F-22 Raptor - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The United States Air Force originally planned to order 750 ATFs, with production beginning in 1994; however, the 1990 Major Aircraft Review altered the plan to 648 aircraft beginning in 1996. The goal changed again in 1994, when it became 442 aircraft entering service in 2003 or 2004, but a 1997 Department of Defense report put the purchase at 339. In 2003, the Air Force said that the existing congressional cost cap limited the purchase to 277. By 2006, the Pentagon said it will buy 183 aircraft, which would save $15 billion but raise the cost of each aircraft, and this plan has been de facto approved by Congress in the form of a multi-year procurement plan, which still holds open the possibility for new orders past that point. The total cost of the program by 2006 was $62 billion.^[4]

In April 2006, the cost of the F-22A was assessed by the Government Accountability Office to be $361 million per aircraft. This cost reflects the F-22A total program cost, divided by the number of fighters the Air Force is programmed to buy; and which has so far invested $28 billion in the Raptor's research, development and testing. That money, referred to as a "sunk cost", is already spent and is separate from money used for future decision-making, including procuring a copy of the jet.

By the time all 183 fighters have been purchased, $34 billion will have been spent on actual procurement, resulting in a total program cost of $62 billion or about $339 million per aircraft. The incremental cost for one additional F-22 is around $137 million; decreasing with larger volumes. If the Air Force were to buy 100 more F-22s today, the cost of each one would be less than $117 million and would continue to drop with additional aircraft purchases.^[4]

So in this case (which afaik is typical of big-ticket military procurement), the potential advantage of arms sales to a government is not any kind of "payback" or profit, but merely reduced unit costs. The profit stays with the contractor.

And I'm not sure that any such projects can ever happen "without government" aid, as contractors don't do squat until they're sure the government will pick up the development costs.

At least in Western countries. Russia may have a radically different arms establishment. But my best guess would be that there too, the primary benefit for the government of military sales would be decreased unit costs and political influence.

The fact is that what we're experiencing right now is a top-down disaster. -Paul Krugman

Once communications are cut, other strategic weapons have a free hand.  The close-based missiles are just to prepare the way for what follows.  

The Russian reaction is not merely for show.  This is not about the politics of public relations and diplomacy, this is about strategic nuclear war.  

I DO think the Russians will come up with an effective countermeasure that does not entail invading Poland and Czecho, but as yet, no one seems to know what that will be.  

The Fates are kind.

PL and CR having some collective PTSD from their relationship with Russia in the 20th Century, wanting a restraining order, and asking the US for protection in return for their agreeing to be in the coalition of the willing makes more sense than just the us provoking Russia just because ... it's Russia.

Initially there was a lot of opposition from major European governments, but gradually they all fell back into line, with some behind-the-scenes diplomacy at NATO involved.

It's the same thing that happened with the CIA secret flights/prisons. The USA asked presumably Poland and Romania (why hasn't the WaPo said yet where they were told the prisons were? They've been sitting on it for over 2 years) to allow them to use bases on their territory. We don't even know whether they were told there would be detainees there. WHen the thing blew up there were denials from all quarters and a lot of hand-wringing from European governments. The noise level forced Condi to make a lightning visit to Europe, during which it was reported (a slip, surely) that the European Governments asked her for help managing their public opinions. That is, the problem were not the prisons, the problem was that the public opinion was questioning Atlanticist's complicity or incompetence regarding human right violations on our soil, not to speak of violations of the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation.

So there is a pattern.

We have met the enemy, and he is us — Pogo

"few people notice, while even fewer care."  I assume we are speaking of Katrina and NO?  I think a lot of people noticed and cared, but most felt helpless to respond, plus we are involved in 2 wars, our economy is tanking, people just feel overwhelmed and their capacity to react in profoundly explicit ways is becoming exhausted.

HOWEVER:

An attack on American soil in which what, less than 3,000 died, outraged the country to such an extent that in their patriotic passion led to 2 full-scale wars.  Poor black people die of negligence everyday.  Scary Arabs who want to kill us is a whole different story.  And it is worth noting that if there were popular mandate for it, we would be in Iran by now.  Yet, despite huzzah with which we recently attacked two other countries in the region, one with absolutely no provocation, the war with Iran is proving to be a bit of a difficult sell to the American people.  Therefore, I think that 1) Americans still demand, however wearily, some pretense for war and -perhaps more so now- some proof that we can win it, and 2) parallels abound, but NO was not a large-scale act of war - of a foreign attack on a sovereign nation - a fact illustrated by the radically different reactions the American people had to 9-11 and to Katrina.


"Pretending that you already know the answer when you don't is not actually very helpful." ~Migeru.