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The first criticism, about the EFSF-ESM's size, is true but irrelevant. As I have argued from day one of the EFSF's creation, its problem is not its size but its CDO-like structure. Turning to the second criticism, that it resembles a Dickensian Workhouse, Spain's current predicament is instructive: To get money to give to its decrepit banks, the nation must be humiliated and undergo further fiscal waterboarding so that Italy and others are deterred from turning to the EFSF for help. In this sense, when Europe's functionaries say that there is no need for further action on Spain since the EFSF is available to help, they are inviting the Spanish to enter the Workhouse for a life of undeserved misery on behalf of their bankers. And they have the audacity to call this `solidarity' with the Spanish people. ... As I wrote in a Le Monde article recently, the bankrupt Greek state was recently forced, by the troika, to borrow 4.2 billion from the EFSF so as immediately to pass it on to the European Central Bank (ECB) so as to redeem Greek government bonds that the ECB had previously purchased in a failed attempt to shore up their price. This new loan boosted Greece's debt substantially but netted the ECB a profit of around 840 million (courtesy of the 20% discount at which the ECB had purchased these bonds). Is this `solidarity with the fallen', even of a Victorian Workhouse type? ... When the 2nd Greek `bailout' was agreed, you may recall that the Finnish government asked for guarantees, for collateral, that would reduce its exposure to Greece. The Greek government conceded, promising collateral of 925 million in value. One might have expected that the said collateral would come in the form of some assets (e.g. Greek government owned real estate). But no! Helsinki would have none of that. Instead, they demanded... cash! And cash they received. Last month, in May 2012, Athens wired 311 million to the Helsinki government, as a first installment. My sources here in the United States tell me that the Finnish government is now seeking to invest this money in joint ventures with US and other European firms. Now that is what I call solidarity with Greece...
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As I wrote in a Le Monde article recently, the bankrupt Greek state was recently forced, by the troika, to borrow 4.2 billion from the EFSF so as immediately to pass it on to the European Central Bank (ECB) so as to redeem Greek government bonds that the ECB had previously purchased in a failed attempt to shore up their price. This new loan boosted Greece's debt substantially but netted the ECB a profit of around 840 million (courtesy of the 20% discount at which the ECB had purchased these bonds). Is this `solidarity with the fallen', even of a Victorian Workhouse type?
When the 2nd Greek `bailout' was agreed, you may recall that the Finnish government asked for guarantees, for collateral, that would reduce its exposure to Greece. The Greek government conceded, promising collateral of 925 million in value. One might have expected that the said collateral would come in the form of some assets (e.g. Greek government owned real estate). But no! Helsinki would have none of that. Instead, they demanded... cash! And cash they received. Last month, in May 2012, Athens wired 311 million to the Helsinki government, as a first installment. My sources here in the United States tell me that the Finnish government is now seeking to invest this money in joint ventures with US and other European firms. Now that is what I call solidarity with Greece...
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