not a Good Thing

a Goo thing though...

i can see the military recruiters now:

'let's cut to the chase....you want cheap gas to tun your camaros, then put on that uniform!'

'but what about democracy and liberty and protecting our values?'

'same thing, sucker...'

the american way of life may not be negotiable, but it sure is expensive.

it'd be cheaper to design cars to run on blood, and just open a vein when you need to go shopping...

sheez

'The history of public debt is full of irony. It rarely follows our ideas of order and justice.' Thomas Piketty

The letter also states that they recognise no "treaty, ceasefire or peace treaty" with Israel. This is also contradicted by practice, for example the 1996 agreement with Israel about rules of conflict (which was held to by both sides until the current outbreak), and the 2004 prisoner exchange.

It also calls for the establishment of an Islamic state (though explicitly saying they want it by the will of the people and not force). Despite continuing strong ties with Iran, this goal was abadoned in practice and mostly in rhetoric (Hezbollah is more liberal than the US-groomed pro-Sistani Shi'a parties in Iraq). Nasrallah said of this in 2004:

We believe the requirement for an Islamic state is to have an overwhelming popular desire, and we're not talking about fifty percent plus one, but a large majority. And this is not available in Lebanon and probably never will be.

I close this by recommending two further articles on Hizbollah:

• Adam Shatz: In Search of Hezbollah is an account more critical than Cobban's, but also with some details on the other Janus face or general background lacking in Cobban.
  
• Lara Deeb: Hizballah: A Primer discusses the group from different aspects separately, again with details missing from or adding to those in the previous two, and is the freshest of them: written during the war last month.

I wasn't disputing what you quoted from Chomsky, it was a general note when one tries to interpret his words (using other quotes from him). You point just to one of those fine distinctions I would want to make:

In any case, his statement that "they [Hezbollah] don't think Israel is a legitimate state" is not controversial, is it?  i.e. It is not controversial that Hezbollah does not think Israel is a legitimate state, right?  (I consider the non-recognition of a state and an avowed intent to destroy that state to be quite distinct; in particular, the former does not imply the latter.)

Also, even if someone wants a transition from an illegal to a legal situation, that could take many forms - beyond destroying one side and deporting one side and peaceful exodus of one side: a two-state solution with borders newly agreed to and recognised by all parties, or a one-state solution based on individual equality, or a one-state solution based on communal equality, or a one-state solution based on toleration of one community by the other. (I emphasize, thinking of other readers, that whether one of these visions is desired or viable are again separate things.) (Finally I also note what Chomsky wrote, that not recognising Israel as a legitimate state is the official position of many Arab couintries, if I am not mistaken including Lebanon itself.)

On the other hand, I will not deny that Nasrallah's notion of Israel as an illegitimate state has more negative consequences, in that when he spoke out in support of Hamas suicide attacks as a means to create mutual deterrence, he argued that all Israelis as illegal occupants, thus denying the importance of the civilian/military distinction in Israel's special case. (Yet again, it must be noted that since then even Hamas was forced to change thinking on suicide bombings of civilians both due to ineffectiveness and negative reactions even in the Arab world, while Hezbollah itself has not applied it even against military targets for almost a decade.)

_{*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

I think that 'always' only lasts until it can become a bargaining matter, would peace negotiations start -- as it happened with the PLO. But there is no official peace between either Lebanon and Israel or Hezbollah and Israel, there never has been one.

What is relevant is what people perceive/believe/hope/dream to be possible: that is seed enough for staggering amounts of mayhem.

That's correct (and the kidnap operation is an example on a smaller scale), but I don't find your analogies to be good ones. While Japan was weaker than the 'sleeping giant', that war wasn't assymmetrical warfare, only an attack by a force that had similar capabilities but was weaker, and more importantly it wasn't an attempted invasion and conquest. The Iraq example is closer in that respect (a future Arab invader of Israel that can neutralise Israel's nukes might very well be surprised by a Jewish version of Hezbollah), but Iraq was an example of a mistake by the stronger, of hubris and ignorance in the use of very real full-spectrum powers.

But the existence of "Israel must be obliterated" language as part of Hezbollah's avowed objectives would be enough fuel for a Hezbollah version of neocons to exploit as they wish, should such a group ever gain power in the future.

That is a very good point. Thinking it further, assassinating Nasrallah might produce a worse outcome for Israel. Though should this eventuality come, still I don't see more practical result possible than increased terror and border attacks (staggering amounts of mayhem, but no threat to Israel's existence).

I think it would be great if Hezbollah -- and Hamas -- took the first step and gained the moral highground by unilaterally disavowing their past destruction of Israel language.  At a swoop, this would take away a huge arguing point from Israelis who ask, "How can anyone expect us to negotiate with/recognize an organization that explicitly seeks our destruction?" as well gain massive amounts of goodwill from around the world.

On this, we agree, but I can also see why that road is not taken. Not only would supporters feel they are giving something for nothing in return (e.g. "difficult to sell to the base"), but Hezbollah or Hamas leaders and supporters would think of the fate of the PLO when they took that road, or of the IDF's 'reaction' when Hamas seemed to move in that direction (when Fatah forced consent to a referendum and then Israel shelled the beach), or to unilateral goodwill moves in general (Hamas's 15-month-long unilateral ceasefire that only got them further dozens of targeted assassinations, and was barely emphasized or even mentioned in the US or even European press). (Where I think this thinking is strategically wrong is not distinguishing short-term and long-term benefits: a change sweeping through public perception and political elites' perception to significant policy change in the West or at least in Europe would take years.)

_{*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

A State is to protect its population from any danger, existential or not.  To most Israelis Nasrallahs words are of no reassurance and does not represent what they believe is the reality.  The keyword here is trust, of which there is very little of, if any, between the parties in the area, even less than between the two adversaries the Soviet Union and the US during the Cold War. If Nasrallah has a tendency to say one thing one day and another the next how can they trust his words and deem it reality? To the Israelis it is just an act concealing what he really means.  

They believe, and so do I frankly, that even if the Palestinians get there own State in the West bank and Gaza, Nasrallah has his own vision of how the Middle-East ought to look like in the future.  They believe that he will continue sending rockets into Israel and kill and kidnap Israeli soldiers in cross border raids regardless of the Palestinians and the more weapons he get the grimmer the future looks, meaning his capabilities of doing harm enhances.  

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