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The latest post-2008 hierarchy escalation stage is just a few years old. The austerity effects will take another decade to play out and affect 2100 projections.

Fertility of the poor will likely meet the conditions (and demographic dynamics) of the 19th century. Their resource limitations is already a model of a wide civilization collapse. Before long, we will see how much poor population can be supported in this economic regime.

As for the middle class mysteriously lower fertility - the futility of their race for sufficient wealth and status is getting yet more obvious. You either hit abundance of a lucky rentier-investor and typically have a proud set of kids; this applies to many successful conventional professionals "earning" significant portfolios as an extra. Or you chase elusive fortune with a demanding work, mindfully continuing to compromise your biological chances. The financial food hierarchy is not explicit, but its reproductive effects (on primates) are increasingly just as in a jungle.

by das monde on Mon Sep 22nd, 2014 at 09:00:42 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The neoliberal hierarchy escalation goes back to the 80ies, where the projection for Africa went off track.

das monde:

Fertility of the poor will likely meet the conditions (and demographic dynamics) of the 19th century. Their resource limitations is already a model of a wide civilization collapse. Before long, we will see how much poor population can be supported in this economic regime.

In the 19th century you have almost universal high fertility. What you also have is high death rates in most of the world, though Europe and european colonies had lowered the death rate through improved agriculture and basic hygiene. The means to sustain that low death rate are 19th century. So when you write that we are going back to the 19th century, I tell you that that means a larger population boom where it counts. Hierarchy may be a mechanism related to population increase, but if so it is a feedback mechanism for larger populations.

das monde:

As for the middle class mysteriously lower fertility - the futility of their race for sufficient wealth and status is getting yet more obvious.

There is no mystery unless you insist on forcing the observations into a evolution biology mold where it does not fit. If increased wealth led to increased number of children the post-war decades would have seen an increase in children in the west. Instead you have a continual decrease.

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by A swedish kind of death on Mon Sep 22nd, 2014 at 11:11:08 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Middle class life was supposed to bring a more relaxed atmosphere in which to enjoy having kids, but since the 'Leave it to Beaver' days this has not been the case. The increased stress of an uber-competitive society has had the effect of making people personal-agenda-based thinkers, lacking the time to relax or be altruistic enough to do the work involved in raising children.

Plus the obvious fact of pensions supplanting the need to have descendants in the paid workforce cushioning old age.

If the neolib push to shrink/deny pensions continues, one may well see more child-rearing in the (ex?)-middle class.

Another data point is the effect of extreme modernity diminishing libido, viz Japan.

'The history of public debt is full of irony. It rarely follows our ideas of order and justice.' Thomas Piketty

by melo (melometa4(at)gmail.com) on Mon Sep 22nd, 2014 at 12:44:29 PM EST
[ Parent ]
How high was fertility before the Industrial Revolution? Human population had a pretty anemic growth then - were the poor then relying on the rate selection just as much?

If there is some biological-genetic encoding of historical-demographic cycles - yeah, a very unconventional if - then it is evolutionarily rational to reproduce a lot when exceptional opportunities of some industrial growth are in sight, and to reproduce reluctantly for the decline turn. In particular, Japan has much of the private sense of little perspective, cause to bring a child for some time already. Genuine resource signaling may not be that hard to catch unconsciously.

by das monde on Tue Sep 23rd, 2014 at 03:24:32 AM EST
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It depends, and I don't have my Livi-Bacci at hand. But I can give some rough estimates from the google books pages.

In figure 1.6 we have modern day Japan, Italy of 1921 and Cisalpine Gaul as examples of how mortality affects breeding space. From it we can see that while in modern day Japan almost all born women are also alive to be mums and thus 2 children is breaking even, in 1921 Italy only 71% of the available fertile years for women can be used. So you need about 3 children per mother just to stay even in Italy 1921. And for Cisalpine Gaul you have a mere 29%, so you need about 6 children per mother to stay even.

I would say it is the six children family that is more representative of pre-19th century agricultural society. Add 19th century food and hygiene to get to Italy 1921 and you have a population that doubles per generation. Add 20th century medicine and you have a population that triples per generation.

The good news is that we have a functioning feedback to have fewer children in an increased societal position for women, which has brought and is bringing births in most of the world down to or below reproduction levels. Births started going down in the areas that first saw the decrease in deaths already a hundred years ago. That was at the same time as the European empires were at their heights and industrialism was taking off. It is hard to fit that with some precognition of future resource hardships, in particular as other societies were just entering the same pattern. So to fit it with resource scarcity the richest societies must have felt that we were heading into poverty while poorer thought they were heading for expansion.

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by A swedish kind of death on Tue Sep 23rd, 2014 at 04:47:12 AM EST
[ Parent ]
One obvious dynamics is that when people see wealthy neighbors or instances of social upward mobility, they are hot ready to mimic, capitalize on that. Interestingly, this explains both high fertility in the catching up countries, and low fertility in the developed rat race countries.
by das monde on Tue Sep 23rd, 2014 at 05:50:57 AM EST
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A significant problem with Spengler's analysis is the discontinuity in the collection of sets of civilizations to analyze. At the time of his writing only West European derived civilizations, with the possible exceptions of Japan and the failed, then abandoned industrial revolution in Ming China, had ever experienced anything like the Industrial Revolution. So he was comparing a large number of civilizations that were somewhat alike with one that was fundamentally different. How can one extrapolate anything from that set of data?

