The European Tribune is a forum for thoughtful dialogue of European and international issues. You are invited to post comments and your own articles.
Please REGISTER to post.
Liikanen isn't from a "major" country...
This is a feature, not a bug.
The new ECB chair will come into office in the middle of the worst constitutional crisis the European Union has had since... Hell, I can't remember the any worse crisis the European Union has gone through. And all the "major" -zone countries (except maybe - maybe - France) have a major dog in this fight. That's what makes it a serious crisis. Nobody from Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy or Iberia could ever be seen as an honest broker, and another Frenchman wouldn't be acceptable for the reasons outlined in the diary. The UK has an opt-out, so they're obviously not in the picture.
That leaves Estonia, Slovenia, Finland, Slovakia, Austria, Belgium (who may be about to get a dog in the fight too), the Netherlands and Malta, Cypern and Luxembourg.
I think we want a Belgian of reasonable accessability of mind, because a Belgian is enough of a Good Old Boy that he should be acceptable to the Germans, but on the other hand, Belgium is about to become a graphic example of the fact that this is not a North/South conflict but a deficit/surplus conflict. The danger of backing a Belgian candidate is that Belgium might be attacked too soon, or not at all, leading him to become unacceptably partisan before his election, or to not draw the right conclusions after he is elected.
- Jake Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.
Sixten Korkman, the Managing Director of the Research Institute of the Finnish Economy, is the best economist we have. He might yet become the Bank of Finland Governor. You can't be me, I'm taken
The left has no clue what do they stand for.
Sixten Korkman, the Managing Director of the Research Institute of the Finnish Economy,
Thanks, but no thanks. Korkman's only public comment i've seen has been the criticism of Uusipaavalniemi, the only man in the whole country who criticises banks.
Liikanen isn't from a "major" country... This is a feature, not a bug.
Or maybe there will - blame it all on the French speakers and take the attacks as a way to apply a "good bank/bad bank" solution to Belgium, along linguistic lines... Keynesianism is intellectually hard, as evidenced by the inability of many trained economists to get it - Paul Krugman
I think it's clear Germany has been lining up its ducks by not bidding for any major EU post in the 2009- cycle. Keynesianism is intellectually hard, as evidenced by the inability of many trained economists to get it - Paul Krugman
Is Draghi totally evil for having worked for GS? Is there not a tiny parcel of good in every human being? </desperate>
"The euro is solid," Draghi told a gathering of market operators in Naples," but he called on the EU to extend and reform its economic structures "with the same vigour it devoted over the years to consolidating government budgets."
There were even the lies contradicting the Governor of the Bank, Draghi, who had said something true, namely that there are 1,600,000 Italians who risk finding themselves completely up the creek if they lose their job, because there is no social safety net to soften the blow. Probably the number is even more than 1,600,000, but the fact that the Governor said this was already an interesting fact. Berlusconi, who was evidently asleep during Draghi's speech, as often happens, afterwards said: Draghi made an excellent Berlusconian speech. Later he found out that Draghi had said that there were 1,600,000 people who stood to lose everything while the government was doing nothing, and at that point Berlusconi says: the data are not true. Actually the data are true, and may even be underestimates.
It appears that the only revolutionary left in Italy is the head of Italian fed reserve, Mario Draghi who insists that workers be paid more.
We're fucked.
I mean, is there a German candidate we would like? Weber, Stark and Regling are obviously hawks, though it is unclear whether Regling would oppose having his EFSF give Greece a relatively cheap loan so Greece can repurchase its bonds... Keynesianism is intellectually hard, as evidenced by the inability of many trained economists to get it - Paul Krugman
Workers hungry to share in the spoils of Germany's booming economy through higher wages have been given encouragement from a surprising place: the country's pro-business Economy Minister Rainer Brüderle.
