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Timmy-Gate: Did Geithner Help Hide Lehman's Fraud?   By L. Randall Wray

Timmy-Gate Takes a Turn For The Worse: Did Geithner Help Lehman Hide Accounting Tricks?

Just when you thought that nothing could stink more than Timothy Geithner's handling of the AIG bailout, a new report details how Geithner's New York Fed allowed Lehman Brothers to use an accounting gimmick to hide debt. The report, which runs to 2200 pages, was released by Anton Valukas, the court-appointed examiner. It actually makes the AIG bailout look tame by comparison. It is now crystal clear why Geithner's Treasury as well as Bernanke's Fed refuse to allow any light to shine on the massive cover-up underway.

Recall that the New York Fed arranged for AIG to pay one hundred cents on the dollar on bad debts to its counterparties--benefiting Goldman Sachs and a handful of other favored Wall Street firms. (see here) The purported reason is that Geithner so feared any negative repercussions resulting from debt write-downs that he wanted Uncle Sam to make sure that Wall Street banks could not lose on bad bets. Now we find that Geithner's NYFed supported Lehman's efforts to conceal the extent of its problems. (see here) Not only did the NYFed fail to blow the whistle on flagrant accounting tricks, it also helped to hide Lehman's illiquid assets on the Fed's balance sheet to make its position look better. Note that the NY Fed had increased its supervision to the point that it was going over Lehman's books daily; further, it continued to take trash off the books of Lehman right up to the bitter end, helping to perpetuate the fraud that was designed to maintain the pretense that Lehman was not massively insolvent.

Wray cites a NYT article on the subject of the Fed's involvement in hiding the insolvency:

They were considered the dregs of Lehman Brothers -- "bottom of the barrel," as one banker put it. But as Lehman executives tried to keep the floundering bank afloat in 2008, they used these troubled investments to raise quick cash that helped mask the extent of the firm's troubles. And they did it with the help of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

The newly released report on the collapse of Lehman Brothers -- which lays out what it characterizes as "materially misleading" accounting at the bank -- also sheds surprising new light on Lehman's dealings with the New York Fed.

Lehman engaged in a series of transactions with the New York Fed that were similar to the ones that drew criticism from the bankruptcy court examiner who investigated its collapse. The examiner, Anton R. Valukas, drew no conclusions about the transactions with the Fed, and focused instead on deals that were known inside Lehman as "Repo 105."

But the report by Mr. Valukas nonetheless raises fresh questions about the role of the New York Fed in supporting Lehman during the frantic months leading up to its collapse. It suggests that Lehman executives believed the Fed would be able to help the bank avert disaster and provide it with a business opportunity.


So, we have "the dregs of Lehman Brothers" traded to the Fed for "high powered money" at face value. Sort of defines "cash for trash".  But back to Wray:


Geithner told Congress that he has never been a regulator. (see here) That is a quite honest assessment of his job performance, although it is completely inaccurate as a description of his duties as President of the NYFed. Apparently, Geithner has never met an accounting gimmick that he does not like, if it appears to improve the reported finances of a Wall Street firm. We will leave to the side his own checkered past as a taxpayer, although one might question the wisdom of appointing someone who is apparently insufficiently skilled to file accurate tax returns to a position as our nation's chief tax collector. What is far more troubling is that he now heads the Treaury--which means that he is not only responsible for managing two regulatory units (the FDIC and OCC), but also that he has got hold of the government's purse strings. How many more billions or trillions will he commit to a futile effort to help Wall Street avoid its losses?

