Welcome to European Tribune. It's gone a bit quiet around here these days, but it's still going.

After Hiroshima Terror is What Bombing Is For

by Captain Future Mon Aug 7th, 2006 at 04:57:41 AM EST

On August 6, 1945, Hiroshima was destroyed by the first atomic bomb used in warfare. Three days later, President Truman began a pattern of lies that characterized the nuclear age.

But another lie also emerged from World War II, when the kind of bombing we see today--from the air, on urban centers and civilian populations--was first done regularly, on a large scale. The lie is that bombing is an effective, reasonable and legitimate method of waging war, whereas there are other despicable and illegitimate acts committed by uncivilized and ruthless enemies, called terrorism.

The truth is that bombing is terrorism, no matter who does it, and it always has been.


As Norman Solomon recently reminds us, the immense explosion at Hiroshima was followed by an immense lie. On August 9th, President Truman told the Amercan people:

"The world will note that the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, a military base. That was because we wished in this first attack to avoid, in so far as possible, the killing of civilians."

Solomon continues:

Actually, the U.S. government went out of its way to select Japanese cities of sufficient size to showcase the extent of the A-bomb's deadly power -- in Hiroshima on Aug. 6 and in Nagasaki on Aug. 9. As a result of those two bombings, hundreds of thousands of civilians died, immediately or eventually. If Truman's conscience had been clear, it's doubtful he would have felt compelled to engage in such a basic distortion at the dawn of the nuclear era.

In fact, Hiroshima had no military significance, and so had not been bombed before--one of the principal reasons it was chosen for the A-bomb, so its destructive power would be more obvious to the Japanese and clearer for Americans studying those effects. It was considered a "safe city" to the extent that some parents in California who were forced into internment camps, sent their children to the safety of Hiroshima. So the victims of the U.S. atomic bomb likely included American children.

Truman's was the first of many lies of the nuclear era, including the initial lies about the effects of radiation. Some 75,000 people died in Hiroshima from the blast and fire of the Bomb. Five years later, radiation effects more than doubled the dead, to some 200,000. The vast majority of those who died from the Nagasaki bomb were from radiation, months and years later.

But the biggest lie is not about the atomic bomb, but the very practice of bombing. The facts show (as described in Sven Lindqvist's A History of Bombing and Gerard DeGroot's The Bomb: A Life, among other works) that the effect of bombing cities is not a strategy of war but a strategy of terror, and that it doesn't work.

The idea of this kind of bombing is not to kill enemy combatants or destroy military bases, but to destroy the population's will by terrorizing them with the threat of random death and destruction. Although the idea of this kind of bombing is now apparently acceptable, it is relatively new in the history of warfare.

While many nations experimented with it, especially imperial powers who bombed restless colonies, and Nazi Germany terrorized Guernica and London in the Blitz, it was used as a policy by the British in World War II in Germany. It did not result in a revolt of the German people against its government, any more than the Blitz resulted in England's surrender.

The U.S. followed in its bombing campaign against Japan, at first aimed at military and industrial support targets, but eventually using saturation bombing against cities. It was the failure of this campaign to terrorize the Japanese population into submission that led to the decision to use the atomic bomb.

As Gerard DeGroot points out, when We (whoever We are) drop bombs, it is to destroy the enemy's capability to fight--the logic that says if you are going to destroy the enemy's tanks, then destroy the factories that build the tanks, and kill the people who work in those factories. But when They bomb Us, using the same logic, it is brutal, indiscriminate killing. "The difference is contrived--a matter of perspective. Indiscriminate bombing means killing civilians for the sake of attrition--the killing is the object."

But it isn't only attrition, and in less than the kind of total war that World War II was, it is more obviously aimed at terrorizing the enemy population. Hezbollah fires bombs into Israel to terrorize the population, hoping to eventually win concessions or ultimately to destroy the state of Israel. Israel fires bombs into Lebanon to destroy rocket implacements but also to terrorize the population into not supporting Hezbollah, either by allowing them to operate out of their neighborhoods or by supporting them politically. The strategy in both cases is the attrition of terror.

Argument on the morality of targeting civilians in war go back hundreds of years. All too ironically, the first known code that forbade the killing of non-combatants was promulgated by Abu Hanifa, a legal scholar in Baghdad. Western powers adopted a double standard: war between "civilized" European nations would be conducted in this civilized manner. But war against lesser peoples was total war, against the population as well as combatants. Primitive people were not only lesser, but more easily frightened by western technology's advances in explosives and methods of delivering them. World War II ended even these distinctions.