This really is about surplus vs. deficit countries, and the deficit countries have no other weapon but the nuclear option: to default. Keynesianism is intellectually hard, as evidenced by the inability of many trained economists to get it - Paul Krugman
I think we want a Belgian
See this thread:
Very interesting first roundup of the year from Eurointelligence: A year of truth for the eurozone ...Is Merkel ready to drop Axel Weber for the ECB job? Frankfurter Allgemeine has an interesting if speculative article about why Merkel might drop Weber in the race for the ECB presidency. The theory goes like this: Merkel is getting closer to Sarkozy on the euro because Germany wants the ECB to help out where governments are constrained for political reasons - through bond purchases, continuation of flexible lending policies, and low interest rates. For example, Germany opposes an extension of the EFSF's size and mandate, while the ECB wants governments to solve the problem. Weber might not be the most conducive candidate for a compliant ECB. The paper quotes an official close to Merkel as saying that Germany was no longer pushing for a German central banker at the top of the ECB, but for the most qualified central banker. The authors of the Herdentrieb blog predicted that Klaus Regling would get the job.Who is Klaus Regling? Would we like him as a Central Banker?
...
Is Merkel ready to drop Axel Weber for the ECB job? Frankfurter Allgemeine has an interesting if speculative article about why Merkel might drop Weber in the race for the ECB presidency. The theory goes like this: Merkel is getting closer to Sarkozy on the euro because Germany wants the ECB to help out where governments are constrained for political reasons - through bond purchases, continuation of flexible lending policies, and low interest rates. For example, Germany opposes an extension of the EFSF's size and mandate, while the ECB wants governments to solve the problem. Weber might not be the most conducive candidate for a compliant ECB. The paper quotes an official close to Merkel as saying that Germany was no longer pushing for a German central banker at the top of the ECB, but for the most qualified central banker. The authors of the Herdentrieb blog predicted that Klaus Regling would get the job.
Frankfurter Allgemeine has an interesting if speculative article about why Merkel might drop Weber in the race for the ECB presidency. The theory goes like this: Merkel is getting closer to Sarkozy on the euro because Germany wants the ECB to help out where governments are constrained for political reasons - through bond purchases, continuation of flexible lending policies, and low interest rates. For example, Germany opposes an extension of the EFSF's size and mandate, while the ECB wants governments to solve the problem. Weber might not be the most conducive candidate for a compliant ECB. The paper quotes an official close to Merkel as saying that Germany was no longer pushing for a German central banker at the top of the ECB, but for the most qualified central banker. The authors of the Herdentrieb blog predicted that Klaus Regling would get the job.
his past experience also recommends Mr Regling for the job. The 59-year-old has spent the better part of four decades flitting between the IMF, Germany's finance ministry and Brussels. He played a key role in drawing up the Stability and Growth Pact in the 1990s while based at the German finance ministry. The pact, which was a condition Germany insisted on before agreeing to give up its precious D-mark, was intended to rein in profligacy among countries using the euro and prevent the mess that they are now in. Mr Regling then spent much of the past decade trying to enforce it as the director-general for economic and financial affairs at the European Commission.
Yglesias: The Latvian CatastropheKlaus Regling, chief executive of the European Financial Stability Facility, wants you to know that monetary union without fiscal integration is workable after all and he offers, as an example, Latvia:Latvia which has a currency pegged to the euro, testifies to the success of this policy. Contrary to commentators who predicted disaster for Latvia early last year unless it gave up its hard peg - in line with advice from the commission - it did not devalue its exchange rate. A real effective devaluation was achieved through severe cuts in nominal income. Today its economy is growing again. Those outside "experts", who always seem to know what is good for Europe, should take note.So to be clear about this, the Latvian economy suffered a 4.2 percent contraction in 2008. By way of comparison, in the horrible year of 2009 the US economy contracted 2.44 percent. So that was a very bad recession, much worse than the American recession. At this point, so called "outside `experts'" predicted disaster for Latvia in early 2009 unless it devalued its exchange rate. Latvia declined to devalue and its GDP shrunk 18 percent! That's the disaster right there. Overall GDP growth for 2010 is forecast to be slightly negative again. So, yes, Latvia has returned the growth. But the toll was terrifyingly high.I despair, I truly do.
