For now I haven't anything to add to Franck's words, I'm still pretty much in the digestive process of these ideas. Following are some annotated highlights of the text.

From February 15th 2006 on, when we coined the expression "global systemic crisis" in our bulletin (the GEAB N°2), we defined this concept as a general break down of world governance as we knew it in the past decades (essentially since WW II).

Capitalism itself is not dying:

In our opinion, this crisis has nothing to do with the end of capitalism or even a crisis of capitalism. It has on the contrary everything to do with the end of a political era which saw the overall global supremacy of one country, the USA; and which has been marked, since the 1970s and Bretton Woods II, by an increasing number of aberrations and excesses in the financial and monetary spheres, due to the diminishing ability of the USA to fulfill its role of global pillar.

This won't be a reprise of the 1930s:

In 2007, we called the starting crisis in the USA, the `Very Great US Depression'. So this crisis indeed is different from the 1930s one in many ways. First, today's world is far more integrated than in the 1930s so this crisis is definitely the first ever truly `global crisis'. The 1930s one was essentially limited to the USA and Europe. Second, our societies depend much more on the financial sphere than 80 years ago, so the impact of the financial meltdown is going to affect more deeply and more durably our societies. Third, the USA, which is the epicenter of the current global crisis, was an ascendant world power in the 1930s when now it is a decaying one.

The lucky Eurozone:

The major difference is going to be between the USA and the Eurozone. EU member states outside the Eurozone will be affected more severely than Eurozone ones. And some of them more integrated to the US economic and strategic sphere such as UK for instance, will be at least as affected as the USA if not more.

Although it is still lacking proper institutions:

There is an obvious need for regular meetings of the Eurozone summit now that it was gathered once last November. It should take place the day before every EU summit (every 4 months). There is a need for a kind of Secretariat of the Eurozone which will coordinate economic policies and serve as the daily interlocutor to the ECB on the one hand (in charge of monetary matters) and with the EU Commission & Parliament (in charge of the whole EU area).

As Jérôme has been saying, nationalization is the only effective way to fight the fractional reserve system crisis:

The distressed assets buyout is only pushing towards the state (and ultimately the taxpayer) the cost of getting out of the mess. And not entering the bank's board is only making more probable that in a few months, because banks are not delivering the loan increase to the economy they promised, the very same banks will have to be fully nationalized.

Our big asset:

The existence of a developed social system is the big asset of Europe compared to the USA or Asia which don't have them and will be faced by the emergency of having to build them from almost scratch, or face social unrest on a large scale.

Message to the deflationistas:

We are seeing a transitory deflation of asset prices which skyrocketed for speculative reasons. But the amazing money creation, especially in the US which is printing money like never before, or the major use of debt to pay their way out of the crisis, again in the USA and also in UK, will result into strong inflation in these countries.

Can the Euro takes the Dollar's role as the de facto international reserve currency?

[...] the instability created by a reference currency controlled by a single political entity as it is the case for the US Dollar clearly makes the case against any attempt for the Euro to play such a role.  We think that the coming years will see the emergence of a global reserve currency (which could be called the "Global").

Obama is no change:

The new US administration is facing a task of historic proportion, but I am very afraid that Barak Obama and his team still belong to the `old political class'. When looking at his team of economic advisers or officials, you can only notice that they all come from yesterday. People like Laurence Summers have been directly responsible of the big Wall Street mess of the past decade (when they orchestrated in 1999 the suppression of Great Depression regulations preventing the banks to behave as they just did these past years). And Timothy Geithner is one of the three major decision-makers (together with Paulson and Bernanke) of the failed interventions of the past year.

I stress the forecast of stagflation for Europe, something now out of the cards for many people. For now I have two main questions: a) will in fact Europe be able to continue avoiding a hard recession? and b) will it be possible for the G20 to enact a new world paper currency? In this last question I especially doubt the current status quo on the dollar will last until next Summer.

I strongly recommend the complete read of this interview.