Now bombing is normal, and far from being the last resort, it is often the first option. Nations use it now because it is cheaper, and since no troops are endangered, there is no grumbling at home about the loss of life. Bombs of all kinds constitute a thriving business. In use, they have a very brief productive life before it's time to buy more. And there's plenty to chose from. Small groups can plant various kinds of bombs along roads or in parked vehicles, or use suicide bombers. Larger organizations can use bombs attached to small rockets. Nations can use bombs with sophisticated targetting capabilities, launched on rockets or fired from ships or dropped from airplanes. Long range missiles with thermonuclear weapons are still pointed at the U.S. and Russia. And as was infamously proven in the U.S., jet airliners loaded with fuel can themselves make lethal and terrible bombs.

From the smallest to the largest-yield weapons, bombs are instruments of terror. They sever the limbs of children, burn babies alive, destroy homes that send families into a tailspin of poverty, wreck the urban infrastructure that makes daily life possible, and send millions of traumatized people wandering into nightmare through the piles of broken homes and schools and hospitals, shards of bone, crushed bodies, smoldering flesh, hot twisted metal and clouds of toxic smoke, because they are supposed to. This is what bombs are for.

Display:
it was used as a policy by the British in World War II in Germany. It did not result in a revolt of the German people against its government, any more than the Blitz resulted in England's surrender.
...
As Gerard DeGroot points out, when We (whoever We are) drop bombs, it is to destroy the enemy's capability to fight--the logic that says if you are going to destroy the enemy's tanks, then destroy the factories that build the tanks, and kill the people who work in those factories.

Actually, according to John Kenneth Galbraith, who served as a director of the post-war United States Strategic Bombing Survey, bombing can and has backfired as a means of achieving such putatively military objectives:

In the last days of February 1944, as a striking example of economic error, the German aircraft plants, the largest component of the arms industry , were the targets of massive raids.  In March and later months, aircraft production rose enormously: 48 percent more fighter planes were produced in March than in February.1  Factory buildings suffered heavy damage, but the basic machine tools came through mostly unscathed, and thy were quickly put back into use.  New assembly lines were organized in nearby buildings.  The industry was also reorganized and moved from the incompetent direction of Goering and the Luftwaffe to the more efficient direction of Albert Speer and his ministry.  Overall, the effect of the bombing was an increase in aircraft production.

The air attacks also brought the movement of resources from peacetime to wartime purposes -- nitrogen from agriculture to munitions, gasoline from automobiles to aircraft and army vehicles.  Even the attacks of the Royal Air Force on urban areas may have had a stimulatinng effect.  The German air raids on London in 1940-1941 were thought to have further heightened British morale.  Not less, it was the conclusion of the Bombing Survey, 'the air raids of 1943-1944 [on Germany], particularly the area attacks of the RAF, may have kept up the tension of national danger, and created the requisite atmosphere for sacrifice.'2

How much the air attacks raised morale can be debated; what is not in serious doubt is their larger economic effect.  It was part of the wartime doctrine that this would necessarily be great: economic strength was, all knew, decisive.  It was at the economy the bombers struck.  In fact, the modern rich economy has a high measure of resilience.  A dismaying shortage in one area can be overcome by drawing supplies from a less essential use elsewhere.  The long-rage or strategic bombers did not win World War II; it is not clear that they even appreciably shortened the war in Europe.

One appeals here to the considerable service of history.  In both the military and the associated civilian mind there is little that is more certain than the decisive role of air power.  We have planes; therefore they must be effective.  No doctrine is, in reality, so suspect.  In the years after the Second World War, American control of the air over Korea and Vietnam was complete; this did not win or demonstrably affect the course of the wars in those countries.  They were still fought and won -- or lost -- on the ground.  In the aftermath of the minor operations in Grenada and Panama, there were grave misgivings as to the contribution of attacks by air and particularly as to the casualities they unnecessarily caused.  Even after the Gulf war there has been substantial reappraisal of the accuracy and effect of bombs.  The belief in the efficacy of air power remains strong; the historical record is, at best, dim.

  1.  The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the Germany War Economy, United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Ocotber 31, 1945, p. 156.
  2.  Ibid., p. 26.

from The World Economy Since The Wars, pp. 141-142


Point n'est besoin d'espérer pour entreprendre, ni de réussir pour persévérer. - Charles le Téméraire
by marco on Mon Aug 7th, 2006 at 09:04:45 AM EST
Max Hastings comes to the same conclusion as Galbraith in his latest book on WWII:

http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0375414339/sr=1-2/qid=1154978825/ref=pd_bbs_2/104-0901497-6719103?i e=UTF8&s=books

"When the abyss stares at me, it wets its pants." Brian Hopkins

by EricC on Mon Aug 7th, 2006 at 03:32:48 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Although the idea of this kind of bombing is now apparently acceptable, it is relatively new in the history of warfare.