Geithner has denied that he played any direct role in the AIG bail-out--a somewhat implausible claim given that he was the President of the NYFed and given that this was a monumental and unprecedented action to funnel government funds to AIG's counterparties. He may try to deny involvement in the Lehman deals. (Again, this is implausible. Lehman executives claimed they "gave full and complete financial information to government agencies", and that the government never raised significant objections or directed that Lehman take any corrective action. In fairness, the SEC also overlooked any problems at Lehman. (see here) But here is what is so astounding about the gimmicks: Lehman used "Repo 105" to temporarily move liabilities off its balance sheet--essentially pretending to sell them although it promised to immediately buy them back. The abuse was so flagrant that no US law firm would sign off on the practice, fearing that creditors and stockholders would have grounds for lawsuits on the basis that this caused a "material misrepresentation" of Lehman's financial statements. (see here) The court-appointed examiner hired to look into the failure of Lehman found "materially misleading" accounting and "actionable balance sheet manipulation." (here) But just as Arthur Andersen had signed off on Enron's scams, Ernst & Young found no problem with Lehman. (here)

In short, this was an Enron-style, go directly to jail and do not pass go, sort of fraud. Lehman's had been using this trick since 2001. (here) It looked fine to Timmy's Fed, which extended loans allowing Lehman to flip bad assets onto the Fed's balance sheet to keep the fraud going.

More generally, this revelation drives home three related points. First, the scandal is on-going and it is huge. President Obama must hold Geithner accountable. He must determine what did Geithner know, and when did he know it. All internal documents and emails related to the AIG bailout and the attempt to keep Lehman afloat need to be released. Further, Obama must ask what has Geithner done to favor his clients on Wall Street? It now looks like even the Fed BOG, not just the NYFed, is involved in the cover-up. It is in the interest of the Obama administration to come clean. It is hard to believe that it does not already have sufficient cause to fire Geithner. In terms of dollar costs to the government, this is surely the biggest scandal in US history. It terms of sheer sleaze does it rank with Watergate? I suppose that depends on whether you believe that political hit lists and spying that had no real impact on the outcome of an election is as bad as a wholesale handing-over of government and the economy to Wall Street.

At least Senator Kaufman, who took Joe Biden's seat, has spoken out on this outrage. But the Republicans are hoping to win back Wall Street's favor, so they are keeping quiet about this massive ongoing fraud, and, of course, the Obama White House, who received the most money ever for a presidential campaign from Wall Street, is demonstrating to Wall Street just what their largess has purchased. From HuPo, who picked up Simon Johnson's article in Baseline Scenario:

Last week, Senator Ted Kaufman (D., DE) gave a devastating speech in the Senate on "too big to fail" and all it entails. A long public silence from our political class was broken -- and to great effect. Today's Dodd reform proposals stand in pale comparison to the principles outlined by Senator Kaufman. And yes, DE stands for Delaware -- corporate America has finally decided that its largest financial offspring are way out of line and must be reined in.

Now, the Senator has gone one better, putting many private criticisms of the financial sector -- the kind you hear whispered with conviction on the Upper East Side and in Midtown -- firmly and articulately on the public record in a Senate floor speech to be delivered tomorrow (this is a direct link to speech). He pulls no punches:
   

"fraud and potential criminal conduct were at the heart of the financial crisis"

He goes after Lehman -- with its infamous Repo 105 -- as well as the other entities potentially implicated in those transactions, including Ernst and Young (Lehman's auditors). This is the low hanging fruit -- but have you heard even a squeak from the White House or anyone else in the country's putative leadership on this issue?

And then he goes for the twin jugulars of Wall Street as it still stands: The idea that we saved something, at great expense in 2008-09, that was actually worth saving; and Goldman Sachs.
   

"[T]his is not about retribution. This is about addressing the continuum of behavior that took place -- some of it fraudulent and illegal -- and in the process addressing what Wall Street and the legal and regulatory system underlying its behavior have become."

I certainly hope that Sen. Kaufman, D. Del. does, as Simon suggests, have the tacit approval of the preponderance of the many corporations incorporated in Delaware. Wall Street's activities have long since ceased to benefit any but themselves. Divide and conquer could spell the end of the cover-up, of Wall Street and the existing system of financialization. I dream. But their goal would be to save corporatism by sacrificing some of Wall Street.

