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The problem I see with this is that there are perfectly valid reasons to use both debt and intermediaries in a financial system.

A disintermediated economy can be visualised as a network in which most nodes connect to only a few other nodes. Each connection has three properties: A cash flow, an outstanding debt balance and an outstanding equity balance. Each node has five properties: Its aggregate cash flow, the equity it owes to other nodes, the debt it owes to other nodes, its real capital and its clear equity - the equity that does not appear as an asset for any other entity.

If some inauspicious event happens to a node, the holders of any equity owed to other nodes will suffer a loss. If you do not allow debt balances between nodes, then any and all inauspicious events will cause losses for every node in the network. These losses will be serially diluted, of course, but since the average node has a low number of outgoing connections, this dilution is relatively slow.

Debt, in this picture, functions much as a dike against such inauspicious events: As long as the inauspicious event is within tolerances (that is, as long as it does not wipe out the equity of the node principally involved), the loss is not transmitted to the wider system. But when it fails the failure is correspondingly spectacular, because the pool of equity in which the losses can be diluted is correspondingly smaller.

Banks serve as the second tier of dikes: By intermediating credit, it detaches the credit relationship from the cash flow relationship. Rather than node A doing business with node B and extending or obtaining credit from node B, it does business with node B and extends to or obtains credit from node C.

This has two advantages: The first is that it puts node B at one remove from node A's insolvency. Node A's insolvency will have to be bad enough to wipe out node C's equity as well before node B takes losses. The second advantage is that node C will accumulate a lot of connections, and a more connected node is, ceteris paribus, less affected by any individual default.

Both of these add value for every risk-averse node in the network. Which is very nearly all of them.

As always, there is a tradeoff between failing gracefully and failing rarely. By imposing a model that forces the system to fail gracefully, you are also mandating that it fails a little bit all the time.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sun Feb 26th, 2012 at 04:52:03 PM EST
If some inauspicious event happens to a node, the holders of any equity owed to other nodes will suffer a loss. If you do not allow debt balances between nodes, then any and all inauspicious events will cause losses for every node in the network. These losses will be serially diluted, of course, but since the average node has a low number of outgoing connections, this dilution is relatively slow.

This is only true if you believe in the conservation of money.

Which is to say, it's nonsense.

The concept of 'loss' is inherently misleading, and serves no useful purpose in a mature social economy.

Going back to an earlier conservation, money is a decision-making process, not a thing. It's one - extremely poor and rather stupid - way to decide how to steer policy and values.

With a mature social structure, neither 'loss' nor 'debt' have anything useful to contribute as policy concepts. You can certainly have 'mistakes' and 'things that didn't work for some reason' - but you'll always have those.

Critically the concept of loss does nothing to keep them from happening. You can use other metrics to avoid them, with equal - or more likely much greater - predictive power and effectiveness.

The only way in which loss may matter as a concept is if you're attempting to account for physical resources which can never be replaced.

Any other kind of loss is illusory and psychological - which is a bad foundation for useful policy, as we all know.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Sun Feb 26th, 2012 at 05:55:33 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Excellent, TBG.

The point that Jake is missing is that in a networked P2P economy there will be no double-entry book keeping and there will be no Profit and Loss; there will be no dated debt and no possibility of default; there will be no (intermediary-issued) money paid for the use of money; and intermediaries will transition to service provision, thereby minimising the finance capital they need.

There will instead be shared transaction and title registries; shared risk and shared surplus. The risk for an investor - as it is with any form of equity, is the absence of any return.....except that in the case of equity-as-undated-credit (as opposed to the sociopathic 'divine right of capital' equity in a Corporation) the word 'return' refers to redemption of credit against value received.

'Peer to Peer' credit will be cleared within a suitable framework agreement of trust.

'Peer to Asset' credit will be a 21st century form of the Stock which has been airbrushed from economic history for hundreds of years since sovereign credit was first privatised in 1694.

This dis-intermediation is already taking place because 'it works' for the banks who have suckered risk averse investors into commodity and equity markets.

Once these bubbles collapse, then I believe we will move to the adjacent possible - as above - and capitalism as we know it will devour itself and emerge in a non-toxic form.

This will happen is because it is simply inefficient to pay a return to someone for nothing if you do not have to.....and those businesses who do not pay rentiers will be at a competitive advantage to those who do.

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Sun Feb 26th, 2012 at 06:33:10 PM EST
[ Parent ]
ThatBritGuy:
conservation

freudian typo dept... ;)

'The history of public debt is full of irony. It rarely follows our ideas of order and justice.' Thomas Piketty

by melo (melometa4(at)gmail.com) on Sun Feb 26th, 2012 at 08:39:45 PM EST
[ Parent ]
This is only true if you believe in the conservation of money.

No, it is true as long as economic actors are averse to risk and uncertainty.

Going back to an earlier conservation, money is a decision-making process, not a thing. It's one - extremely poor and rather stupid - way to decide how to steer policy and values.

With a mature social structure, neither 'loss' nor 'debt' have anything useful to contribute as policy concepts. You can certainly have 'mistakes' and 'things that didn't work for some reason' - but you'll always have those.

That may be, but what Chris is proposing is not such a social structure. It's just a return to a more primitive form of money. We tried private money in the 19th century. It was abandoned for a number of unimpeachable reasons.

Critically the concept of loss does nothing to keep them from happening.

That is not the point of considering how losses propagate through the economy. The point of considering the propagation of losses is that people tend to want to protect themselves from losses. For, again, a variety of mostly unimpeachable reasons.

If you have an all-equity financial network, of the sort Chris proposes here, it becomes impossible to protect yourself from the fallout from other people's failures. People don't like eating the fallout from failures they had no part in making.

You may argue that this is a silly attitude, that people should realise that we're all in this game together and support rational collective planning. And that may be a perfectly sound idea. But people will none the less deploy considerable ingenuity towards protecting themselves from the negative consequences of what they perceive as other people's mistakes.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sun Feb 26th, 2012 at 09:19:31 PM EST
[ Parent ]
If some inauspicious event happens to a node...

This gets to the basic concept of underwriting. If the underwriting is properly done a project whose monetary purpose is to pay back with a return the money invested will only fail for unforeseeable and rare reasons, such as having a rock fall from the sky upon it. But, in the existing system, the critical function of underwriting has been seriously compromised by control fraud which now extends to the entire apparatus of government and banking. This leads to the question of which is easier: breaking the control fraud in the interest of saving the long term survival by sacrificing the short term interest of those running the fraud or abandoning ship in the hope of not going down with it or being destroyed while on board?

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Mon Feb 27th, 2012 at 11:04:28 AM EST
[ Parent ]

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