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That is, the reason that China is not "responsible for the imbalance because it saves too much", is that "saving too much" cannot cause an imbalance. If there is such a thing as "saving too much" causing anything. It is a symptom, not a cause.
Evidently, China is in part responsible for the imbalance because of its discounted exchange rate policy, just as the US is in part responsible for the imbalance because of the same discounted exchange rate policy.
After all, China could not discount the ¥RMB/US$ exchange rate on its own without the US electing to tolerate the discount. All the US need do is to discount back, and the originally discounted exchange rate nation will be under proportionally more imported inflationary pressure than the originally overvalued exchange rate nation. Its a game of chicken race to the cliff with the Chinese car starting out closer to the cliff.
Greece and Germany are a different case because they have an exchange rate pegged at €1:€1. Under a fixed exchange rate system, the surplus country has more power to determine policy stance than the deficit country. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
All the US need do is to discount back, and the originally discounted exchange rate nation will be under proportionally more imported inflationary pressure than the originally overvalued exchange rate nation.
Why?
And doesn't that depend on the relative mix of structural imports from third parties? If the US has to import more, say, oil than China does, then the US would be the first to have to back out of a competitive devaluation in the face of cost-push inflation, no? (Yes, I know that oil is priced in dollars, but presumably the oil producing states would not keep doing that in the face of a serious competitive devaluation. Or maybe they would because the US has more control over them than commonly imagined, in which case they would count as domestic production for the purpose of this analysis.)
- Jake Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.
Under a fixed exchange rate system, the surplus country has more power to determine policy stance than the deficit country.
a part of the reason that the Bretton Woods system collapsed? That the US was no longer willing to play ball in a system that favoured surplus countries when it went from being a surplus to a deficit country due to its colonial adventure in Indochina?
Further, the Chinese economy, as a prime manufacturing site currently organised around importing large volumes of raw materials to feed the factories is (% wise) much more vulnerable than the US to cost-push.
Of course this gets complicated because how much of the "cost-push" in China gets passed on to the US because you can't change the mix of US-China trade that quickly (lots of trade internal to companies).
China is already striking a balance between capture of export markets and cost of essential imports. If it fights to maintain a stable US$ exchange rate while the US counter by discounting the US$ against the ROW, the ¥RMB drops against the ROW.
With the Chinese about where they want to be and the US above where we would want to be under a neo-mercentalist stance, they'd be experiencing problems while we were still experiencing gains. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
the reason that China is not "responsible for the imbalance because it saves too much", is that "saving too much" cannot cause an imbalance. If there is such a thing as "saving too much" causing anything. It is a symptom, not a cause.
I suspect that supply-side economics is consistent with the view that savings causes investment. This is inconsistent with Keynes' paradox of thrift. Therefore in a Keynesian view saving doesn't cause investment. It is either that investment causes saving or that there's a third common cause of both.
Causal relationships are extremely difficult to infer from data. You run into correlation is not causation, as well as the problem of what direction causation runs in (post hoc ergo propter hoc being a possible problem here). And since economics is not experimental but historical, one would have to do a thorough historical study and then ensure that no external factors have been overlooked that can introduce a spurious apparent direction of causation.
Is economics ultimately a collection of just-so stories? Do we like the paradox of thrift because it is consistent with solidarity politics? By laying out pros and cons we risk inducing people to join the debate, and losing control of a process that only we fully understand. - Alan Greenspan
However, I like the Paradox of Thrift because it appears to match the reality of what happened in the Great Depression and indeed in previous episodes of deflation...
Is economics ultimately a collection of just-so stories? Do we like the paradox of thrift because it is consistent with solidarity politics?
I think economics, done properly (rare, I know), lends itself more to our way of thinking than is commonly thought because of what passes for economics on television.
What it should be is a combination of sociology, political science, logic, and statistics. What it winds up being in too many cases is mathematics' retarded brother.
Simon Johnson's blog had a post up on this the other day that made a point I've -- clumsily -- tried to make in the past, noting differences in opinion between PhD economists and undergraduates (the former being quite a bit more liberal than the latter): Studying economics as an undergraduate tends to correlate with becoming a Republican, but going on to a PhD tends to swing the person back to the left.
A little bit of economics can be a dangerous thing.
You have to get fairly deep into the subject, or you wind up believing crazy shit because your Macro 101 textbook had a pretty graph and your professor was more interested in writing papers than teaching properly. You get people believing that RATEX is actually true rather than simply a tool for isolating other variables, which leads to all kinds of other absurdities.
Part of it is a time problem, I think. It's difficult to fit the basic concepts of the different areas into a semester, let alone really dig into information asymmetries, price and wage adjustment, etc. At best they'll tend to be covered to some extent in the intermediate-level classes. And I'd guess most students aren't really interested in diving that deep into the field. They just want the degree. Be nice to America. Or we'll bring democracy to your country.
A little bit of economics can be a dangerous thing. You have to get fairly deep into the subject, or you wind up believing crazy shit because your Macro 101 textbook had a pretty graph and your professor was more interested in writing papers than teaching properly. You get people believing that RATEX is actually true rather than simply a tool for isolating other variables, which leads to all kinds of other absurdities.
