• An ostensibly crazy prime minister who has gone out of his way to appear militant and anti-semitic.
  
• A reform movement in retreat since the last elections, partly due to the advantage given to the conservatives by the spectacle of the invasion of Iraq.
  
• A religious head of state who in theory holds supreme power and is the one who has the authority to declare war and so on.

1. israel. she cannot afford another muslim country to have nuclear weapons.
   
2. iran wants to sell oil in euros, which will upset the dollar-hegemony, whose inflation also weighs on us in europe.
   
3. it's personal: iran's loudmouthed leader was one of the kidnappers of the us hostages.
   
4. it's blowback from the shah days. karma is a b....
   
5. there is a mood in all the muslim world to correct what they see to be a distinctly unlevel playing field, that benefits only a few sunni dictatorships, kingdoms.
   
6. america (and europe) are attempting to re-con their populi into accepting nuclear power, and the cognitive disconnect emerging from not wanting iran to prepare in the same way for when their oil runs out, and selling the 'great' idea to our own, is the kind that is so enraging - due to its rational unsolvability, and most importantly the impossibility of spinning it convincingly to an increasingly self-educated public, who are learning, slowly, to read between the lines, thanks to blogs like this, and efforts like jerome's to further the viability of alternate sources, so benign in contrast.

i am trying to keep my sense of humour as i contemplate the possible scenarios unfolding from this 'perfect storm', whose effects will be global.

another waxing day, another shrinking dollar....

perhaps it can be done gently, with the violence restricted to the plane of rhetoric (and cartoons).

'The history of public debt is full of irony. It rarely follows our ideas of order and justice.' Thomas Piketty

• Connections to Palestinian-Israeli issue
  
• Security and regional geopolitics

1. There is not an iota of technical proof as of current that Iran does have a nuclear armament programme. There were several points of evidence presented as such but subsequently negated.

2. If, in theory, Iran does want nukes, the motivation is what the PNAC seems to have acknowledged (see Migeru's quotes): deterrence, not threat. Threat makes no sense when you have a few nukes, and delivery systems that will instantly identify you as the sender, but your opponent has hundreds (Israel) or thousands (USA) of nukes for a counterstrike to eradicate your entire country. On the other hand, since both Israel and the USA do openly threaten Iran militarily, and the USA 'encircled' Iran from all sides, deterrence does very much make sense.

3. Hence, if Iran does want nukes, it is not a security threat in itself, in fact it could be called the opposite (reducing the chance of another disastrous US intervention a la Iraq). What is a threat, IMO, is a slow spread of nukes to ever more states, which on the lkong run does increase the chances of a nuclear war: it could be (a) between two smaller states, (b) it would be easier to blame a strike on another state, (c) the total madness factor could become non-neglible. But the main obstacle to stopping the spread of nukes is the hypocritical love of nukes by existing nuclear powers (including France, hint hint). As long as they don't show any inclination to plan to dismantle their arsenal (which would be their obligation under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, BTW), others will have a motivation to get ones themselves.

4. What do the Iranian leaders really want? One possibility is that they do want nukes, and they want to get them after they get the Western powers and IAEA into a situation where they give them a legal excuse to boot out the inspectors, maybe taking a US airstrike as a price (or not even price, but possible outside force that will get the population behind them).

5. Another possibility is that Iran's leadership doesn't think the West is capable of a serious strike in practice, and wants to get as much as possible.

6. The no-nukes version is, based either on a similar assessment of Western military capacities or blindness, that for the new Iranian leaders, the issue is one of national pride, a push to get every (civilian) technology the West has and not accept any restrictions the West doesn't apply to itself. I don't think this version is the least likely. One thing rarely noticed in the West about thew Iranian Revolution is that it not only brought social medievalism, but a modernist push in comprehensive and high-quality education (no wonder they didn't like the Taliban) and (not just military) technology (there were Iranian students at my university, including women in head scarfs, BTW). Telecom, cars, railroads, ports, oil industry development.

