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The Peak Oil Whistle

by Luis de Sousa Thu Nov 12th, 2009 at 08:06:13 AM EST

This morning I woke up, went shaving and then jumped for a quick shower as usual; at 7 o'clock I tunned the radio from Radio France to the local news radio in time for the first morning program. One of the opening news-bits seemed to have been edited by one of my colleagues at TheOilDrum.

Yes, world oil production has been stagnant since 2004; it won't go much beyond the present 83 Mb/d; we are the peak; the IEA's predictions are just dreams. It was all there, in my mother language in my preferred news radio. And more than that, the news source was a “mole” right at the heart of the IEA.

Update [2009-11-10 12:33:54 by Luis de Sousa]: : Kjell Aleklett (ASPO's chairman) has posted a note on this Guardian piece (hat tip Starvid). Highlights at the end of this weblog.

Promoted by afew


This all comes from a piece published overnight by the Guardian newspaper,  someone found the courage (or ran out of shame) and set his mouth on the whistle:


Key oil figures were distorted by US pressure, says whistleblower.

The world is much closer to running out of oil than official estimates admit, according to a whistleblower at the International Energy Agency who claims it has been deliberately underplaying a looming shortage for fear of triggering panic buying.

The senior official claims the US has played an influential role in encouraging the watchdog to underplay the rate of decline from existing oil fields while overplaying the chances of finding new reserves.

[…]

Now the "peak oil" theory is gaining support at the heart of the global energy establishment. "The IEA in 2005 was predicting oil supplies could rise as high as 120m barrels a day by 2030 although it was forced to reduce this gradually to 116m and then 105m last year," said the IEA source, who was unwilling to be identified for fear of reprisals inside the industry. "The 120m figure always was nonsense but even today's number is much higher than can be justified and the IEA knows this.

"Many inside the organisation believe that maintaining oil supplies at even 90m to 95m barrels a day would be impossible but there are fears that panic could spread on the financial markets if the figures were brought down further. And the Americans fear the end of oil supremacy because it would threaten their power over access to oil resources," he added.

A second senior IEA source, who has now left but was also unwilling to give his name, said a key rule at the organisation was that it was "imperative not to anger the Americans" but the fact was that there was not as much oil in the world as had been admitted. "We have [already] entered the 'peak oil' zone. I think that the situation is really bad," he added.

[…]

I can't stop thinking about James Schlinsinger's speech at the ASPO conference at Cork in 2007. In it he said the peok oil movement could declare victory. Back then I didn't quite feel like it, but today, with such explicit whistling, it surely feels like it.

But what have we won? The expected economic turmoil is here, Stakeholders in general are still acting as if they were living in the XX century (of which the coming Copenhagen conference is a good example), the common man in the street is still driving to work everyday and thinking how he'll finance his next four-wheeled token of adaptation success. If this is victory it is a bitter one.

And this leads me to reflect once more on the question of where to go from here for this movement. The awareness phase seems over for all practical purposes. Fossil Fuels are no longer blindly regarded as limitless deity gifts. With the consequences of the end of the Oil Age upon us, it is perhaps time to focus on what sort of Society and Civilization can be built in the XXI century. This will inevitably lead to different views of the future and a possible dilution of the movement. But as long as the compass keeps pointing to facts and reality there is a purpose for the Peak Oil cause.


Here are a few highlights from Kjell Aleklett's blog; it contains quite a number of interesting “revelations”:

[...] At that opportunity, in November 2007, I had a number of private conversations with officers of the IEA. The revelations now reported in the Guardian were revealed to me then under the promise that I not name the source. I had earlier heard the same thing from another officer from Norway who, at the time he spoke of the pressure being applied by the USA, was working for the IEA. Since these anecdotes were not scientific evidence I never made use of the information other than as inspiration to continue our own research.

Earlier, following a suggestion by Colin Campbell, I had communicated to Sweden’s delegate at the IEA that Sweden should leave the IEA since it was deceiving the world and this would have serious consequences globally. I also asked how they could approve of something like the World Energy Outlook that was so in error. I had previously posted an analysis of World Outlook 2004 on ASPO’s homepage. In the discussion that followed it was revealed that the USA was applying pressure. The pressure was that the IEA should consider the prognoses that USA’s Energy Information Agency releases half a year earlier as guidelines for the IEA report. […]

One consequence of that which has now been revealed is that the emissions scenarios that the IPCC has advanced for calculating future carbon dioxide production from oil can never reflect reality. Before the round table conference in Paris I was also given the task by the OECD of writing another report, ”Reserve driven forecasts for oil, gas and coal and limits in carbon dioxide emissions”. In connection with the Global Transport Forum in Leipzig in 2008 I met the chairperson for the IPCC, Rajendra Kumar Pachauri, and gave him a copy of this report. The subsequent interest from the IPCC’s side can be described as absolutely zero.

Display:
Key oil figures were distorted by US pressure, says whistleblower | Environment | The Guardian
The world is much closer to running out of oil than official estimates admit, according to a whistleblower at the International Energy Agency who claims it has been deliberately underplaying a looming shortage for fear of triggering panic buying.

...

"Many inside the organisation believe that maintaining oil supplies at even 90m to 95m barrels a day would be impossible but there are fears that panic could spread on the financial markets if the figures were brought down further. And the Americans fear the end of oil supremacy because it would threaten their power over access to oil resources," he added.

...

But as far back as 2004 there have been people making similar warnings. Colin Campbell, a former executive with Total of France told a conference: "If the real [oil reserve] figures were to come out there would be panic on the stock markets ... in the end that would suit no one."

Has nobody thought that the financial markets might be the problem here?

En un viejo país ineficiente, algo así como España entre dos guerras civiles, poseer una casa y poca hacienda y memoria ninguna. -- Gil de Biedma
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Nov 10th, 2009 at 06:03:23 AM EST
Migeru:
Has nobody thought that the financial markets might be the problem here?

