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Taiwan condemns Russia's infringement on Ukrainian sovereignty & encourages all parties involved to resolve their disputes rationally & peacefully. Meanwhile, we will take steps to bolster our military readiness & counter cognitive warfare while ensuring economic stability. pic.twitter.com/iZJC5TQlc0— 蔡英文 Tsai Ing-wen (@iingwen) February 23, 2022
Taiwan condemns Russia's infringement on Ukrainian sovereignty & encourages all parties involved to resolve their disputes rationally & peacefully. Meanwhile, we will take steps to bolster our military readiness & counter cognitive warfare while ensuring economic stability. pic.twitter.com/iZJC5TQlc0
Taiwan question is fundamentally different from Ukraine issue: Taiwan Affairs Office
DPP, US link Ukraine crisis with Taiwan island, will only 'draw China, Russia closer' | Feb. 14, 2022 | As tensions rise in Ukraine and attract the world's attention, Taiwan, an island that has been largely ignored for a while, has begun to link its discourse to the Ukrainian crisis, along with collaboration from some US officials who recently claimed that the Biden administration believes that the US' response to the Ukrainian crisis would be seen as a "proxy" for how it would respond to the Taiwan question. Chinese experts pointed out that the US and the Taiwan authority's hype is nothing but a game of political calculations as the island needs to assuage its anxieties about being a pawn that could be discarded by the US, while Washington, now less powerful, wants to make more economic and military gains by fabricating a war crisis.
As tensions rise in Ukraine and attract the world's attention, Taiwan, an island that has been largely ignored for a while, has begun to link its discourse to the Ukrainian crisis, along with collaboration from some US officials who recently claimed that the Biden administration believes that the US' response to the Ukrainian crisis would be seen as a "proxy" for how it would respond to the Taiwan question.
Chinese experts pointed out that the US and the Taiwan authority's hype is nothing but a game of political calculations as the island needs to assuage its anxieties about being a pawn that could be discarded by the US, while Washington, now less powerful, wants to make more economic and military gains by fabricating a war crisis.
Ongoing Sino-American Relations Regarding Chinese actions and inaction, Beijing's public presentation of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict has generally mirrored Moscow's explanation for the invasion, claiming that it stemmed from Russia's reaction to constant Western pressure, especially NATO's expansion to and encroachment on areas adjacent to Russia. Yet Beijing has been reluctant to side completely with Moscow's position. It has consistently and publicly professed its support for the principle of sovereignty for all states. Moscow's recognition of the two breakaway republics in eastern Ukraine, Donetsk and Luhansk, is concerning to Beijing because of the obvious parallel to Taiwan. For Beijing to show support for Russia on this issue would undermine its own position on Taiwan. Specifically, the secession of eastern Ukraine--and, earlier, of Crimea from Ukraine--could provide fodder for those supporting Taiwan's independence, and Russia's recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk could provide a legal precedent for the US to do the same for Taiwan. This said, the Russo-Ukrainian war came at a propitious time for Beijing. Before this episode, Washington had been clearly "pivoting" to Asia, with a focus on rallying China's neighbors to oppose Beijing. US officials have been transparent in designating China as the US's main competitor, or even adversary, in international relations. Many have professed that policies intended to engage China and transform it into a more cooperative and congenial "responsible stakeholder" have failed, and that it is time to take a tougher stance against Beijing (see e.g. Campbell and Rapp-Hooper 2020). Significantly, even though sharp partisan divisions usually characterize politics in Washington, Republicans and Democrats generally agree on this policy of confronting China. The Russo-Ukrainian conflict has, at least for now, weakened the push in Washington to single out China as the US's chief opponent in a global struggle for influence, and disrupted the Biden administration's attempt to shift attention and resources from Europe and the Middle East to East Asia in a campaign to contain Beijing's influence. Before this war, Washington had increased its political and military support for Taipei, a position implying greater support for an independent Taiwan, at the same time that it claimed to oppose any unilateral attempt to alter the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. On October 21, 2021, when asked whether Washington would come to Taiwan's defense if it were attacked by China, president Joe Biden said, "Yes, we have a commitment to do that." The White House, however, quickly walked back Biden's statement, indicating that there has not been any change in the US policy of "strategic ambiguity" which declines to commit Washington to any future course of action (Widakuswara 2021).
