Honohan took a position with the International Monetary Fund in 1971. While completing his PhD in London, he joined the economics staff of the Central Bank of Ireland. During the 1980s, he was Economic Advisor to Taoiseach Garret Fitzgerald and subsequently began working with the World Bank. Honohan then spent seven years as a Research Professor with the Economic and Social Research Institute before returning to the World Bank in 1998 as a Lead Economist and subsequently Senior Advisor on financial sector policy. The author of numerous academic papers and monographs,[3] he has taught economics at the LSE, University of California, San Diego, the Australian National University and University College Dublin. He was appointed Professor of International Financial Economics and Development in 2007 at Trinity College Dublin. In September 2009, Honohan was appointed as the tenth governor of the Central Bank of Ireland. The following December he said in a speech that "ignorance and inattention" by staff at the Financial Regulator were to blame for regulatory failure.
Before pursuing postgraduate research, Honohan took a position with the International Monetary Fund in 1971. While completing his PhD in London, he joined the economics staff of the Central Bank of Ireland. During the 1980s, he was Economic Advisor to Taoiseach Garret Fitzgerald and subsequently began working with the World Bank. Honohan then spent seven years as a Research Professor with the Economic and Social Research Institute before returning to the World Bank in 1998 as a Lead Economist and subsequently Senior Advisor on financial sector policy.
The author of numerous academic papers and monographs,[3] he has taught economics at the LSE, University of California, San Diego, the Australian National University and University College Dublin. He was appointed Professor of International Financial Economics and Development in 2007 at Trinity College Dublin.
In September 2009, Honohan was appointed as the tenth governor of the Central Bank of Ireland.
The following December he said in a speech that "ignorance and inattention" by staff at the Financial Regulator were to blame for regulatory failure.
As far as I know he is a respected if mainstream economist known for his blunt talking. However he appears to have avoided criticism the Central Bank in the above quote and I am unclear what remaining functions (not carried out by the financial regulator or the ECB) continue to justify such a large staff at the Central bank in their preposterous Head office in central Dublin (which was originally built in breach of Planning permission and had to be lowered to become more compliant...an appropriate metaphor for how it conducted itself in other ways...)
Not being an economist I won't comment on the ideological orientation or significance of his research work. Index of Frank's Diaries
The Irish crash was a peculiarly Irish creation after all.
Reports blame domestic factors for banking crisis...The Government's budgets during the boom years "contributed significantly to the economic overheating", Dr Honohan said, as they relied to an "unsustainable extent" on the construction sector and encouraged the property boom through tax breaks."This helped create a climate of public opinion which was led to believe that the party could last forever," he said.Dr Honohan found that the Financial Regulator was "excessively deferential and accommodating" to the banks, while the Central Bank, led by his predecessor John Hurley, had not been alert to warnings signs of an imminent crash.There was insufficient awareness or willingness to accept "how close the system was to the edge" and that it was the responsibility of the Central Bank and the regulator to pull it back from the edge, he said."Rocking the boat and swimming against the tide of public opinion would have required a particularly strong sense of the independent role of a central bank in being prepared to `spoil the party' and withstand possible strong adverse public reaction," Dr Honohan said.Pat Neary, the former chief executive of the regulator, said he had no comment. Mr Neary's predecessor, Liam O'Reilly, and Mr Hurley could not be reached for comment.Dr Honohan said there was "a comprehensive failure of bank management" to maintain "safe and sound banking practices".The weakness of the Irish banks was not caused by the collapse of US bank Lehman Brothers in September 2008 but by an over-exposure to property driven by excessive overseas borrowing "to support a creditfuelled property market and construction frenzy".Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide Building Society were "well on the road towards insolvency" at that stage, he said, while the two biggest banks, Allied Irish Banks and Bank of Ireland, could only have survived without a State bailout if the international financial markets had calmed.The scale of the Government guarantee raised the cost of the bailout to the State, narrowing options available to fix failing institutions, he said.... So obviously the Government will now resign in the wake of such a damning indictment?
