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If anything happens that decreases the reserves of most banks, then fewer banks will have excess reserves to deposit at the depository rates and more will have to borrow reserves for longer periods of time. This increased demand for overnight loans will drive up EONIA and keep it up longer, depending on the severity of the problem. I can only hope that this is neither totally wrong nor hopelessly obvious. Either way, I hope to learn something. "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
The more different ways this argument is restated the better the chance is that readers will understand what is being said. So, in what may be my last act of "advising", I'll advise you to cut the jargon. -- My old PhD advisor, to me, 26/2/11
the less healthy banks don't have excess reserves to deposit at the ECB and, in fact, have to borrow at the end of the maintenance period in order to have enough reserves to meet requirements. This drives up the rates in the heartbeat spike pattern shown.
The "unhealthy" banks probably have to borrow enough at the repo rate to cover their reserve requirements without resort to the interbank market at all.
One possible explanation of the heightened volatility and raised level in the past 8 months is that on the one hand the ECB is withdrawing extraordnary liquidity support (e.g., the 1-year tender wasn't renewed), and on the other hand every time an ECB official opens their mouth the market has a fit. So, in what may be my last act of "advising", I'll advise you to cut the jargon. -- My old PhD advisor, to me, 26/2/11
Are they not remunerated for making the required deposits, and is that remuneration not now, effectively, the EONIA rate
That's what it says.
and the same as they would get for depositing "excess reserves" with the ECB.
A bit higher by now, actually.
What do you mean by "in the aggregate"?
That's a response to your question of whether they could borrow at 0.25 % and use the funds to speculate. They can't - if the banks who are not shut out of the overnight market began showing that sort of aggressive behaviour they would either be shut out of the overnight market or the overnight market would rise to the MRO rate.
They can borrow at 1 % and use the proceeds for speculation assuming they have enough sound assets to pledge at the discount window. I don't know precisely what a sound asset is, so I couldn't tell you whether - say - an oil future counts, though.
- Jake Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.
From elsewhere in the thread
Type of asset: ECB debt certificates [or] Other marketable debt instruments: e.g. Central government debt instruments Debt instruments issued by central banks Local and regional government debt instruments Supranational debt instruments Covered bank bonds Credit institutions debt instruments Debt instruments issued by corporate and other issuers Asset-backed securities
Other marketable debt instruments: e.g. Central government debt instruments Debt instruments issued by central banks Local and regional government debt instruments Supranational debt instruments Covered bank bonds Credit institutions debt instruments Debt instruments issued by corporate and other issuers Asset-backed securities
No, from the diary:
(BuBa sez:) ... credit institutions' holdings of required reserves are remunerated. The remuneration corresponds to the marginal rate (weighted according to the number of calendar days) of the main refinancing operations during the reserve maintenance period.
This rate is therefore very close to the short-term money market rates.
I mean taking the baking system as a whole, viewing it as a single borrower from the ECB and the interbank lending rate as a "frictional" cost arising from dividing up the banking system into a number of institutions. The ECB doesn't lend at 0.25%, it lends at 1% or 1.75%. It remunerates at 0.25% - the fact that it remunerates required reserves at the same rate as the Repo means that you can meet your reserve requirements by repo'ing "elligible collateral". So, in what may be my last act of "advising", I'll advise you to cut the jargon. -- My old PhD advisor, to me, 26/2/11
If I understand correctly, the baseline rate of EONIA is currently established by the rate that the ECB PAYS depositors and that this is likely because the healthy banks are reluctant to lend overnight at higher rates to bad banks and instead deposit excess cash at the ECB for the minimal depository rate. THEY WILL LEND OVERNIGHT TO GOOD RISK BANKS, but, due to the relative surplus of cash compared to creditworthy borrowers, this tends to be very close to or at the depository rate. This establishes the (green line) depository rate as the baseline for EONIA.
This is my reading too.
But the less healthy banks don't have excess reserves to deposit at the ECB and, in fact, have to borrow at the end of the maintenance period in order to have enough reserves to meet requirements. This drives up the rates in the heartbeat spike pattern shown.
This is not my reading, but it is not impossible that you are correct.
