Power Void in Europe

by nanne Mon Nov 2nd, 2009 at 11:38:29 AM EST

Two years after the European Council on Foreign Relations kicked off with a less than useful power audit of EU-Russia relations and six months after it repeated the trick with regard to China, it has finally produced a major report on the relations between the EU and the USA. The tenor of the publication can be described as 'A more assertive European Union is in the interests of both America and Europe' - which, though still looking through something like a transatlantic prism, is a sound prescription.

The report, titled 'Towards a post-American Europe', is spot-on in its diagnosis of current European attitudes towards the US. To quote from the introduction:

Europeans’ default conclusion that “the US are the ultimate guarantors of our security” now seems more a matter of habit, and perhaps even of subconscious choice, than of necessity. This continued sense of dependence suits Europeans. It absolves them from responsibility and lets the US take the hard decisions, run the risks and incur the costs. And deferring to the US as what one top French official described to us as “le grand frère égalisateur” has other advantages: it allows Europeans to stop other Europeans getting above themselves. Italians can hope to use American clout to keep Germany off the UN Security Council; Germany can ignore French “pretension” in suggesting that the French nuclear deterrent could protect Germany; and Dutchmen and Danes are frank that their Atlanticism owes much to a wish to see France and Germany held in check.
In other words, the illusions persist because they are comfortable and convenient. But they suggest a less-than-adult attitude on the part of Europeans to transatlantic relations. In fact, the term “infantilism” does not seem out of place. Similarly, veneration of the transatlantic relationship less for what it can deliver than as an end in itself might unkindly be described as a sort of fetishism.
The effect of these illusions is pernicious. As a result of them, we argue, Europeans consistently sell their own interests short.

While latter-day Atlanticists like Claus Christian Malzahn or John C. Hulsman are telling Obama that Europe longs for nothing like American leadership, and European countries that it's time to 'put up or shut up', the ECFR is providing useful analysis.

(Jerome criticised the earlier ECFR 'power audit' of EU-Russia relations in the piece Containing Them)

Power Void in Europe | 21 comments (21 topical, 0 editorial, 0 hidden)

Prescriptions (4.00 / 3)

Though the authors' policy recommendations on two of their case studies (Afghanistan and Russia policy) is a bit more hard line than mine, their idea of how to get to a common policy is a hands-on version of what I've argued in the post European Geopolitics. From their summary:

What is needed [...] is serious European discussion of which issues currently really matter in transatlantic terms - and on which of those issues Europeans can present a united position to the Americans. The French Presidency of the EU made a start on this during the second half of 2008, convening two ministerial discussions of what international priorities and agenda Europeans might collectively present to the new American administration. (As with policy towards Russia, it seems that there is nothing like an interregnum in the White House to liberate Europeans from their transatlantic inhibitions.) The output was largely lost in the turbulence of the US transition and the welter of advice for the new administration which flowed around Washington. But the participants by all accounts found it a refreshing and illuminating experience. It is time to repeat it.

Nick Whitney, co-author, is a sharp mind.

by nanne (zwaerdenmaecker@gmail.com) on Mon Nov 2nd, 2009 at 12:01:06 PM EST

Re: Power Void in Europe (4.00 / 3)

I have to dig deeper into the document, but the part you quote could fit just as well into the "deep down you need us, admit it" and "grow up, and ~~help out doing America's White Man's Burde~~ tke responsibility in solving Global Problems" narratives.

For example, "the US are the ultimate guarantors of our security" is certainly in the minds of people strolling NATO headquarters in Brussels, and probably in the majoprity of European politicians, but every European? And what follows that, is not a standard divide-and-conquer narrative; one ignoring the much more complex relationships in and via the EU Council?

_{*Lunatic*, n.

One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

by DoDo on Mon Nov 2nd, 2009 at 02:42:33 PM EST

Re: Power Void in Europe (none / 1)

Extended quote:

They fail to take responsibility where they should (for example, on Russia); they fail to get what they want out of the US (for example, visa-free travel); they acquiesce when America chooses to strongarm them (except in the economic relationship); they adopt courses of action not out of conviction but in order to propitiate their patron (for example, Afghanistan); and they suffer from US policies not specifically directed against them but which nonetheless have adverse consequences for them (for example, Israel/Palestine).

What do you mean by more complex relationships in and via the EU Council? There is no European foreign policy. The EU can't even agree on a common position with regard to Kosovo. The EU does not even want to begin talking about Iraq out of fear it will reopen old wounds. And a common policy exists least of all with regard to Washington. Rather, the leaders of Britain, France and Germany are openly (or less openly in Merkel's case) jockeying for who gets to be first poodle. What's wrong with an analysis that blasts Europe for this sorry state of affairs?

by nanne (zwaerdenmaecker@gmail.com) on Mon Nov 2nd, 2009 at 03:12:59 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Power Void in Europe (none / 0)

This:

And deferring to the US as what one top French official described to us as "le grand frère égalisateur" has other advantages: it allows Europeans to stop other Europeans getting above themselves. Italians can hope to use American clout to keep Germany off the UN Security Council; Germany can ignore French "pretension" in suggesting that the French nuclear deterrent could protect Germany; and Dutchmen and Danes are frank that their Atlanticism owes much to a wish to see France and Germany held in check.