7. Finally, I cannot disassociate the question of the "Iranian Problem" from those who want to 'solve it', which makes this wchurchill-inspired exercise a bit nonsensical to me. That is: it is a very big and vague what-if to imagine if Europe would be at the ball and not the USA (does that mean the USA disappears from Iraq, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan and the Gulf?), and that doesn't just change the 'solution' but the 'problem' itself, too.

My understanding from speaking to an Iranian friend who regularly returns there is that the stultifying boredom of existence in the Islamic Republic means that Iran's younger generation are among the most committed secular democrats in the region. The lead-in time to any deployable capability must be at least 5-10 years at which point we might be dealing with a democratic Iranian state.

I've heard it argued that possession of nuclear weapons will entrench the regime but peaceful revolutions take place in nuclear armed states - remember 1989.

Presumably the Sunnis will view Iran with nukes as a threat and the Shias will see it as an opportunity to leverage more power. Kurdish security I assume would be guaranteed by the US.

Conceivably the Shias might seek to join a kind of 'greater Iran' with the protection of its nuclear umbrella.

One of the most worryingly points against that is the recurring (and non-negotionable) urgency Iran puts on having gas (or isotope) centrifuges, those massive uranium enrichers. For the civilian use of nuclear energy, Iran needs centrifuges which can enrich uranium from its natural 0.7% to the necessarry 4 to 5% - after which nuclear fission is attainable.

Iran has and is building bigger gas centrifuges. There is but one goal for bigger gas centrifuges: higher uranium enrichment. There is but one goal known to man for uranium with higher enrichment than 4 - 5 percent: nuclear weapons. Do the math. Alarm bells should be ringing and they do ring in the IAEA.

And in that respect, I think there is a serious problem in Iran and Europe should not accept the way it gets treated. The Iranians even snuffed the perfectly acceptable offer of the Russians.

Having gas centrifuges for 4-5 % enrichment? Perfectly acceptable to me. Go ahead.
Gas centrifuges bigger than that? No, no, no.

In an aside: To other raised points that there would be perfect reasons for Iran to have nukes, as deterrents or such, that doesn't fly with me at all. We want to ban nuclear arms, not promote it.

1. Iran with nukes would be a bad thing.  I don't care about arguments that condemn the hypocrisy of trying to not allow Iran to have them. It is a regional power that is hostile to both the US and Europe, letting it be more powerful would be bad for the interests of both the US and Europe.

2. We don't know whether Iran wants nukes or not.  Quite possibly they don't either. What we do know is that they have a program that could serve as the basis for nuclear weapons development and that they seem to be intent on at least keeping their options open.

3. Assuming the intelligence reports are correct Iran is nowhere near actually having the capability to produce its own nuclear weapons.

4. Under the current Supreme Guide Iran has been quite pragmatic and rational in pursuing its own national interests - witness its cooperation with the US against the Taliban and in creating the Karzai government.

5. The new president seems less inclined towards pragmatism - more a reversion to the messianic revolutionary spirit of the early Islamic Republic.

6. Even someone sympathetic to the foreign policy ideology of the current US administration would have to admit that its competency leaves a lot to be desired.

1. Slowly build pressure on Iran, with slowly being the operative word. Thus the referal to the Security Council, but the vague verbal rebuke that is the most that China and Russia are likely to allow is actually just the right step for now.

2. Later perhaps low level sanctions - e.g. an EU travel ban for senior Iranian officials and their families.  Such sanctions could be gradually ratchetted up over a period of years.

3. Don't do anything major until this admin is out of office.

I often read that a military attack will be necessary since the Chinese and Russians won't support a full blown sanctions regime in the Security Council. But nor would they support a resolution allowing military action. If the US is not concerned about having its military actions being legal, it could just as easily block Iranian exports as it could bomb its nuclear program related sites. Now, considering the situation of the oil markets such sanctions would pose their own problems but that's true of both UN sanctions and a unilaterally imposed embargo.