...The Government's budgets during the boom years "contributed significantly to the economic overheating", Dr Honohan said, as they relied to an "unsustainable extent" on the construction sector and encouraged the property boom through tax breaks."This helped create a climate of public opinion which was led to believe that the party could last forever," he said.Dr Honohan found that the Financial Regulator was "excessively deferential and accommodating" to the banks, while the Central Bank, led by his predecessor John Hurley, had not been alert to warnings signs of an imminent crash.There was insufficient awareness or willingness to accept "how close the system was to the edge" and that it was the responsibility of the Central Bank and the regulator to pull it back from the edge, he said."Rocking the boat and swimming against the tide of public opinion would have required a particularly strong sense of the independent role of a central bank in being prepared to `spoil the party' and withstand possible strong adverse public reaction," Dr Honohan said.Pat Neary, the former chief executive of the regulator, said he had no comment. Mr Neary's predecessor, Liam O'Reilly, and Mr Hurley could not be reached for comment.Dr Honohan said there was "a comprehensive failure of bank management" to maintain "safe and sound banking practices".The weakness of the Irish banks was not caused by the collapse of US bank Lehman Brothers in September 2008 but by an over-exposure to property driven by excessive overseas borrowing "to support a creditfuelled property market and construction frenzy".Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide Building Society were "well on the road towards insolvency" at that stage, he said, while the two biggest banks, Allied Irish Banks and Bank of Ireland, could only have survived without a State bailout if the international financial markets had calmed.The scale of the Government guarantee raised the cost of the bailout to the State, narrowing options available to fix failing institutions, he said....
The Government's budgets during the boom years "contributed significantly to the economic overheating", Dr Honohan said, as they relied to an "unsustainable extent" on the construction sector and encouraged the property boom through tax breaks.
"This helped create a climate of public opinion which was led to believe that the party could last forever," he said.
Dr Honohan found that the Financial Regulator was "excessively deferential and accommodating" to the banks, while the Central Bank, led by his predecessor John Hurley, had not been alert to warnings signs of an imminent crash.
There was insufficient awareness or willingness to accept "how close the system was to the edge" and that it was the responsibility of the Central Bank and the regulator to pull it back from the edge, he said.
"Rocking the boat and swimming against the tide of public opinion would have required a particularly strong sense of the independent role of a central bank in being prepared to `spoil the party' and withstand possible strong adverse public reaction," Dr Honohan said.
Pat Neary, the former chief executive of the regulator, said he had no comment. Mr Neary's predecessor, Liam O'Reilly, and Mr Hurley could not be reached for comment.
Dr Honohan said there was "a comprehensive failure of bank management" to maintain "safe and sound banking practices".
The weakness of the Irish banks was not caused by the collapse of US bank Lehman Brothers in September 2008 but by an over-exposure to property driven by excessive overseas borrowing "to support a creditfuelled property market and construction frenzy".
Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide Building Society were "well on the road towards insolvency" at that stage, he said, while the two biggest banks, Allied Irish Banks and Bank of Ireland, could only have survived without a State bailout if the international financial markets had calmed.
The scale of the Government guarantee raised the cost of the bailout to the State, narrowing options available to fix failing institutions, he said.
...
So obviously the Government will now resign in the wake of such a damning indictment?
I googled "Irish ministerial resignations for wrongdoing" and came up with nothing, so we must be clean... Index of Frank's Diaries
how do you ensure that people with the necessary skills and resolve (not necessarily individually, but certainly collectively) are where they need to be in a time of crisis?
Meanwhile, if you want to avoid disaster, you have to build a system with feedback loops that make disaster less likely.
Promoting idiots who are out of their depth but are "a safe pair of hands" and "won't rock the boat" is a good way not to do that.
Public recordings - not just minutes, but actual video and audio - of all significant ministerial and financial meetings would go a long way to restoring real accountability.
Do you really think it would work, even if desirable (I don't think it is)? Don't you think that, the minute after they start recording these meetings, participant will stop saying anything significant and shift to backroom deals for the real stuff and decision-making? Unless you implant microphones and micro-cameras on all the politicians and civil servants (and CEOs while we are at it), you won't be able to monitor them properly... "People only accept change when they are faced with necessity, and only recognize necessity when a crisis is upon them." - Jean Monnet
All discussions, all personal, departmental, and relevant corporate financial records, all decisions and positions should be public.
Backroom deals should be banned.
What would be the problem with this?
Of course everyone would be nervous with the public looking over their shoulder. But that's exactly the point.
Pols with something to hide would naturally excuse themselves from power and surveillance - which doesn't seem like a loss to me.
It's nice to see you still hold on some idealism.
All discussions, all personal, departmental, and relevant corporate financial records, all decisions and positions should be public. Backroom deals should be banned.
