I didn't say that in the first paragraph in re: reserved domains.

Recalling the domination of state-owned aka public broadcast services (radio, television) across Europe as well as many third-countries prior to concerted DTV acts of 1991;

subsequent trust-busting of same which deregulated telecom and broadcast markets for competition among "independent," investor-owned cable and WAN IP infrastructure for network subscribers--individuals, organizations, and comercial businesses; and  

I noted that Politco.eu(.com) assumed the identity of the EU (gov) "public broadcast service" although it is a privately-held business, incorporated in the USA, acquired by Axel Springer SE publishing in 2021. This imprimature at least implies exclusive use granted by EU authorities that obscure the ahhh editorial independence of its business...

incompatible with the MFA matrix of "indicators" intended to preclude government or publisher interference with and restraint of professional journalists' employment status d/b/a impartial free expression of everyone.

I've no rational explanation why "public broadcast service" recurs in MFA reference and PR materials in contrast to elements of broadcast technology— "legacy media", "social media", "social inclusion", "digital platform", "media market operators", all-purpose "media company" and "economic operator," etc.

I detect subterfuge of MFA purposes in inconsistency of nomeclature that should have been ironed out by serial Digital Market directives, not least of which GDPR. It's an inexcusable failure to communicate to purpose of deregulating either industry consolidation or facilitating multimodal information exchange.

Work on the bill on media, which has been in the Verkhovna Rada for almost 3 years [!], is entering the home stretch. Servants of the People report that they are ready to adopt a bill by the end of summer that will regulate the work of all media, including online media.

For the sharp expansion of the powers of the National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting (which received the right to punish and pardon all media), this bill was sharply criticized by both Ukrainian journalists and international organizations.

But now, after revision, the document has become even tougher.

Earlier, Strana spoke in detail about how the authorities want to regulate the work of journalists....

"Worthy of the worst authoritarian regimes." What is written in the bill on media, which they want to adopt in Ukraine [4 Aug]
... since the European Parliament by a majority vote approved Ukraine's application for the status of a candidate for accession to the European Union, the lobbyists of this project have an additional argument, they say, media reform is one of the main requirements of the EU.

At the same time, Europe has already called the Ukrainian media bill "worthy of the worst authoritarian regimes". Thus, the European Federation of Journalists criticized the forced regulation of the media - it is that, according to the draft law, the National Council of Ukraine on Television and Radio Broadcasting will receive "disproportionate regulatory powers"[] and will have "power not only over the audiovisual media, but also over print and online publications. ....

The Committee to Protect Journalists (an international non-governmental organization headquartered in New York) has condemned  the law "On Media" recently adopted in the first reading by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. This was stated [28 Jul] by CPJ Program Director Carlos Martinez de la Serna, according to the official website of the organization.

"A review of Ukraine's outdated media legislation is necessary if the country is to meet European Union standards, but lawmakers should not use such reforms as an excuse to expand state control over information. Lawmakers should develop bill in line with EU directives < wipes tears > that includes strong guarantees of freedom press [sic]," he said. ...

(5) 'press publication' means a publication as defined in Article 2(4) of Directive
2019/790/EU [Title I, Art. 2 Definitions, p 22];

(6) 'audiovisual media service' means a service as defined in Article 1(1), point (a), of
Directive 2010/13/EU [Ch.1, Art. 1 Definitions, p 11];
[...]
(11) 'video-sharing platform service' means a service as defined in Article 1(1), point (aa),
of Directive 2010/13/EU;
(12) `national regulatory authority or body' means the authority or body designated by
Member States pursuant to Article 30 of Directive 2010/13/EU;

after major social media companies identified and took offline fake accounts suspected of being run by the U.S. military in violation of the platform [sic] rules.
[...]
The takedowns [sic] in recent years by Twitter and Facebook [media operators] of more than 150 bogus personas

and media sites ["media operators"] created in the United States was disclosed last month by internet researchers Graphika and the Stanford Internet Observatory. While the researchers did not attribute the sham accounts ["personas"] to the U.S. military, two officials familiar with the matter said that U.S. Central Command is among those whose activities are facing scrutiny.
[...]
Independent of the report, The Washington Post has learned that in 2020 Facebook disabled fictitious personas created by Centcom to counter disinformation spread by China suggesting the coronavirus responsible for covid-19 was created at a U.S. Army lab in Fort Detrick, Md., according to officials familiar with the matter. The pseudo profiles [social media influencers] -- active in Facebook [user] groups that conversed in Arabic, Farsi[,] and Urdu, the officials said -- were used to amplify [replicate] truthful ["Like watching a train wreck"] information from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention about the virus's origination in China.

[...]
A spokeswoman for the National Security Council, which is part of the White House, declined to comment.
[...]
[former NSC staff] David Agranovich, Facebook's [current] director for global threat disruption, spoke to Christopher C. Miller, then assistant director for [DOD] Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict, which oversees influence operations policy, warning him that if Facebook could sniff them out, so could U.S. adversaries, several people familiar with the conversation said.

"His point," one person said, "was 'Guys, you got caught [again]. That's a problem.'"...

The unit started in 2014 as his personal project to fund a fighting force to intervene in Ukraine's civil war on the side of Donetsk and Lugansk regions, Prigozhin claimed. He said he was one of several wealthy people in Russia, who were willing to invest their money to "defend Russians" from Kiev, but didn't trust anyone else to use the resources the way he wanted....