Reforms, reforms

Hungary has a mixed proportional/first-past-the-post election system, with the latter part dominating, thus the formation of a bipartisan party system was almost finished.

The governing coalition (in office since 2002) consists of the post-reformed-communist Socialists (MSzP), and the post-liberal-dissident, now almost only neoliberal Free Democrats (SzDSz). The strange combination was the result of the second free elections, ever since SzDSz has no other coalition choice, in effect becoming an ever smaller satellite of MSzP. MSzP in turn, since it also represents party-secretaries-turned-businessmen & friends, is much more attentive to neoliberalism than its name would suggest, indeed current PM Ferenc Gyurcsány is from this wing and a 'reformist'.

The main opposition party is Fidesz. It started out as a left-liberal youth party, but the close-knit yuppie gang in its inner circles decided that a rightward turn will bring them into government -- which came to be between 1998 and 2002. They are populists in a very opportunistic way, taking policy positions from hard-left to hard-right. The charismatic and reckless party leader is former PM Viktor Orbán.

Fidesz doesn't exclude cooperation with anyone on the right, and systematically ate up other formations. However, MDF, which was the original main right-wing party that immploded in 1994, cut itself loose in the last minute, and got into parliament on its own just passing 5%. They emphasize independence from everyone, and claim the title of a non-populist centre-right party with Merkel's CDU as model.

There is a fifth party in Parliament: the Christian Democrats. But this is only due to Fidesz's calculation: the party without significant own support got in on a joint list with Fidesz, then separated out because more committee seats are due this way.

Ever since Viktor Orbán had the idea to pursue a US-style two-party system consciously, the two sides are in a state of cold civil war, with even the bare minimum of political civility often broken. Parties not in parliament (including far-right ones, a far-left one and more) are well below 5%.

The government is still undeterred in its push to solve the self-created budget deficit problem with 'reforms'. That so far all they achieved was a dramatic slowdown of the economy, doesn't figure, because their more ambitious reforms have as yet been blocked or slowed down (and the mayor coalition partner, the Socialists at least don't want significant neolib tax cuts).

The cutbacks and reorganisations also hit my company, the state railways, but I won't repeat the details I told about earler. The major policy issue is still healthcare 'reform'. This involved the introduction of doctor visit fees (€1.2 per visit, with some social exemptions, say pregant women, that many people are unable to claim in practice) openly to reduce the number of doctor visits (which it does...) and stop the practice of gratitude money (which it demonstrably didn't), reduced prescription drug supports, hospital reorganisations and closures, but the looming big change is privatisation pushed by the liberals.

The concept is of dividing up healthcare among a couple of major private insurers, with a rump state insurer behind for unprofitable basic services, and they most often cite the Netherlands as model. (Hence I'd wish someone knowledgeable would do a write-up of how that works or doesn't in reality.) It (like the prior measures too) is opposed by the overwhelming majority of citizens, as well as healthcare workers. What's more, a few days ago at a conference, even the Socialist Party speaker spoke out against it, though the PM still stands behind it.

Doctor looking like PM Gyurcsány: "We implemented a smaller reform while you were anaesthetized." Cartoon from delmagyar.hu

Liberal voes and polls

With the above background, it shouldn't be surprising that the liberals dropped to 1-3% in polls. There is possibly another reason behind this development: the party leader election earlier this year.

The old party leader, a jovial guy famous for sarcastic jokes and bon-mots, retired from politics. There were two candidates to replace him, neither of whom were founding members: Gábor Fodor and economy minister János Kóka.

Gábor Fodor used to be a leading Fidesz member, but switched to SzDSz upon Fidesz's rightward turn over a decade ago. He still has some alternative-culture and left-liberal air around him, and is popular in the party base, but party officials considered him lazy and unfit for a serious job.

János Kóka (left) and Gábor Fodor (right) on a photo from [origo]

János Kóka, is a yuppie businessman turned economy minister, a hardcore neoliberal who also tried to gain some popularity with rather amateurish performances for the rainbow press. He joined the party only recently, but he was the leadership's favorite. (And yours truly can't stand him at all.)