National Public Radio (NPR)in the US had a short piece this week by their correspondent in Teheran introducing Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. It's not deep analysis but it's not cliché. You may find it interesting.

NPR Summary:
World Takes Notice of Iran's Ahmadinejad by Mike Shuster --- All Things Considered, February 13, 2006 · Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been Iran's president for only six months, but he has made a strong impression worldwide. Unlike former presidents of the Islamic republic, Ahmadinejad is not a cleric, he dresses simply, and can talk a language most ordinary Iranians understand.

Here is the link to the broadcast: http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5204387

The sad fact is only a modicum of effort is required to build nuclear weapons.  If Iran is willing to make the effort there is nothing anyone can do to stop them.  A more intense, time consuming, and expense effort is required to build the Command and Control, targeting systems, launching infrastructure, maintainance and service organizations, and delivery systems to be able to reliably deploy the weapons as an element in the Iranian political arsenal.

Note that!  Political arsenal.  "Warfare is politics by other means," per von Clausewitz and, if that means anything at all, the weapons of war are political tools -- ultimately.

Focusing, for the moment, on delivery systems there are two venues for striking a target: air and land.  The air delivery systems Iran can use are missles and planes.  I dismiss missles as a point targeting system from my feeling Iran does not have the technology, yet, to construct the guidance systems.  They do have the technology to use missles as a area delivery system.  Iran does have the ability to use aircraft as both a point and area delivery system.

Missles have the advantages they can be launched with minimal notice from either fixed (hardened) or mobile launching sites with a short flight time (15 minutes, say) giving a short reaction time to the targeted nation.  The disadvantage, to Iran, of missles (given my assessment above) is if they were launched against Israel, say, they are as likely to hit Gaza, Syria, Lebanon, or Jordan as Israel.  Launched against Saudi Arabia, say, they have a good chance of destroying Mecca as any other Saudi city.  

The same reasoning applies to aircraft as an area delivery system leaving us with aircraft as the only point air delivery system available to Iran.  Aircraft have the decided disadvantage of a long(er) flight time, depending on the target, and, thus, a longer reaction time given to the targeted nation.  Further aircraft are easily and quickly detected giving the targeted nation sufficent reaction time to direct its own Air Force against the Iranian Strike Force making the success of the strike problematic.  

We can now make the tentative conclusion the only practical means for Iran to delivery nuclear weapons is by land: a truck or car.  This method shifts the advantages to Iran.  First, the weapons can be pre-set to achieve a point strike.  Second, it is almost impossible to prevent a weapon from being successfully smuggled into a country.  Third, the weapon can be exploded with no advance warning.  

The downside to pre-sitting is the danger of a security breach allowing the targeted nation to find the weapon.  A continual operating team of technicians have to be able to get to the site in order to do maintainance on the weapon, for example.  The operations team has to maintain strict security.  Iran has to maintain internal strict security to prevent the sites from being blown.  Last, the longer the weapon(s) sit there the greater the odds for disclosure.  Once it is known these weapons have been pre-sited the targeted nation is going to freak-out with unpredicable results.  Also it is possible for security to be blown by a third party, including non-govermental groups, with the potential for these weapons to fall into the hands of a group that would use them against directly against Iran or against the target when Iran does not want them to.

Whether the Iranian political leadership would choose such a delivery system is up to your assessment of the Iranian political leadership.  I doubt it, mainly for the last postulate, but I can be convinced otherwise.

The use of a truck or car to delivery a weapon breaks into two operational methods: intermediate siting in a third country for delivery to the target and keeping the weapons under control in Iran.  The intermediate siting has the same problems as pre-siting, without any of the advantages, so I dismiss it.  Keeping the weapons under control in Iran means land delivery to the target takes more time and becomes much more difficult but it is the method I would choose - sometimes the way my mind works frightens me! - so let's spend some time here.