My reading is that EONIA is now completely decoupled from the MRO. Meaning that the bad banks don't borrow on EONIA at all - they borrow directly from the ECB. Which is why the ECB's liquidity support is being tapped so heavily. Which is what is getting Die Seriöse Leute's knickers in a twist. Under this reading, the spikes are due to banks being unable to predict precisely how much reserves they'll need. Since the banks who have excess reserves at the end of a maintenance period can always just leave them at the ECB for 0.25 %, they have the banks who underestimated their reserve needs over a barrel, and can demand more than 0.25 %
(Whereas in the normal course of operations, where EONIA is centred around the MRO rate, the banks needing reserves will sometimes have the banks with excess reserves over a barrel, because the banks as a whole overestimated their reserve needs, and there is room for EONIA to drop.)
But your reading is also possible: It is possible that the good (old boys') banks who are not generally prepared to lend overnight to the bad banks are willing to do so on the final day of the maintenance period, for some reason. Off the top of my head, I can't think of any, but that does not mean that one does not exist. The only way to really tell the two hypotheses apart would be to look a the volume data. But unfortunately that's proprietary.
If anything happens that decreases the reserves of most [good] banks, then fewer banks will have excess reserves to deposit at the depository rates and more will have to borrow reserves for longer periods of time. This increased demand for overnight loans will drive up EONIA and keep it up longer, depending on the severity of the problem.
Yes. With the caveat that draining liquidity should also thin the volume on EONIA, and thinner volume would be expected, all else being equal, to lead to increased volatility. And since EONIA is bounded at the low end by the deposit rate, the volatility would have to manifest in a trend towards higher rates.
Since the banks who have excess reserves at the end of a maintenance period can always just leave them at the ECB for 0.25 %, they have the banks who underestimated their reserve needs over a barrel, and can demand more than 0.25 %
Aha, thus the spikes down as well as up pre 15/10/08.
On the subject of spikes down, what happened in the fall of 2001 to cause EONIA to drop below MRO?
Should be unpossible - realted to 9/11? Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se
Eonia® (Euro OverNight Index Average) is an effective overnight rate computed as a weighted average of all overnight unsecured lending transactions in the interbank market, initiated within the euro area by the contributing panel banks.
I emphasize in time of crisis because, prior to June 2000, refinancing operations were also on an unlimited tender and yet the interbank rate had its baseline on the Repo rate, not the Deposit rate. So, in what may be my last act of "advising", I'll advise you to cut the jargon. -- My old PhD advisor, to me, 26/2/11
You know, these kinds of cutesy rules of thumb are no way to run monetary policy. How much do we pay these people? (Apart from the perk of appointing them high priests of the economic religion?) So, in what may be my last act of "advising", I'll advise you to cut the jargon. -- My old PhD advisor, to me, 26/2/11
UPDATE 1-ECB official-peripheral banks still dependent on ECB | Reuters (March 3, 2011)
The euro zone money market is polarised with banks in peripheral euro zone countries still dependent on the European Central Bank for liquidity, the ECB's head of market operations Francesco Papadia said on Thursday. Papadia, who oversees the ECB's crisis strategy and controversial government bond purchase programme, said the money market remained split between banks who have access to open markets and those who do not. He urged reliant banks to come up with ways to end their dependency on the ECB, calling national governments to take action where necessary.
Papadia, who oversees the ECB's crisis strategy and controversial government bond purchase programme, said the money market remained split between banks who have access to open markets and those who do not.
He urged reliant banks to come up with ways to end their dependency on the ECB, calling national governments to take action where necessary.
The what, how and when, maybe. But I think we have a workable hypothesis which measures up well enough with the data to be able to shoot down the conventional wisdom.
Another implication is that banks are covering all their liquidity needs at the MRO rather than borrowing from each other at EONIA, which is strange given that EONIA is so much lower. This might mean that the amount actually offered at EONIA is relatively small, so while banks are receiving liquidity from the ECB they're actually hoarding it. A possible mechanism for EONIA to become decoupled form the MRO is a segmentation of the banking sector into (at least) two groups. One group of banks, the good old boys, are trusted by other banks and so borrow cheaply at EONIA (here's where we recall the observation that even under the heightened interbank volatility conditions of late the EONIA rate manages to touch back down near the deposit rate baseline some days - and remember also that EONIA is a weighted average of actual transactions). The banks other banks don't trust are financing themselves at the repo and marginal rates (that is, from the Central Bank, currently at 1% weekly and 1.75% daily, and on good collateral). The banks most everyone trusts are financing themselves at the repo and EONIA rates (1% weekly at the ECB on good collateral, and daily at the low rate they charge each other, without collateral). However, the volume available for EONIA lending among the trusted banks is dwindling because they are putting it in "sterilising" deposits at the ECB.
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