The first round of the party secretary vote shocked the leadership: dead-even! But then Kóka won the re-vote by a minute margin. Fodor had to be 'given a bone', and became environment minister. Lately, Kóka seems to try to adopt some Fodor positions: at a 1956 commemoration speech, for the first time he said that SzDSz should have criticised police brutality during the violent protests last year, and now there is (entirely theoretical) talk about opening towards a post-Orbán Fidesz.

But now SzDSz has a leader who is among the least popular politicians (and that says a lot: even the most popular are liked only by half the population!), where the least popular polled is the healthcare minister (also SzDSz).

The big picture however is that while Fidesz leads polls with 60% or more of potential voters, its absolute number of supporters is almost unchanged: that is, disillusioned leftist voters rather stay home than vote right. (This has been the situation for more than a decade.)

Anecdotal evidence the other day: I overheard a train conductor woman talking to a man. She has a second 'job' as volunteering social worker, and explained how hardships hit the two ends of the educatedness spectrum, with three dozen homeless with diploma at the shelter she is at. This led to politics, and "neither Orbán, nor Gyurcsány" declarations.

Corruption affairs

In the past few years, the two sides did talk a lot about various suspicious events in the wealth gain of the other side's leader, but these scandals were of little consequence, and not once baseless. But now the governing Socialists were raked by a serious one.

It's the Zuschlag affair which I once wrote about. At its epicenter is young Socialist upstart János Zuschlag, whom the party was unable to get rid of during an earlier scandal, when he was taped joking about Holocaust victims at a commemoration. (Contrary to what I wrote earlier, he only lost his position as youngest MP.) Zuschlag is popular in the party for being a good organiser -- as it turned out, he managed that by also being a good organiser of embezzlements.

The main vehicles Zuschlag created were potemkin youth foundations, which ran for public grants, and prepared fake bills for nonexistent expenses. He also manipulated local party branch elections. It was amazing how cock-sure he was until his arrest. It was also amazing how much the MSzP leadership failed to foresee and do something about what's coming up at them. They started to fire Zuschlag & associates from the party only after the first arrest.

I'm innocent! A handcuffed-chained János "There is no Zuschlag affair!" Zuschlag is led away from a court appearance. Photo from [origo]

The affair is long from being over, due to suspicions against many members of MSzP's Young Turks generation that they colluded with Zuschlag by giving public grants to his foundations. But so far only Zuschlag's inner circle is accused and under arrest.

But the latest on the issue of politicians' wealth is that the tax authority will investigate Fidesz leader Orbán...

Referendum mania

Doing social populism for a change, last year Fidesz initiated a referendum drive -- which by now became a comedy in four acts.

Last year Fidesz prepared seven questions, each meant to stop government 'reforms'. The election committee rejected four of these, but the Constitutional Court as highest instance didn't agree about two. Fidesz insisted on those and added another, and after a long tussle, this summer the election committee was forced to accept all three.

However, on the same day Fidesz re-issued the problematic three the last time, a(n obviously 'left'-voting) linguist also asked for the approval of three referendum questions -- which happen to be re-wordings of the Fidesz questions with a different spin, but put in the negative. Those were approved too, so by September, we looked forward to nine questions... and, sadly proving the linguist's expectation about an inattentive and manipulable public true, polls showed a Yes majority for all.

If that's not grotesque enough, wait for the next two acts! Hit by the unpopuarity of reforms, the Zuschlag affair, and the reform referendums, PM Gyurcsány found a truly wily way to counter-attack: call for referendums himself! Using (yet another) parliamentary debate about more transparency over politicians' income, in theatrical and martial tones he announced seven referendum questions on the cleanliness of public life.

Fidesz was nonplussed only for one day. Then they announced eight questions of their own on the same issue!... A few days ago, the election committee only approved three of these, but we'll see. We could still get a 15-question referendum after the 9-question one...

