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"run on the banking system by the banking system."
"The current panic centered on the repo market, which suffered a run when lenders [whom he likens to depositors during Depression-era banking runs] required increasing haircuts, due to concerns about the value and liquidity of the collateral should the counterparty `bank' fail." These repo lenders also refused to rollover existing repos. Both actions created "massive deleveraging . . . resulting in the banking system being insolvent."
If I recall correctly, the total hole in Lehman's balance sheet was somewhere north of $300 billion, with Repo 105 accounting for ~$50 billion, unless that figure included both Repo 105 and 108. I got the impression that much of the rest was in held by The Fed as longer duration repos of some sort. Also that the Lehman bankruptcy was triggered by Morgan refusing to renew its transactions with Lehman. I do not know the nature of the transaction that Morgan refused to renew.
Unfortunately, I do not have all my sources individually bookmarked and don't have the time just now to look them up again. "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
Um, I don't think Repo 105 represents a 'hole' in the balance sheet in the usual sense. I mean it doesn't negatively impact on the solvency of the firm given it is a short-term swap of cash for good quality assets.
Granted, there is a 5% mismatch between the value of the cash and the collateral, which means the $50bn in Repo 105 resulted in an effective loss of $2.5bn - which 1) is recouped when the repo matures and you underpay by 5% when you repurchase the collateral; 2) is just 1% of the "hole" and, I suppose, 3) is a fair price to pay to reduce your leverage ratio.
If the amount of assets in the Repo 105 program had stayed constant (by rolling all the repos) rather than increasing at the time of closing the quarterly books the claim of intentional fraud would be much less plausible, and Lehman would just be taking a $2.5bn loss to permanently (as long as counterparties rolled the repos) shrink its leverage ratio. The brainless should not be in banking -- Willem Buiter
Banks lend long-term assets, and fund themselves short-term (be it deposits or borrowing in the money markets). This is in the nature of things as is unavoidable. Therefore, any bank is vulnerable to a run, which is defined as an inability to secure short-term funding to meet maturing liabilities (in other words, an inability to roll maturing short-term credit). In August 2007 the 3-month interbank market completely dried up for weeks, taking Northern Rock with it. Lehman Brothers, being a broker-dealer, had no deposits and also funded itself exclusively in the short-term money markets (repos, not Repo 105, would be an example of this). The run on the money markets took with it Bear Stearns and eventually Lehman Brothers, which I seem to recall was the smallest and by far the most highly leveraged of the four big US investment banks (Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and Merrill Lynch being the other three).
In the frame of Hyman Minsky's Stabilizing an Unstable Economy banks are by definition speculative, borrowing to pay the interest on their loans (this is what rolling short-term liabilities amounts to). When their leverage exceeds a certain threshold (which is lower if interest rates rise, which is what happened in the run on interbank credit 2 years ago) they become ponzi finance (ponzi finance is not a term of abuse in Minsky, just a name for a situation where you have to borrow to pay down the principal as well as the interest). The brainless should not be in banking -- Willem Buiter
Of course, as soon as you make it the basis for regulatory action, the thus regulated entities will try to figure out ways to game it. So we'd need to figure out whether it's robust against accounting gimmicks.
- Jake Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.
This is the opposite of the US financial regulation system, and in a large part depends on the political system, where banks can fund individual congressmen and senators to add complexity and exemptions. Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
Which is why that parameter needs to be reasonably robust against accounting gimmicks.
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