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Rating agencies are just the banker's attempt to solve the inescapable principal-agent problem given conditions of imperfect information (read: incentive to lie, even to yourself) by trying to establish an institutional wall between lenders and risk analysts by outsourcing to a pooled resource. It makes a lot of sense and is an improvement over what existed before, but it's a problem that has no permanent institutional solution.
I suppose you could imagine, in the long term, the SEC rating the rating agencies on the accuracy of their forecasts and removing certification from ones who failed to do a good.
For example, how well has the SEC actually performed its less critical job responsibilities up to now? So why would we expect it to do much better job with greater power and responsibility over rating agencies?
In this case, perhaps the tree of credit needs to be periodically watered with the blood of rating agencies.
And make all financial transactions public with standard non-vague on-book accounting definitions, so that anyone with a mind to can check a rating for themselves.
That's not the point. The point is the market only exists within the rules set up by government. The brainless should not be in banking -- Willem Buiter
And people will believe the ones paid by the billionaires with real skin in the game before the government bureaucrats, like they do now in every filed regulated by government ratings and analysis.
"People" and "wealthy investors" can believe whatever they want. The point here is to prevent the banks from counterfeiting, not to prevent market-worshippers from being separated from their money.
- Jake Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.
N months after a rating has been issued (where N possibly depends on the type of rating), the rating is compared to the actual reality. This information is then input into the Beatrice database.
The people who run the Beatrice database can then mine the now blinded data for noteworthy patterns. Any suspicious patterns discovered can be analysed independently, and only if they are actually damning is the Alice database contacted for retrieval of the identity of the suspicious author(s) and/or institution(s).
That's roughly analogous to how you'd blind a medical trial. It's not idiot-proof (no system is, and even if it were, the universe is continually working on inventing more creative idiots), and it's certainly not fraud-proof either (no institution in this universe can be made completely fraud-proof), but it would be head and shoulders above what we currently have.
(Assuming you even need rating agencies at all...)
And without proper regulation and oversight they might be encouraged to do so.
Hypothetically.
And how in gods name can they short a non-securitised loan they have issued themselves? Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
Becuase they can short and/or insure their own loans if the insurance and/or short is in danger of becoming more profitable than the potential loan loss.
This, however, requires that the sucker who is on the other end of the deal hasn't done his risk analysis properly.
Which really speaks more to the need for keeping widows and orphans out of the capital markets than to any need to rein in the capital markets' tendencies to separate suckers from their money. Because the former is possible - the latter may very well not be.
Rating agencies are just the banker's attempt to solve the inescapable principal-agent problem given conditions of imperfect information (read: incentive to lie, even to yourself) by trying to establish an institutional wall between lenders and risk analysts by outsourcing to a pooled resource. It makes a lot of sense and is an improvement over what existed before
The problem isn't, in and of itself, that the credit rating is outsourced.
The problem is that the credit rating - which, like all risk analysis is inherently (partly) political suddenly gets treated like an objective fact simply by the invocation of an Our Standards Are Poor "AAA" rating.
In that respect, it makes less sense than keeping it in-house: As long as it is done in-house, everybody who has eyes to see with will realise that the risk analysis is at least partly a matter of political fiat. By outsourcing it to a third party, it becomes easier to convince yourself that the resulting rating is an objective fact.
Even if we take as read that performing the political process of risk evaluation in a different organisational entity gives you objectively better data quality (something that is not altogether self-evident), it is perfectly possible that this superior data quality comes at a price of less competent and cautious data processing. And the quality of a decision is limited by the worst of the data and the protocols that deal with the data.
But I may be biased by the fact that I prefer to work with data whose pedigree I know...
Seems simple enough.
(Yeah, that would kill the entire securitisation market dead. That is a feature, not a bug.)
But due diligence is not what rating agencies do.
Well, that's quite clearly true.
Whether they should have been doing it is, hopefully, something that will be decided in the course of a fair an honest criminal trial.
Rating agencies are just supposed to predict the odds of default relative to alternative investments, assuming that what they've been informed about underlying collateral is true,
Then rating agencies are worth fuck all, if you'll excuse my French.
You need to see the underlying data to determine whether it is plausible. If the rating agencies are permitted to take the truth of the underlying data as read, then the investor still has to perform an independent analysis of the data. And once you're looking at the data yourself anyway, you might as well run the full battery of tests.
If you're an institutional investor then you should have that capability, unless the security in question is excessively complicated (in which case you don't want to buy it). If you're not an institutional investor, then you shouldn't be playing in the capital markets with money you can't afford to lose.
Institutional investors, on the other hand, should have the capability of analyzing the data before they buy anything, and most did.
Did have the capability, or did use the capability?
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