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At some point it ran out of securities that its (commercial) counterparties would accept as collateral for these very short term cash loans. And that's where apparently the Fed took over, by taking in junk in exchange for fresh cash.
Amazing. Wind power
Geithner told Congress that he has never been a regulator. (see here) That is a quite honest assessment of his job performance, although it is completely inaccurate as a description of his duties as President of the NYFed. Apparently, Geithner has never met an accounting gimmick that he does not like, if it appears to improve the reported finances of a Wall Street firm.
Lehman's had been using this trick since 2001
Lying is what very serious people do for a living. The head nodding, think tank funding and suit wearing are just protective colouration.
BBC: ECB lends $500bn350bn to lower rates (18 December 2007)
All banks with enough collateral, and which submitted bids of at least 4.21%, received funds from the ECB. The ECB said 390 banks across the eurozone had sought the funding. The move - making the extra cash available over the next two weeks -will ease fears of a credit meltdown over the Christmas period, when banks need extra cash.
The ECB said 390 banks across the eurozone had sought the funding.
The move - making the extra cash available over the next two weeks -will ease fears of a credit meltdown over the Christmas period, when banks need extra cash.
I mean, how is ease fears of a credit meltdown over the Christmas period, when banks need extra cash [to close their year-end books] different from Jérôme's temporarily convert securities into cash at the time of quarterly book closings, to make its accounts look better?
Lehman was using repo 105s to temporarily convert securities into cash at the time of quarterly book closings, to make its accounts look better (less leveraged, mainly). At some point it ran out of securities that its (commercial) counterparties would accept as collateral for these very short term cash loans. And that's where apparently the Fed took over, by taking in junk in exchange for fresh cash.
Amazing
The Lehman innovation was systematic misreporting of its solvency, repeated quarterly to give a misleading impression to markets - aided by the Fed, which presumably was doing similar deals elsewhere on Wall St.
It's the difference between a one-off loan with full disclosure, and a quick bung between friends, which is never reported or disclosed.
In the UK it's illegal for a company to trade while insolvent. Lehman was insolvent in real terms, and was hiding that fact behind a facade of misreporting, creative accounting and generous undisclosed cash handouts from Timmy.
So it is in Spain. However, a Decree was enacted on December 12 2008 providing that losses on real state investments or inventory are not computed for the purposes of technical insolvency. Just in time to close the books for the year, I might point out. The brainless should not be in banking -- Willem Buiter
At some point (Lehman) ran out of securities that its (commercial) counterparties would accept as collateral...
Gotta love the multiple meanings of "accounted." And who says the financialization industry doesn't have a brutal sense of humor. A long term repo written around trash and held by a subsidiary or the friendly Fed is a SIV! "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
They were considered the dregs of Lehman Brothers -- "bottom of the barrel," as one banker put it. But as Lehman executives tried to keep the floundering bank afloat in 2008, they used these troubled investments to raise quick cash that helped mask the extent of the firm's troubles. And they did it with the help of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
But what exactly was Lehman Bros stuffing into the Repo 105 sausage? Perhaps counter-intuitively it was not using the stuff on its balance sheet that was hardest to sell into markets. Rather, it was the most liquid -- things like A- to AAA-rated securities, Treasuries and Agency debt, which you can see in the below table, from the Examiner's Report (Appendix 17)
Perhaps counter-intuitively it was not using the stuff on its balance sheet that was hardest to sell into markets.
Rather, it was the most liquid -- things like A- to AAA-rated securities, Treasuries and Agency debt, which you can see in the below table, from the Examiner's Report (Appendix 17)
In August 2008, just before it was over, the firm allowed $55 million, or seven securities, rated CCC to be included in a Repo 105 transaction.
The next chart makes it evident it that 105s were used simply to game the firm's assets into quarter end (yellow highlights), by reducing overall asset for leverage ratio calculations. That this scam was going unsupervised (just who the hell were the counterparties?) for many years, and that many banks are likely using it right now to fool investors, regulators, rating agencies, and the idiots at the FRBNY (who certainly also know about this), is beyond criminal. Yet that nobody will go to jail for this is as certain as the market going up another 10% tomorrow. A full investigation has to be conducted immediately into whether existing Wall Street firms, and in particular those who use Ernst & Young as auditors, are currently abusing public confidence via such transactions.
That this scam was going unsupervised (just who the hell were the counterparties?) for many years, and that many banks are likely using it right now to fool investors, regulators, rating agencies, and the idiots at the FRBNY (who certainly also know about this), is beyond criminal. Yet that nobody will go to jail for this is as certain as the market going up another 10% tomorrow. A full investigation has to be conducted immediately into whether existing Wall Street firms, and in particular those who use Ernst & Young as auditors, are currently abusing public confidence via such transactions.
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