..is not extra-EU foreign policy, it is intra-EU relations seen through an Atlanticist filter.

_{*Lunatic*, n.

One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

by DoDo on Mon Nov 2nd, 2009 at 03:19:07 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Power Void in Europe (none / 0)

While the perspective is certainly transatlantic (and I would have preferred something more clearly European), I think that there's nothing in that paragraph that's not roughly correct, and it's not stated that these are the main reasons. They are in my estimation definitely reasons for the continued inertia.

To qualify, Dutch transatlanticism has ebbed somewhat in the last Balkenende government, which has mainly been due to the mutual reaching out between Balkenende and Sarkozy on the one hand and the degree of toxicity of G.W. Bush on the other hand. I am not confident that this will be a lasting change of direction.

by nanne (zwaerdenmaecker@gmail.com) on Mon Nov 2nd, 2009 at 03:58:49 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Power Void in Europe (none / 1)

They are in my estimation definitely reasons for the continued inertia.

However, in the actual context of that paragraph, I don't think they play that much a role in allowing "Europeans to stop other Europeans getting above themselves". (So I agree that there's nothing in that paragraph that's not roughly correct, but there is an implication that these are main factors.)

To give another direction to this sub-discussion; I'm only at pdf page 17 now so don't know if it is covered later, but, IMO, there is a logical sequence of these European attitudes:

there are real conflicts of foreign policy interests between EU member states,
earlier bouts of American divide-and-rule [a policy named by the report explicitely on page 12 as one of four] exploited these,
EU member states act as vassals and client states and hope for special relationships rather than act jointly ( = EU foreign policy paralysis).

To get out of this, IMO one has to go back to the core (e.g. point 1) OR push through a much more radical institutional reform than Lisbon -- hard chance with both.

_{*Lunatic*, n.

One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

by DoDo on Mon Nov 2nd, 2009 at 04:24:13 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Power Void in Europe (none / 0)

What's wrong with an analysis that blasts Europe for this sorry state of affairs?

That, so far, every second paragraph comes back to an implication that some American foreign policy objective would be in Europe's interests, too; that the sorry state of affairs usually ends up being something where Europe failed to live up to Obama admin expectations, and the resolution to European foreign policy paralysis tends to look like doing something in America's stead. (I'm on page 17.)

But, to again highlight that I see this as a bold departure anyway, here is the last of four recommendations on how Europeans could 'maintain and strengthen transatlantic cooperation':

In Chorus, not Solo. If they are to count for something in Washington's world view, EU member states need above all to speak and act together, thus bringing their collective weight to bear. This is as true in relation to the US as it is in relation to Russia or China - only even more difficult. The current practice of banking on some bilateral "special relationship" in a European competition for Washington's favour simply invites the US to continue to divide and rule. Worse, by hamstringing Europeans as effective partners for the US, it is also undermining the transatlantic relationship as a whole.

_{*Lunatic*, n.

One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

by DoDo on Mon Nov 2nd, 2009 at 03:37:55 PM EST
[ Parent ]

the implicit conclusion (4.00 / 3)

is that a common position would be very similar to America's... the reality is that when Europe actually has a common position, it can pretty much impose it to everybody, including to the Americans. See technical standards, trade matters or even the euro.

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes

by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Mon Nov 2nd, 2009 at 03:55:36 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: the implicit conclusion (4.00 / 3)

There are some limits to that power of course. But yes, as I wrote in European Geopolitics.

A frequent problem of policies and institutions that do not exist is that they are imparted with a purpose they are unlikely to serve by those who argue on behalf of their creation. Thus does U.S. presidential candidate John McCain seek a 'League of Democracies' that would engage in bolder democracy promotion and create freer markets. Thus does Anne Applebaum dream of the leaders of the UK, France and Germany coming to the White House, pledging to solve Afghanistan. Thus, likewise, does the English foreign policy community desire a common European foreign and defence policy that will stand up to Russia.

So I take my excoriations of transatlanticism and calls for common European foreign and defence policy as they come.

by nanne (zwaerdenmaecker@gmail.com) on Mon Nov 2nd, 2009 at 04:14:50 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: the implicit conclusion (none / 1)

So I take my excoriations of transatlanticism and calls for common European foreign and defence policy as they come.

Point taken.

_{*Lunatic*, n.

One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

by DoDo on Mon Nov 2nd, 2009 at 04:29:32 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: the implicit conclusion (none / 0)

Yes, that's how it feels so far, despite this in the intro:

Among the illusions that European governments find hard to shake off, we identify four which are particularly damaging - the beliefs that:
...
American and European interests are at bottom the same - and apparent evidence to the contrary only evidences the need for the US to pay greater heed to European advice;

I hope to find them fleshing out that point when I read on, but probably not tonight.

_{*Lunatic*, n.