The weapon has changed -- aerial bomber rather than warrior on horseback -- but the military tactic -- inciting mass terror amidst a civilian population through slaughter and devastation -- is not new at all.

Exhibit A, Genghis Khan:

David Nicole states in The Mongol Warlords, "terror and mass extermination of anyone opposing them was a well tested Mongol tactic." In such cases he would not give an alternative but ordered massive collective slaughter of the population of resisting cities and destruction of their property, usually by burning it to the ground.
...
They used terror very successfully and had legendary name with terror in almost all battles that after fear inducing slaughters of populations they would intentionally spread the information to others by sending refugees and survivors to other towns and cities to tell their tale that for example the feared Assassins cult laid down their arms upon hearing the Mongol armies.


Point n'est besoin d'espérer pour entreprendre, ni de réussir pour persévérer. - Charles le Téméraire
by marco on Mon Aug 7th, 2006 at 09:14:39 AM EST
But then again, how "mainstream" was Genghis Khan? Do we make generalizations "oh, it's always like that" too quickly?

I mean, in 90% of the time warriors are not slaughtering, and in 99% of the time people do not make war at all. Isn't war just an idea of crazy ambitious few?

by das monde on Mon Aug 7th, 2006 at 07:55:52 PM EST
[ Parent ]
But then again, how "mainstream" was Genghis Khan? Do we make generalizations "oh, it's always like that" too quickly?

How about the Romans?  How about the Albigensian crusade?  How about the later Crusades in general?  How about the Thirty Years' War?  How about the U.S. Civil War (especially Sherman's March)?

I mean, in 90% of the time warriors are not slaughtering, and in 99% of the time people do not make war at all.

Hmmm.  I am not familiar with military history enough to guess whether the proof of the burden is on you or on me.

Isn't war just an idea of crazy ambitious few?

I hope so.  But too often, the rest of us -- the vast majority of us -- get caught up in the madness.

Remember Goering's words of wisdom:

We got around to the subject of war again and I said that, contrary to his attitude, I did not think that the common people are very thankful for leaders who bring them war and destruction.

"Why, of course, the people don't want war," Goering shrugged. "Why would some poor slob on a farm want to risk his life in a war when the best that he can get out of it is to come back to his farm in one piece. Naturally, the common people don't want war; neither in Russia nor in England nor in America, nor for that matter in Germany. That is understood. But, after all, it is the leaders of the country who determine the policy and it is always a simple matter to drag the people along, whether it is a democracy or a fascist dictatorship or a Parliament or a Communist dictatorship."

"There is one difference," I pointed out. "In a democracy the people have some say in the matter through their elected representatives, and in the United States only Congress can declare wars."

"Oh, that is all well and good, but, voice or no voice, the people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders. That is easy. All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger. It works the same way in any country."



Point n'est besoin d'espérer pour entreprendre, ni de réussir pour persévérer. - Charles le Téméraire
by marco on Mon Aug 7th, 2006 at 10:36:07 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I would prefer to see distinctions than blurring everything together. Evil evolves, in small steps usually, but sometimes faster than the good. When we blur the whole evil spectrum together, we give too much excuse to evil doers, a la "It's just human nature, you know".

I cannot deny that people have fascination with wars, and violent instincts as well. I would even 100% agree that all nature creatures have violent instincts, because they are needed sometimes. The crucial word is "sometimes". The point is, it is not easy to find nature creatures which would be violent (or greedy) indiscriminately. Apart from primitive bacteria and locust, the only other obvious example is... humans. Indiscriminately violent creatures are not very successful in long term surviving, somehow. Or is that really surprising?

I see "intertribal" violence as a virus. It is highly contagious, but nevertheless it is just a rather primitive virus. People will learn some day how to tame that virus - nature did. The reason I responded in this thread, is that I wish to fight that virus somehow.