(Everywhere a "(here)" appears in Wray's text there is a link that I did not incorporate. It is way past my bedtime.)

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 01:52:19 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Lehman was using repo 105s to temporarily convert securities into cash at the time of quarterly book closings, to make its accounts look better (less leveraged, mainly).

At some point it ran out of securities that its (commercial) counterparties would accept as collateral for these very short term cash loans. And that's where apparently the Fed took over, by taking in junk in exchange for fresh cash.

Amazing.

Wind power

by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 05:30:17 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Amazing
Geithner told Congress that he has never been a regulator. (see here) That is a quite honest assessment of his job performance, although it is completely inaccurate as a description of his duties as President of the NYFed. Apparently, Geithner has never met an accounting gimmick that he does not like, if it appears to improve the reported finances of a Wall Street firm.
I think Congress should drop on Geithner like a ton of bricks.

The brainless should not be in banking -- Willem Buiter
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 06:05:59 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The level of awesome™ here is frying my Geiger counter
Lehman's had been using this trick since 2001
In other words, when the .com bubble burst it should have taken Lehman Brothers with it. It didn't. Instead, Lehman was allowed to cook the books until well after the next bubble burst.

The brainless should not be in banking -- Willem Buiter
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 06:10:07 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Who thinks Lehman is the only 'investment' bank capable of systematic dishonesty?

Lying is what very serious people do for a living. The head nodding, think tank funding and suit wearing are just protective colouration.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 09:36:00 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Is this in the same league?

BBC: ECB lends $500bn€350bn to lower rates (18 December 2007)

All banks with enough collateral, and which submitted bids of at least 4.21%, received funds from the ECB.

The ECB said 390 banks across the eurozone had sought the funding.

The move - making the extra cash available over the next two weeks -will ease fears of a credit meltdown over the Christmas period, when banks need extra cash.

I'm not sure any more what's legitimate and what's accounting fraud (borderline or outright).

I mean, how is ease fears of a credit meltdown over the Christmas period, when banks need extra cash [to close their year-end books] different from Jérôme's temporarily convert securities into cash at the time of quarterly book closings, to make its accounts look better?

Lehman was using repo 105s to temporarily convert securities into cash at the time of quarterly book closings, to make its accounts look better (less leveraged, mainly).

At some point it ran out of securities that its (commercial) counterparties would accept as collateral for these very short term cash loans. And that's where apparently the Fed took over, by taking in junk in exchange for fresh cash.

What's so
Amazing
here?

The brainless should not be in banking -- Willem Buiter
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 10:13:05 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The ECB action looks like a panic one-off loan - effectively a short-term overdraft for the banks to cover cash flow requirements.

The Lehman innovation was systematic misreporting of its solvency, repeated quarterly to give a misleading impression to markets - aided by the Fed, which presumably was doing similar deals elsewhere on Wall St.

It's the difference between a one-off loan with full disclosure, and a quick bung between friends, which is never reported or disclosed.

In the UK it's illegal for a company to trade while insolvent. Lehman was insolvent in real terms, and was hiding that fact behind a facade of misreporting, creative accounting and generous undisclosed cash handouts from Timmy.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 10:36:59 AM EST
[ Parent ]
In the UK it's illegal for a company to trade while insolvent.

So it is in Spain. However, a Decree was enacted on December 12 2008 providing that losses on real state investments or inventory are not computed for the purposes of technical insolvency. Just in time to close the books for the year, I might point out.

The brainless should not be in banking -- Willem Buiter

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 10:58:34 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The ECB has explicit standards for collateral. The Fed seems to have taken complete (unrated) junk from Lehman.

Wind power
by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 02:06:17 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I guess the Fed had swallowed the ideological position that a central bank need only carry out only open market operations and set the base interest rate hook, line and sinker; to the point that they had forgotten how to operate the discount window.

