i don't think you'll get any contradictions here.

what comes up for me as i read this was:

1. realpolitik rules, and we are not deemed as a public worthy to absorb and understand such concepts, so are you just  ahead of the curve, or we being dumbed down so we specifically remain ignorant, chewing on the cud of whether to vote for brown or cameron etc.

i think a lot of relatively politically unsophisticated peeps have come to the same conclusions around their kitchen tables, following 'cui bono?' to its logical conclusion.

this cognitive gap between the blithe lying we have to expect from our leaders and the reality of what's happening that we all feel in our guts,(and see reflected in our energy bills) is staggering....

crazymaking, in fact....

humanist values just don't get much of a place at the table of the powerbrokers, and if we don't assert our demands and rights, well and often, i certainly am not holding my breath till they give them to us out of the goodness of their black little hearts...

well done for researching and writing this summary of the frightening status of world power, and the lunatics who control it.

2. europe will nor be able to sit on the fence for ever.

3. i pray that the enlightenment values we discuss so often and well here, will prevail over the brutal mindsets of the other world powers, russia and china. in fact i think this is the only kind of globalism i endorse.

savour our thoreaus and emersons, our shakespeares and whitmans, become blues fans...we really did come up with some intellectual, cultural and scientific marvels that will help your civilisations as well, dance to the best of our music, and we'll do the same...

but PLEASE don't treat us like the americans treat the iraquis, or we brits treated the indians, or the french the algerians, or the italians the ethiopians....

don't just feed us into the hopper to be rendered...

'The history of public debt is full of irony. It rarely follows our ideas of order and justice.' Thomas Piketty

who knows what the world will look like 10 years hence...


The world will end not with a Bang, but with a "do'oh"

It seemed to many that the post-1970 period was a golden era for the us. Not at all; it was quite the contrary. First, the us had lost a major war against a small country... Vietnam was compounded by the Watergate scandal, which forced Nixon to resign. Military defeat and domestic political crisis were, however, only a backdrop to the graver us geopolitical problem--the loss of any automatic economic superiority over its major allies, Western Europe and Japan. For, once the Triad had become more or less economic equals, the us could no longer count on Western Europe and Japan behaving like political satellites. American foreign policy had to change. Beginning with Nixon, and continuing for the next thirty years (Nixon to Clinton and passing through Reagan), all administrations concentrated on an unspoken objective--slowing down the decline of us hegemony.

The programme they evolved was threefold. The first plank...was an offer to Western Europe and Japan of `partnership'. Washington in effect said...that it would offer them a say in constructing a joint world geopolitical policy, in return for (their) refraining from unilateral policies of their own. Partnership was implemented by the creation of a series of institutions: the Trilateral Commission, the g7 meetings, the World Economic Forum at Davos among others. One major argument the us used was the need to maintain a united front against the Soviet Union...The allies did not stray too far.

The second plank was designed to secure us military advantage...The us had already lost an absolute monopoly in nuclear weapons, since by the mid-sixties Great Britain, the Soviet Union, France and China had all developed them. But the us decided it was crucial that the spread stop there. The second plank was thus a drive to stop nuclear proliferation. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons...offered a deal: the five nuclear powers would work to pursue negotiations for nuclear disarmament and permit...other countries to develop the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; in return, the rest of the world would renounce the pursuit of nuclear weaponry. Three countries refused to sign the treaty--India, Pakistan and Israel--and each has since obtained nuclear weapons. But the majority of states eventually signed, and many countries which were thought to have started programmes in the direction of developing nuclear weaponry in fact closed them down...There is of course a small group of countries whose real practices have long been in dispute: Iraq (whose Osirak nuclear facility was bombed by Israel in 1981), Libya (which dismantled its facilities in 2004), North Korea and Iran in particular. The reason why this treaty is so crucial to the us is that even a few nuclear weapons give a country the capacity to limit the strategic options of the us and the reach of its military strength...

The third element in the revised us foreign policy was economic. When the Washington Consensus replaced developmentalism as the reigning world doctrine, American economic and particularly financial involvement in Third World countries became much more profitable, hence compensating for some of the decline in the profitability of erstwhile leading industries in the us. In many ways, this aspect of the revised foreign policy was the most successful of the three, until the late 1990s.

But the very success of these efforts to slow hegemonic decline created difficulties for the us at the very moment when it was congratulating itself on its emergence as the `sole superpower'. The first of these was caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The rhetoric of the United States had always been that the Soviet system should be ended...When Gorbachev did...tear down the Wall, and forced considerable mutual disarmament on the superpowers, the us was unsure how to handle this new development...

The principal geopolitical consequences were two. Washington lost the last important argument it could employ as to why Western Europe should remain politically tied to the us... It also lost the last major indirect constraint on the policies of Third World nations--the role of the Soviet Union as an enforcer of the rules of the Yalta arrangements, in countries hostile to the us. The latter effect became dramatically visible with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990...