It had occurred to me... :-)

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Tue Nov 10th, 2009 at 07:42:21 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I know this is herisy, but a mitigation would be to limit participation in oil futures market transactions to those who can produce oil or those who can take physical delivery of oil. If Wall Street wants to blow bubbles, let it be in gold rather than in oil. I fail to see how hundreds of billions of dollars from retirement funds invested in oil futures is likely to benefit anyone but those making manipulating the market. Or perhaps someone can explain how the massive capital flows in and out of oil futures and the accompanying gyrations in the spot and futures price of oil in 2008 helped the economy.  

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Tue Nov 10th, 2009 at 03:31:13 PM EST
[ Parent ]
It's far from heresy, ARG, and lots of people agree with you: but I regret that I think you, and they, are under a misapprehension.

The futures markets are the tail, not the dog. Systemic manipulation has been going on in the Brent/BFOE physical/OTC complex for years, and was transmitted to the WTI market by the arbitrage available on the ICE trading platform. This manipulation is now entirely out of control. It was IMHO responsible for the 'spike' last year and is responsible for the bubble now.

Essentially what is happening, I think, is that producers - who are able (unlike speculators) to store oil for nothing in the ground - are able to borrow money from the funds and to lend oil to the funds in return.

Just as is happening in the other asset classes - particularly equities - we are seeing the physical market price (and it doesn't take that much in the BFOE market these days) gradually pumped up with borrowed money.  The correlation between WTI and the S&P was almost perfect recently, and last year we saw pretty much all of the other commodities spiking in the same way. This proves beyond doubt that supply and demand for the commodities had nothing to do with it, and that another factor was at work.

That factor is the shape of the yield curve at the zero bound. ie at the moment the forward curves on commodities react almost precisely to movements on the forward curve on money.

In the oil market, I believe that it is BP and Goldman who combine to lead the arbitrage between money and oil, but everyone else will be doing the same.

The necessity to be in both the physical/OTC and the futures to avoid getting screwed in one or the other is the motive behind the move by GLG (hedge fund) into the physical market. It is probably also why Occidental acquired Citigroup's Phibro trading unit, and why Vitol acquired some Petroplus infrastructure assets recently.

It is only those participants capable of making and taking delivery who can affect the physical market price, which in turn affects the futures price - and not vice versa as you, and almost everyone else, assume.

I managed IPE Gas Oil contract deliveries for six years - of anything up to 800,000 tonnes in the second half of the contract month - and while I kept a close eye on who was doing what in Europe'sbiggest game of 'chicken', no broker in his right mind allowed investors unable to make or take delivery to participate in the 'spot' month. The reason being of course that if the client cannot perform, it is the broker's arse on the line to the clearing house.

The fact is that for producers trying to hedge energy prices (in dollars) then funds whose purpose is to hedge the dollar priced in energy (ie 'energy inflation') are precisely the genuine liquidity needed in the futures market.

It is the Wall Street Refiners in particular who are causing the problems in league with one or two producers - quite possibly the Saudis, which may help to account for their wish to move from the WTI futures contract, where the Brent/WTI arbitrage had broken down badly.

I believe that a practical first step to solving the problem is a big breath of transparency.

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Tue Nov 10th, 2009 at 04:45:32 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I recalled having asked you if the oil co.s were essentially loaning "investors" oil still in the ground when this came up a few months ago.  As I recall, some of the pension funds got burned rather badly in July '08, so there might not be so many takers this time. Having the biggest oil co.s and banks in the world involved, along with sovereigns such as Saudi Arabia, would definitely make regulation harder. I think you have suggested creating a registry for futures trades and making OTC trades not listed on this registry unenforceable. That at least would make the risk analysis for an unlisted OTC future more problematic and the structuring of the transaction more creative.

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 12:17:24 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Geezer, two points:

a) Industries heavily dependent on oil (airlines, hauliers, etc) could loose hedging and get compromised even more;

b) Small investors would flock elswhere (Asia, Gulf).

luis_de_sousa@mastodon.social

by Luis de Sousa (luis[dot]de[dot]sousa[at]protonmail[dot]ch) on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 05:37:39 AM EST
[ Parent ]
(airlines, hauliers, etc) could loose hedging

Having to register their positions with an exchange would deprive them of the ability to hedge? I don't believe Chris proposed that the positions of specific companies be made public knowledge.

Small investors would flock elswhere (Asia, Gulf).

Where they could more efficiently and discretely be parted from their money. Caveat emptor!  

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Thu Nov 12th, 2009 at 01:53:03 PM EST
[ Parent ]
For some 10 years I have proposed generic transaction registration, which could form the basis of global regulation through the creation of market user groups or "International Trade Associations".

Membership would be open to anyone who met the  standards agreed by the ITA which would of course not be dominated by middlemen but would include in its membership all of the market constituencies. Any market player would be free to stay out of the ITA, but he would probably not find himself doing too much business. Likewise, the threat of suspension or termination of ITA membership would give it regulatory teeth with global scope.

The transparency of the captured data would be at an agreed level and this would not be such as to compromise legitimate trading. However, the data would certainly be available to the people in the Manager member consortium providing regulatory services to the ITA membership by enforcing agreed standards of market behaviour.

It's all in this article written in the aftermath of a dot com I set up in the area of electronic market transaction registration.

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Thu Nov 12th, 2009 at 05:27:41 PM EST
[ Parent ]
This is the IEA's own projections:

Note that
  • "crude oil - currently producing fields" is already in a precipitous decline
  • "crude oil - fields yet to be developed" and "crude oil - fields yet to be found" only postpone the peak to maybe 2013-4.

I'd say "fields yet to be found" looks completely massaged to me.

En un viejo país ineficiente, algo así como España entre dos guerras civiles, poseer una casa y poca hacienda y memoria ninguna. -- Gil de Biedma
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Nov 10th, 2009 at 06:08:18 AM EST
Dutch NRC Handelsblad had an oil special on peak oil (I still have a copy on my shelf) predicting against the IEA that it would be increasingly more likely that 2015, and not 2020, will be marked with the start of the production decline.

This looks increasingly more likely despite the fact that we've had at least one year of decreasing demand.

by Nomad (Bjinse) on Tue Nov 10th, 2009 at 06:46:44 AM EST
[ Parent ]
decreasing demand will hasten and steepen the decline: it makes investments more risky, less attractive (because of high capital costs and long lead times in the energy sector, any doubt about demand growth forecasts will put projects on hold).

