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So do not rely on codes. Rely on physics and proofs. One time pads, air gaps, faraday cages.
If you want secure communications, brute force is the only solution.
Step the first: Keep no secrets that are not strictly necessary. Open information structures are not vulnerable to covert monitoring because they are public.
Step the second: For those things which secrecy is judged necessary, do not get cute. Use the techniques which are provably secure, and no hard or software with any proprietary bits at all. - assume all secrets of design are zero-level exploits designed to send all your secrets to your worst enemy.
Keep your terminals in faraday cages in rooms with no windows. Encode your transmissions with one time pads.
But yeah, if you really need security, build your own kit, airgap, one-time pads (stenography is to hide the fact of the encryption) and faraday cages. And worry more about informants, because now you're a target!
Not even nation states have that kind of budget. Nowhere close.
Public email and cloud storage are very low hanging fruit in security terms. So far the NSA has been relying on hope and wishful thinking to get its sigint.
But my point is that once you start sending messages through non-standard channels, it doesn't take much effort to become invisible.
And once that happens, your only hope as a spook is to scan and decrypt the entire Internet - because nothing else will do the job.
If everyone is using encrypted channels you get lost in the noise. Otherwise you just risk attracting attention.
But all that says is that most commercial steganography apps aren't all that good.
In the limit, good steganography is indistinguishable from compression artefacts and random noise. And if the bit rate is low enough and somewhat randomised, it becomes even harder to be confident about getting a clean positive.
There are also things like this.
How do you get the one-time pads to your correspondents? Couriers? In an age of surveillance? Oh dear.
- Jake Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.
I estimate that the odds that the other declining empire is into that game up to it's eyeballs at nigh-unity.
Which also explains why there is so much money flowing into US politics, and why the economy is so crappy. - The market economy isn't - the game is being rigged in the favor of whoever is paying the biggest bribes.
The best solution to this would be radical openness. Tear up the intellectual property treaties, close the patent offices, void the IPs on everything, and run corporate governance with open books and open board meetings. This seems a bit unlikely to be implemented, so as a second best solution, it might be worth while to prevent the NSA from just giving boeing the blueprints for anything they want. Not that they seem to be profiting much from what they are stealing...
The rule of good security is that the amount of effort that the attacker has to spend to penetrate your security, less the amount of effort you have to spend to maintain your security has to be greater than the higher of the value to you of not having your security penetrated or the value to the attacker of the attacker penetrating your security.
In practice, there are four groups of people that a private individual does not want to share his mail with, in roughly descending order of capabilities:
To prevent your boss from reading your mail, it will probably suffice to assume that he monitors all traffic that touches hardware he actually owns. So maintain strict segregation between work hardware and networks and personal hardware and networks, and never use the former for anything you don't want your boss to read along with. Assume that your boss installs keyloggers on anything he lends you.
Assume that all major governments and most major corporations will read anything you commit to electronic signal in any form.
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