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Mon Sep 22nd, 2014 at 08:46:40 PM EST
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And, at the time Spengler was writing, neither European derived industrial civilizations nor that in Japan had collapsed. And the sort of collapse all but the USA experienced after WW II was not what Spengler was considering.

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Mon Sep 22nd, 2014 at 08:55:54 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I do not read everything of Archdruid easily, but some line of his argument is engaging. There is not much other commentary in that direction. Thus a little more from him:
Spengler was thus contributing to an established tradition, rather than breaking wholly new ground, and there have been important works since his time -- most notably Arnold Toynbee's sprawling A Study of History, twelve weighty volumes packed with evidence and case studies [...] Spengler and Toynbee were both major public figures in their day, as well as bestselling authors whose ideas briefly became part of the common currency of thought in the Western world. They and their work, in turn, were both consigned to oblivion once it stopped being fashionable to think about the points they raised [...]

What makes this disappearance fascinating to me is that very few critics ever made a serious attempt to argue the facts that Spengler and his peers discussed [...]

The second foundation for claims of our uniqueness is, of course, the explosive growth of technology made possible over the last three centuries by the reckless extraction and burning of fossil fuels. It's true that no other civilization has done that, but the differences have had remarkably little impact on the political, cultural, and social trends that shape our lives and the destinies of our communities ...

Arnold Toynbee [...] has pointed out an intriguing difference between the way civilizations rise and the way they fall. On the way up, he noted, each civilization tends to diverge not merely from its neighbors but from all other civilizations throughout history. Its political and religious institutions, its arts and architecture, and all the other details of its daily life take on distinctive forms, so that as it nears maturity, even the briefest glance at one of its creations is often enough to identify its source.

Once the peak is past and the long road down begins, though, that pattern of divergence shifts into reverse, slowly at first, and then with increasing speed. A curious sort of homogenization takes place: distinctive features are lost, and common patterns emerge in their place. That doesn't happen all at once, and different cultural forms lose their distinctive outlines at different rates, but the further down the trajectory of decline and fall a civilization proceeds, the more it resembles every other civilization in decline ...

When it comes to hitting resource limits, it may be hard to be exceptional even for a definite Industrial Revolution.
by das monde on Tue Sep 23rd, 2014 at 03:09:54 AM EST
[ Parent ]
das monde:
I do not read everything of Archdruid easily

He's no easy read, on any level! A notable sang-froid spiced with occasional bone-dry asides that use wit to stab the message further home, well it doesn't pander the reader.

Basically the price of entry is any hope you ever had of a happy ending, gloom expressed with rare elegance is the tone of all his posts. That said, he manages to make me chuckle in between groans...

Enlightened pessimism.

His writing has gravitas, but listening to him talk live he comes across less mature, a bit boyishly flippant. Common sense wrapped in a somewhat self-conscious brilliance, a polymath's love for learning and orthogonal thinking.

He has another blog on the Druidic side to his work which attracts a different set of commenters.

The level of commentary on both blogs is very sharp. The acid test of any blogger...

The Pragmatic Pagan. A rare voice, a strong signal in the minestrone of the Inter-Noise.

Feral Scholar-ish for intellectual loft, with less military stuff and more civilisation history.

'The history of public debt is full of irony. It rarely follows our ideas of order and justice.' Thomas Piketty

by melo (melometa4(at)gmail.com) on Tue Sep 23rd, 2014 at 10:59:11 AM EST
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The Archdruid is talking on Falling Empires here.
by das monde on Sat Sep 27th, 2014 at 08:36:14 AM EST
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das monde:
Arnold Toynbee [...] has pointed out an intriguing difference between the way civilizations rise and the way they fall. On the way up, he noted, each civilization tends to diverge not merely from its neighbors but from all other civilizations throughout history.

One of the consequences of 'Western Civilization' haven risen so far and so fast is that it has also almost certainly evolved capabilities that will allow it to reconfigure itself in ways that can both be more personally satisfying to the entire population and more energy efficient at the same time. Propaganda has proven such a powerful tool that it is quite conceivable that a society could be converted to an orientation that favors reduced material and energy consumption in return for more equality and opprotunity for all.

What we need is a leader and a movement that can do for capitalism what Gorbechev did for Soviet Communism, but with better control of the direction that the transformation takes. Social orders are entirely human creations and no social order is but that the thinking of the population makes it so. It only took a little more than a quarter century for US wealthy elites to transform US society from one with a powerful central government and increasing equality to one where the central government has become the creature of elites and is being used to despoil the masses in the interests of the elites. (~1950 - 1980) It would seem that it should be possible to reverse that process even quicker that the time it took to create and put it to work.

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Sat Sep 27th, 2014 at 03:53:12 PM EST
[ Parent ]
it is quite conceivable that a society could be converted to an orientation that favors reduced material and energy consumption in return for more equality and opprotunity for all.
That would be a top-down transformation. The problem is that the top will not be interested in reversing opportunities once they perceive resource limitations. They will know the game - either you rule the limited capital and the people, or be ruled. So their social constructs  will be on the backward feudal side. Who will be willing, able, effective to bother with the contrary social constructs?
by das monde on Sun Sep 28th, 2014 at 05:21:39 AM EST
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