But the same lead times mean the expected new supplies for 2013 won't materialize because they assume continued investments just now.

Pierre

by Pierre on Tue Nov 10th, 2009 at 07:42:00 AM EST
[ Parent ]
What matters is not demand growth but the forecast slack between supply and demand. With supply entering an accelerating decline phase, it will take investment to satisfy demand even if demand is flagging.

En un viejo país ineficiente, algo así como España entre dos guerras civiles, poseer una casa y poca hacienda y memoria ninguna. -- Gil de Biedma
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Nov 10th, 2009 at 09:24:51 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Something people never seem to remember is that underlying decline is like 4-5 times as big as demand growth, each and every year. Yep, 75-80 % of the energy we spend running up the energy escalator is consumed by just trying to stay in the same place and not backslide.

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
by Starvid on Tue Nov 10th, 2009 at 10:03:36 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Interestingly the IEA's "currently producing fields" forecast upthread looks like exponential decay from the current value. The total production looks like nearly linear growth, and "fields yet to be found" makes up for the difference.

En un viejo país ineficiente, algo así como España entre dos guerras civiles, poseer una casa y poca hacienda y memoria ninguna. -- Gil de Biedma
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Nov 10th, 2009 at 11:53:14 AM EST
[ Parent ]
of Hubbert's work, it seems to me that there is evidence of exponential decay. The theory is generally presented as a bell-shaped curve, but I think that the data says otherwise - particularly the U.S. experience and, within that, the Texas oil fields' decline.

Not sure, but I think that I remember that Hubbert himself commented on the trajectory toward the end of his career.

paul spencer

by paul spencer (paulgspencer@gmail.com) on Tue Nov 10th, 2009 at 01:40:33 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Is Hubbert's model logistic? If so, then the rate of consumption is asymptotically a decaying exponential.

En un viejo país ineficiente, algo así como España entre dos guerras civiles, poseer una casa y poca hacienda y memoria ninguna. -- Gil de Biedma
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Nov 10th, 2009 at 07:39:46 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The standard Hubbert Curve:

(From a rather nice - from a quick skim - analysis here.)

Apparently Hubbert never published the underlying formula(s) but his curve looks suspiciously like a modified Bell Curve.  To me.  ;-)

 

She believed in nothing; only her skepticism kept her from being an atheist. -- Jean-Paul Sartre

by ATinNM on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 11:58:59 AM EST
[ Parent ]
What does a logistic curve look like but a "modified bell curve"?

En un viejo país ineficiente, algo así como España entre dos guerras civiles, poseer una casa y poca hacienda y memoria ninguna. -- Gil de Biedma
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 12:05:01 PM EST
[ Parent ]
When it doesn't look like a modified Bell Curve.  

(neener, neener, neener)

:-þ

(LOL)

OK, what I SHOULD have written ...

This, to me, looks like an artifact stemming from a simplified Model of the underlying phenomena using the paradigms of Statistical Analysis based on Set Theory rather than the, more correct, Bifurcative Analysis based on Complexity Theory.

 

She believed in nothing; only her skepticism kept her from being an atheist. -- Jean-Paul Sartre

by ATinNM on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 01:15:34 PM EST
[ Parent ]
... as what happens when you expand into a new niche based on an exponential growth process driven by the resources of that niche. If, critical assumption, those are renewable resources and if, critical assumption, the growth is slow enough for negative feedbacks from resource scarcity to be a smooth damping process - you get in the simplest case a logistic growth curve.

If then you change the first assumption, so that instead of the resources being renewable, they are a population of non-renewable resources that can each be exploited first in growing volumes and then in declining volumes, but still supposing feedbacks that are responsive enough for smooth damping processes, you get a Hilbert's curve.

The derivation I saw was based on a assumption of average size of total discoveries (measured by the eventual recoverable reserve of the discovery) being a simple negative function of time, so that total annual supply is first a rising quantity, as early discoveries are exploited, and then a declining quantity, as decline in production of old discoveries is no longer offset by the new production from the smaller discoveries coming on stream.

The idea of it being a niche exploitation phenomenon is supported by the fact that it takes a while into the discovery data before the linear downward trendline stabilizes.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 03:59:33 PM EST
[ Parent ]
... still supposing feedbacks that are responsive enough for smooth damping processes, you get a Hilbert's curve.

Oops.  I keep forgetting not all RW data comes in "byte-sized" chunks that goes hippity-hopping all over the place.  Some data actually IS linear ... like ... duh

My bad.

She believed in nothing; only her skepticism kept her from being an atheist. -- Jean-Paul Sartre

by ATinNM on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 06:38:00 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The data may not be not linear when plotted point to point, but some data actually does fit a linear trendline very well. That's how Hilbert was able to predict US peak oil as well as he did as early as he did, because the over the 50's, the trendline on size of US oil discoveries over time, while bouncing around, fit a very stable trendline, which then did in fact continue stable through to the peak oil year.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 10:44:05 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Isn't it just the Central Limit Theorem?
by njh on Thu Nov 12th, 2009 at 10:27:13 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Not if Kenneth Deffeye's derivation of Hilbert's curve is correct - the Central Limit theorem is about a distribution around a mean, while in Deffeye's derivation, the curve is the dynamics of the mean value.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Thu Nov 12th, 2009 at 11:19:54 PM EST
[ Parent ]
do you have a good ref?
by njh on Fri Nov 13th, 2009 at 06:42:53 AM EST
[ Parent ]
... [ Beyond Oil: The View from Hubbert's Peak].

His derivation of the Hubbert method is Chapter 3.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Fri Nov 13th, 2009 at 12:03:01 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Beyond Oil: The View from Hubbert's Peak. I believe he's Professor Emeritus in Geology at Princeton, moving from industry into academia in the late 60's.

I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Fri Nov 13th, 2009 at 08:00:54 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Hubbert curve - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The Hubbert curve is a logistic distribution curve. It is not a normal distribution curve, which appears similar. Some differences are that the density of a normal distribution approaches zero faster than a logistic distribution does. The Hubbert curve is the derivative of the logistic function


En un viejo país ineficiente, algo así como España entre dos guerras civiles, poseer una casa y poca hacienda y memoria ninguna. -- Gil de Biedma
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Nov 13th, 2009 at 08:49:38 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Paul, singular fields do not show a logistic decline, it is more like a boot shaped profile: fast linear rise, plateau and then decay (usually exponential).