Cleaning up public life -- cartoon from delmagyar.hu

The first legal far-right paramilitary

As historical far-right in Hungary, most people think of the Arrowcrossers, though they weren't alone. A historical back-up.

Between the two world wars, Hungary had a semi-dictator and a pseudo-democracy, with right-wingers of variing severity changing in government. The main issue of the day was demanding a correction to the borders agreed at Versailles after WWI (which cut Hungary back by two-thirds), and Hitler became the natural ally. Conversely, there were a number of politicians and movements with various level of affinity for Hitler and adopting fascist principles to various levels.

The Arrowcrosser Party came maybe closest to the Nazis in apearance, having a Führer (Szálasi), a symbol (the Arrowcross), a paramilitary, and rampant anti-semitism. However, initially they were also anti-German, and threatened the powers-that-be, so Szálasi first ended up in prison.

However, the other hard- and far-righters were bad enough. It was them who implemented laws for the segregation and discrimination of Jews, who sent armies into Hitler's wars against Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, and after the Nazi occupation of the seen-as-unreliable ally with a relatively small military force in March 1944, it was them who conducted the brutal collection and deportation of half the Hungarian Jews (two-thirds of the victims), though then aborted the operation.

With further loss of confidence in him, Hitler forced the semi-dictator to fire the government and install Szálasi. By then he was more than willing to fight along the Germans against the coming Soviets, and re-start the deportations of Jews. The Arrowcrosser paramilitary became known for a great readiness for excess brutality and murder, a less disciplined version of the SS. After the war, Szálasi was executed as first-order war criminal at Nuremburg.

The Hungarian far-right is small in itself, and rather fractured.

In the early nineties, there were four people who attempted to organise skinheads into a hardcore public organisation (a female school teacher, a 1956 veteran, and two younger men), each gathering at most a few hundred around them. Of these, only one openly referenced the Arrowcrossers as historical origin, and all foundered or were driven away. No far-right movement openly organised the skins since.

But there were plenty of other far-right traditions between the world wars to lean on, and the far-right likes to widen the Overton Window step-by-step anyway. And a potential base wider than gutter-skinheads is that of retirees ad other disgruntled people hit by post-regime-change economic hardships. That was the strategy of István Csurka, leader of MIÉP.

MIÉP, a breakaway from MDF, was and is the by far largest far-right party. But that's not much in itself: in 1998, they barely passed the 5% margin, then fell under next time, and in 2006, achieved just 2.2% even in coalition with JOBBIK. Attendance of Csurka's regular protest rallies also fell from a few ten thousand to the low thousands.

JOBBIK, a youth party, in turn represents the saddest thing about the Hungarian far-right: that its third main base is among highschool and college students. These aren't skinheads, these are web forum ranters and history dreamers and young rebels, but they don't mind the company of beer-and-brawl skins and aging fascism nostalgics.

JOBBIK is the first and largest of a large number of non-exclusive far-right youth organisations. At times JOBBIK was closest to Fidesz, then in coalition with MIÉP, then on its own, the same can be said for most of the others. In general, far-righters can at times cooperate, compete, or denounce each other for this or that failing or paranoia.

So in itself, the far-right is small -- what gives them undue influence is that Fidesz won't declare a cordon sanitaire towards them. This has its origin in 1998, when Fidesz depended on far-right votes for majority, and the principle is the same ever since. With the consequence that Fidesz participates in moving the Overton Window, and what was once far-right gets a hearing from and is to be tolerated by a much wider segment of the population.

The worst part is that the Fidesz-aligned media has its own house far-rightists, who actively pursue the blurring of borders. And one of these mini-Goebbelses had the genial idea to import progressive-left, altermondialist concepts and arguments into far-right rhetoric, since the local nominal left won't.

This summer, the leader of JOBBIK managed to get legal recognition for an organisation named 'Hungarian Guard' as a civilian organisation. But in effect they talk and walk like a paramilitary: uniforms, confirmation ceremony in military formation, standing guard at events, only weapos missing. The uniforms are black, with Árpád-stripes insignia on it, reminding of the Arrowcrossers.

