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Gyurcsány's Demokratikus Koalicio groupings are really prominent at all of these events, certainly were at the Szolidaritas demo.

They were the only ones carrying party symbols (based on the Hunger March, I suspect Socialists outnumbered them but were less intent on campaigning here). It would indeed be fatal if Varánusz1s wish would be fulfilled by DK rather than any other party. Interestingly, in the media (that is he non-right-wing media), the LMP presence was noted, due to the signature collection; some news even accused them of hijacking the protest, ignoring that Szolidaritás gave full support and collected signatures itself (at the southern end of the square).

BTW a note on LMP. Back when they obsessed about the 2006 dishonesty of Gyurcsány, I saw that as a naive liberal/bourgeoise attitude that completely misses the point of the "lies" speech (namely that he wanted to scare his fellow Socialists into supporting neolib reforms), the point that should be attacked in 2012 to prevent another run of the Shock Doctrine. So it came as a surprise that after the internal troubles, the kicking of the opposition roundtable, and the strategic declarations about aiming for the votes of disgruntled Fidesz voters, it came as a surprise that they went full-throttle about the social referendums.

I think reclaiming the language of Hungarianness by wearing a tricolor is a start

(IMHO it's an aside and I hope for another generation in a few years that rebels against the obligatory display of patriotism. This is not a region of Europe where an exclusive "we have been wronged/we have had heroes" view of history won't overlook horrible wrongs by ancestors and martyrs on the other side and thus won't lead to serious conflict.)

The hardest bit is confronting the Hungarian middle class with their Dorian Gray-type image

I only know that Dorian Gray is an Oscar Wilde figure who had eternal youth, so I'm not sure I get the association. If I guess right, then you mean the self-image of the liberal part of the middle class, in particular that of liberal intellectuals. If so I can relate to that very much: that's my family, with me between the stools: I mean, I am like them (speech, tastes, interests), but my political views and job environment have made me aware of how they always ritually demarcate themselves against the "uneducated" or even the 'parvenu' and seldom move in circles not part of their own (my) social class. (As I don't tire to say just travelling on public transport rather than by private car will give one a better perspective on the social consequences of economic 'reform'.)

On the other hand, being relatively young, I don't think the middle class in Hungary (or the rest of the former East Bloc) is uniform, and this has some reflection on the party landscape: though I wouldn't draw clear lines, I would distinguish at least the conservative heirs of the really old bourgeois and the gentry (like the inhabitants of Buda), then the more liberal heirs of those who were 'parvenu' a century or so ago, then the new middle class of the Kádár era, finally those who rose and had success in the small enterprise wave from the late seventies and now fiercely stick to their economic independence (resenting taxes, regulations and solidarity).

These segments of the middle class have different self-images, though all have negative views about other classes (and other sub-classes). This is sharply reflected in my company (MÁV) where employees are strongly differentiated according to education level and those with higher levels traditionally boss around those with lower levels even if not subordinates (with a few exceptions, predominantly younger ones).

And sure, we do like ourselves, as we consider ourselves nice, but this can be at the expense of responsibility

That's true and the low interest in (or fear from) participating in anti-fascist actions is a particularly sore point for me. (I wish I could join actions like this.) But is it enough or even meaningful to expect for the middle class to reform themselves? In Marxist terms, the middle class are the have-somes who want to protect the little they have. They will never act in ways like the have-nothings (like the organiser of the Hunger March or indeed like the youth joining the Hungarian Guard or the riots).

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.

by DoDo on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 02:21:34 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I think you understand the Dorian Gray reference - I'm trying to account for the dislocation between the flash and opulence of the Allee or Arena shopping plazas, with those early morning services full of people from Győr and the surrounding countryside heading to Budapest to do manual or semi-skilled labour for terribly low wages. Somewhere in this is a middle class which is strident and determined, and sees itself as somehow omnipotent.

the conservative heirs of the really old bourgeois and the gentry (like the inhabitants of Buda

These would be upper class, I expect... we maybe should leave these out of it as they're relatively small in number?

the more liberal heirs of those who were 'parvenu' a century or so ago,

Can't quite place these... are there really many around?

then the new middle class of the Kádár era,

let's say the state sector intelligentsia (and offspring) upon which the left in Hungary almost entirely draws its leaders

finally those who rose and had success in the small enterprise wave from the late seventies and now fiercely stick to their economic independence (resenting taxes, regulations and solidarity).

undoubtably, this is an important section. However, I'd also add a subsequent group, consisting of those who came of age around the time of the transition and, despite qualifications, may be less than financially secure, despite possibly being able to rely on parental resources for help. For me it is this group, now just hitting middle age, which has become politicised by the repetition of right-wing themes and which has the feeling of entitlement combined with resentment. It is possibly the first genuinely consumerist generation in Hungary. Dorian Gray doesn't get older; he looks great and carries on looking great, but his sins are depicted in the picture stored in the attic, just as the lifestyle, social irresponsibility and modus operandi of this part of the middle class are imprinted onto an inequal and troubled Hungarian society. Hope i'm not stretching the metaphor, but I think it carries some truth.

by car05 on Sat Mar 17th, 2012 at 03:15:16 PM EST
[ Parent ]
These would be upper class, I expect...

Part of them may be the poorer heirs of a onetime upper class (who became not-so-upper-class when losing wealth in Austria-Hungary times or in the Rákosi era), but I mean the culture and heritage that goes back to the really old bourgoise, the urban population preceing the big urbanisation waves.

Can't quite place these... are there really many around?

Yes. Hungary had a major wave of urbanisation from the first half of the 19th century to WWI, especially after the Compromise of 1867. In Budapest resp. its predecessors, the population grew from c. 50,000 at the end of Emperor Joseph II's reign to c. 250,000 at the time of the Compromise and then to 1 million by 1930. Most of the new urban population (former peasants, servants and bankrupted lower noblemen) became working-class, but part of it became middle-class bourgeois (the new bureaucrats, artists, engineers). The assimilated Jewish middle-class dates to this era, too (as does the parallel anti-Semitic 'tradition'). The children and grandchildren of these people would then look down upon and exclude those who entered higher education during the communist era from a peasant or working-class background.

let's say the state sector intelligentsia (and offspring) upon which the left in Hungary almost entirely draws its leaders

The Kádár-era educated state sector was a combination of those who rose socially in the Kádár era, and those from the previous urbanisation wave who could maintain or restore their middle-class status after the Stalinist era. I'm not sure BTW if "intelligentsia" covers all or most of the middle-class: it would appear to me that intelligentsia assumes some participation in public life, dealing with ideas (something even the upper-class can do); whereas you can be middle-class and spend all your professional and free time on issues not touching any of that. If so, I claim that the pre-WII middle-class maintained its domination of intelligentsia through the Kádár era, but the communist-era new middle class had more clue about the economy outside the ivory towers of the intelligentsia. These differences don't matter that much nowadays, though earlier there was some mapping to SzDSz vs. MSzP.

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.

by DoDo on Sun Mar 18th, 2012 at 03:38:42 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Maybe it helps if I say that most of the literature and film popular in the West that portrays East Bloc life in a negative light focuses on the experience of the intelligentsia with roots in the pre-WII middle class. For example the recent film The Lives of Others on the Stasi.

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.
by DoDo on Sun Mar 18th, 2012 at 04:12:25 PM EST
[ Parent ]

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