And how would you enforce this? It would require a lot of people dedicated to watching these politicians/civil servants/decision-makers and a lot of sophisticated equipment to monitor them all the time. Oh, and at what level would you start?
And saying that a measure only harms those who "have something to hide" is an old authoritarian argument... "People only accept change when they are faced with necessity, and only recognize necessity when a crisis is upon them." - Jean Monnet
There's already plenty of discussion and debate about policy and politicians. It wouldn't need a Separate Public Oversight Committee with people in scary robes and fascist black leather - debate would happen naturally, just as it does already, but more so.
Why would that be a bad thing?
As for "having something to hide", the point is that pols notoriously do have things to hide - many, many things, which they would rather the public never found out about. The things they hide suck out democracy and public involvement from politics like the legislative equivalent of a black hole.
Do you think the FOIA legislation is authoritarian too? Or Finland's public financial disclosure laws? Is Wikileaks authoritarian for making diplomatic cables public?
If a cabinet meeting decides X, but Y becomes policy instead then it's not hard to see that something has gone astray somewhere.
But, usually, backroom deals take place before meetings where decisions are made. So there would be no discrepancy between a decision made during the meeting and the policy implemented...
I am all in favour of FOIA, but you must notice that there is a period of time during which you cannot access the information/data. And Finland's law is limited to a certain type of information, whereas you would like to make public in real time "all the discussions and meetings".
What I am saying is this would require a STASI-like organisation. And who would monitor this organisation? How long would it take before this organisation become the real power? "People only accept change when they are faced with necessity, and only recognize necessity when a crisis is upon them." - Jean Monnet
You set up live feeds, and you put the media recordings up on a server. The public and the press can do the rest.
I'll say again - there is no Bureau of Transgression in this idea. It's purely to put policy debate on the record.
As for backroom deals - a meeting that rubber stamps a decision without debating it is just as suspicious as a meeting which doesn't lead to consistent policy.
Financial records provide a literal paper trail for anyone who wants to check who benefits from decisions.
I don't understand why there's a problem with any of this. Parliamentary debates are already televised in the UK, Hansard keeps a record of all parliamentary statements in paper form, and MPs are supposed to make their expense claims and business connections public.
This is just extending the same established principle to other government contexts.
Like the meetings of the general assembly of shareholders in a large industrial corporation.
- Jake Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.
What I am saying is this would require a STASI-like organisation. And who would monitor this organisation?
Make it the law that acceptance of governmental employment constitutes permission to have your activities recorded by sound and video, and, except as specifically excluded, it is legal to make any of these recordings public. Make the legal presumption in favor of release of recordings and make claims to the contrary continuously subject to judicial review, with both the party that made the recording and the party that was recorded entitled to bring claims to a judge of their choice. "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
And you're complaining my suggestion would make government unworkable?
In particular, I learned something about the European secret police: They are either blind, dumb and deaf-mute for not already having those cables in their archives (with three million people having access to them, any serious intelligence agency should be able to get a data dump now and then); or that they are completely on board with politicians collaborating with the Americans. Considering how much time they spent chasing DFHs suspected of taking funding from the KGB, this reveals something of a double standard (either between the treatment of spies from different countries, or between hippies and politicians being spies).
So anyone who isn't completely dull in their private life would opt out? Of all the ways of organizing banking, the worst is the one we have today — Mervyn King, 25 October 2010
But people who can't keep it zipped tend to come to a sticky end in politics anyway - it just takes the press longer to catch on, once they make a few enemies who can afford private detectives.
If the only place they are allowed privacy is the restroom, that's where the backroom deals will be made. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
The problem then becomes one of identifying the most appropriate experts, and unfortunately in this case the establishment experts have all become thoroughly neo-liberalised in recent times. But that is also a bigger political problem - the decline of social democracy and Keynesian economics throughout "the West".
It seems that the CW is that to compete against China you have to become more like the Chinese... Remarkably that is not my experience of strategic thinking in big business - but it seems to have become the orthodoxy for Governments and academia. Index of Frank's Diaries
and I got to thinking: if during good times being in certain positions of responsibility is an unchallenging job, how do you ensure that people with the necessary skills and resolve (not necessarily individually, but certainly collectively) are where they need to be in a time of crisis? A military analogy would be, how do you maintain combat-readiness in your defence forces after two generations of peace? And if you don't, who do you turn to when the unthinkable happens and you're invaded?
