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NATO's Hegemonic Formula 4. enlarging the circle For half a century the Atlantic Alliance had supplanted, to a considerable degree, national defence in Western Europe. In the 1990s, American policy makers became preoccupied by the converse possibility, 're-nationalization'. The connotations of this bugbear, ubiquitous in the period, are ambiguous, encompassing everything from barriers to trade to inter-state military rivalry and war. It is the interconnection of such ills, and the holism of their remedy, that distinguished Clinton-era globalist ideology. 'America's core concepts--democracy and market economics--are more broadly accepted than ever', rejoiced National Security Advisor Anthony Lake in September 1993. Emancipation of Eastern European states from the Communist yoke handed the administration a 'moment of immense democratic and entrepreneurial opportunity'. The time had come to advance `from containment to enlargement'. 'During the Cold War', Clinton intoned a week later, 'we sought to contain a threat to the survival of free institutions'. 'Now we seek to enlarge the circle of nations that live under those free institutions.' Where the 'new democracies' were concerned, NATO and shock therapy were part of the same package. In hindsight, it is notable that accession of the Visegrád trio, formalized at the 1997 Summit in Madrid should have encountered as much us domestic resistance as it did. Congress was pliant enough, but a number of establishment grandees expressed their dissatisfaction, among them the secretary of defence, out of misgivings about alienating Russia. Differences chiefly had to do with when and where the alliance expanded, not its purpose as such. The Kremlin's concerns were ultimately brushed aside, and Clinton dismissed fears of a Russian backlash as 'silly'.
4. enlarging the circle
For half a century the Atlantic Alliance had supplanted, to a considerable degree, national defence in Western Europe. In the 1990s, American policy makers became preoccupied by the converse possibility, 're-nationalization'. The connotations of this bugbear, ubiquitous in the period, are ambiguous, encompassing everything from barriers to trade to inter-state military rivalry and war. It is the interconnection of such ills, and the holism of their remedy, that distinguished Clinton-era globalist ideology. 'America's core concepts--democracy and market economics--are more broadly accepted than ever', rejoiced National Security Advisor Anthony Lake in September 1993. Emancipation of Eastern European states from the Communist yoke handed the administration a 'moment of immense democratic and entrepreneurial opportunity'. The time had come to advance `from containment to enlargement'.
'During the Cold War', Clinton intoned a week later, 'we sought to contain a threat to the survival of free institutions'. 'Now we seek to enlarge the circle of nations that live under those free institutions.' Where the 'new democracies' were concerned, NATO and shock therapy were part of the same package.
In hindsight, it is notable that accession of the Visegrád trio, formalized at the 1997 Summit in Madrid should have encountered as much us domestic resistance as it did. Congress was pliant enough, but a number of establishment grandees expressed their dissatisfaction, among them the secretary of defence, out of misgivings about alienating Russia. Differences chiefly had to do with when and where the alliance expanded, not its purpose as such. The Kremlin's concerns were ultimately brushed aside, and Clinton dismissed fears of a Russian backlash as 'silly'.
I just finished updating my "international bloc" file to incorporate permutations of post-WWII "Group of n". The indisputable feature of so-called enlargement that engrosses, patronizes, ROW anarchy is "Great Power" domination of so-called multilateral institutions, specifically, IMF (debt) and UNSC (force)—regardless of which person of which generation that transnational unfree press portrays as leader of the free world rules-base order and hierarchy of international norms.
For example, when the G8 of the day graciously invoked a G14 (G8 + G5* + "unaligned" at the time Egypt) convention to memorialize advanced economies' 2009 "Credit Crash" defenestration, India's prime minister Manmohan Singh remarked.
"The original rationale of G7 was the belief that it would evolve more effective consultation among the more powerful countries on one side of the bi-polar world of the 1970s and 1980s. Its expansion to G8 reflects the disappearance of that particular faultline by the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, while the group includes many of the economically powerful nations, it is obviously not representative as it does not include any developing country."
"state-controlled" DW | Germany flexes its soft-power muscle in Africa's Sahel, 3 May
The end of Germany's military mission in Mali [2024!] is the beginning of a broader development strategy across the Sahel. Improved prospects for people there mean more security for Europe, officials say. The plan, as outlined in a paper published on Wednesday by the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), seeks to "orient itself on the needs of the people" in the region. The plan seeks to bring in more [AFRICOM Bundeswahr?] partners over a wider area. "We are more successful when we act together with international partners than everyone on their own," BMZ Minister Svenja Schulze said in a statement.
"We are more successful when we act together with international partners than everyone on their own," BMZ Minister Svenja Schulze said in a statement.
Germany has long been a significant player in stabilization and development efforts in the largely francophone [!] Sahel. With deeper engagement, Germany hopes to be a soft-power leader in a region it classifies as central to European security. As part of that commitment, the BMZ says that Schulze will put herself up as the chair of the Sahel Alliance*, a cooperation among Sahelian [sic] and Western [sic] countries and organizations [OHCHR, UNDP, EU, EIB, IFC, WB, AfDB, Gates Foundation, Tony Blair Institute, Organisation internationale de la Francophonie]. The [a]lliance, which takes credit [finance!] for supporting nearly 1,200 projects totaling 26.5 billion ($29.3 billion), will choose the chair at a meeting next month in Mauritania. [...]
With deeper engagement, Germany hopes to be a soft-power leader in a region it classifies as central to European security. As part of that commitment, the BMZ says that Schulze will put herself up as the chair of the Sahel Alliance*, a cooperation among Sahelian [sic] and Western [sic] countries and organizations [OHCHR, UNDP, EU, EIB, IFC, WB, AfDB, Gates Foundation, Tony Blair Institute, Organisation internationale de la Francophonie]. The [a]lliance, which takes credit [finance!] for supporting nearly 1,200 projects totaling 26.5 billion ($29.3 billion), will choose the chair at a meeting next month in Mauritania. [...]
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