Klaus Regling, chief executive of the European Financial Stability Facility, wants you to know that monetary union without fiscal integration is workable after all and he offers, as an example, Latvia:Latvia which has a currency pegged to the euro, testifies to the success of this policy. Contrary to commentators who predicted disaster for Latvia early last year unless it gave up its hard peg - in line with advice from the commission - it did not devalue its exchange rate. A real effective devaluation was achieved through severe cuts in nominal income. Today its economy is growing again. Those outside "experts", who always seem to know what is good for Europe, should take note.So to be clear about this, the Latvian economy suffered a 4.2 percent contraction in 2008. By way of comparison, in the horrible year of 2009 the US economy contracted 2.44 percent. So that was a very bad recession, much worse than the American recession. At this point, so called "outside `experts'" predicted disaster for Latvia in early 2009 unless it devalued its exchange rate. Latvia declined to devalue and its GDP shrunk 18 percent! That's the disaster right there. Overall GDP growth for 2010 is forecast to be slightly negative again. So, yes, Latvia has returned the growth. But the toll was terrifyingly high.
Latvia which has a currency pegged to the euro, testifies to the success of this policy. Contrary to commentators who predicted disaster for Latvia early last year unless it gave up its hard peg - in line with advice from the commission - it did not devalue its exchange rate. A real effective devaluation was achieved through severe cuts in nominal income. Today its economy is growing again. Those outside "experts", who always seem to know what is good for Europe, should take note.
The hard-hitting reports by the new Central Bank governor Patrick Honohan and international banking experts Klaus Regling and Max Watson published yesterday heavily criticised misguided government economic policies, a weak system of financial regulation and poor bank lending.
Jaime Caruana (born March 14, 1952) is the General Manager of the Bank for International Settlements. His five-year term began on April 1, 2009. He was also the Governor of the Bank of Spain from July 2000 to July 2006.
Note the term of his current appointment. Keynesianism is intellectually hard, as evidenced by the inability of many trained economists to get it - Paul Krugman
See this Bloomberg piece.
This Spanish interview with El Economista includes the following claim:
¿Está satisfecho de que al final se hiciera lo que usted proponía, aumentar las provisiones bancarias y el control financiero? Se hizo finalmente lo que yo decía, pero no se hizo todo. El Banco Central Europeo (BCE) bajó demasiado los tipos de interés respecto de lo que yo decía. Y el tema de las provisiones se hizo con dificultades porque a Europa no le gustaba nada lo de mejorarlas y cuando se hizo fuimos muy criticados dentro y fuera de la banca. Nunca entendí por qué no se daban cuenta de que al ritmo al que iba la economía española era fundamental que se protegiera y tuviera unas mayores provisiones. Finalmente se reforzaron y eso ha tenido unos efectos absolutamente benéficos porque somos uno de los pocos países del mundo occidental que está pasando esta etapa con una cierta tranquilidad bancaria. Nuestra banca hasta ahora se ha comportado muy bien. Unos bancos menos, pero bueno.
Se hizo finalmente lo que yo decía, pero no se hizo todo. El Banco Central Europeo (BCE) bajó demasiado los tipos de interés respecto de lo que yo decía. Y el tema de las provisiones se hizo con dificultades porque a Europa no le gustaba nada lo de mejorarlas y cuando se hizo fuimos muy criticados dentro y fuera de la banca. Nunca entendí por qué no se daban cuenta de que al ritmo al que iba la economía española era fundamental que se protegiera y tuviera unas mayores provisiones. Finalmente se reforzaron y eso ha tenido unos efectos absolutamente benéficos porque somos uno de los pocos países del mundo occidental que está pasando esta etapa con una cierta tranquilidad bancaria. Nuestra banca hasta ahora se ha comportado muy bien. Unos bancos menos, pero bueno.
Are you happy that in the end what you proposed was done, to increase the banks' provisions and financial control? In the end what I said was done, but not all of it. The ECB lowered interest rates too much with respect to what I was saying. And provisions were done with difficulty because Europe didn't like the idea of improving them and when it was done we were much criticised form within and outside banking. I never understood why they didn't realise that at the spped that the Spanish economy was going it was essential that it protect itself and have greater provisions. In the end they were reinforced and this has had absolutely beneficial effects because we're one of the few countries in the world that's going through this time with a certain banking calm. Our banks have so far behaved really well. Some less so, oh well...
In the end what I said was done, but not all of it. The ECB lowered interest rates too much with respect to what I was saying. And provisions were done with difficulty because Europe didn't like the idea of improving them and when it was done we were much criticised form within and outside banking. I never understood why they didn't realise that at the spped that the Spanish economy was going it was essential that it protect itself and have greater provisions. In the end they were reinforced and this has had absolutely beneficial effects because we're one of the few countries in the world that's going through this time with a certain banking calm. Our banks have so far behaved really well. Some less so, oh well...