A military analogy would be, how do you maintain combat-readiness in your defence forces after two generations of peace? And if you don't, who do you turn to when the unthinkable happens and you're invaded?
The military does it with drills and war games, and I could well imagine that this might work for a central bank/financial regulator as well. Every quarter, the ministry of finance would make a scenario in which a Charlie Foxtrot of random severity occurs, ranging from the insolvency of a small bank all the way through to systemic insolvency coupled with a run on the currency.
For maximum effect, you'd spring it on the financial regulator on a random day in the quarter, and the financial regulator would game out the scenario. The disadvantage of that approach is that, unlike the military in peacetime, the financial regulator has a day job. So running unscheduled exercises is going to be a real pain in the ass. It may be more sustainable to pick a long weekend (i.e. a weekend where Friday or Monday is also a bank holiday) somewhere in each quarter and hold the exercise then. Or simply cook up an exercise for each long weekend in the year.
If they pass an exercise, its weigh in the random draw is reduced, so the exercise schedule becomes biased towards the sorts of exercises they need to get better at.
The big problem is, of course, that you'd have to get someone to design realistic scenarios - and since nobody among Die Seriöse Leute predicted this Charlie Foxtrot in advance...
Neo-Classical Economics cannot predict Bubbles will happen much less what to do when they do. She believed in nothing; only her skepticism kept her from being an atheist. -- Jean-Paul Sartre
:-) She believed in nothing; only her skepticism kept her from being an atheist. -- Jean-Paul Sartre
I don't expect the military to be able to accurately predict whether the Russians will invade or not, but I do expect the military to have run enough exercises to convince themselves that they know how to hurt the Russians if they did decide to invade, for whatever obscure reason. Hell, the military has scenarios for fighting a nuclear war, which is probably about the most pointless sort of war game you can imagine - if people start lobbing around megatons, you lose. Even if you win.
Macroeconomic modelling is the Treasury's job. The CB and FR do not need macroeconomic models to do the jobs I want them to do, and if they feel the need for the results of macroeconomic modelling, they can ask the Treasury to do a run for them. Macroeconomic policy is properly the Treasury's turf, and I don't want the CB and FR developing a parallel capability in that area. That would almost inevitably lead lead to a sort of mission creep that I consider harmful in an institution that is traditionally not particularly democratically accountable.
But good macro is preventative more than it is curative. What I'm talking about here is crisis management, and you don't need good macro models for that - all you need is a firm political will to screw over bondholders and use the power of the sovereign to restore full employment. After you've arrested the rise in unemployment, you can start firing up your macro models to develop medium-term policies.
If there IS a paper I'd be eager to read it. She believed in nothing; only her skepticism kept her from being an atheist. -- Jean-Paul Sartre
I meant an NCE paper.
There are UnSerious People who have written such. She believed in nothing; only her skepticism kept her from being an atheist. -- Jean-Paul Sartre
I don't want the central bank or financial regulator to be doing macroeconomic modelling.
One of the advantages of having useless theories and models is that it facilitates an Alice in Wonderland situation in which everything means exactly what the relevant authority says it means. "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
The IMF is a different sort of story - they should be doing macro, and they should be doing it right. (But they should never have been involved in an internal -zone crisis in the first place...)
You make the training as close to the real thing as you can. Grueling training exercises, live fire with heavy artillery over your heads as you advance, and so on.
What the central bank equivalence of this would be, I do not know. Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
Starvid wanted an example of a live-fire exercise. Simulating the reaction to a 1997 SE Asia style collapse would be an excellent exercise for a central banker.
It also provides a more graceful out for the people who didn't see the crash coming. Rather than having to discard their entire academic career because it's garbage, they can say "well, I sure didn't see that coming, but let's update out scenarios to make sure we'll be ready to deal with it next time." While not as viscerally satisfying as purging the morons, it would go a long way towards improving the financial regulator's combat readiness.
what is the equivalent of Wall St. in the EU?
are there parallels with the ECB? 'The history of public debt is full of irony. It rarely follows our ideas of order and justice.' Thomas Piketty
(even if you obviously will learn some good things) Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
What the central bank equivalence of this would be, I do not know.
maybe just studying history would be enough!
i am watching a doc on arte about how the germans held up the french franc for a year in '93, and protected it from speculators.
fascinating... 'The history of public debt is full of irony. It rarely follows our ideas of order and justice.' Thomas Piketty
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