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low-brow Encyclopedia | House Un-American Activities Committee
In 1938, the U.S. House of Representatives established the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). With communist and fascist regimes posing threats to the security of European countries, Congress decided to investigate the potential of danger in the United States. HUAC had the responsibility of investigating un-American propaganda and activities that might threaten national security. It focused mostly on communist and fascist organizations. Its guidelines, however, were vague enough that many people who simply disagreed with [US] government policy found themselves under scrutiny by the committee. Defining A Purpose Because HUAC was led by U.S. representative Martin Dies Jr. (1900-1972) of Texass, it was also called the Dies Committee. Sponsors of the motion to establish HUAC expected it to reduce the potential threat of foreign agents and subversive activities by communist and fascist interests. Under the leadership of Dies, however, the term "un-American" gained a broader definition, and many without communist or fascist ["]ties["] were investigated. HUAC investigations became a means to suppress any dissent, often with the effect of undermining the freedoms of speech, press, and assembly. Liberals, intellectuals, artists, labor leaders, immigrants, Jews, and African Americans found themselves targets of HUAC investigations. [...] Founded in 1938 as the House Special Committee to Investigate Un-American Activities and chaired by a conservative Texas Democrat, Martin Dies, HUAC became a standing committee of the House in 1945. In 1969 it announced a new focus, domestic terrorism [!], and received a new name, the House Internal Security Committee. Six years later, in the wake of Vietnam and Watergate, the full House abolished the committee.
Defining A Purpose
Because HUAC was led by U.S. representative Martin Dies Jr. (1900-1972) of Texass, it was also called the Dies Committee.
Sponsors of the motion to establish HUAC expected it to reduce the potential threat of foreign agents and subversive activities by communist and fascist interests. Under the leadership of Dies, however, the term "un-American" gained a broader definition, and many without communist or fascist ["]ties["] were investigated. HUAC investigations became a means to suppress any dissent, often with the effect of undermining the freedoms of speech, press, and assembly. Liberals, intellectuals, artists, labor leaders, immigrants, Jews, and African Americans found themselves targets of HUAC investigations. [...] Founded in 1938 as the House Special Committee to Investigate Un-American Activities and chaired by a conservative Texas Democrat, Martin Dies, HUAC became a standing committee of the House in 1945. In 1969 it announced a new focus, domestic terrorism [!], and received a new name, the House Internal Security Committee. Six years later, in the wake of Vietnam and Watergate, the full House abolished the committee.
East Texass History | Martin Dies, Democrat
In 1938, Dies created and secured appointment as the first chairman of the House Un-American Activities Committee, which was tasked with investigating subversive groups within the United States. Initially, the committee focused on domestic extremism and the Ku Klux Klan. Over time, however, the committee re-oriented its attention to suspected communists and civil rights supporters. Many critics of the committee complained that its members violated the rights of suspects and publicly ruined the careers of many good people for political reasons....
Despite Dies' promises to conduct fair and impartial hearings, his House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) has long been regarded as a problematic, even dangerous, detour into demagoguery and extremism. In an October 1938 poll taken during the first months of Dies' chairmanship, a pair of New York Daily News columnists found that only two of the eighteen reporters who regularly covered the hearings thought they were fair; eleven said they were unfair, and other reporters were unwilling to take a stand. The Communist Party USA called the Committee an "outfit of storm troopers" in its newspaper, The Daily Worker, and liberal critics at the New Republic and the Nation agreed [!].3 As one recent critic has noted, "Dies regularly accused the U.S. government of employing Communists, showcased ex-Communist and anti-Communist witnesses brandishing long lists of names, practiced guilt by association, and attempted to intimidate and bully unfriendly witnesses."4 Although civil libertarians condemned Dies and his investigatory tactics, the general public seemed to approve of his efforts. In a Gallup Poll taken in December 1938, 74 percent of those who were familiar with the Special Committee approved of its work. Many respondents said that it helped to "keep our eyes open in the midst of all this world trouble," and to "weed out those who want to overthrow the American system." [...] In 1968, Walter Goodman released an even more comprehensive book, The Committee: The Extraordinary Career of the House of on Un-American Activities, which discussed the various stages of HUAC from the 1930s to the 1960s. Goodman argued that Nazism, fascism, and communism were the initial investigation targets, but that it was communism that became the committee's consistent focus. He discussed how different committee members directed attacks at various organizations, with Hollywood's supposed connection to communism being a favorite subject for several of the investigators.12 [...] The most comprehensive scholarly treatment of Dies and his work was done by Dennis Kay McDaniel. In his 1988 University of Houston dissertation entitled Martin Dies of Un-American Activities: His Life and Times, McDaniel argued that Dies' personal views and prejudices shaped his efforts with HUAC. Dies' views were not only from his home congressional district, however, but also from his father who had been in the House of Representatives two decades prior. Martin Dies father, Martin Dies Sr., McDaniel argued, was extremely ["]nativist["] and suspicious of anything ["]progressive["]. Furthermore, using here-to-fore unavailable congressional records, McDaniel illustrated how Dies' father fought to defend white supremacy, something Dies Jr. did as well, especially when it came to his stance on racial segregation.13 Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Cold War scholars have divided into two opposing camps on the role of government leaders fighting communism. ...