The red/white-striped Árpád-stripes flag was originally the royal flag of Hungary's first royal dynasty, which goes back to Árpád, who led the then nomadic tribes into the Carpathian Basin. It continued to be in use by various national forces until being replaced by the red/white/green national flag.

However, at the end of the nineteen-thirties, the Arrowcrossers seized upon the Árpád flag, to differentiate themselves from other nationalists. It became strongly associated with fascism the same way the Swastika was.

However, when in the early nineties, the first freely elected, right-wing government of Hungary responded to accusations that they ignore the far-right by preparing a list of the symbols of "autocratic regimes", the Arrowcross was on it but the Árpád-stripes flag wasn't.

It was then tolerated on far-right protests, and began to spread a few years ago. This again is less due to reverence for the Arrowcrossers, and more as provocation and sign of defiance, like the Confederate military flag in the US. And since Fidesz tolerated the far-right, it began to appear and spread on their rallies, too, along with the popular excuse that "this is an old Hungarian symbol, we won't abandon it just because the Arrowcrossers hijacked it" (but then who is the king whose kingdom it is meant to symbolize?...). Last year, Orbán made this the 'official' Fidesz position.

I reported their first public confirmation ceremony, at which only 55 of the intended symbolic 56 showed up.

The reaction of parliamentary parties? Silly party-politics squabbling:

Organised by the smaller opposition party, all party leaders gathered for a joint press conference before the international media. Gyurcsány spoke first, and instantly launched a broadside against Fidesz. As justified as his accusations were, it wasn't the time and place -- and only gave Orbán the opportunity to talk about being accused, rather than about the Guard.

And so it went on, no one found a way to stop the Hungarian Guard before the next public member confirmation ceremony last week, this time with six hundred 'recruits' (see IdiotSavant's report and my comments, and my deconstruction of a truly bent NYT article).

The second public confirmation ceremony of the Hungarian Guard at Heroes' Square in Budapest. Árpád stripes on the insignia and the scarf, black vest and cap, but white shirt to look less scary and more folkish. Photo from Index.hu

Anniversary riots

23 October is the day of the outbreak of the 1956 Revolution. In 1992, the central ceremony was distrupted during the speech of the then (figurehead) President by skinheads (and, as we later learnt, a police unit in civilian dress).

Ever since, 23 October is we-hate-you day for the far-right. And they hate liberals(=Jews for them) more than the 'commies', thus disrupting the SzDSz commemoration at the grave of the 1956 executed has most tradition.

One important event not on this date was in the summer of 2002. Then, the far-right employed itself with conspiracy theories about how the governing(!) Right lost elections due to election fraud. One morning the looniest blocked a bridge in the center of Budapest, some hoping that that would trigger a revolution. They only achieved chaotic police action -- and the establishment of a new protest 'culture'.

In September 2006, they organised anti-government protests after the leak of a Gyurcsány speech at a closed-doors MSzP meeting, in which he said "we" lied about the economy during the election campaign. (It was more that everyone acted as-if even though the data was there to see. It was a speech to scare comrades into accepting radical reforms.) One of these protests turned into the storming of the public television building, with heavy help from professional rioters from the football hooligan scene, and the event was also a giant demonstration of police ineptness.

This was followed by more rioting, during which a vengeful police brutally beat protester, passers-by and journalist alike, even while committing more errors. The rioting (and police violence) peaked on the 50th anniversary of 1956. There was rioting again by the same elements on 15 March, the day of another revolution, Hungary's most important, the 1848 one (more in next box).

As everyone expected, the loonie far-right attempted a repeat performance of last year's events. But, like most events everyone expects, so far it 'fell behind expectations' (and the rain also helped).

Most people (a few thousand) turned up back in September at the rally on the one-year anniversary of the storming of the TV headquarters. But there was no rioting this time.