Only when you get to the basin, region or country level do the logistic profile starts emerging.

luis_de_sousa@mastodon.social

by Luis de Sousa (luis[dot]de[dot]sousa[at]protonmail[dot]ch) on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 05:40:12 AM EST
[ Parent ]
So the logistic part of the Hubbert model is the exploration/development of the fields?

In any case, with logistic exploration/development and exponential decay of the individual fields you get an explonentially decreasing tail for aggregate production.

En un viejo país ineficiente, algo así como España entre dos guerras civiles, poseer una casa y poca hacienda y memoria ninguna. -- Gil de Biedma

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 07:15:59 AM EST
[ Parent ]
to describing some of the cases that have been 'completed', such as the 'oil patch' in Texas.

I don't know that Hubbert was trying to mathematically model the whole process, when he was doing his main work. Bell curves were 'the rage' at that time, and he may have simply found it convenient. My recollection is that, later, he began to recognize that the downward side of the data-based curve was not symmetrical to the logistic side.

paul spencer

by paul spencer (paulgspencer@gmail.com) on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 08:30:00 PM EST
[ Parent ]
A poor fit at the extreme downward end would in a certain sense be very symmetrical, since when you focus on the early years alone even in the US data on which Hilbert successfully predicted the US peak, you get wild variations in the predicted path until it stabilizes on the trend line that it stayed very close to through the peak and early decline.

If the fit of the model is as ragged in the very early part of the ramp up, there'd be no reason for surprise if its ragged at the very final stage of depletion.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 10:57:56 PM EST
[ Parent ]
different kinds of symmetry. I'm referring to shape symmetry around the vertical axis through the peak, not raggedness at the edges.

paul spencer
by paul spencer (paulgspencer@gmail.com) on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 11:20:12 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Yes, you were addressing the bias rather than the kirtosis of the empirical curve.

Shape symmetry around the peak follows if the discovery trendline remains linear and the pattern of exploitation remains regular (which could, of course, include a regular linear trend) after crossing the peak.

It seems plausible that the latter assumption may not hold, especially when thinking about the production regions that will be hitting their Peak Oil in the period of extreme price volatility after the aggregate peak has been reached.

Since there are unlikely to be sudden sectoral shifts at that point, if there is a non-linear trend in the change in the pattern of exploitation, it would likely skew the curve. If it tends to extend the plateau, it may increase the rate of decline in the steepest part of the downward slide, and if it brings a more rapid descent off the plateau, it may decrease the rate of decline in the steepest part of the downward slide.

I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Thu Nov 12th, 2009 at 09:51:54 AM EST
[ Parent ]
... aggregates distinct resources, for which there is no reason to expect the same time lag between discovery and peak exploitation, so even if the individual resources have symmetric Hilbert curves, there's no reason to expect an aggregate curve to be symmetric.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Thu Nov 12th, 2009 at 09:54:25 AM EST
[ Parent ]
yes, but IEA has been consistently claiming that decline was low (when accounting for the global effect of "other players" bringing online all those "yet to discover" fields, all modelled according to "very clever IEA models")

So if you believe iea supply forecasts, and at the same time observe the severe demand contraction of last year, you fold you projects.

Of course, the right thing to do is to throw away the supply forecasts at the same time as the (now discredited) demand forecasts...

I also believe some oil exec have good understanding of decline rates and have known for some time that iea supply forecasts were crap (notably de Margerie of Total said so, basically)

Eventually, another factor is Saudi Arabia. They have demonstrated they want oil above $70 for internal policy reasons. So the questions of an oil exec would be:

  • can the project break even at $70/bl ?
  • what's the risk the supply/demand breaks down so much that SA can't defend $70/bl ?

For question 2, I believe there are serious risks right now and for the next couple of years. Of course, if SA can't defend a price range that is a survival must for the ruling family, some nasty hysteresis effect could kick in, by which SA would produce much less for a very, very long time.

When we are well past peak, SA won't have any problem defending a bottom, assuming it still follows the same rule.

For question 1, it's not obvious to me that the western oilcos have lots of opportunities there (deep offshore and unconventional oil are too expensive).

This leaves us with the national oilcos of developing countries, which have no EOR tech and will suffer terrible decline rates.

This should send oil skyrocketing, but actually not, because the global oil tax rate goes to high and consumption gets curtailed (see price/bbl times 80mb/d times 365d divided by world gdp... )

Pierre

by Pierre on Tue Nov 10th, 2009 at 11:25:18 AM EST
[ Parent ]
For a very long time IEA supply forecasts were nothing more than demand forecasts...

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
by Starvid on Tue Nov 10th, 2009 at 11:37:33 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Also remember, every time the "global oil tax" becomes high for a few quarters in a row, massive substitution to coal and gas happens.

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
by Starvid on Tue Nov 10th, 2009 at 11:40:08 AM EST
[ Parent ]
It seems like anything that stretches out the curve would in the short term look like hastening and steepening the decline, because the longer and harder we fight to stay near the plateau, the less recoverable reserves will exist in any given future decade.

I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Tue Nov 10th, 2009 at 11:39:52 AM EST
[ Parent ]
... hastening and steepening the decline in the short term is a good thing ... oil not exploited is CO2 not emitted.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Tue Nov 10th, 2009 at 11:40:48 AM EST
[ Parent ]
we get

(Appologies for the bodged picture, due to lack of proper tools and the black slice which has come out brown)

Any idiot can face a crisis - it's day to day living that wears you out.

by ceebs (ceebs (at) eurotrib (dot) com) on Tue Nov 10th, 2009 at 06:48:57 AM EST
[ Parent ]
We could probably take out the "non-conventional oil" as well. Shale and tar sands have a prohibitive EROEI at best.

The fact is that what we're experiencing right now is a top-down disaster. -Paul Krugman
by dvx (dvx.clt ät gmail dotcom) on Tue Nov 10th, 2009 at 01:37:03 PM EST
[ Parent ]
It's positive at least, as you can fuel the process on itself.