Although civil libertarians condemned Dies and his investigatory tactics, the general public seemed to approve of his efforts. In a Gallup Poll taken in December 1938, 74 percent of those who were familiar with the Special Committee approved of its work. Many respondents said that it helped to "keep our eyes open in the midst of all this world trouble," and to "weed out those who want to overthrow the American system." [...] In 1968, Walter Goodman released an even more comprehensive book, The Committee: The Extraordinary Career of the House of on Un-American Activities, which discussed the various stages of HUAC from the 1930s to the 1960s. Goodman argued that Nazism, fascism, and communism were the initial investigation targets, but that it was communism that became the committee's consistent focus. He discussed how different committee members directed attacks at various organizations, with Hollywood's supposed connection to communism being a favorite subject for several of the investigators.12 [...] The most comprehensive scholarly treatment of Dies and his work was done by Dennis Kay McDaniel. In his 1988 University of Houston dissertation entitled Martin Dies of Un-American Activities: His Life and Times, McDaniel argued that Dies' personal views and prejudices shaped his efforts with HUAC. Dies' views were not only from his home congressional district, however, but also from his father who had been in the House of Representatives two decades prior. Martin Dies father, Martin Dies Sr., McDaniel argued, was extremely ["]nativist["] and suspicious of anything ["]progressive["]. Furthermore, using here-to-fore unavailable congressional records, McDaniel illustrated how Dies' father fought to defend white supremacy, something Dies Jr. did as well, especially when it came to his stance on racial segregation.13
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Cold War scholars have divided into two opposing camps on the role of government leaders fighting communism. ...
The role of J. Edgar Hoover fits well and how the FBI tried to smear MLK as a Communist and traitor for criticizing the Vietnam War shortly before he was assassinated in Memphis. 1968 another pivotal year in American History ... death MLK and Robert Kennedy, the Chicago protests around the DNC convention and of course the Nixon/Kissinger role in undermining the Paris Peace talks to end the Vietnam War. Speaking of patriotism and the role of American traitors. Depends on who authors history.
FBI.gov | A Brief History, The Nation Calls, 1908-1923, GD II-GD III cycle
But violence was just the tip of the criminal iceberg. Corruption was rampant nationwide--especially in local politics, with crooked political machines like Tammany Hall in full flower. Big business had its share of sleaze, too, from the shoddy, even criminal, conditions in meat packaging plants and factories (as muckrakers like Upton Sinclair had so artfully exposed) to the illegal monopolies [read: labor unions, not Standard Oil] threatening to control entire industries. [...] It happened at the hands of a 28-year-old Ohioan named Leon Czolgosz, who after losing his factory job and turning to the writings of anarchists like Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman, took a train to Buffalo, bought a revolver, and put a bullet in the stomach of a visiting President McKinley [R].
Eight days later, on September 14, 1901, McKinley was dead, and his vice president Teddy Roosevelt [R] took the oval office. Call it Czolgosz's folly, because this new President was a staunch advocate of the rising "Progressive Movement." Many progressives, including Roosevelt, believed that the federal government's guiding hand was necessary to foster justice in an industrial society. Roosevelt, who had no tolerance for corruption and little trust of those he called the "malefactors of great wealth," had already cracked the whip of reform for six years as a Civil Service Commissioner in Washington (where, as he said, "we stirred things up well") and for two years as head of the New York [!!] Police Department.
Call it Czolgosz's folly, because this new President was a staunch advocate of the rising "Progressive Movement." Many progressives, including Roosevelt, believed that the federal government's guiding hand was necessary to foster justice in an industrial society. Roosevelt, who had no tolerance for corruption and little trust of those he called the "malefactors of great wealth," had already cracked the whip of reform for six years as a Civil Service Commissioner in Washington (where, as he said, "we stirred things up well") and for two years as head of the New York [!!] Police Department.