The brainless should not be in banking -- Willem Buiter
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 04:12:44 PM EST
[ Parent ]
At some point (Lehman) ran out of securities that its (commercial) counterparties would accept as collateral...

That point might have been five years ago! IIRCC, Repo 105 only accounted for around $50 billion of the >$300 billion hole that suddenly appeared on Lehman's books. It may be that "cash for trash" "Special Investment Vehicles, (SIVs), courtesy of the Fed, accounted for the rest.

Gotta love the multiple meanings of "accounted." And who says the financialization industry doesn't have a brutal sense of humor. A long term repo written around trash and held by a subsidiary or the friendly Fed is a SIV!

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 01:19:28 PM EST
[ Parent ]
At some point it ran out of securities that its (commercial) counterparties would accept as collateral for these very short term cash loans. And that's where apparently the Fed took over, by taking in junk in exchange for fresh cash.
It appears that's not correct, and may be an exaggeration by the New York Times when they say
They were considered the dregs of Lehman Brothers -- "bottom of the barrel," as one banker put it. But as Lehman executives tried to keep the floundering bank afloat in 2008, they used these troubled investments to raise quick cash that helped mask the extent of the firm's troubles. And they did it with the help of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
If Lehman brothers an out of willing counterparties it was not because of the quality of the assets, but because its own creditworthiness was deteriorating, and because of the high value of liquidity. Specifically, according to FT Alphaville's What's in Repo 105
But what exactly was Lehman Bros stuffing into the Repo 105 sausage?

Perhaps counter-intuitively it was not using the stuff on its balance sheet that was hardest to sell into markets.

Rather, it was the most liquid -- things like A- to AAA-rated securities, Treasuries and Agency debt, which you can see in the below table, from the Examiner's Report (Appendix 17)

What this means is that Lehman was using Repo 105 exclusively to reduce its leverage (by shrinking its balance sheet) rather than to get liquidity. It needed to put good quality collateral into the Repo 105 in order to find willing counterparties. Of course, as the crisis worsened it had to turn to the Fed, but the collateral seems to have been good (or, at least, blessed with a good rating by the agencies) except for a 5-10 percent of the total value of the Repo 105. Tyler Durden of Zero Hedge writes in The "Repo 105" Scam: How Lehman Fooled Everyone (Including Allegedly Dick Fuld) And How Other Banks Are Likely Doing This Right Now
In August 2008, just before it was over, the firm allowed $55 million, or seven securities, rated CCC to be included in a Repo 105 transaction.
$55 million is just 0.1% of the $50bn that Lehman shifted off of its balance sheet in the second quarter of 2008 alone (link to HuffPo). Tyler Durden proceeds:
The next chart makes it evident it that 105s were used simply to game the firm's assets into quarter end (yellow highlights), by reducing overall asset for leverage ratio calculations.

That this scam was going unsupervised (just who the hell were the counterparties?) for many years, and that many banks are likely using it right now to fool investors, regulators, rating agencies, and the idiots at the FRBNY (who certainly also know about this), is beyond criminal. Yet that nobody will go to jail for this is as certain as the market going up another 10% tomorrow. A full investigation has to be conducted immediately into whether existing Wall Street firms, and in particular those who use Ernst & Young as auditors, are currently abusing public confidence via such transactions.

The "scam" is not that they were getting cash for junk, but that they were reporting repos as sales, not as financial transactions.

The brainless should not be in banking -- Willem Buiter
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 04:45:27 PM EST
[ Parent ]
President Obama must hold Geithner accountable. He must determine what did Geithner know, and when did he know it.
Remind me again what the stated justification was for Obama to appoint Geithner Treasury Secretary? Can we say fox in the henhouse?

The brainless should not be in banking -- Willem Buiter
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 06:16:56 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Can we say Fox Industrial Chicken Harvesting Inc?

