Two of three important official pre Copenhagen negotiation meetings have been completed. One in Bonn was past June, and the one in Bangkok ended 9 October, less than two weeks ago. The next, and final, round of these pre Copenhagen negotiations will be held in Barcelona early November. As is wont in these international treaties, the preparation rounds are crucial in hammering out the foundations of the agreement - whereas the main event serves as polish and a good PR circus for generating headlines.

The fallout of the Bangkok meeting does not bode well, for either the Barcelona or Copenhagen negotiations. Not all is lost, according to De Boer:

Mr de Boer pointed out: “If you look at the limited amount of time that remains to Copenhagen, we have to focus on what can realistically be done and how that can realistically be framed.”

The need was to “concentrate on the political imperatives that make it clear how countries are committed [to tackling climate change] and engaging in cutting emissions, and what co-operative mechanisms they need to put in place”, he said.

“That means an overarching decision at Copenhagen that sets out individual targets for industrialised countries, that decides how major developing countries intend to engage [in curbing emissions by] 2020, and hopefully that puts that in the context of a long-term goal [of cutting global emissions by 2050].”

Ministers meeting in Copenhagen should also “decide a deadline by which that architecture can be negotiated into something comprehensive”, such as a legally binding international treaty, said Mr de Boer.

This optimism does not prevent the outlook from appearing grim. Failure in Copenhagen could bring the risk that the climate conferences take the same road as the WTO conferences: high-profile events with zero results, status quo, business as usual. While BAU is precisely what shouldn't happen.

For those interested in the nitty-gritty, the draft negotiating text that causes so much strife is available here (PDF). Special attention to the goals of global emission reduction:

12. The long-term global goal for emission reductions {shall}{should} be set

Option 1
as a stabilization of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at {400}{450 or lower}{not more than 450}{450} ppm carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2 eq) and a temperature increase limited to 2 oC above the pre-industrial level. For this purpose, the Parties {shall}{should} collectively reduce global emissions by at least 50 per cent {from 1990} levels by 2050.

Option 2
as a stabilization of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere well below 350 ppm CO2 eq and a temperature increase limited to below 1.5 oC above the pre-industrial level. For this purpose, the Parties {shall}{should} collectively reduce global emissions by {81–71}{more than 85} per centfrom 1990 levels by 2050.

Option 3
as a global temperature increase limited to 2 oC above the pre-industrial level.

Option 4
as a reduction in global average GHG emissions per capita to about 2 t CO2.

Option 5
on the basis of
Option 5.1
historical responsibility.
Option 5.2
emissions debt.
Option 5.3
per capita accumulative emission convergence.
Option 5.4
an equitable allocation of the global atmospheric resources.

and

17. Option 2 (in the case of a long-term global goal as defined in para. 12, option 3, above)
The long-term global goal for emission reductions {shall}{should} be updated to reflect progress in scientific knowledge. To allow for these updates, the 2 oC goal {shall}{should} be broken down into partial targets: initially, a 0.2 oC temperature increase per decade over 10 decades. Every 10 years, the partial target {shall}{should} be evaluated, with a view to possibly redefining it, taking into account advances in scientific knowledge and the reduction of uncertainties.

Let's see what's left standing of this when all is said and done.