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all this has to do with the fact that the German banks lost much much more than reported
I don't know about losses, but here's Wolfgang Munchau:
Why this crisis will go all the way
at its core, it is not a sovereign debt crisis at all - but a highly interconnected banking crisis about to blow up. There is a dynamic at work that the macroeconomic data does not convey - and that the political response to the crisis does not address. Those inter-connections are even bigger than we had previously thought - but it should not be suprising given the massive current account imbalances in the eurozone. In its latest Quarterly Review, the Bank for International Settlements came out with some shocking figures. German banks have a $200bn exposure to Spain, $175bn to Ireland, and $50bn, respectively, to Greece and Portugal, making a total exposure to the four countries of almost $500bn, more than 20% of German GDP. French banks have an exposure of $250bn to Spain, $80bn to Ireland, $100bn to Greece, and $50bn to Portugal, also almost $500bn in exposures, but more than 25% of French GDP. Total foreign bank exposures are well over $1100bn to Spain and $800bn to Ireland. Add the four countries together, and you are arrive at more than $2 trillion. Now, I am not saying that there is $2 trillion of bad debt. I have no idea how big the portion of genuinely bad debt is. The problem is that no one else knows it either, and that includes the banks, which are now refusing to lend in the inter-banking market.
at its core, it is not a sovereign debt crisis at all - but a highly interconnected banking crisis about to blow up. There is a dynamic at work that the macroeconomic data does not convey - and that the political response to the crisis does not address.
Those inter-connections are even bigger than we had previously thought - but it should not be suprising given the massive current account imbalances in the eurozone. In its latest Quarterly Review, the Bank for International Settlements came out with some shocking figures. German banks have a $200bn exposure to Spain, $175bn to Ireland, and $50bn, respectively, to Greece and Portugal, making a total exposure to the four countries of almost $500bn, more than 20% of German GDP. French banks have an exposure of $250bn to Spain, $80bn to Ireland, $100bn to Greece, and $50bn to Portugal, also almost $500bn in exposures, but more than 25% of French GDP. Total foreign bank exposures are well over $1100bn to Spain and $800bn to Ireland. Add the four countries together, and you are arrive at more than $2 trillion.
Now, I am not saying that there is $2 trillion of bad debt. I have no idea how big the portion of genuinely bad debt is. The problem is that no one else knows it either, and that includes the banks, which are now refusing to lend in the inter-banking market.
In its latest Quarterly Review, the Bank for International Settlements came out with some shocking figures. German banks have a $200bn exposure to Spain, $175bn to Ireland, and $50bn, respectively, to Greece and Portugal, making a total exposure to the four countries of almost $500bn, more than 20% of German GDP. French banks have an exposure of $250bn to Spain, $80bn to Ireland, $100bn to Greece, and $50bn to Portugal, also almost $500bn in exposures, but more than 25% of French GDP. Total foreign bank exposures are well over $1100bn to Spain and $800bn to Ireland. Add the four countries together, and you are arrive at more than $2 trillion.
One of the stories of Roskilde Bank that didn't get much play at the time was that the bailout didn't bail out the depositors, and it didn't bail out the Danish banks.
It bailed out DeutcheBank and a couple of Dutch banks, who had been funding Roskilde Bank.
And the Danish financial sector unanimously pressed for the bailout, partly, of course, out of class loyalty, but mostly because they were afraid that DeutcheBank would take it personally and retaliate if they didn't.
- Jake Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.
with a little bit of luck we can get rif of it..and Merkel with it.
A pleasure I therefore claim to show, not how men think in myths, but how myths operate in men's minds without their being aware of the fact. Levi-Strauss, Claude
However, its severity has oscillated. It was really bad in August 2007, leading to the failure of Northern Rock. It was bad again in the summer of 2008, leading to the Lehman Brothers failure, Iceland's collapse, TARP and the G20. 2009 was the year of business as usual, and now this article claims there's been a serious draught for two months already... So, is another September failure to be expected? By laying out pros and cons we risk inducing people to join the debate, and losing control of a process that only we fully understand. - Alan Greenspan
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