The Spanish model has become the prototype for so-called counter-cyclical provisioning, said Paul de Grauwe, an economics professor at the Catholic University of Leuven in Belgium. Regulators in London and Brussels are considering adopting the Spanish model as they seek ways to prevent future blow-ups. ... "It shows how far banks have been distracted from their historically conservative mission that people are getting excited by this now," said Jonathan McMahon, a former official at the U.K. Financial Services Authority and now a director of Promontory Financial Group. "Maybe Spain just remembered what to do when other people forgot." ... The central bank implemented the system partly to rein in lending after Spain cut borrowing costs as a precursor to the start of the euro, Rojo said. Spanish interest rates plunged to 3 percent in 1998 from as high as 9.25 percent in 1995. ... "We tried to sell it in Europe when we did it and we weren't successful," Rojo said. "The model has worked very well for us and it should work for everyone."
"It shows how far banks have been distracted from their historically conservative mission that people are getting excited by this now," said Jonathan McMahon, a former official at the U.K. Financial Services Authority and now a director of Promontory Financial Group. "Maybe Spain just remembered what to do when other people forgot."
The central bank implemented the system partly to rein in lending after Spain cut borrowing costs as a precursor to the start of the euro, Rojo said. Spanish interest rates plunged to 3 percent in 1998 from as high as 9.25 percent in 1995.
"We tried to sell it in Europe when we did it and we weren't successful," Rojo said. "The model has worked very well for us and it should work for everyone."
... Rojo afirma que "de estas situaciones sólo se sale con algún tipo de actuación por parte de los Gobiernos". Sin embargo, no le convence la nueva medida propuesta, la compra de activos bancarios por parte del Gobierno, puesto que Rojo considera que la dotación de liquidez al sistema es una competencia que "depende en gran medida del BCE". Comprar deuda... "eso lo tiene que hacer el sistema bancario, por coordinación de los Bancos Centrales a través del BCE. Los Gobiernos no se pueden poner ahora a inyectar liquidez mediante aumentos de gasto. Eso sería tremendo". ... Francia y Alemania influyeron negativamente sobre el BCE Para el viejo profesor, no hay dudas a la hora de repartir culpas. "Debería haber venido el impulso de contracción de EEUU, y no hicieron nada. En España yo era partidario de que la banca creciera menos, que se expandiera a unos ritmos más bajos, pero no sucedió así. ¿Es culpa de la banca? En parte sí, y de las autoridades también. Yo culpo también al Banco Central Europeo, porque cuando inició sus actividades le dio por hacer una política expansiva tremenda impulsado por Alemania y por Francia. Francia y Alemania estaban entonces convencidos de que lo que necesita Europa era gas porque sus dos economías lo necesitaban, y la verdad es que fue un desastre aquello. Y para países como España, Irlanda o como Portugal o como Grecia que eran países que venían de una fase de crecimiento bastante lento, pues el meterse en fase expansiva tan fuerte era peligrosísimo, pero bueno yo, en el consejo BCE lo dije hasta hartarme. Estábamos metidos en una cosa que no tenía salida. Pero en fin, como suele suceder en esos casos de expansión no me hicieron ni caso". ... Distintos estados de gravedad y distintas medidas de actuación. ¿Dónde queda una acción coordinada de la UE? "Cada país debe arreglárselas como pueda y el conjunto pues será una cosa, un arreglo para toda Europa poco a poco. No creo que Europa esté en condiciones, por el momento, de abordar el tema de un modo conjunto. Sería bueno que el ECOFIN tuviera mayor poder, sería bueno que el BCE no tuviera las ideas que tiene y fuera una entidad con una visión más general".
Sin embargo, no le convence la nueva medida propuesta, la compra de activos bancarios por parte del Gobierno, puesto que Rojo considera que la dotación de liquidez al sistema es una competencia que "depende en gran medida del BCE". Comprar deuda... "eso lo tiene que hacer el sistema bancario, por coordinación de los Bancos Centrales a través del BCE. Los Gobiernos no se pueden poner ahora a inyectar liquidez mediante aumentos de gasto. Eso sería tremendo".