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
by Starvid on Tue Nov 10th, 2009 at 01:44:19 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Not if you include water

"Life shrinks or expands in proportion to one's courage." - Anaïs Nin
by Crazy Horse on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 02:34:44 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The Oil Drum's take on tar sand EROI.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 03:25:37 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The process is being developed to radically reduce water use. Further, only a very small fraction of the flow of the Athabasca river is used by the industry.

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
by Starvid on Thu Nov 12th, 2009 at 01:49:20 AM EST
[ Parent ]


Any idiot can face a crisis - it's day to day living that wears you out.
by ceebs (ceebs (at) eurotrib (dot) com) on Tue Nov 10th, 2009 at 06:19:09 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Massaged?  More like "flogged".
by rifek on Tue Nov 10th, 2009 at 11:30:29 AM EST
[ Parent ]
but then I'd have to kill you. :)

Suffice to say, IEA is a political organisation. This is something 99 % of all companies and organisations don't understand, as they base all their energy projections on copy-paste from the IEA reports.

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.

by Starvid on Tue Nov 10th, 2009 at 10:01:01 AM EST
Actually, I don't have to kill you, as my source has today published (some) of his IEA stories.

At that opportunity, in November 2007, I had a number of private conversations with officers of the IEA. The revelations now reported in the Guardian were revealed to me then under the promise that I not name the source. I had earlier heard the same thing from another officer from Norway who, at the time he spoke of the pressure being applied by the USA, was working for the IEA.

   

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.

by Starvid on Tue Nov 10th, 2009 at 11:19:20 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Comments on "Key oil figures were distorted by US pressure, says whistleblower", The Guardian « Aleklett's Energy Mix
it was revealed that the USA was applying pressure. The pressure was that the IEA should consider the prognoses that USA's Energy Information Agency releases half a year earlier as guidelines for the IEA report.
This is around 2004, after the Bush Administration had already ensured that no independent science advice was produced by the US' science advisory agencies. But that blog claims already in 2002 the pressure was on.

En un viejo país ineficiente, algo así como España entre dos guerras civiles, poseer una casa y poca hacienda y memoria ninguna. -- Gil de Biedma
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Nov 10th, 2009 at 11:41:15 AM EST
[ Parent ]
And the blog is written by the chairman of ASPO International.

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
by Starvid on Tue Nov 10th, 2009 at 11:50:07 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Thanks for the note on Kyell's blog.

This is the first WEO of the Obama era, is it because of that we are finally getting the truth?

luis_de_sousa@mastodon.social

by Luis de Sousa (luis[dot]de[dot]sousa[at]protonmail[dot]ch) on Tue Nov 10th, 2009 at 12:12:53 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Suffice to say, IEA is a political organisation. This is something 99 % of all companies and organisations don't understand, as they base all their energy projections on copy-paste from the IEA reports.

Starvid, from last year's report I got the idea that the IEA is simply copy-and-pasting the Fossil Fuels dreamcasts of the IPCC.

luis_de_sousa@mastodon.social

by Luis de Sousa (luis[dot]de[dot]sousa[at]protonmail[dot]ch) on Tue Nov 10th, 2009 at 12:15:25 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I dunno about that.. the people at the IPCC know nothing at all about fossil fuels, not even the slightest fraction of the competence they have at the IEA. IIRC all the IPCC fossil fuel estimates are made by some completely unknown economist(!) in Vienna.

They have thousands of people obsessing over the climate, the atmosphere, the seas, albedo and so on, but they do not care in the slightest if there are actual enough fossil fuels around to create their beloved climate disasters. A little weird, eh?

Or as Upton Sinclair said: It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends upon his not understanding it!

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.

by Starvid on Tue Nov 10th, 2009 at 01:08:36 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Considering that IPCC uses mainstream assumptions from sciences not directly represented in the IPCC-project and that Peak Oil has not been the mainstream theory within geology (though it is hopefully becoming that) I would say it is not strange. Not stranger then that they assume that the economy can keep growing exponentially for a hundred years. Yes, it is nonsensical to ignore the physical fundaments for human activities - whether it is driving car engines or turning natural resources into industrial products - but that is the world we live in.

However, is there not enough coal to fulfill the worst scenarios anyway?

Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se

by A swedish kind of death on Tue Nov 10th, 2009 at 05:25:49 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I agree with this and also don't quite understand why IPCC suddenly has to be dragged into this. Even if oil production has peaked it does NOT follow that CO2 emissions will suddenly fall steeply. There is a lot more coal than oil, and coal can to a certain extent replace oil, as it has already done in the electricity sector. Coal can be used to synthesize liquid fuels, but the CO2 emissions will be something like twice as high. In this case, peak oil will make global warming worse.

Alternatively, car transport could be electrified, but if the electricity is produced by coal the CO2 emissions will be almost as high as for petrol cars.

To avoid doing something really bad to the climate we still need to stop using coal long before coal deposits are exhausted.

Finally, the last oil deposits (such as the tar sands), are likely to require more energy to extract, again leading to increased CO2 emissions.

Real capricorns don't believe in astrology.

by tomhuld (thomas punkt huld at jrc punkt it) on Tue Nov 10th, 2009 at 06:04:11 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I have a friend who is writing his ph.d dissertation on the question of global coal reserves, and of course it's a complex issue, but in a word: no. There might be enough coal to physically cause those kinds of emissions, but not enough cheap and or easily accesible coal. Wind and nuclear is cheaper than a lot of that coal, even on a deregulated market.

Then there are places where there is cheap coal but where production won't expand, like Montana. The state already exports huge amounts of coal, 90 % of its electricity and actually want to be a farming state, and farming doesn't mix well with huge open-pit coal mines. Add to this railroad monopolies not interested in increasing rail capacity for coal export and well, the 100+ year reserves of that state will actually have to be mined for 100+ years to deplete them.

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.

by Starvid on Tue Nov 10th, 2009 at 06:56:50 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Hi Swede,

However, is there not enough coal to fulfill the worst scenarios anyway?