Land delivery by car, truck, camel ... whatever ... means the weapon can be point targeted with a high degree of security.  Command and Control can be maintained so the weapon can be recalled if the political situation changes, something not possible with any other delivery system, and it gives the Iranians the chance to "use" the weapon without actual detonation.

If it is not known that these weapons have been deployed then it is almost impossible for the targeted nation to prevent all of these weapons from being sited.  Some of the weapons will almost certainly be stopped but the targeted nation can never be sure of interdicting all of the weapons.  Of course once these weapons are sited they cannot stay sited for long otherwise the problems of pre-sited weapons comes into play.  So either these weapons need to be used, in fairly short order, or they must be withdrawn with some of them, perhaps, discovered during the withdrawal and we're back to the problems with pre-sited weapons.  The fact some of the weapons may be halted in transit means more than one weapon must be sent to the target(s) to ensure one of them will get through.  

For a number or reasons the operational teams have to be fairly fanatical as the chances of being detected or killed through an 'Own Goal' are pretty good.  From the Iranian Command and Control perspective this means the team may decide, upon detection, to detonate the sucker no matter where they are.  Which means a land delivery system is not a reliable point targeting system and detonation can occur just about anywhere at just about any time.  Therefore, Land Delivery systems while theoretically point systems need to be considered as potential area systems.

And we're back to that, again.

Given this, superficial, discussion the question now becomes, "With all the problems, why the hell do they want these things?"  

As has been already mentioned, nuclear weapons are a political weapon that, in the last resort, make the statement: Don't Mess With Us.  Whether or no Iran can use nukes they could use them and that's enough.  Once these weapons are operational Iran immediately becomes the Islamic Middle Eastern Power and eventually a Global Political Power capable of forcing the world to its will.  Once they have the weapons the ability to develop a reliable delivery system (missles) becomes a matter of time, money, and effort; this is what is causing the goverments of France and Germany concern.  (Along with a bomb placed on a ship and sailing into Marseille, Hamburg, Jaffe, or New York but this post is already too long to go into that!)  

OK, what are the options preventing Iran going nuclear?

Military:  Forget it.  A conventional bombing campaign will not guarantee destruction of any weapons already existing.  Nor will it guarantee destruction of weapons making material disbursed across Iran.  A pre-emptive nuclear strike won't guarantee destruction either and it ensures retaliation from Iran, if or when.  (And what about Pakistan?  What happens there?  How do you prevent contamination of the Middle Eastern oilfields?  How do you prevent destruction of the ports?)  Military invasion and occupation just makes it easier to target the occupying forces.  Neither does it totally preclude land, or ship, delivery to a target.

A blockade is pointless.  It will not stop development while giving a greater impetus to develop and force an end to the blockade.  

Political:  All we need to do is convince the Iranian political leadership for all time not to make these weapons.  How?

Economic:  I've mentioned several times Iran needs money to successfully complete a weapons program.  OK, all we need to do is (1) stop buying oil and (2) hope like hell they don't have enough money already to fund the project.  H'mm.  That doesn't look so great either.  

Technical:  Prevent Iran from purchasing the required tools.  This one does have some hope of success but they could make them internally, given time and the need.  So it is only a short term solution.

Wrapping this up.

If Iran wants to make nuclear weapons ... they will, eventually.  While they, currently, face severe operational problems if they try to use nuclear weapons these limitations are not insurmountable.  Immediate global prevention options do not seem insurmountable, by the Iranians, either.    

She believed in nothing; only her skepticism kept her from being an atheist. -- Jean-Paul Sartre

for progress to ensue, double standards as MO are going the way of the dodo.

watch out for flying debris as the giant morons duke it out.

you owe it to your dna to survive

go gaia!

'The history of public debt is full of irony. It rarely follows our ideas of order and justice.' Thomas Piketty

The US contends that the Iranian government are developing a nuclear weapons programme behind the cover of a civilian programme. It Is further contended that Iran cannot be allowed develop such a capability as it will pose an unacceptable danger to the peace and safety of the region. It is proposed that to prevent Iran acquiring nuclear weapons all solutions are acceptable, up to and including nuclear strikes.