Goering's "wisdom" does not necessarily mean that people are inclined to violence. The thing is, people have to adopt to violence of the others, especially violence of power holders. People "naturally don't want war", but they often have to support war because of individual survival concerns. In violent societies, such as the Arab countries, or even Russia, it is safer to be conformist, whether consciously or not. The core Arab problem is that they do not have progressives - they do not survive usually. That is how nasty that virus is.

by das monde on Mon Aug 7th, 2006 at 11:27:32 PM EST
[ Parent ]
In violent societies, such as the Arab countries, or even Russia, it is safer to be conformist, whether consciously or not.

What evidence do you have that Arab countries are inherrently violent? or Russia? is it more dangerous to be a non conformist in an Arabic state, then a south American one?

the idea that there are no progressives in Arabic countries or Russia seems to me to be absurd.

I'm not saying that you are wrong, but I would apreciate some of the evidence that you have built these statements from.  

Any idiot can face a crisis - it's day to day living that wears you out.

by ceebs (ceebs (at) eurotrib (dot) com) on Tue Aug 8th, 2006 at 06:19:43 PM EST
[ Parent ]
"Inherrently"... I am saying quite the opposite in general. But the truth is, violence spiral is a part of the Arab culture.

Take family or tribal feuds, for example. It is a matter of honnor there to avenge killing your relative, even with full knowledge that your avenge will likely to be avanged as well. This "tradition" might be less visible in urbanized and technological environment, but it was and there is there. It makes you less wonder why suicidal bombing is used frequently there.

The political stuggle there is based purely on power perception. Assassinations and coup attempts are frequent - no one matches that standard. Rulers are ruthless - they know the rules of the game too well. Typically, you come to the political top there with bombs, and "leave" with bombs. This interpretation makes most sense when considering Arab history.

Why does the idea of "no progressives" seem absurd? What did you read particularly about the Arabs? On surface, it is easy to assume that any culture on Earth can be fit onto the Western frame. But what if the Western culture is more an anomaly? What other civilization had Rennesaince and Enlightment? In the Arab countries, in particular, the grip of Islam is pretty strong - there is no secular or reformist tradition to speak of.

That does not mean that the Arabs are "inherrently" backward or something. They just need a generation or two to overcome the pressure of violent habits, and more enlighted people. Sadly, certain powerful deciders  chose to exploit and deepen the traumas in the Middle East rather than heal them.

As for Russia, I have some personal knowledge. The things are certainly not as bad as in the Middle East there, but occasional Terrible Ruling has deep consequencies. And the current trends are not on the pretty side.  

by das monde on Tue Aug 8th, 2006 at 08:29:43 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I was thinking about the time lag for the Islamic states of the Middle East, yesterday. Looks like they're 100+ years behind the rest of the world, and there are "lags" other places too.

Wish I could be more optimistic.Just guessing really.

"When the abyss stares at me, it wets its pants." Brian Hopkins

by EricC on Tue Aug 8th, 2006 at 09:19:38 PM EST
[ Parent ]
A simpler interpretation might be that the West is going "abnormally" far forward :-)) Until the end of dark ages, Europe was not an exceptional civilisation. But then came Reformation, Enlightment, collonialisations, Industrial Revolution - like a chain reaction. That all looks very impressive. But the question is: how long will this "chain reaction" last? Will it meet its limits? At some time, the wise civilisations might turns out to be some slower ones.
by das monde on Tue Aug 8th, 2006 at 09:54:39 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Whole thing confuses the crap out of me, Das.

"When the abyss stares at me, it wets its pants." Brian Hopkins
by EricC on Tue Aug 8th, 2006 at 11:13:56 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Sorry you are wrong in your analysis of "Arab culture" which has as diverse traditions as the lands on the other side of the Mediterraanean. If we are talking about the region around Saudi Arabia where there is still a tribal and clan alegiance, there are mechanisms for settling the sort of feuds you describe. The elders within a tribe will decide the case and compensation is paid to the family of the victim, often referred to as "blood money" in teh West. The British Army is aware of this tradition in Iraq and makes payments to diffuse possible protests if, say, somebody is accidentally run down by an army vehicle.
by Londonbear on Wed Aug 9th, 2006 at 02:44:24 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Just in case this message was addressed to me.

I like looking for distinctions rather than assuming generalized picture. Family feuds may indeed be more a problem to the Middle East countries than to Northern Africa. But political stability throughout history still has similiar features throughout the region, at least as far as Egypt and Ethiopia.  

by das monde on Wed Aug 9th, 2006 at 09:18:17 PM EST
[ Parent ]
These citations may be interesting:
http://www.editorandpublisher.com/eandp/columns/pressingissues_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1002950982

This one tells of the suppressed news reports from the scene which are now being published in a book. They contained the first reports of radiation sickness.