It's becoming less and less clear who exactly appointed whom. See also:

Senator Kaufman Makes A Stand Against The Criminality Exposed By The Lehman Examiner Report, Questions The Core Principles Of US Democracy | zero hedge

One person, however, who refuses to let it go, is Senator Ted Kaufman, whose determined support for an overhaul of market structure we have followed over the past year. The Senator now moves on to yet another pressing issue: the disclosures of unprecedented impropriety conducted by virtually every person of responsibility within the Lehman organization, as well as associated firms like Ernst & Young, and regulators who were asleep at the wheel during the moment of greatest stress for the American financial system. Kaufman calls for a "a thorough investigation, both civil and criminal, to identify every last person who had knowledge that Lehman was misleading the public about its troubled balance sheet - and that means everyone from the Lehman executives, to its board of directors, to its accounting firm, Ernst & Young. Moreover, if the foreign bank counterparties who purchased the now infamous "Repo 105s" were complicit in the scheme, they should be held accountable as well."

So what happens now?

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 09:46:22 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Kaufman calls for a "a thorough investigation, both civil and criminal, to identify every last person who had knowledge that Lehman was misleading the public about its troubled balance sheet - and that means everyone from the Lehman executives, to its board of directors, to its accounting firm, Ernst & Young. Moreover, if the foreign bank counterparties who purchased the now infamous "Repo 105s" were complicit in the scheme, they should be held accountable as well."

Funny the (New York) Fed is not mentioned...

The brainless should not be in banking -- Willem Buiter

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 09:49:39 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I noticed that too.

I wonder how the audit bill is doing.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 10:03:31 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Noting how the Catholic church seems to pass off the repeated manifestations of priestly kiddy-fiddling as "a couple of bad apples, nothing institutional whatsoever, move along", I'm sure that we'll find that there were no systemic problems whatsoever, but it was just " a couple of bad apples".

Over and over again.

keep to the Fen Causeway

by Helen (lareinagal at yahoo dot co dot uk) on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 11:00:51 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Deal Book (NY Times blog): In Lehman's Demise, Some Shades of Enron (12 March, 2010)
The examiner's report gives us a new term for hiding problems on a corporate balance sheet that may become common parlance: "Repo 105." Starting in 2001, Lehman Brothers engaged in repurchase agreements, called "repos," which were described by DealBook as "what amounts to a short-term loan, exchanging collateral for cash up front, and then unwinding the trade as soon as overnight." Repos are  a common method for investment banks to finance their operations and are neither illegal nor questionable, at least when clearly accounted for.

Lehman Brothers went a step further by having the collateral exchange under the agreement worth 105 percent of the cash it received -- hence, the "105" in the firm's nomenclature. By doing so, that turned it into a sale for accounting purposes, so that the firm could move the assets it exchanged in the deal off of its balance sheet, at least for a short while.

As explained by DealBook, "That meant that for a few days -- and by the fourth quarter of 2007 that meant end-of-quarter -- Lehman could shuffle off tens of billions of dollars in assets to appear more financially healthy than it really was." By timing Repo 105 transactions to the end of a quarter, the reports filed with the S.E.C. and reviewed by investors looked much better than what was going to be the case just a short time later. Enron did much the same thing with some of its assets, such as its notorious Nigerian barge deal.



The brainless should not be in banking -- Willem Buiter
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 10:20:33 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Here's what I don't understand.

A repo is, roughly, a contract where A pays B an amount X in exchange for collateral worth Y and the commitment to repurchase the collateral for Z at a later date.

Are we supposed to understand from the Repo 105 issue that, depending on the relative values of X, Y, and Z, the transaction may or may not be a sale or a derivative or a loan for accounting purposes? Can accounting regulations be this byzantine and at the same time this harebrained?

The brainless should not be in banking -- Willem Buiter

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 11:13:27 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Accounting regulations are decided by committees of accountants.
by Colman (colman at eurotrib.com) on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 11:27:30 AM EST
[ Parent ]
That explains it.