Then on the eve of the anniversary of the outbreak of the 1956 revolution, some two thousand gathered for another protest. One 'star' of the 2006 events, György Budaházy, defied the stay-at-home court order on him and gave a fiery speech, while the other 'star', László Toroczkai, called upon people to follow him on a protest march to the Opera (where a state commemoration was held) police didn't grant permission for. A few hundred followed, police stopped them, after which police hunted about one hundred glass-bottle- and Molotov-cocktail-throwing, car-toppling hooligans, I reported.

Above: water cannon puts out fire laid to toppled car. from Index.hu Below: a 'protester' and riot police well-protected in new gear. Photo from Index.hu

Less participants than last year, and more professionalism on both sides. Of the final tally of 19 injured, 14 were policemen - and 3 were journalists, the rioters didn't consider them friends. Of the three dozen detained, Toroczkai was the first, and the only one put under arrest.

György Budaházy came to fame as a leader of the 2002 bridge blockade, whom police at the time arrested with technical errors that freed him. Thus gaining 'street cred', he became the man for fiery speeches, so in 2006, too. And not just speeches: he participated in the damaging of a Soviet war memorial the far-right long wants to remove, for which police put him on the wanted list.

But police never dared to arrest Budaházy when he provocatively appeared at yet another protest rally, in IRA-style mask. He was then apprehended on the morning of 15 March, day of the 1848 Revolution. This was then excuse for yet another round of rioting. But even after, courts only ordered Budaházy to not leave his house for the time of his trial.

Toroczkai (left) and Budaházy (right) during the latter's speech at the 22 October protest rally. MTI photo via Index.hu's portrait of Toroczkai

László Toroczkai is the son of a local leader of MIÉP. His father got him into the oversight board of one of those foundations that were used to funnel money to Milošević's opposition in Serbia. But when he wanted to organise a paramilitary for the defense of ethnic Hungarians there, even MIÉP leader Csurka had the sense to order him to stop it, while the then Fidesz government later got him fired from the oversight board -- allegedly on suspicion of being a foreign secret service's agent. He then left MIÉP and founded his own group (the 64 Shires Youth Movement, named for the territorial units of pre-WWI Greater Hungary). He also changed his name from the original Tóth (means "Slovakian" in old Hungarian) to the historical-sounding Toroczkai.

But Toroczkai first gained wide recognition for organising a far-right counterpart to the popular Sziget summer youth music festival. Later, he got himself banned from each of Hungary's neighbouring countries with significant ethnic Hungarian minority. And then came an anti-government protest last year, when he led a march to the state TV headquarters to demand (like in 1956) publicity for them. This led to the well-known storming. Though ever in the midst of events, Toroczkai so far evaded being found directly responsible for violent acts.

Next day was the 1956 anniversary day. Unlike last year, police first tried to prevent a two-thousand-strong far-right protest march from joining the Fidesz rally, but then relented, and things ended without rioting. Meanwhile, Orbán held another insane speech, in which he menanced that Fidesz will get those responsible for 'the masked hooligans and police violence on the streets' among the police leadership and higher before court. That was a sop to the conspiracy theory that the rioters were MSzP/police provocators(!).

JOBBIK-supported far-right 23 October 1956 commemoration at the place of the heaviest partisan battles later on, in front of the Corvin movie theatre, 'guarded' by Hungarian Guards. Photo from Index.hu

Later that day however, the looney-far-right hardcore wanted to 'free' Toroczkai (replaying this 15 March's event with Budaházy). But he was transported outside Budapest, and the at most two hundred didn't got beyond glass bottle throwing before being dispersed, I reported.

The so far last event was two days later, a bridge blockade on Friday. This was organised by others, a web forum closer to JOBBIK, but, as I reported, it was again of limited success: while three hundred (that became three dozen) could disrupt traffic on various points in town for two hours, they were pushed around by police during that time and contained for the rest of the day.

Here the football hooligan (and skinhead) element was apparently missing, there was no violence. What's more, following the Fidesz major of the inner-city district, Fidesz for the first time denounced violent protests without cop-outs on the essence.