Francia y Alemania influyeron negativamente sobre el BCE
Para el viejo profesor, no hay dudas a la hora de repartir culpas. "Debería haber venido el impulso de contracción de EEUU, y no hicieron nada. En España yo era partidario de que la banca creciera menos, que se expandiera a unos ritmos más bajos, pero no sucedió así. ¿Es culpa de la banca? En parte sí, y de las autoridades también. Yo culpo también al Banco Central Europeo, porque cuando inició sus actividades le dio por hacer una política expansiva tremenda impulsado por Alemania y por Francia.
Francia y Alemania estaban entonces convencidos de que lo que necesita Europa era gas porque sus dos economías lo necesitaban, y la verdad es que fue un desastre aquello. Y para países como España, Irlanda o como Portugal o como Grecia que eran países que venían de una fase de crecimiento bastante lento, pues el meterse en fase expansiva tan fuerte era peligrosísimo, pero bueno yo, en el consejo BCE lo dije hasta hartarme. Estábamos metidos en una cosa que no tenía salida. Pero en fin, como suele suceder en esos casos de expansión no me hicieron ni caso".
Distintos estados de gravedad y distintas medidas de actuación. ¿Dónde queda una acción coordinada de la UE? "Cada país debe arreglárselas como pueda y el conjunto pues será una cosa, un arreglo para toda Europa poco a poco. No creo que Europa esté en condiciones, por el momento, de abordar el tema de un modo conjunto. Sería bueno que el ECOFIN tuviera mayor poder, sería bueno que el BCE no tuviera las ideas que tiene y fuera una entidad con una visión más general".
... Rojo claims that "you only get out of these situations with some sort of government intervention". However, he's not convinced by the new proposed measure, the purchase of bank assets by government, as Rojo thinks that systemic liquidity provision is a competence that "depends in great measure from the ECB". To buy debt... "must be done by the banking system, by means of Central Bank coordintion through the ECB. Governments cannot now start injecting liquidity through spending increases. That would be terrible"". ... France and Germany had a negative influence over the ECB For the old professor, there are no doubts when it comes to assigning blame. "The contraction impetus should have come from the USA, and they did nothing. In Spain I was for lesser banking growth, for it to expand at lower rates, but it didn't happen that way. Is it the banks' fault? Partly yes, and also the fault of the authorities. I also blame the ECB, because when it started functioning it got it in its head to carry out a tremendously expansive policy, pushed by Germany and France. France and Germany were then convinced that what Europe needed was fuel because its two economies did, and in truth that was a disaster. And for countries such as Spain, Ireland or like Portugal or like Greece which were countries coming out of a phase of rather slow growth, getting into such a strong expansive phase was very dangerous, but well, I said it at the ECB council until I was fed up. We were in something that had no way out. But well, as it happens in these instances of expansion, they didn't listen to me". ... Various degrees of seriousness and various policy measures. Where is a coordinated action by the EU? "Each country must cope as best it can, and the whole, an arrangement for the whole of Europe [will come] step by step. I don't think Europe is in a position, for the moment, to tackle the issue jointly. It would be good for the ECOFIN to have more power, it would be good for the ECB not to have the ideas it has and to be an institution with a more general vision".
However, he's not convinced by the new proposed measure, the purchase of bank assets by government, as Rojo thinks that systemic liquidity provision is a competence that "depends in great measure from the ECB". To buy debt... "must be done by the banking system, by means of Central Bank coordintion through the ECB. Governments cannot now start injecting liquidity through spending increases. That would be terrible"".
France and Germany had a negative influence over the ECB
For the old professor, there are no doubts when it comes to assigning blame. "The contraction impetus should have come from the USA, and they did nothing. In Spain I was for lesser banking growth, for it to expand at lower rates, but it didn't happen that way. Is it the banks' fault? Partly yes, and also the fault of the authorities. I also blame the ECB, because when it started functioning it got it in its head to carry out a tremendously expansive policy, pushed by Germany and France.
France and Germany were then convinced that what Europe needed was fuel because its two economies did, and in truth that was a disaster. And for countries such as Spain, Ireland or like Portugal or like Greece which were countries coming out of a phase of rather slow growth, getting into such a strong expansive phase was very dangerous, but well, I said it at the ECB council until I was fed up. We were in something that had no way out. But well, as it happens in these instances of expansion, they didn't listen to me".