Regarding Chinese actions and inaction, Beijing's public presentation of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict has generally mirrored Moscow's explanation for the invasion, claiming that it stemmed from Russia's reaction to constant Western pressure, especially NATO's expansion to and encroachment on areas adjacent to Russia. Yet Beijing has been reluctant to side completely with Moscow's position. It has consistently and publicly professed its support for the principle of sovereignty for all states. Moscow's recognition of the two breakaway republics in eastern Ukraine, Donetsk and Luhansk, is concerning to Beijing because of the obvious parallel to Taiwan. For Beijing to show support for Russia on this issue would undermine its own position on Taiwan. Specifically, the secession of eastern Ukraine--and, earlier, of Crimea from Ukraine--could provide fodder for those supporting Taiwan's independence, and Russia's recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk could provide a legal precedent for the US to do the same for Taiwan.
This said, the Russo-Ukrainian war came at a propitious time for Beijing. Before this episode, Washington had been clearly "pivoting" to Asia, with a focus on rallying China's neighbors to oppose Beijing. US officials have been transparent in designating China as the US's main competitor, or even adversary, in international relations. Many have professed that policies intended to engage China and transform it into a more cooperative and congenial "responsible stakeholder" have failed, and that it is time to take a tougher stance against Beijing (see e.g. Campbell and Rapp-Hooper 2020). Significantly, even though sharp partisan divisions usually characterize politics in Washington, Republicans and Democrats generally agree on this policy of confronting China. The Russo-Ukrainian conflict has, at least for now, weakened the push in Washington to single out China as the US's chief opponent in a global struggle for influence, and disrupted the Biden administration's attempt to shift attention and resources from Europe and the Middle East to East Asia in a campaign to contain Beijing's influence.
Before this war, Washington had increased its political and military support for Taipei, a position implying greater support for an independent Taiwan, at the same time that it claimed to oppose any unilateral attempt to alter the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. On October 21, 2021, when asked whether Washington would come to Taiwan's defense if it were attacked by China, president Joe Biden said, "Yes, we have a commitment to do that." The White House, however, quickly walked back Biden's statement, indicating that there has not been any change in the US policy of "strategic ambiguity" which declines to commit Washington to any future course of action (Widakuswara 2021).
Zelensky to China: there would be a 'world war' if you ally with Russia [_link]— South China Morning Post (@SCMPNews) February 20, 2023
Zelensky to China: there would be a 'world war' if you ally with Russia [_link]
During our call, @JosepBorrellF and I discussed latest contacts of Ukraine and the EU with China, as well as ways to deepen ties with countries of Latin America. I also called on HR/VP to urge EU member states to speed up the delivery of weapons and ammunition to Ukraine.— Dmytro Kuleba (@DmytroKuleba) April 27, 2023
During our call, @JosepBorrellF and I discussed latest contacts of Ukraine and the EU with China, as well as ways to deepen ties with countries of Latin America. I also called on HR/VP to urge EU member states to speed up the delivery of weapons and ammunition to Ukraine.
President Zelenskyy congratulated President Xi on his re-election and commended China for its remarkable achievements. He expressed confidence that under the leadership of President Xi, China will successfully address various challenges and continue to move forward. China upholds the purposes and principles of the UN Charter in international affairs and has significant influence on the international stage. The Ukrainian side is committed to the one-China policy, and hopes to advance all-round bilateral cooperation with China, open up a new chapter in Ukraine-China relations, and jointly safeguard world peace and stability.
UA 🇺🇦 is committed to the one-China 🇨🇳 policy, according to readout telephone call. [CN version] 'Sapere aude'
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