(Saddam) of course worried about world reaction to what was obviously, under international law, aggression. But because of the imminent collapse of the Soviet Union, he could afford to disregard Soviet views. Saudi Arabia posed no serious military threat. The only obstacle was the United States. Saddam probably reasoned thus: either the us fails to react (as he was assured by the us Ambassador to Iraq two days before the invasion) or if they do react, the worst they will probably do is push Iraq out of Kuwait. So, all in all, it seemed a gamble well worth taking. And of course he turned out to be right. The us, after a momentary hesitation, mobilized a political and military campaign to expel Iraq from Kuwait, getting four countries (Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) to bear some 90 per cent of the cost of the American operation. But they stopped at the border for fear of the negative consequences for American interests of invading Iraq itself. The end result was the status quo ante...

On the world-economic front, the 1990s was to be the decade of long-term institutionalization of the neoliberal global order. Its chief instrument, the WTO, was charged with ensuring that the countries of the South open their frontiers to trade and financial flows from the North, while respecting their `intellectual property'. The basic message was the slogan launched by Thatcher a decade earlier: There is No Alternative. The countries of the erstwhile socialist bloc, including Russia itself, engaged in an orgy of privatization and deregulation. So did many other states in the South.

The immediate result in a large number of countries was to worsen economic conditions, with the disappearance of social safety nets, increasing rates of unemployment, and declining currencies--all occurring side by side with the spectacular rise of new wealthy strata. Internal inequalities in the less developed countries of the world greatly increased. When the one area of the South that had been doing rather well economically--East and Southeast Asia--suffered a severe financial crisis in 1997, followed by similar setbacks in Russia and Brazil, the neoliberal option lost much of its credibility as a solution to the world's economic problems...

When the wto met in Seattle in 1999 to draw up definitive rules for a neoliberal world economic order, it was met by popular demonstrations (largely of us social movements) that effectively derailed the proceedings. Similar protests followed at other international meetings over the next few years, leading to the creation of the World Social Forum, which met for the first time in Porto Alegre in January 2001--designed as a popular riposte to the World Economic Forum of Davos, the official meeting-ground of global neoliberalism. The programme to slow down the decline in American hegemony seemed to be grinding to a halt. It was time to rethink it.

The rethinking was provided by the group of neo-conservatives whom George W. Bush installed in high positions in his Administration after his inauguration in 2001... This group was extremely critical of Clinton's foreign policy but, in effect, they rejected the whole thrust of the us foreign policy that had tried to slow down the decline of us hegemony after 1970. They believed the glass of us power was not half full, but half empty--American decline was all too real. They did not attribute this to structural changes in the world-system (for example, the end of us economic superiority vis-à-vis Western Europe and Japan), but rather to the political blunders and lack of tough resolve of successive us presidents. They did not exempt Reagan from this critique, although they did not say so too loudly.

This lobby called for a radical revision of us foreign policy. They wished to replace the soft multilateralism that was the basis of the partnership the us had offered its principal allies between 1970 and 2000 with unilateral decisions, to be offered its allies on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Those countries that seemed to be resisting nuclear non-proliferation were to be forced toward immediate adherence. At the same time, efforts were to be made to free the United States from the restraints it had accepted on the expansion and updating of its own nuclear arsenal. The neo-conservatives aimed to block American participation in new international treaties that would in any way limit us national decisions (Kyoto Protocol, Law of the Sea, etc). Above all, they were set on ousting Saddam Hussein, who in their eyes had humiliated the us by remaining in power in Iraq, by force. Implicitly, they blamed the first President Bush for not having marched on Baghdad in 1991.

It is important to note that many, if not most, of these individuals had held high positions in the governments of Reagan and Bush Snr, but had never been able to get either of these administrations to buy this programme. They had been stymied by a large group of officials who adhered to the Nixon-to-Clinton strategy, and regarded their proposals as dangerous folly. So they were frustrated not only by Saddam, but by the us foreign policy establishment. Their frustration continued for the first eight months of the Bush Administration. Then came bin Laden's assault on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon. Almost immediately they were able to get Bush to buy their entire approach. What probably persuaded him and his immediate political advisors was the fact that assuming the mantle of `war president' seemed to be the surest road to re-election as well as to the realization of his most cherished domestic objectives.

The logic of the neo-conservative position was very simple. Bringing down Saddam by force, preferably unilateral, would not only restore American honour, but also intimidate three groups whose policies seemed to constitute a major threat to us hegemony: Western Europe with its pretensions to geopolitical autonomy; the potential nuclear proliferators, especially North Korea and Iran; and the rulers of the Arab states who were dragging their feet over a `lasting' settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict largely on Israel's terms. The neo-conservatives reasoned that, if they could achieve these three objectives rapidly and conclusively, all serious opposition to us hegemony would disintegrate and the world would indeed enter a `new American century'.

In doing so, they made several major errors of judgement. They assumed that the military conquest of Iraq would be relatively simple, and cost little in either personnel or money. It is now clear they were wrong...Washington was manifestly unprepared to handle the complexity of Iraqi internal politics, and found itself caught in not only a military but a political quagmire, from which it has so far failed to extricate itself...

