I'm not sure what you think that piece proves. Sure, if you define the neocons as being part and parcel of the Israel Lobby, then the neocons are part and parcel of the Israel Lobby. Duh.

Your argument in the diary was that the neocon project was primarily about furthering Israel's Likud's interests. Your argument in this subthread was that the attack on Iraq was primarily about furthering Israel's Likud's interests.

Nobody doubts that the neocons are, at the moment, strong supporters of the Israeli far-right (whether the attack on Iraq furthered Israeli interests, or even Israeli far-right interests, is more debatable). What remains to be adequately argued is that this support is central to the neocon project. In other words, everybody agrees that there is wagging going on, but who's the tail and who's the dog?

One way to shed some light on the matter would be to go through some of the major flip-flops of American, neocon and/or Israeli foreign policy over the last couple of decades. Then one could investigate whether the three actors flipped at the same time, or one or two of them maintained an independent line.

If two actors did flip at the same time, one would have to check whether there were plausible reasons for their objective interests to change in concert. If there were no such commonality of interests, one could conclude that the actor that changed against its best interests was being influenced by the other actor. If there turned out to be a commonality of interests, one could still infer something about the relationship from the timing - the leading actor is more likely to be the originator of the change than the lagging actor.

For example, in the 1980's, back when quite a lot of the neocons were involved in the Raygun/Bush the Elder administration, Saddam Hussein and the neocons were best buddies. This changed around the early 1990's. There's a couple of plausible reasons for why the American and/or neocon stance on Iraq would change (the collapse of the Soviet Union reduced Iranian power, which in turn reduced the need for a countervailing influence; Iraq lost their war against Iran, reducing their value both as a client state and as a countervailing force; the US needed a third-world country to throw up against the wall to demonstrate that they were the only show in the post-Soviet town, and the air defences around Damaskus were too good).

Was Israel hostile to Iraq in the 1980's?

If so, that would be a strike against the argument put forth in your diary: When, in the 1980's, the neocons were given the choice between supporting their vision for the US and supporting Israeli policy, they chose the US.

If not, when did Israel change its stance vis-a-vis Iraq? If they did so before the neocons, and the neocons changed stance before the US, one might reasonably infer that the policy change was being promoted by Israel through the neocons. If, OTOH, the neocons became hostile to Iraq before the US and Israel became hostile to Iraq after the US did, it would indicate that the neocons influenced American policy, and Israel followed American policy. Finally, if the US turned against Iraq before both Israel and the neocons, it would indicate that both Israel and the neocons are in the tail, and some other faction or factions are in the dog.

That's an empirical question. I don't know enough to answer it right now, but it should be possible to answer.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.