Earlier diaries on politics, life and history of Hungary

1. After a bizarre press vs. politicians court case, an introduction of parties & history since 1989.
2. The workings of non-issue-based politics: the tragicomic double referendum on barring hospital privatisations and giving neighbouring countries' ethnic Hungarians double citizenship.
3. Bush and Hungary: why the nominal centre-left (now governing) is pro-Bush and the nominal centre-right opposition anti-Bush.
4. Campaign season opens - half a year early.
5. Further in the campaign, October polls and nonsensical rhetoric (how can you give preferential treatment to both the elites and the poor?)
6. The juiciest of the many storm-in-the-bathtub scandals: Mata Hari in Budapest
7. A foray into history (not much to do with recent Hungarian politics, but some further perspective for the debate on Turkey's accession to the EU).
8. European Dream: where would Hungarians like to live?
9. Hungarian Orange (no relation to the Ukrainian version): on a clever opposition poster campaign and its contrast with reality.
10. On another poster campaign by the same party - how to outsource negative campaign, and how it can be made to backfire.
11. Of Socialists and Presidents.
12. On the Oscar-winning film director who was The Mephisto Behind Mephisto.
13. The Inverted Example of Spinning Jobless Statistics: doing the exact opposite of what the Bushites did.
14. Mephisto And Informants Update.
15. Non-partisan corruption, meta-corruption.
16. Another foray into history: March 15, 1848 revolution.
17. Six Weeks of Insanity: how a national celebration turns political freak show.
18. Article Deconstruction: how a Western paper (here: DER SPIEGEL) twists facts to fit Western stereotypes.
19. A Salvo In The Foot, or how to mobilise voters for the other side.
20. On the art of Counting Crowds.
21. Europe Under Water
22. 2006 first-round election in an Election day open thread.
23. The Laughing Fourth (& down with FPTP)
24. Remember Bob on Earth's Day (+Floods)
25. Hungarian Elections 2nd Round
26. Mood for Reforms
27. Mini-Hurricane hits the Carpathian Basin
28. The cost of lying to win by IdiotSavant (first riots; background & reports from me in the comments)
29. Scary (some scary elements of far-right protest culture & the cries for police action against them)
30. How I voted for 3 different parties simultaneously (local elections)
31. Battle of Liars (spin overdrive on consequences of "I Lied" speech, with EPP help)
32. The 1956 Hungarian Revolution - Prelude (communism in Hungary and the forces behind the revolution)
33. The 1956 Hungarian Revolution - Outbreak (the turbulent events of 23 October)
34. The 1956 Hungarian Revolution - Turmoil (the hectic events in the next twelve days)
35. The 1956 Hungarian Revolution - Fighting (the final losing battle against the Soviet tanks and its background)
36. The 1956 Hungarian Revolution - Personal Memories (eyewitness accounts from my relatives)
37. Hungarian riots: developments
38. The 1956 Hungarian Revolution - Aftermath (what happened to the country and the people, and what role did its memory play later)
39. The 1956 Hungarian Revolution - Cutting Loose Ends
40. Occasional Train Blogging: Trams
41. Where the State is most corrupt & least efficient (an anecdote on privatisation)
42. Rádió © (Gypsies/Roma in Hungary, and a special radio station)
43. Occasional Train Blogging: Central European Time
44. Terrorism In Hungary!
45. The Balkans Pipeline Poker
46. The Day Budapest Burns To Cinder (or not) (scaremongering before and rioting during 1848 revolution day 15 March)
47. The Wonders of Capitalism (how my company is destroyed)
48. Occasional Train Blogging: Zone Pricing
49. Russia -- ex-East-Bloc Realignment
50. Cycle & Walk (Earth Day 2007)
51. Terrorism In Hungary II
52. Trial and Error (getting the wrong guys for a bank robbery turned slaughter)
53. Hot Summer
54. Local Warming
55. Local Warming 2 (Skull Caps Melting)