The last bit could be counted as part of incompetence, but I separate it out to cover views of Fidesz, by which I mean both an over-estimation of chances for electoral gain from the Orbán government's mess and an under-estimation of what further steps the Orbán government is ready for (for example, the latest constitutional changes took them completely by surprise). Which shouldn't be the case, especially for the Socialists, who regularly face threats of legal disruption and under-the-belt attacks in parliament (for example, in the parliamentary debate about the total government failure to prepare for and deal with the cold spell, Fidesz MPs told Socialist MPs to shut up if there are no blisters on their hands from shovelling snow).

Divisions over personal, tactical and ideological issues are significant. In a normal democracy, it would be natural for the constituents of the current opposition to fight each other. In Romania, where President Traian Băsescu conducted another, though less wide power grab and constitutional re-arrangement, it took years for two main parties (the traditional centre-right of the National Liberals and the post-reformed-communist Social Democrats) to build a unified front that could then beat Băsescu's minions.

(The above reminded me to add two paragraphs at the end of the diary about the complex relationship with Romania.)

_{*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.}