Important that Speaker Bercow says he would sign letter asking for Brexit delay if either the courts or parliament asked him to do so - and if of course @BorisJohnson failed to properly request a delay. This in response to question from @joannaccherry

— Robert Peston (@Peston) October 19, 2019

.@joannaccherry says Boris Johnson has behaved childishly but the EU will take the extension request seriously and could delay Brexit until February 2020.

Watch the full interview at 10.35pm on ITV #Peston pic.twitter.com/XlZK2jvcoO

— Peston (@itvpeston) October 20, 2019

On Monday, those behind the petition - SNP MP Joanna Cherry, businessman Dale Vince and QC Jolyon Maugham - asked for a further extension.

(1) DALE VINCEOBE; (2)JOLYON MAUGHAM QC; and (3)JOANNA CHERRYQC MP v. BORIS JOHNSON AND THE LORD KEEN OF ELIE (7 Oct)

[22] In passing, it may be noted that the 2019 Act says nothing about how the Prime Minister or the government should conduct the negotiations on the withdrawal agreement.

[23] It is perhaps also worth recalling that the government's conduct of the negotiations with the EU with the aim of reaching a withdrawal agreement is not a matter that is justiciable in the courts (R (Webster) v Secretary of State for Exiting the EU [2019] 1 CMLR 8 per Gross LJ at para 20;  Re McCord (Northern Ireland Court of Appeal, unreported, 27 September 2019) per Morgan LCJ at para 127).
[...]
[55] In my opinion, the terms of the interdict are not sufficiently precise and clear(c.f. Murdoch vMurdoch 1973 SLT (Notes) 13). The wording in the prayer of the petition refers to "taking any action that would undermine or frustrate the will of the Union Parliament as enacted in (the 2019 Act)". In my view, this language is too broad.

[56] The same may be said in regard to other parts of the crave for interdict: for example, the reference to "encouraging (or causing to be encouraged) any other Member State ... either directly or indirectly to disagree with any proposed extension ..."
[...]
[58] Similarly, it is unclear why the proposed order refers to the letter of request having to be sent prior to 3.00 pm on 19 October 2019. That is not a requirement of the statutory provisions.

[59] I note also that the order sought would require the first respondent to "take all steps that shall be required in order to obtain from the European Council an extension of the period under Article 50(3) of the Treaty on European Union ..."  This goes beyond what the first respondent is obliged to do under the 2019 Act.
[...]
[60] At the hearing Mr O'Neill asked for consideration of heads (iii) and (iv) of the prayer to be "held over". I am not persuaded that this unusual step would be appropriate. I have concluded that the petitioners have not made out their case based on reasonable apprehension of breach of statutory duty.For the reasons I have set out, I am not prepared to grant either of the orders for which the petitioners moved at the hearing. Insofar as the petitioners elected not to move for any other heads of the prayer to be granted, they must be taken not to have insisted on those aspects of the petition. The court's practice isto dispose of a case brought by a petition under Chapter 14 at a hearing on the petition and answers. Such a hearing is not, in any sense, an interim one.

[61] Accordingly, I shall sustain the Advocate General's fourth and fifth pleas-in-law and refuse the petition.

Their lawyer, Aidan O'Neill QC, described the manner in which the second letter was sent by Mr Johnson as "unusual". He told the three judges that it was "not entirely in accordance with undertakings which were given to this court" and said it was "sailing close to the wind".

[2] The interim orders sought by the petitioner were in the following terms: "(i)to suspend ad interim the purported agreement which is said by the United Kingdom government to have been concluded between it and the European Union and the United Kingdom government, on the basis that this agreement provides for Northern Ireland to form part of a separate customs territory to Great Britain; and

(ii)for interdict ad interim against Ministers of the Crown in right of the United Kingdom including the Prime Minster (and anybody acting on their behalf or at their request) from entering into arrangements under which Northern Ireland is to form part of a separate customs territory to Great Britain".
[...]
[8] The petitioner argue that what the Protocol seeks to do is to create what Mr O'Neill QC described as an overlapping Venn diagram in which Northern Ireland is at one and the same time both a part of the customs territory of the United Kingdom and a part of the customs territory of the European Union. By contrast, the island of Great Britain will, post-Brexit, form a part of the customs territory of the United Kingdom, but the island of Great Britain will no longer form a part of the customs territory of the European Union.

[9] Mr O'Neill drew attention to section 55 of the Taxation (Cross-Border Trade) Act 2018("the 2018 Act").  This provides as follows:"55 Single United Kingdom customs territory (1)It shall be unlawful for Her Majesty's Government to enter into arrangements under which Northern Ireland forms part of a separate customs territory to Great Britain.(2)For the purposes of this section `customs territory' shall have the same meaning as in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 as amended."
[...]
[14] Mr Moynihan contended that against the background of this statutory framework it was clearly a matter for Parliament to address its own mind to the terms of the draft Withdrawal Agreement.

[15] Mr Moynihan also submitted that the effect of an interim order for suspension would be to prevent the responsible minister from making to Parliament the statements required by the Withdrawal Acts. The agreement would have been declared void and there would be nothing that could lawfully be laid before Parliament. The remedies sought would amount to a manifest interference with the proper processes and procedures of Parliament and would prevent legitimate debate in Parliament about the terms of the Withdrawal Agreement.
[...]
[21] The issues which the court must address at this stage are (i) whether the petitioner has a prima facie case and (ii) where the balance of convenience lies.

[22] In my opinion, the petitioner does not have a prima facie case.  In the first place, the petition is of very doubtful competency.  The orders sought would unquestionably interfere to a major extent with the proposed proceedings in Parliament.  Suspension of the draft withdrawal agreement would mean that the motion for its approval could not realistically or properly go ahead as planned. I cannot see that it would be right for Parliament to be invited to consider a draft treaty which the court had suspended on the basis that it was unlawful. It is a cardinal principle of constitutional law that the courts should not intrude on the legitimate affairs and processes of Parliament. I consider that it should be left to Parliament to proceed in relation to the draft withdrawal agreement in the manner and according to the procedures that Parliament considers most appropriate in the circumstances.  

[23] Secondly, I consider that the petitioner's legal argument as to the incompatibility of the draft withdrawal agreement with section 55 of the 2018 Act is at best a weak one. The starting point, in my opinion, is the clear declaration in article 4 of the draft Protocol. That statement is closely aligned with the definition of a "customs territory" contained in Article XXIV of GATT. The petitioner has placed nothing before the court by way of evidence, averment or oral submission to show that in future Northern Ireland's trading and customs arrangements will not qualify and fall to be treated as amounting to a "customs territory" in the manner envisaged in the draft Protocol.
[...]
[26] For all these reasons, I conclude that the petitioner's applications for interim orders are misconceived and unjustified.  They have no or at best a weak prima facie case. The balance of convenience comes down firmly on the side of refusing to make the orders. I shall accordingly refuse the petitioner's motion insofar as it seeks interim orders.

[27] I shall order intimation and service of the petition and appoint answers to be lodged within 7 days.