If you only take a first-year physics course you may end up believing in a clockwork universe, but at least planets and billiard balls and boxes on slopes will behave as advertised in your textbook... And any misconceptions you may take away don't have toxic sociopolitical consequences. By laying out pros and cons we risk inducing people to join the debate, and losing control of a process that only we fully understand. - Alan Greenspan
I'm sure it's always been that way to some extent, but it used to be that Samuelson's textbook was quite common.
Although Krugman's intro texts are gaining some steam, as I understand it. Be nice to America. Or we'll bring democracy to your country.
This is rather more expensive than producing a textbook, but it would be very much more effective.
Bureaucrats work better if the believe in their organizations cause, and multi-nationals are no exception. Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se
That's not a GAAP. GAAP records spending. Spending amounts (values) are classified either asset or liability.
Balance sheet asset category, "investment activity," refers to both cash equivalent value of securities held for sale (of which guidance boards permit a variety of valuation methodologies including purchase price applicable to this asset type) and income, if any, from interest- and dividend-earning securities.
"savings = investment" is a finance supposition; it's not even a mathematical identity. Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.
Savings identity or the savings investment identity is a concept in National Income Accounting stating that the amount saved (S) in an economy will be amount invested (I). More specifically, in an open economy (an economy with foreign trade and capital flows), governmental borrowing plus private investment must equal private savings plus foreign investment. In other words, investment must be financed by some combination of private domestic savings, government savings (surplus), and foreign savings (foreign capital inflows). Note that this is an "identity", meaning it is true by definition. This identity only holds true because investment here is defined as including inventories. Thus, should consumers decide to save more, and spend less, the fall in demand would lead to an increase in business inventories. The change in inventories brings savings and investment into balance without any intention by business to increase investment.
Note that this is an "identity", meaning it is true by definition. This identity only holds true because investment here is defined as including inventories. Thus, should consumers decide to save more, and spend less, the fall in demand would lead to an increase in business inventories. The change in inventories brings savings and investment into balance without any intention by business to increase investment.
savings investment identity is a concept in National Income Accounting
"National income accounting" is what it is, a model to estimate GNP/GDP. Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.
"savings = investment" is not an "accounting identity" because, according to GAAP, savings is money (or cash equivalent) not spent or otherwise disposed --even for a productive purpose such as "investment." Savings is an amount of retained income. The only "savings" recorded in a financial statement, according to GAAP, is the market value of cash. Currency is an asset type recorded on a balance sheet; the value fluctuates from reporting period to reporting period.
Value terminology employed for national income accounting purposes remotely resemble those standardized by GAAP. That annoys me.
I apologize for commenting on the subject. Again. Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.
Otherwise, this is like a physicist, a chemist, and a perpetual motion machine crank getting annoyed at each other for using different meanings of the words "free energy" By laying out pros and cons we risk inducing people to join the debate, and losing control of a process that only we fully understand. - Alan Greenspan
What's wrong with that picture or how do actual accounting and actual national accounting differ from it? By laying out pros and cons we risk inducing people to join the debate, and losing control of a process that only we fully understand. - Alan Greenspan
Money nonconservation comes from credit in the form of intertemporal links. By laying out pros and cons we risk inducing people to join the debate, and losing control of a process that only we fully understand. - Alan Greenspan
The more volatile transaction prices and volumes are, the larger will this unsigned sum of net money flows be, and the more credit will be created to prevent parts of the network from dying (going bankrupt). This means that inflation is correlated with market volatility.
So, the freer the market the larger the inflation of the money mass. Price and volume control, be it through market power or regulation, reduces volatility and the pressure to create credit and inflation. By laying out pros and cons we risk inducing people to join the debate, and losing control of a process that only we fully understand. - Alan Greenspan
Let's see, if there is a cash flow on an edge, the amount is subtracted from the balance of the starting node, and added to the balance of the end node. The total of the balances doesn't change.
Instead of exchanging cash along an edge, an IOU at a discount may be exchanged. Say A has to pay B 100 but instead pays B with an IOU for 105 payable a year later, with "the market" agreeing that that IOU has a present value of 100. The balance sheets of A and B still change in ±100 now, so the total balance is still conserved.
But the total side of the whole network's asset (or liability) side has increased because this IOU didn't use to exist. By laying out pros and cons we risk inducing people to join the debate, and losing control of a process that only we fully understand. - Alan Greenspan
Gah, ±100. By laying out pros and cons we risk inducing people to join the debate, and losing control of a process that only we fully understand. - Alan Greenspan
Its just that that gravitation toward full employment is not based on any empirical cause and effect explanation, its based on the way the model needs to be built to use the traditional analytical toolkit.
So, yes, non-empirical mainstream economics certainly is just a series of Just So stories. If we want empirical economics, we have to abandon the idea of making the re-use of a particular analytical toolkit the defining feature of mainstream economics, and replace it with an effort to provide cause and effect explanations about the material provisioning of society. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
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