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Specifically, I find it confusing that your rows do not sum to zero because their elements can be denominated in different currencies under your notation. The whole thing would be much clearer (if also somewhat more cumbersome) if you had each of the three sectors hold both dollar assets and liabilities and reals assets and liabilities, and explicitly settled the FX transactions implied by the foreign and domestic sectors' willingness to hold non-native currency.
To this end, I prefer to treat all foreign trade as being transacted in either the currency of the trade bloc hegemon (for unspecified trade with RoW) or in the currency of the higher-ranking party (in the case of specific bilateral relationships). I believe that this better reflects the actual constraints imposed by the international trade and tribute system than the symmetric treatment you impose here.
However, qualitatively I believe your conclusion rests upon the key assumption that the private sector's FX reserves operate broadly similarly to the strategic FX reserve. This is false: The private sector FX reserve is largely inaccessible during a national solvency crisis, and the strategic FX reserve is largely inaccessible in the daily operations of a non-crisis economy.
This is why prudent central banks should maintain strategic FX reserves on the order of the gross, rather than the net FX debt of their private sector (plus the net FX debt of any other branches of government).
- Jake Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.
Specifically, I find it confusing that your rows do not sum to zero because their elements can be denominated in different currencies under your notation.
The whole thing would be much clearer (if also somewhat more cumbersome) if you had each of the three sectors hold both dollar assets and liabilities and reals assets and liabilities, and explicitly settled the FX transactions implied by the foreign and domestic sectors' willingness to hold non-native currency.
I also have not exhibited explicitly the balance sheet. Maybe I should do that.
However, the stability condition involves only the domestic dollar liabilities, not the assets. So I am not assuming the domestic dollar cash is accessible in a solvency crisis.
What I am saying is that, if the domestic sector has a demand for foreign assets (cash), "clever" domestic-denominated derivatives won't fool them. So you cannot control the exchnge rate with derivatives. A society committed to the notion that government is always bad will have bad government. And it doesn't have to be that way. — Paul Krugman
FT.com: Brazil: net debtor to the world
When the bank uses such a swap to limit the depreciation of the real, it offers to pay the difference between the initial exchange rate and the final exchange rate during the period of the contract, plus a dollar-linked rate of interest (known to traders as the cupom cambial). In return, it receives the cumulative interbank interest rate (currently about 10 per cent a year) on the amount of the contract in Brazilian reals. Crucially, the contracts are settled entirely in reals. No dollars exchange hands and there is no obvious impact on the country's ability to pay its foreign debts.
Suppose the domestic sector's $ liabilities of -λL$φ come suddenly due. Because the external stability condition ρR$ > λL$ is being maintained, the BCB can settle the liability with the external creditors in exchange for domestic BRL debt. The result is
The subscript T is in case we want to be generous to the domestic sector and not index the new debt to the dollar exchange rate but just vaue it at the exchange rate at the time of the rescue. In that case, the stock of new debt might well be written as β[BR+(λL$φ/β)T]
But, in any case, to be able to rescue the domestic economy from its foreign entanglements, the swaps position is irrelevant. It is true that the swap legs indexed to the dollar are a potentially domestically destabilising after a "successful" external rescue. A society committed to the notion that government is always bad will have bad government. And it doesn't have to be that way. — Paul Krugman
... Gersztein and Alday at BNP Paribas think a reasonable indication of the cost is to net out the central bank's short dollar position through currency swaps from its foreign reserves. After all, it is not only the stock of reserves but also the broader health of the Brazilian economy that affects its ability to pay its debts.
That is something investors may wish to keep a close eye on if, as widely predicted, the real continues to weaken and Brazil's fiscal position continues to deteriorate during 2014 and 2015.
I suppose that's the point the FT article is trying to make.
Clumsily and without focus. It appears the BCB is attempting to manage currency by playing with financial markets (which it can do) instead of dealing with the actual foundation of the currency, the domestic economy (which it can't), and is doing so with the acquiescence of the government, which doesn't want to deal with the economy either. Which supports your conclusion that they are simply manipulating money for the benefit of the moneyed.
explicitly settled the FX transactions implied by the foreign and domestic sectors' willingness to hold non-native currency
An export transaction would then be (assuming the foreign trade is transacted in foreign currency): Domestic nongov't domestic currency account +Xphi Domestic nongov't foreign currency account Gov't domestic currency account Gov't foreign currency account Foreign domestic currency account -Xphi Foreign foreign currency account
And since the domestic sector does not wish to hold foreign currency, it will engage in an FX transaction with the domestic CB:
An export transaction would then be (assuming the foreign trade is transacted in foreign currency): +X Domestic nongov't domestic currency account -Xphi Domestic nongov't foreign currency account -X Gov't domestic currency account +Xphi Gov't foreign currency account Foreign domestic currency account Foreign foreign currency account
Similarly, if the gov't wants to build strategic currency reserves, it will engage with the foreign sector: Domestic nongov't domestic currency account Domestic nongov't foreign currency account -X Gov't domestic currency account +Xphi Gov't foreign currency account +X Foreign domestic currency account -Xphi Foreign foreign currency account
But since the foreign sector does not wish to hold domestic currency in non-negligible amounts, it will close out its transaction by dealing with the domestic private sector: +X Domestic nongov't domestic currency account -Xphi Domestic nongov't foreign currency account Gov't domestic currency account Gov't foreign currency account -X Foreign domestic currency account +Xphi Foreign foreign currency account
This picture represents the net positions. You can further split each column into a full balance sheet. Which you should if you want to discuss foreign stability, because the (strong) foreign account stability condition for a non-hegemonic economy is that neg gov't long FX position exceeds the private sector's gross short FX position and that the current account is not in deficit.
And since the domestic sector does not wish to hold foreign currency, it will engage in an FX transaction with the domestic CB
You use 6 columns: Domestic nongov't domestic currency account Domestic nongov't foreign currency account Gov't domestic currency account Gov't foreign currency account Foreign domestic currency account Foreign foreign currency account
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