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A contrary opinion on the suitability of Euro-bonds.

VoxEU: E-bonds: Europe's own subprime teaser rates

The E-bonds proposal is a brilliant piece of economic reengineering in favour of the Eurozone creditor countries - especially Germany and France. It is understandable and rational that the creditor nations should seek to improve the negotiating terms in preparation for all-but-certain sovereign defaults by the "peripheral" countries (Eichengreen 2010b).

  • It is warranted and necessary that the Eurozone puts in place some orderly process for sovereign debt restructuring (Weder di Mauro and Zettelmeyer 2010, Eichengreen 2010b),
  • The E-bonds proposal seems to be an important component of such a mechanism.
  • It is also possible that the E-bonds are a first step in a long-term process towards fiscal and political union as argued by German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble. 

Nonetheless, the ends do not justify the means.

  • This E-bonds proposal is somewhat similar to the US subprime's "pick-a-payment" Adjustable-Rate Mortgage low teaser rates.
  • It offers "peripheral" countries the option of picking a slightly lower E-bonds interest rate now, with much higher costs later on.

It runs counter to the principles of the Trichet proposal "Towards a Code of Good Conduct on Sovereign Debt Re-Negotiation" (Banque de France 2003).

It is a type of non-cooperative behaviour by creditor nations that invites tit-for-tat retaliation by debtor nations. Instead, Game Theory suggests that cooperative behaviour would result in higher total welfare outcomes. Therefore, let us hope that reason and mutual respect prevail.



Of all the ways of organizing banking, the worst is the one we have today — Mervyn King, 25 October 2010
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Dec 21st, 2010 at 09:33:25 AM EST
in the concept, or is there a co-operative way of framing a Eurobond system?

The VoxEU author is arguing that debtor nations -- Greece, et al -- will inevitably default within a few years, and would be much better off doing so by redefining their sovereign debt out of existence by rewriting their domestic laws.

Since, under a Eurobond system, they would not be at liberty to do so, any haircuts would have to be negotiated with creditors (Germany and France), who would be in a much more powerful position.

However, an EU (and a Eurozone) which sees member nations defaulting on each other is at a dead end in terms of integration, and would not seem compatible with progress towards fiscal and political union.

It seems to me that the optimal outcome involves both debt reduction and economic assistance to the debtor nations, which is only feasible within a deeper economic union which would enable co-ordinated industrial policy...

OK so am I dreaming? Is the Juncker bonds scheme (let's hope that name doesn't catch on) all about protecting the creditor nations and their banks?

It is rightly acknowledged that people of faith have no monopoly of virtue - Queen Elizabeth II

by eurogreen on Tue Dec 21st, 2010 at 06:17:53 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The good way to do €-bonds is to realise that bonds are an interest rate instrument, not a fiscal instrument. So you decouple the bonds from the state-level fiscal policy, by giving every state a permanent, unlimited overdraft with the ECB, at no worse terms than the Frankfurt overnight rate. Then you issue ECB bonds rather than Treasury bonds.

If this is politically unpalatable, the same functional arrangement can be obtained by having the ECB procure at face value whatever bonds cannot be sold at the Frankfurt overnight rate (i.e. almost all of them), and then issue its own ECB bonds through open market operations. Functionally, the effects would be the same, but it would allow the sort of people who get aneurysms at the thought of unlimited overdrafts with the central bank to keep pretending that that's not what's happening.

Of course, the really smart way to do monetary policy is to not issue a fixed volume of bonds at all. Just fix the short term rate through the discount window, and issue bonds with a bid-ask spread around the policy rate (with widening spread as the term increases - in this view bonds are a service to the holder, in that they allow him to lock in an interest rate that the central bank could change arbitrarily and without notice; he should get to pay for that service, not the other way around).

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Wed Dec 22nd, 2010 at 03:03:02 AM EST
[ Parent ]
JakeS:
Of course, the really smart way to do monetary policy is to not issue a fixed volume of bonds at all.
I wonder why governments don't switch to fixed-rate open-tender bond auctions...

Of all the ways of organizing banking, the worst is the one we have today — Mervyn King, 25 October 2010
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed Dec 22nd, 2010 at 04:22:56 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Because that requires a central bank that accommodates such a stance. As long as the CB pretends (and is allowed to pretend) that it's not a part of the government, bonds become fiscal instruments as much as interest rate instruments.

Of course, they could always issue Greenbacks...

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Wed Dec 22nd, 2010 at 06:11:59 AM EST
[ Parent ]

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