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Deal Book (NY Times blog): In Lehman's Demise, Some Shades of Enron (12 March, 2010)
The examiner's report gives us a new term for hiding problems on a corporate balance sheet that may become common parlance: "Repo 105." Starting in 2001, Lehman Brothers engaged in repurchase agreements, called "repos," which were described by DealBook as "what amounts to a short-term loan, exchanging collateral for cash up front, and then unwinding the trade as soon as overnight." Repos are  a common method for investment banks to finance their operations and are neither illegal nor questionable, at least when clearly accounted for.

Lehman Brothers went a step further by having the collateral exchange under the agreement worth 105 percent of the cash it received -- hence, the "105" in the firm's nomenclature. By doing so, that turned it into a sale for accounting purposes, so that the firm could move the assets it exchanged in the deal off of its balance sheet, at least for a short while.

As explained by DealBook, "That meant that for a few days -- and by the fourth quarter of 2007 that meant end-of-quarter -- Lehman could shuffle off tens of billions of dollars in assets to appear more financially healthy than it really was." By timing Repo 105 transactions to the end of a quarter, the reports filed with the S.E.C. and reviewed by investors looked much better than what was going to be the case just a short time later. Enron did much the same thing with some of its assets, such as its notorious Nigerian barge deal.



The brainless should not be in banking -- Willem Buiter
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 10:20:33 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Here's what I don't understand.

A repo is, roughly, a contract where A pays B an amount X in exchange for collateral worth Y and the commitment to repurchase the collateral for Z at a later date.

Are we supposed to understand from the Repo 105 issue that, depending on the relative values of X, Y, and Z, the transaction may or may not be a sale or a derivative or a loan for accounting purposes? Can accounting regulations be this byzantine and at the same time this harebrained?

The brainless should not be in banking -- Willem Buiter

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 11:13:27 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Accounting regulations are decided by committees of accountants.
by Colman (colman at eurotrib.com) on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 11:27:30 AM EST
[ Parent ]
That explains it.

The brainless should not be in banking -- Willem Buiter
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 01:27:49 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Oh, worse. Many transnational corporate auditors are conniving thieves.

You can't be me, I'm taken
by Sven Triloqvist on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 11:27:55 AM EST
[ Parent ]
We have an answer from MarketBeat (WSJ blogs)
First off, what's a repo?: Repos, or repurchase agreements, are transactions which banks use to borrow cash short term. The deals involve raising cash to fund operations by lending out high-quality assets (usually Treasury bills) for a short period of time. As part of the deals, the banks agree to repurchase their collateral within days or weeks.

What is the accounting?: In most circumstances, these transactions are accounted for as a loan on the books of the company. Accountants can treat these agreements as sales of assets rather than loans, only if the companies show that the company receiving the loan does not retain control over the securities used as collateral.

How do you know if the company controls the securities or not?: Guidance in the accounting rules suggests that an exchange of securities in excess of 102% of the cash value would show a lack of control. So Lehman exchanged securities worth 105% of the cash it received, which is why they were called Repo 105 deals, according to the Lehman examiner's report. So according to the report, Lehman would get these things off its books, report earnings, showing lower leverage rationsratios, and then buy the assets back.

Let's replay that in slow motion:
Guidance in the accounting rules suggests that an exchange of securities in excess of 102% of the cash value would show a lack of control.
That's is the most stupid accounting regulation ever! There are all kinds of reasons for overcollateralization, and over-the-counter credit transactions (putting on an accountant's hat for a minute let's call them all loans) can include credit spreads above or below market interest rates. So, under US GAAP, if you slap a 200 basis point credit charge on a repo counterparty they get to book a collateralised loan as a sale!? WTF?

The brainless should not be in banking -- Willem Buiter
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 04:55:19 PM EST
[ Parent ]
In fact, it's a little more complicated than that. I guess the WSJ guy is right that GAAP gives that harebrained guidance about control being lost for collateral in excess of 102% of loan value, but it's likely that's not what Lehman was doing. According to the FT alphaville piece What's in Repo 105 that I linked to here
Lehman's own accounting policy required assets used for Repo 105 "be readily obtainable" -- i.e. liquid -- according to the report. Lehman's lawyers also recommended they be liquid so that "the Buyer could easily dispose of the Purchased Securities and acquire equivalent securities if it wished."
The first time I read that it struck me as odd - in a regular repo, the parties commit to exchanging the exact same security at the beginning and end of the transaction. But Lehman's, in order to make sure that the loss of control GAAP guidance applied, must have written into its repo contracts a clause allowing the counterparty to dispose of the collateral at will, as long as it returned an equivalent security at the end of the repo's life. But in order for this to be a meaningful clause, the security must have been highly liquid. Hence the internal requirement by the lawyers (not the accountants) that the assets be highly liquid.

Clever little buggers, Lehman Brothers...

The brainless should not be in banking -- Willem Buiter

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 05:35:41 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Still not clever enough...

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
by Starvid on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 07:26:50 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Every ponzi scheme comes to an end.

The brainless should not be in banking -- Willem Buiter
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 07:47:46 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Enron did much the same thing with some of its assets, such as its notorious Nigerian barge deal.
I got an email today from an executive in a big American bank telling me he had a barge in Nigeria he needed to move and did I have a couple million for a repo...

The brainless should not be in banking -- Willem Buiter
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 12:10:00 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I got an email today from an executive in a big American bank telling me he had a barge in Nigeria he needed to move and did I have a couple million for a repo...

For real?!


"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 01:03:45 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I was trying to make a joke about Nigerian scam email spam...

The brainless should not be in banking -- Willem Buiter
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 01:24:48 PM EST
[ Parent ]
These days, considering your day job, it is hard to know...  :-/

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 02:35:50 PM EST
[ Parent ]
E-mail him back and ask if he could get GS to write you a CDS around the deal at his expense

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Tue Mar 16th, 2010 at 01:09:05 PM EST
[ Parent ]

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