Not in the least. Last year I worked with the Energy Watch Group's scenario for Coal, with a maximum plateau between 2025 and 2040. That way the overall Fossil Fuel ultimate went just above 1000 Gtoe. Jean Laherrère has been working with a larger Coal reserve base and a peak about 2050; he gets to 1200 Gtoe. The largest estimates I've seen from the Industry go as far as 1500 Gtoe, but BP, for instance, publishes an ultimate of 1000 Gtoe.

Now, the lowest emission scenario published by the IEA last year (copy-and-pasted from the IPCC) would need a ultimate of at least 2400 Gtoe to become true. The "worst case scenario" would need something in excess of 4000 Gtoe to happen.

When I use the term dreamcast I'm not being ironic or caustic.

luis_de_sousa@mastodon.social

by Luis de Sousa (luis[dot]de[dot]sousa[at]protonmail[dot]ch) on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 05:50:45 AM EST
[ Parent ]
This is really good news.

Luis de Sousa:

That way the overall Fossil Fuel ultimate went just above 1000 Gtoe.

If this is put into the climate models, roughly what level of maximum CO2 in the atmosphere does it correspond to?

Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se

by A swedish kind of death on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 07:07:24 AM EST
[ Parent ]
With an "overall Fossil Fuel Ultimate" of 1000 GToe, do we get runaway release of methane from permafrost melting?



En un viejo país ineficiente, algo así como España entre dos guerras civiles, poseer una casa y poca hacienda y memoria ninguna. -- Gil de Biedma

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 07:13:33 AM EST
[ Parent ]
At a major forest conference in Finland in '95, I interviewed 2 prominent Russian researchers who told me that a 2 degree C rise in average temperature in the Siberian boreal forest and tundra belt would turn it into a tinderbox. There is virtually no access to these vast wilderness areas for fire fighting or fire prevention. Large seaplanes have been developed to land and pick up water from lakes, and there is a corps of parachute-trained firefighters - and that sounds like a suicide mission, with no way out again.

You can't be me, I'm taken
by Sven Triloqvist on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 08:12:47 AM EST
[ Parent ]
For the past decade major Siberian fires have been obvious to everyone flying the Finnair route Helsinki - Shanghai/Beijing during the summer months - from 10 kms up.

You can't be me, I'm taken
by Sven Triloqvist on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 11:09:52 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Meanwhile the permafrost line has been moving south and the tree line has been moving north.

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Thu Nov 12th, 2009 at 02:08:55 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Russia - climate change winner no.1.

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
by Starvid on Thu Nov 12th, 2009 at 05:00:40 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Except for those cities that have to be moved because the permafrost they're built on melts into a marshy bog...

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Thu Nov 12th, 2009 at 05:03:03 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Man måste ta det gooode me det onde...

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
by Starvid on Thu Nov 12th, 2009 at 05:17:31 PM EST
[ Parent ]
They can always rebuild the city on stilts or a floating platform on the bog...

En un viejo país ineficiente, algo así como España entre dos guerras civiles, poseer una casa y poca hacienda y memoria ninguna. -- Gil de Biedma
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Nov 13th, 2009 at 08:54:39 AM EST
[ Parent ]
ARGeezer:
the permafrost line has been moving south
Surely north, too?

En un viejo país ineficiente, algo así como España entre dos guerras civiles, poseer una casa y poca hacienda y memoria ninguna. -- Gil de Biedma
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Nov 13th, 2009 at 08:53:48 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Of course!  I was thinking "thaw line."

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Fri Nov 13th, 2009 at 09:42:59 AM EST
[ Parent ]
That would also be moving north. Well, polewards, let's not be northern-hemisphere-centric here.

En un viejo país ineficiente, algo así como España entre dos guerras civiles, poseer una casa y poca hacienda y memoria ninguna. -- Gil de Biedma
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Nov 13th, 2009 at 09:51:36 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Seemed like something should be moving south, but perhaps it is my mind!  I'll invoke the first law of holes and shut up.

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Fri Nov 13th, 2009 at 03:52:17 PM EST
[ Parent ]
IPPC AR4 Chapter 8 - pdf:

Based on the understanding of both the physical processes that
control key climate feedbacks (see Section 8.6.3), and also the
origin of inter-model differences in the simulation of feedbacks
(see Section 8.6.2), the following climate characteristics appear
to be particularly important: (i) for the water vapour and lapse
rate feedbacks, the response of upper-tropospheric RH and lapse
rate to interannual or decadal changes in climate; (ii) for cloud
feedbacks, the response of boundary-layer clouds and anvil
clouds to a change in surface or atmospheric conditions and the
change in cloud radiative properties associated with a change
in extratropical synoptic weather systems; (iii) for snow albedo
feedbacks, the relationship between surface air temperature and
snow melt over northern land areas during spring and (iv) for
sea ice feedbacks, the simulation of sea ice thickness.
A number of diagnostic tests have been proposed since the
TAR (see Section 8.6.3), but few of them have been applied to
a majority of the models currently in use. Moreover, it is not yet
clear which tests are critical for constraining future projections.
Consequently, a set of model metrics that might be used to
narrow the range of plausible climate change feedbacks and
climate sensitivity has yet to be developed.

Emphasis mine.

Further, also in response to Sven, I've also referred previously to studies (don't have my bookmarks) indicating that at least during the Holocene optimum, global temperatures were ~2 degrees warmer, and no -runaway- methane has been found in the proxy record.

If there are indications at what temperature a runaway methane release would be triggered, I am not aware of them.

by Nomad (Bjinse) on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 08:20:48 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I quote Masami Fukuda at the Institute of Low Temperature science, Hokkaido University:

Over the course of a year when a large number of forest fires break out in Siberia, some 200,000 km2, a land area equivalent to more than half the size of Japan, can be lost to fire, releasing large amounts of CO2 into the atmosphere. When 1 ha (0.01 km2) of Siberian forest burns, that translates into approximately 40 tons of carbon released. The amount of carbon the surrounding forest can absorb over a year, however, is just 0.4 tons. As a result, calculations suggest that we will not be in a position to have that lost carbon reclaimed unless forests lost to fire are replenished 100 times over. It is also worth noting that when trees are lost to fire, CO2 escapes from the earth over a period of decades via a process known as soil respiration. And as permafrost thaws, it releases methane. When the Siberian taiga is hit by forest fires, it switches from being a "carbon sink," or repository, to a source emitting greenhouse gases.