Then there are two related books by psychiatrist Robert Jay Lifton:

Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima, Random House (New York City), 1968.

Hiroshima in America: Fifty Years of Denial, Putnam's (New York City), 1995.

The first deals with the victims, the second with the US cover up of the after effects and with the brainwashing of Truman to get him to approve the bombing.

Policies not Politics
---- Daily Landscape

by rdf (robert.feinman@gmail.com) on Mon Aug 7th, 2006 at 02:55:47 PM EST
In fact, Hiroshima had no military significance, and so had not been bombed before--one of the principal reasons it was chosen for the A-bomb, so its destructive power would be more obvious to the Japanese and clearer for Americans studying those effects.

Unless you twist a definition, Hiroshima was a traditional military base of Japanese, especially for wars in China or Korea. Hiroshima may not have been a crucial point militarily, but it was nevertheless a military city.

What is most condemning of US, is that they specifically were not bombing Hiroshima beforehand because it was designated as the primary nuclear target, actually. They were also not dropping any warning leaflets on the city, as they usually did before bombing raids. Other cities on the list (Kyoto, Kokura, Nagasaki, Niigata) were also largely spared of conventional bombing. Eventually, Kyoto was scratched from the list thanks to insistence of Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson of its cultural significance.

by das monde on Mon Aug 7th, 2006 at 08:38:54 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I was discussing this the other night and was discussing why you would drop two bombs , and I proposed that it only really made sense if you were sending a message to someone other than the Japanese.

If you were just sending a message to the Japanese, then only the first bomb was necessary to send that message and a much longer period of time between the two bombs would be required. The first bomb would then be followed by an extended period of negotiation

If however you were sending a message to an outside agent then if you drop the first bomb, you are not only  having a military effect, you are also demonstrating a will to use the weapon. now as this was the first of these weapons used in anger, until this point it was entirely theoretical.

The second bomb demonstrates that even though you are aware of the effects, you still have the will to use the weapon.

Any idiot can face a crisis - it's day to day living that wears you out.

by ceebs (ceebs (at) eurotrib (dot) com) on Tue Aug 8th, 2006 at 06:32:02 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I have read that the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was directed at the Russians. The goal was to get the Japanese to surrender before the Soviets started a campaign on Japan, which they were getting ready to do by the end of the summer of '45. That way, the US avoided having to partition Japan like Germany and Korea were.

Nothing is 'mere'. — Richard P. Feynman
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Aug 8th, 2006 at 06:57:19 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I've read that too, but the message seems to be aimed beyond short term gains

Any idiot can face a crisis - it's day to day living that wears you out.
by ceebs (ceebs (at) eurotrib (dot) com) on Tue Aug 8th, 2006 at 07:16:05 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Might be a combination of both.

Maybe the Japanese were not getting into serious negotiations fast enough.

Interesting bit of bluff though, if viewed the other way.

We only had two, after all.

"When the abyss stares at me, it wets its pants." Brian Hopkins

by EricC on Tue Aug 8th, 2006 at 07:55:30 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The Americans were not really interested to end the war diplomatically. For example, in Postdam they were not "ready" to offer mere symbolic guestures towards the Emperor court. They were like not allowing chances not to drop the bombs, so to speak.  
by das monde on Tue Aug 8th, 2006 at 08:36:08 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Perhaps it's a rationalisation, but I've seen it suggested that the strategic aim of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was to warn off the Russians, who would otherwise have contemplated 'liberating' Japan for themselves.
by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Mon Aug 7th, 2006 at 09:26:36 PM EST
Perhaps it's a rationalisation, but I've seen it suggested that the strategic aim of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was to warn off the Russians, who would otherwise have contemplated 'liberating' Japan for themselves.

Actually, it happens to be the thesis of a recent book about Hiroshima, Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan.

Also, according to http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/timeline/1940/1945.htm :

July 24
Walter Brown , special assistant to Secretary of State Byrnes , writes in his journal that Byrnes was now "hoping for time, believing after atomic bomb Japan will surrender and Russia will not get in so much on the kill, thereby being in a position to press claims against China."

August 3
President Truman aboard Augusta receives new report that Japan is seeking peace. Walter Brown , special assistant to Secretary of State Byrnes, writes in his diary, "Aboard Augusta - President, Leahy , JFB agreed Japs looking for peace. (Leahy had another report from Pacific.) President afraid they will sue for peace through Russia instead of some country like Sweden."