Moreover the politics of intimidation was only partially successful. In 2002 and 2003 France and Germany publicly signalled their dissent on the invasion of Iraq and the us had to withdraw the second un Security Council resolution when it became clear how little support it would receive. Nor did intimidation work any better with potential nuclear proliferators. Both North Korea and Iran drew the conclusion from the American invasion of Iraq that the us could attack Iraq not because it had nuclear weapons, but because it did not have them. It seemed obvious to both governments that the surest defence of the existing regimes was to speed up the acquisition of a nuclear arsenal... But the us found itself weakened militarily and politically by the occupation of Iraq. It became clear that the us would not be capable of a successful land invasion of another such country. It might pre-emptively launch nuclear missiles, but the consequences of doing so seemed daunting. Indeed, it was now in less of a position to rally either Western Europe or East Asia to any effort to force the two countries to cease their programmes. The us was consequently in a weaker position to stop nuclear proliferation after the invasion of Iraq than before it, the opposite of neo-conservative projections. As for the Arab regimes, the conclusion they drew from the invasion of Iraq was that the ambiguous policies they had pursued for decades were the only plausible ones for their own survival...They were certainly wary of any further us projects in the Middle East.

Finally, on the front of neoliberalism, the Washington Consensus no longer seemed so binding on the countries of the South, thanks to the weakening of the us geopolitical position as a result of Iraq. Both negotiations within the wto, which the Bush Administration sought to revive, and Washington's bid to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas (ftaa), ran into a roadblock set up by the Brazilians and other governments of the South...

The net result of the entire Bush foreign policy has thus been to accelerate the decline of us hegemony rather than reverse it. The world has entered into a relatively unstructured, multilateral division of geopolitical power, with a number of regional centres of varying strength manoeuvring for advantage--the us, the uk, Western Europe, Russia, China, Japan, India, Iran, Brazil at the very least. There is no overwhelming superiority--economic, political, military or ideological-cultural--in any one of these centres. And there is no strong set of alliances for the moment, although one is likely to emerge.

I certainly doubt the American mepire will fall in a sudden collapse. Transitions from an empire to another in the last two centuries have been normally quite soft and without strong and sudden changes.. it is just a smooth adaptation. ONly a WOLRD War Ii and FDR spped it up alittle bit for the US.

Actitudes and policies can change slightly the profile of the change but the end point is a fix point and almost impossible to avoid/change.

Of course, policies can make it more painful or less painful, this is true, But Presidecnies like FDR only fast tracked the US to global status two or three decades.. and this of course changed the world...for a few decades... but not the final fix point... a multipolar world.

In a world capitalistsc society where energy is abundant (and we have plenty of coal... unfortuantely some would say sinc eglobal warming is there waiting us if we use it) with high interchanges the power and area of influence will be depend almost exclusively in the ability to generate andspatial program which can deliver IBCM. In Physics we learn to isolate the most relevant variables in a particular frame. In our present frame/world the knwoledge, ability and the existence of means within your borders to develope IBCM  (nuclear power is much more easy than IBCM) is all that counts...

So a multipolar world will appear eventually with all nations (or group of nations) that can have one. namely Russia, Europe, China, India and Brazil (eventually Japan-Corea if they scratch they present treaties with the US or Australi if they do the same)....maybe with time SouthAfrica.. but this last is a long shots still.. but eventually it will happen

And that's it. Any of these nations will eventually have enough economic strength to become an economic superpower..

A basic economy with your own resource is the indicator  to achieve a spatial program.. the own nuclear and IBCM programs are pursued and, depending on economists and knowledge of the rulers you can reach world economic status sooner or later...

The ones that have reached an economic status (or seem to get it fairly soon) are China and India.. this is true, three decades at most adn they get to catch up the US or Europe.. so the balance will go to the Pacific.. but Russia is still more a de facto power..and Brazil is only waiting...(example of a delay due to bad leader.. until the present and past presidents)

Bush just did one thing.. he lost Asia two or three decades before than expected without a lot of pain except for Iraq citizens.. on the other hand.. these are also excellent newsgiven that the American army is strecthed thin, hard power of US has been redimensionalize and reduced by an order of magnitutde  (at least) and soft power will have to be subtituted with cooperative power and alliances if the US wants to be the first of the pack for a couple of decades more,

In any case, it woudl have been a matter of time.. luckily Bush make it faster... Invading Iran will make it mcuh more painful.. this is true.. so this is probably the only and relevant measurte of the Bush administration. But the final point is the same..multipolar influences being the US one among many (with good presidents maybe the slightly first among many)

A pleasure

I therefore claim to show, not how men think in myths, but how myths operate in men's minds without their being aware of the fact. Levi-Strauss, Claude

On the other hand, as much as I'd love to see South America rise to the top of the world order, I don't think that Venezuelan oil or Brazilian growth will be enough to push the region into the front ranks.

As for the EU, well, it's obvious that they could easily surpass the U.S. on every single front, if only they could come up with a leader or two who cared enough about the rest of the world to want to be a major player.

I'd agree that it is unlikely that the US will fall hard and fast, unless the abandonment of dollars by japan, europe and China takes place more quickly than currently seems likely. I think it won't, simply because any hint of such a move would render the stock worthless.

But a little more humility from the White House would certainly be welcome

keep to the Fen Causeway