I refuse to accept this narrative at face value. Let's deconstruct it and see if we can get a better picture of what's really going on. Who are the players? What are their motivations? What do they want? What do we know for sure and what is unsubstantiated nonsense? What is the real problem here from Europe's point of view? Is there even a real problem?

<snip>

Someone will write up a summary at each stage. In fact, I suspect that several summaries will come out.

What do we know for sure and what is unsubstantiated nonsense? What is the real problem here from Europe's point of view? Is there even a real problem?l

This seems to be a discussion that can be more fact based, and provide the foundation for dialogue on the second part and on the following stages.  

I'm wondering about this because when we move to the very legitimate issues of who are the players?  What are their motivations?,,,,this will be a discussion that by its nature is less fact based, less scientific.  It may be that mixing the two discussions will endanger our ability to gain agreement, or at least frame alternative postulates, on the first, more fact based discussion.  I think we can achieve a very meaningful problem definition in that first part, but combining the two may endanger that goal by bringing in more fractious debate in an arena that is less fact based.

Just wondering,,,,what do you think?

I did some organizing, for myself, of the above thoughts, and at the risk of being presumptious, thought this might be helpful to you and others.  My objective was to pick out some thematic themes that develop in the above comments, and group them.

First there were a number of great discussions that focused on whether or not the Iranians are developing a nuclear weapon, and then evolved into some outstanding discussion of the science (outstanding to my admittedly feeble scientific mind, anyway):

What is the problem?  There's not a shred of evidence that the Iranians are developing weapons.

Yes there is a problem and it's likely the iranians are developing nuclear weapons

The Science Angle:  a great technical discussion on the challenge Iraq has in getting Nukes

More good discussion of the science

Players:Iran  the initial comment by Colman led to a discussion of the risk of religious zealotry and the threatening statements by Iranian leaders

The Americans are setting this whole thing up again, just like they did in Iraq.

The intelligence and the facts are being fixed around the policy

Players:Europe   discussion of Europe motives; assertion that it's all US driven, and some denial of that

Let them tool up

1. Yes, Iran is almost certainly working towards nuclear weapons.
   
2. It's going to take 5-10 years to build a working weapon, and perhaps 12-15 years to put together an arsenal of weapons that can offer a useful strategic deterrent. (One nuke on its own is hardly useful, except as a suicide gambit of last resort.)

So where's the problem that supposedly requires military action now?

Meanwhile Korea not only claims to have nukes but is much closer to creating an ICBM system to deliver them, and so realistically has to be considered more of an immediate threat to the entire world.

Also, if there happened to be genuine ex-USSR nukes available on the black market arms dealers' equivalent of eBay, they would offer any rogue state a tempting alternative. So Iran may well have nukes already. In which case it's too late for action.  

This may be too Machiavellian, but I wonder if there's a meta-game being played here by Russia and China, who may want to encourage US military action -  because strategically and politically it's likely to lead to a disastrous weakening of US influence. The US can only consider fighting an extended land war by bringing back the draft, which would be politically suicidal. And the alternative - a nuke first strike - would set the Middle East alight, turn off oil supplies, and leave the Russians holding access to the main reserves.

So I'll suggest again that the problem isn't Iran's nuclear ambitions. The problem is access to oil reserves, and in the bigger picture this is just another variation in the Great Game.

European Parliament: Iranian Foreign Minister Talks to MEPs (20-02-2006)

At a tense moment in international relations, with concerns growing about Iran's decision to resume its nuclear research programme and lack of confidence that the programme is meant for solely peaceful purposes, the Iranian Foreign Minister Manoochehr Mottaki will be at the European Parliament in Brussels on Monday evening to talk to members of the Foreign Affairs Committee. His visit follows hot on the heels of a resolution adopted by the Parliament calling for this issue to be resolved in line with international law, and, specifically, through the avenue of the United Nations.