The brainless should not be in banking -- Willem Buiter
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 01:27:49 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Oh, worse. Many transnational corporate auditors are conniving thieves.

You can't be me, I'm taken
by Sven Triloqvist on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 11:27:55 AM EST
[ Parent ]
We have an answer from MarketBeat (WSJ blogs)
First off, what's a repo?: Repos, or repurchase agreements, are transactions which banks use to borrow cash short term. The deals involve raising cash to fund operations by lending out high-quality assets (usually Treasury bills) for a short period of time. As part of the deals, the banks agree to repurchase their collateral within days or weeks.

What is the accounting?: In most circumstances, these transactions are accounted for as a loan on the books of the company. Accountants can treat these agreements as sales of assets rather than loans, only if the companies show that the company receiving the loan does not retain control over the securities used as collateral.

How do you know if the company controls the securities or not?: Guidance in the accounting rules suggests that an exchange of securities in excess of 102% of the cash value would show a lack of control. So Lehman exchanged securities worth 105% of the cash it received, which is why they were called Repo 105 deals, according to the Lehman examiner's report. So according to the report, Lehman would get these things off its books, report earnings, showing lower leverage rationsratios, and then buy the assets back.

Let's replay that in slow motion:
Guidance in the accounting rules suggests that an exchange of securities in excess of 102% of the cash value would show a lack of control.
That's is the most stupid accounting regulation ever! There are all kinds of reasons for overcollateralization, and over-the-counter credit transactions (putting on an accountant's hat for a minute let's call them all loans) can include credit spreads above or below market interest rates. So, under US GAAP, if you slap a 200 basis point credit charge on a repo counterparty they get to book a collateralised loan as a sale!? WTF?

The brainless should not be in banking -- Willem Buiter
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 04:55:19 PM EST
[ Parent ]
In fact, it's a little more complicated than that. I guess the WSJ guy is right that GAAP gives that harebrained guidance about control being lost for collateral in excess of 102% of loan value, but it's likely that's not what Lehman was doing. According to the FT alphaville piece What's in Repo 105 that I linked to here
Lehman's own accounting policy required assets used for Repo 105 "be readily obtainable" -- i.e. liquid -- according to the report. Lehman's lawyers also recommended they be liquid so that "the Buyer could easily dispose of the Purchased Securities and acquire equivalent securities if it wished."
The first time I read that it struck me as odd - in a regular repo, the parties commit to exchanging the exact same security at the beginning and end of the transaction. But Lehman's, in order to make sure that the loss of control GAAP guidance applied, must have written into its repo contracts a clause allowing the counterparty to dispose of the collateral at will, as long as it returned an equivalent security at the end of the repo's life. But in order for this to be a meaningful clause, the security must have been highly liquid. Hence the internal requirement by the lawyers (not the accountants) that the assets be highly liquid.

Clever little buggers, Lehman Brothers...

The brainless should not be in banking -- Willem Buiter

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 05:35:41 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Still not clever enough...

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
by Starvid on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 07:26:50 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Every ponzi scheme comes to an end.

The brainless should not be in banking -- Willem Buiter
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 07:47:46 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Enron did much the same thing with some of its assets, such as its notorious Nigerian barge deal.
I got an email today from an executive in a big American bank telling me he had a barge in Nigeria he needed to move and did I have a couple million for a repo...

The brainless should not be in banking -- Willem Buiter
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 12:10:00 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I got an email today from an executive in a big American bank telling me he had a barge in Nigeria he needed to move and did I have a couple million for a repo...

For real?!


"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 01:03:45 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I was trying to make a joke about Nigerian scam email spam...

The brainless should not be in banking -- Willem Buiter
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 01:24:48 PM EST
[ Parent ]
These days, considering your day job, it is hard to know...  :-/

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 02:35:50 PM EST
[ Parent ]
E-mail him back and ask if he could get GS to write you a CDS around the deal at his expense

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 01:09:05 PM EST
[ Parent ]

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