You can't be me, I'm taken
by Sven Triloqvist on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 11:16:59 AM EST
[ Parent ]
When 1 ha (0.01 km2) of Siberian forest burns, that translates into approximately 40 tons of carbon released. The amount of carbon the surrounding forest can absorb over a year, however, is just 0.4 tons. As a result, calculations suggest that we will not be in a position to have that lost carbon reclaimed unless forests lost to fire are replenished 100 times over.
Gah, is that "surrounding forest" one hectare, too? In any case, a more sensible suggestion would be that this is an old-growth forest with a replacement time scale of 100 years. Among other things, because 40 tons per hectare divided by 0.4 tons per year is 100 years per hectare, not 100 times. It is likely that the 0.4 tons per year are actually per hectare-year.

Also, what fraction of the area of the Taiga is that 200.000 km2 that burns each year? If it is less than 1%, then the Taiga as a whole is more than able to absorb the CO2 released by the forest fires.

Large fires are a natural mechanism involved in the dynamical equilibrium of forests, precisely along the lines I indicate: on average the rate of growth of the forest matches the rate of burn-down.

En un viejo país ineficiente, algo así como España entre dos guerras civiles, poseer una casa y poca hacienda y memoria ninguna. -- Gil de Biedma

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 11:46:00 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The Eastern Siberian Taiga (the  area in question) is 3899700 m2, so I presume the burn is about 19%. Temperatures in summer are hot, with a max of 40 deg C. The recent Australian and Californian fires, which are accessible, show what happens in dry conditions at these temperatures when they are sustained. Added to this is an annual precipitation of only 200 mm most of which falls as snow during the harsh winters.

You can't be me, I'm taken
by Sven Triloqvist on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 12:15:48 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Sven Triloqvist:
The Eastern Siberian Taiga (the  area in question) is 3899700 m2, so I presume the burn is about 19%.
I think you're missing a K there...

Terrestrial Ecoregions -- East Siberian taiga (PA0601)

3,899,700 square kilometers
Right. So 200.000 Km2 is 1/20 or 5%.

I suppose the burn rate has increased 5-fold due to rising temperatures, then? One should expect a reduction in the area of the taiga by a factor of 5.

En un viejo país ineficiente, algo así como España entre dos guerras civiles, poseer una casa y poca hacienda y memoria ninguna. -- Gil de Biedma

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 12:24:46 PM EST
[ Parent ]
These were figures (as I understand) of the past - but the question is: what will happen with a 2 deg C rise?

You can't be me, I'm taken
by Sven Triloqvist on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 12:54:39 PM EST
[ Parent ]
well a 2 degree temperature rise will result in a quadrupking of the number of lightning strikes capable of igniting fires, on top of the increase in dry grass and woodland area capable of sustaining fires, so it wont be a straightline increase, we could see 25% per year ignited, rather than 5%

Any idiot can face a crisis - it's day to day living that wears you out.
by ceebs (ceebs (at) eurotrib (dot) com) on Thu Nov 12th, 2009 at 10:06:42 PM EST
[ Parent ]
have increased by a factor of close to 3 in the last 10 years, compared to the 10 years previous.

paul spencer
by paul spencer (paulgspencer@gmail.com) on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 08:52:05 PM EST
[ Parent ]
the factor is 1.7, not 3.

paul spencer
by paul spencer (paulgspencer@gmail.com) on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 11:08:07 PM EST
[ Parent ]
(Eliminating the turgidosity :-)

Yup.

As things change the way things change change.

She believed in nothing; only her skepticism kept her from being an atheist. -- Jean-Paul Sartre

by ATinNM on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 12:59:03 PM EST
[ Parent ]
But see my response to Bruce's comment above.

In some cases as things change the way they change doesn't change.

(I go suck my toes, now.)


She believed in nothing; only her skepticism kept her from being an atheist. -- Jean-Paul Sartre

by ATinNM on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 06:40:59 PM EST
[ Parent ]
This is really good news.

In state that imports 100% of the fossil fuels it uses, that is definitely not good news.

If this is put into the climate models, roughly what level of maximum CO2 in the atmosphere does it correspond to?

We got around 470 ppm during about a decade (2070-2080). Using MAGICC that results in a temperature rise of 1.1º over 1998. With the new sensitivity assessment of 3º per doubling of CO2 concentration and a taking into account the uncertainty in Coal reserves estimates, temperatures should peak around 2090 somewhere between 1º and 1.5º above 1998 (1.5º - 2.0º above 2008).

Click on the chart to read our report:

But the knowledge about the sensitivity parameter is evolving...

luis_de_sousa@mastodon.social

by Luis de Sousa (luis[dot]de[dot]sousa[at]protonmail[dot]ch) on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 10:11:55 AM EST
[ Parent ]
And "IEA high" and "IEA low" doesn't actually mean IEA, but IPCC, or rather Nakicenovic... gah.

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
by Starvid on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 10:25:02 AM EST
[ Parent ]
And there's no coincidence there is an eerie likeness with this 2003 graph from an article in New Scientist, even though this is before they started looking at coal.

   


Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.

by Starvid on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 10:33:32 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The four scenarios on the link to the Kharecha & Hansen study nanne posted is rather similar:



*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.

by DoDo on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 10:38:11 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Is this the same Hansen as the climate head honcho at the NASA Jet Propulsion lab?

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
by Starvid on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 10:39:35 AM EST
[ Parent ]
NASA GISS, not JPL. nanne's link and my image hotlink goes there.

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.
by DoDo on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 10:55:04 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Karecha and Hansen used an optimistic Coal estimate that resulted in a peaked only in the second half of the century. But some of their constrained scenarios resulted in similar curves to those we got. There's a slight difference here, Karecha and Hansen did not seem to have taken into account emissions from other sources, although that becomes essentially irrelevant beyond 2050.

Last year prof. David Rutledge from the California Institute of Technology got into contact with Karecha, calling his attention to his erroneous Coal reserves. But as far as know Karecha never persued the issue further.

luis_de_sousa@mastodon.social

by Luis de Sousa (luis[dot]de[dot]sousa[at]protonmail[dot]ch) on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 11:05:48 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Luis de Sousa:
In state that imports 100% of the fossil fuels it uses, that is definitely not good news.
I guess Portugal needs to get off fossil carbon...