Various degrees of seriousness and various policy measures. Where is a coordinated action by the EU? "Each country must cope as best it can, and the whole, an arrangement for the whole of Europe [will come] step by step. I don't think Europe is in a position, for the moment, to tackle the issue jointly. It would be good for the ECOFIN to have more power, it would be good for the ECB not to have the ideas it has and to be an institution with a more general vision".
I believe the previous constitutional crisis was the Empty Chair Crisis
President Charles de Gaulle of France favoured a protected market for France's agricultural products. In 1965 the European Commission's president, Walter Hallstein, suggested an extension of the Commission's powers and a general increase in the supranational nature of the Community. He also proposed an increase in the use of qualified majority voting in commercial matters dealt with by the Commission. De Gaulle opposed Hallstein's proposals. De Gaulle also strongly sought a financing agreement for the Common Agricultural Policy ("CAP"). The deadline for this was approaching in 1965. Hallstein made the political judgment that De Gaulle would not risk losing the CAP agreement and upsetting French farmers before a December 1965 presidential election. Hallstein calculated that to secure the CAP De Gaulle would compromise on the institutional questions. The other five countries refused to compromise the agenda of the meeting and wanted de Gaulle to accept the whole package. After a tense meeting on June 28-30 1965, De Gaulle's response was to withdraw France's representative in Brussels and to boycott discussions of institutional change. This strategy led to what was called the "empty chair crisis". The crisis was ended by the Luxembourg compromise in January 1966. It was an informal agreement stating that when a decision was subjected to qualified majority voting, the commission would postpone a decision if any member states felt that very important interests were under threat. In effect the compromise meant that Qualified Majority Voting was used far less often and unanimity became the norm. De Gaulle pushed for this measure, as it essentially gave France a veto power over any decisions, and would ensure that their interests under the Common Agricultural Policy would remain unhindered. The incident leading to the Luxembourg compromise had deep repercussions for the EC, leading to a slowing down of integration, and move toward the "confederalist" approach favoured by de Gaulle, rather than a more federalist approach favoured by Hallstein.
De Gaulle opposed Hallstein's proposals. De Gaulle also strongly sought a financing agreement for the Common Agricultural Policy ("CAP"). The deadline for this was approaching in 1965.
Hallstein made the political judgment that De Gaulle would not risk losing the CAP agreement and upsetting French farmers before a December 1965 presidential election. Hallstein calculated that to secure the CAP De Gaulle would compromise on the institutional questions. The other five countries refused to compromise the agenda of the meeting and wanted de Gaulle to accept the whole package.
After a tense meeting on June 28-30 1965, De Gaulle's response was to withdraw France's representative in Brussels and to boycott discussions of institutional change. This strategy led to what was called the "empty chair crisis".
The crisis was ended by the Luxembourg compromise in January 1966. It was an informal agreement stating that when a decision was subjected to qualified majority voting, the commission would postpone a decision if any member states felt that very important interests were under threat. In effect the compromise meant that Qualified Majority Voting was used far less often and unanimity became the norm. De Gaulle pushed for this measure, as it essentially gave France a veto power over any decisions, and would ensure that their interests under the Common Agricultural Policy would remain unhindered.
The incident leading to the Luxembourg compromise had deep repercussions for the EC, leading to a slowing down of integration, and move toward the "confederalist" approach favoured by de Gaulle, rather than a more federalist approach favoured by Hallstein.
by Frank Schnittger - May 31
by Oui - May 30 25 comments
by Frank Schnittger - May 23 3 comments
by Frank Schnittger - May 27 3 comments
by Frank Schnittger - May 5 22 comments
by Oui - May 13 66 comments
by Oui - Jun 219 comments
by Oui - Jun 17 comments
by Oui - May 3136 comments
by Oui - May 3025 comments
by Frank Schnittger - May 273 comments
by Oui - May 2733 comments
by Oui - May 24
by Frank Schnittger - May 233 comments
by Oui - May 1366 comments
by Oui - May 913 comments
by Frank Schnittger - May 522 comments
by Oui - May 450 comments
by Oui - May 312 comments
by Oui - Apr 30273 comments
by Oui - Apr 2652 comments
by Oui - Apr 895 comments
by Oui - Mar 19145 comments