Point n'est besoin d'espérer pour entreprendre, ni de réussir pour persévérer. - Charles le Téméraire
by marco on Mon Aug 7th, 2006 at 10:47:43 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Perhaps it's a rationalisation, but I've seen it suggested that the strategic aim of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was to warn off the Russians, who would otherwise have contemplated 'liberating' Japan for themselves.

Actually, it happens to be the thesis of a recent book about Hiroshima, Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan.

Okay, I got this wrong.  Actually, the main argument of this book is not that the Americans dropped the atomic bombs in order to warn off the Soviets, but rather that the dropping of the atomic bombs had minimal influence on Japan's decision to surrender; moreover, what did have significant and conclusive impact on the Japanese decision to surrender was the Russians' entry in the war against Japan.

Of course, this doesn't affect the main point of the diary, which is that aerial bombing -- including Hiroshima and Nagasaki -- causing indiscriminate mass deaths among the civilian population had little if any influence on persuading Japan's government to surrender before it did.

Point n'est besoin d'espérer pour entreprendre, ni de réussir pour persévérer. - Charles le Téméraire

by marco on Tue Aug 8th, 2006 at 02:10:37 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Bridge to Never Alive Again, Over The River Cry(cant remember how to spell it).

Yeah, you got a pony who can jump 20', YOU WANT TO SHOW IT.

"When the abyss stares at me, it wets its pants." Brian Hopkins

by EricC on Mon Aug 7th, 2006 at 11:26:18 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I'm not sure it is worth opening an old can of worms, but since I just got back from the local, annual, Hiroshima day observance, I'll risk it.

Their may have been many motives for using the A bombs, but most people who have studied the historical record think a combination of institutional inertia ("we spent all this time and money, so we must use it"), revenge, a warning to the USSR, and shortening the war were all factors. Which were the primary reasons depends upon who you ask.

Personally I think revenge was a big factor, especially since the Japanese were so brutal towards US POW's.

Policies not Politics
---- Daily Landscape

by rdf (robert.feinman@gmail.com) on Mon Aug 7th, 2006 at 10:18:09 PM EST
a combination of institutional inertia ("we spent all this time and money, so we must use it"), revenge, a warning to the USSR, and shortening the war were all factors.

You forgot to mention the possibility of racism.

Point n'est besoin d'espérer pour entreprendre, ni de réussir pour persévérer. - Charles le Téméraire

by marco on Mon Aug 7th, 2006 at 10:37:47 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Nothing about racism at all IMOH.

Mainly about:

1:Revenge

2:For the Russkies, a wake up and smell the coffee moment.

"When the abyss stares at me, it wets its pants." Brian Hopkins

by EricC on Mon Aug 7th, 2006 at 11:55:12 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Should have added #2, which should have been between #1 and #2above:

SHORTENING THE WAR.

"When the abyss stares at me, it wets its pants." Brian Hopkins

by EricC on Tue Aug 8th, 2006 at 12:05:03 AM EST
[ Parent ]
You forgot to mention the possibility of racism.

I should not have mentioned racism.  It is sometimes laid against Truman and the U.S. as a reason for using the atomic bomb on the Japanese.  But in my own opinion it was not a factor.  I regret putting that comment up.

Point n'est besoin d'espérer pour entreprendre, ni de réussir pour persévérer. - Charles le Téméraire

by marco on Tue Aug 8th, 2006 at 12:44:47 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I'm not so sure you should be apologizing.
WWII had the Japs and the Krauts.
Vietnam had the Gooks.
Iraq has the ragheads.

Plus the US is pretty good at stigmatizing portions of our own population (I'll refrain some listing the terms).


Policies not Politics
---- Daily Landscape

by rdf (robert.feinman@gmail.com) on Tue Aug 8th, 2006 at 08:55:29 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Racism was not a reason. On the other hand, nuking a German city was not even considered.

A shocking aspect of WWII for the West was that the "Japs" were basically the first and only non-Caucasian nation that was beating Western powers militarily (albeit just for a few years), and taking prisoners of war, in particular. That was not sweet for those who experienced.

by das monde on Tue Aug 8th, 2006 at 10:04:38 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The motives for Nagasaki are even more curious. The Japanese did not have enough time to asses the damage in Hiroshima let alone report on it before the second attack.

The desire to drop a second regardless I have seen ascribed to the two bombs being of different designs and the military wanted to assess which was more effective.

by Londonbear on Wed Aug 9th, 2006 at 02:49:54 AM EST
[ Parent ]


Display:
Go to: [ European Tribune Homepage : Top of page : Top of comments ]