En un viejo país ineficiente, algo así como España entre dos guerras civiles, poseer una casa y poca hacienda y memoria ninguna. -- Gil de Biedma
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 11:12:05 AM EST
[ Parent ]
However, is there not enough coal to fulfill the worst scenarios anyway?

Maybe not, maybe yes. It's worth to quote the 2001 IPCC's own note on this, sourced to the Nakicenovic article as Luís says upthread:

IPCC Special Reports on Climate Change - Complete online versions | UNEP/GRID-Arendal - Publications - Other

Coal reserves are different in character to oil and gas - coal occurs in seams, often covers large areas, and relatively limited exploration is required to provide a reasonable estimate of coal in place. Total coal in place is estimated at about 220-280 ZJ (WEC, 1995a; Rogner, 1996; 1997; Gregory and Rogner, 1998). Of this total, about 22.9 ZJ are classified as recoverable reserves (WEC, 1995a; 1998), over 200 times current production levels. The question is the extent to which additional resources can be upgraded to reserves. WEC (1995a; 1998) estimates additional recoverable reserves at about 80 ZJ, although it is not clear under what conditions these reserves would become economically attractive. Over 90% of their estimate of total reserves occur in just six countries, with 70% in the Russian Federation alone. Further coal resources are known to exist in various countries, some of which might be exploitable in the future, perhaps at high cost. However, in some countries the environmental damage from coal mining will prevent possible additional reserves being developed. In the IPCC WGII SAR, Nakicenovic et al (1996) estimate that, in addition to today's reserves, a further 89 ZJ could, at least in principle, be mined with technological advances, a figure in agreement with the WEC (1998) estimates.

15 of the 40 UPCC scenarios make use of these additional reserves recoverable thanks to hypothetical technical advances.

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.

by DoDo on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 08:36:12 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I dunno about that.. the people at the IPCC know nothing at all about fossil fuels, not even the slightest fraction of the competence they have at the IEA.

If you check last year's WEO you'll see that all emissions scenarios are presented quoting Nakicenovic.

They have thousands of people obsessing over the climate, the atmosphere, the seas, albedo and so on, but they do not care in the slightest if there are actual enough fossil fuels around to create their beloved climate disasters. A little weird, eh?

Very wierd indeed. But as Kyell Aleklett points out, that seems to be exactly the case...

luis_de_sousa@mastodon.social

by Luis de Sousa (luis[dot]de[dot]sousa[at]protonmail[dot]ch) on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 05:42:35 AM EST
[ Parent ]
OT: Actually it's not Kyell but Kjell, and it's pronounced as

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
by Starvid on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 06:05:37 AM EST
[ Parent ]
:) Why am I always making this same mistake? Thanks. I know how it is pronouced correctly, but when writing I often do this...

luis_de_sousa@mastodon.social
by Luis de Sousa (luis[dot]de[dot]sousa[at]protonmail[dot]ch) on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 06:51:58 AM EST
[ Parent ]
If you check last year's WEO you'll see that all emissions scenarios are presented quoting Nakicenovic.
Wow, I had no idea about that. Thanks!

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
by Starvid on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 06:07:33 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Earlier, following a suggestion by Colin Campbell, I had communicated to Sweden's delegate at the IEA that Sweden should leave the IEA since it was deceiving the world and this would have serious consequences globally. I also asked how they could approve of something like the World Energy Outlook that was so in error. I had previously posted an analysis of World Outlook 2004 on ASPO's homepage. In the discussion that followed it was revealed that the USA was applying pressure. The pressure was that the IEA should consider the prognoses that USA's Energy Information Agency releases half a year earlier as guidelines for the IEA report. [...]

One consequence of that which has now been revealed is that the emissions scenarios that the IPCC has advanced for calculating future carbon dioxide production from oil can never reflect reality. Before the round table conference in Paris I was also given the task by the OECD of writing another report, "Reserve driven forecasts for oil, gas and coal and limits in carbon dioxide emissions".


The fun part of this is that the IEA is an OECD organisation.
by nanne (zwaerdenmaecker@gmail.com) on Tue Nov 10th, 2009 at 01:18:11 PM EST

(If it doesn't work, check it here: http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_-CXk2-VWGgQ/SvpfZ9LpdRI/AAAAAAAAA90/34rFu6iTggE/s1600-h/iea_03.png )

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.

by Starvid on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 08:36:42 AM EST
Are there any similar graphs from, say, 10 years ago? At least then we could compare their idea of "fields to be found in the future" to what actually happened.
by gk (gk (gk quattro due due sette @gmail.com)) on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 08:41:01 AM EST
[ Parent ]
And a (yellow) pony, too...

En un viejo país ineficiente, algo así como España entre dos guerras civiles, poseer una casa y poca hacienda y memoria ninguna. -- Gil de Biedma
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 08:49:04 AM EST
[ Parent ]
My take is that the fact that the fraction of magic pony yet-to-find fields surges around 2015 actually means 2015 is when TSHTF. At somewhere around 90-95 mbpd.

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
by Starvid on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 09:13:17 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Starvid,

That graph is not impossible, we are at least a decade away from Peak Gas. Even at ASPO there are folk forecasting a peak for 2030, with a profile not that far off from that graph. There are still considerable reserves to develop in the Persian Gulf and in the Caucasus.

luis_de_sousa@mastodon.social

by Luis de Sousa (luis[dot]de[dot]sousa[at]protonmail[dot]ch) on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 10:19:14 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Argh, I didn't notice the little "tcm" in the top left corner, I thought the graph was about oil. Argh.

Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
by Starvid on Wed Nov 11th, 2009 at 10:27:45 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Impressive diary and more impressive debate.
Last noght instead of working I could not stop reading it in full.

It is a pity this debate does not reach mass audiences.

A pleasure

I therefore claim to show, not how men think in myths, but how myths operate in men's minds without their being aware of the fact. Levi-Strauss, Claude

by kcurie on Thu Nov 12th, 2009 at 05:31:30 AM EST


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