Ongoing Sino-American Relations

Regarding Chinese actions and inaction, Beijing's public presentation of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict has generally mirrored Moscow's explanation for the invasion, claiming that it stemmed from Russia's reaction to constant Western pressure, especially NATO's expansion to and encroachment on areas adjacent to Russia. Yet Beijing has been reluctant to side completely with Moscow's position. It has consistently and publicly professed its support for the principle of sovereignty for all states. Moscow's recognition of the two breakaway republics in eastern Ukraine, Donetsk and Luhansk, is concerning to Beijing because of the obvious parallel to Taiwan. For Beijing to show support for Russia on this issue would undermine its own position on Taiwan. Specifically, the secession of eastern Ukraine--and, earlier, of Crimea from Ukraine--could provide fodder for those supporting Taiwan's independence, and Russia's recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk could provide a legal precedent for the US to do the same for Taiwan.

This said, the Russo-Ukrainian war came at a propitious time for Beijing. Before this episode, Washington had been clearly "pivoting" to Asia, with a focus on rallying China's neighbors to oppose Beijing. US officials have been transparent in designating China as the US's main competitor, or even adversary, in international relations. Many have professed that policies intended to engage China and transform it into a more cooperative and congenial "responsible stakeholder" have failed, and that it is time to take a tougher stance against Beijing (see e.g. Campbell and Rapp-Hooper 2020). Significantly, even though sharp partisan divisions usually characterize politics in Washington, Republicans and Democrats generally agree on this policy of confronting China. The Russo-Ukrainian conflict has, at least for now, weakened the push in Washington to single out China as the US's chief opponent in a global struggle for influence, and disrupted the Biden administration's attempt to shift attention and resources from Europe and the Middle East to East Asia in a campaign to contain Beijing's influence.

Before this war, Washington had increased its political and military support for Taipei, a position implying greater support for an independent Taiwan, at the same time that it claimed to oppose any unilateral attempt to alter the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. On October 21, 2021, when asked whether Washington would come to Taiwan's defense if it were attacked by China, president Joe Biden said, "Yes, we have a commitment to do that." The White House, however, quickly walked back Biden's statement, indicating that there has not been any change in the US policy of "strategic ambiguity" which declines to commit Washington to any future course of action (Widakuswara 2021).