He was a believer in the law and in the enforcement of that law, and it was under his reform-driven leadership that the FBI would get its start. [...] The chain of events was set in motion in 1906, when Roosevelt appointed a likeminded reformer named Charles Bonaparte as his second Attorney General. The grandnephew of the infamous French emperor, Bonaparte was a noted civic reformer. He met Roosevelt in 1892 when they both spoke at a reform meeting in Baltimore [!!]. Roosevelt, then with the Commission, talked with pride about his insistence that Border Patrol applicants pass marksmanship tests, with the most accurate getting the jobs. Following him on the program, Bonaparte countered, tongue in cheek, that target shooting was not the way to get the best men. "Roosevelt should have had the men shoot at each other, and given the jobs to the survivors." Roosevelt soon grew to trust this short, stocky, balding man from Baltimore [!!] and appointed Bonaparte to a series of posts during his presidency. Soon after becoming the nation's top lawman, Bonaparte learned that his hands were largely tied in tackling the rising tide of crime and corruption. He had no squad of investigators to call his own except for one or two special agents and other investigators who carried out specific assignments on his behalf. They included a force of examiners trained as accountants who reviewed the financial transactions of the federal courts and some civil rights investigators. By 1907, when he wanted to send an investigator out to gather the facts or to help a U.S. Attorney build a case, he was usually borrowing operatives from the Secret Service [not Pinkerton]. These men were well trained, dedicated--and expensive. And they reported not to the Attorney General, but to the Chief of the Secret Service. This situation frustrated Bonaparte, who had little control over his own investigations. Bonaparte made the problem known to Congress, which wondered why he was even renting Secret Service investigators at all when there was no specific provision in the law for it. In a complicated, political showdown with Congress, involving what lawmakers charged was Roosevelt's grab for executive power, Congress banned the loan of Secret Service operatives to any federal department in May 1908. Now Bonaparte had no choice, ironically, but to create his own force of investigators, and that's exactly what he did in the coming weeks, apparently with Roosevelt's blessing. In late June, the Attorney General quietly hired nine of the Secret Service investigators he had borrowed before and brought them together with another 25 of his own to form a special agent force. On July 26, 1908, Bonaparte ordered Department of Justice attorneys to refer most investigative matters to his Chief Examiner, Stanley W. Finch, for handling by one of these 34 agents. The new force had its mission—to conduct investigations for the Department of Justice—so that date is celebrated as the official birth of the FBI. [...] During its first 15 years, the Bureau was a shadow of its future self. It was not yet strong enough to withstand the sometimes corrupting influence of patronage politics on hiring, promotions, and transfers. New agents received limited training and were sometimes undisciplined and poorly managed. The story is told, for example, of a Philadelphia [Iziat's Baltimore "suburb" !!] agent who was for years allowed to split time between doing his job and tending his cranberry bog. Later, a more demanding J. Edgar Hoover reportedly made him chose between the two. Still, the groundwork for the future was being laid. Some excellent investigators and administrators were hired (like the Russian-born Emilio Kosterlitzky), providing a stable corps of talent. And the young Bureau was getting its feet wet in all kinds of investigative areas--not just in law enforcement disciplines, but also in the national security and intelligence arenas.
Soon after becoming the nation's top lawman, Bonaparte learned that his hands were largely tied in tackling the rising tide of crime and corruption. He had no squad of investigators to call his own except for one or two special agents and other investigators who carried out specific assignments on his behalf. They included a force of examiners trained as accountants who reviewed the financial transactions of the federal courts and some civil rights investigators. By 1907, when he wanted to send an investigator out to gather the facts or to help a U.S. Attorney build a case, he was usually borrowing operatives from the Secret Service [not Pinkerton]. These men were well trained, dedicated--and expensive. And they reported not to the Attorney General, but to the Chief of the Secret Service. This situation frustrated Bonaparte, who had little control over his own investigations.
Bonaparte made the problem known to Congress, which wondered why he was even renting Secret Service investigators at all when there was no specific provision in the law for it. In a complicated, political showdown with Congress, involving what lawmakers charged was Roosevelt's grab for executive power, Congress banned the loan of Secret Service operatives to any federal department in May 1908.
Now Bonaparte had no choice, ironically, but to create his own force of investigators, and that's exactly what he did in the coming weeks, apparently with Roosevelt's blessing. In late June, the Attorney General quietly hired nine of the Secret Service investigators he had borrowed before and brought them together with another 25 of his own to form a special agent force. On July 26, 1908, Bonaparte ordered Department of Justice attorneys to refer most investigative matters to his Chief Examiner, Stanley W. Finch, for handling by one of these 34 agents. The new force had its mission—to conduct investigations for the Department of Justice—so that date is celebrated as the official birth of the FBI. [...] During its first 15 years, the Bureau was a shadow of its future self. It was not yet strong enough to withstand the sometimes corrupting influence of patronage politics on hiring, promotions, and transfers. New agents received limited training and were sometimes undisciplined and poorly managed. The story is told, for example, of a Philadelphia [Iziat's Baltimore "suburb" !!] agent who was for years allowed to split time between doing his job and tending his cranberry bog. Later, a more demanding J. Edgar Hoover reportedly made him chose between the two.
Still, the groundwork for the future was being laid. Some excellent investigators and administrators were hired (like the Russian-born Emilio Kosterlitzky), providing a stable corps of talent. And the young Bureau was getting its feet wet in all kinds of investigative areas--not just in law enforcement disciplines, but also in the national security and intelligence arenas.
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