One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

by DoDo on Mon Nov 2nd, 2009 at 04:28:14 PM EST
[ Parent ]

On Russia (4.00 / 4)

quite frankly, there is a West European consensus, joined by more than a few Central European countries, and a lot of incoherent angry noise coming from the UK, Poland and the Baltics (with some justification for the latter). The UK's confrontational, bellicose, insulting-to-all stance makes Europe look divided (and indeed revels in throwing that insult to try to badger the others to join them in their antics) because it is seen as somehow representative of anything other than the panic of the UK elites over their lack of an energy policy.

Europe is not threatened by Russia. It generally knows how to negotiate energy deals with it, even if it is done on a quasi-national-champion per quasi-national-champion basis (I'd note that no other practical alternative to negotiating with Gazprom has ever been proposed). It can cohabitate with it on most international issues.

Russia is the big bogeyman created by the militaro-industrial complex to generate the appearance of a need for US "protection." (Note: I'm not saying Russia is not authoritarian, just that it's not really dangerous to Europe. Relations with the "near abroad" (the FSU) are dominated by oligarchic issues as much as anything and Europe is better off not getting involved in issues it doesn't understand or care about).

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes

by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Mon Nov 2nd, 2009 at 04:06:27 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: On Russia (none / 1)

The characterisatin I used, "bold departure" [from traditional Atlanticism], applies here, too. Though they keep suggesting that Europe should deal with Russia, without (so far) defining what the common EU position should be or would look like, they say this:

Many in Eastern Europe would argue that security dependence on the US is no illusion, but brute fact in the face of Putin's reassertive Russia. Yet, as US Defense Secretary Robert Gates recently attested: "As someone who used to prepare estimates of Soviet military strength for several presidents, I can say that Russia's conventional military, although vastly improved since its nadir in the late 1990s, remains a shadow of its Soviet predecessor. And adverse demographic trends in Russia will likely keep those conventional forces in check."5 Even after recent major increases financed by surging energy prices, Russian defence spending is still significantly lower than that of the EU member states as a whole. In fact, even on the basis of purchasing power parity, last year's Russian defence budget was roughly equivalent to those of the UK and France combined. Europe as a whole continues to spend twice as much as Russia on defence.6

Whatever the details, the implication is that Russia is NOT a threat.

_{*Lunatic*, n.

One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

by DoDo on Mon Nov 2nd, 2009 at 04:35:30 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: On Russia (none / 1)

I think most sane people agree that Russia is not a military threat (although some in the Baltics - and I won't even mention Georgia - may diasagree), but will point out to energy issues and to general political interference and intimidation.

On energy, we mostly need to get out of our insane current neolib policies to eliminate the notion of that energy threat (or reframe it as the larger threat of depletion to deal with it as such).

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes

by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Mon Nov 2nd, 2009 at 04:53:10 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Power Void in Europe (none / 1)

Having read third of the way into it, indeed it does seem like a re-invention of Atlanticism to fit the Obama era re-invention of Empire (the weak Empire that needs 'partners' doing its bidding on their own initiative). But in that, rather bold -- to take another part from the summary:

Among the illusions that European governments find hard to shake off, we identify four which are particularly damaging - the beliefs that:

European security still depends on American protection;

American and European interests are at bottom the same - and apparent evidence to the contrary only evidences the need for the US to pay greater heed to European advice;

the need to keep the relationship close and harmonious therefore trumps any more specific objective that Europeans might want to secure through it; and

"ganging up" on the US would be improper - indeed,

counterproductive - given the "special relationship" that most European states believe they enjoy with Washington.
In this report we aim to show how these illusions induce in European governments and elites an unhealthy mix of complacency and excessive deference towards the United States - attitudes which give rise to a set of strategies of ingratiation that do not work. Such attitudes and strategies fail to secure European interests; fail to provide the US with the sort of transatlantic partner that it is now seeking; and are in consequence undermining the very relationship for which Europeans are so solicitously concerned.

That this European infantility and submission is one seen from Washington, becomes explicit on pages 12 and 13:

Thus far, the Obama administration has seen European governments broadly living down to their expectations. It has found them weak 10 and divided - ready 11 to talk a good game but reluctant to get muddy. Seen from Washington, there is something almost infantile about how European governments behave towards them - a combination of attention seeking and responsibility shirking.
...
Europe's confused but essentially submissive approach to transatlantic relations frustrates Americans, but also sells their own interests short...
Afghanistan provides an ongoing demonstration of the consequences of European governments' failure to take real responsibility for a conflict that they claim is vital to their national security interests.

Frivolous translation: "I hoped you'll fight my war in Afghanistan, but you're such pussies!"

The way thery put the Obama-era re-invention of Empire, BTW:

President Obama ... Europeans miss the implications of the self-avowed pragmatism of his administration. ... it believes that the creation of a web of international partnerships is the best way to ensure that, even in a globalised world, America remains the
"indispensable nation".

_{*Lunatic*, n.

One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

by DoDo on Mon Nov 2nd, 2009 at 03:14:58 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Power Void in Europe (none / 0)

'Indispensible Nation' is a Bill & Hilary Clinton trope. Although I prefer Obama's greater focus on process and consensus (coupled though it is by a belief in America as an exemplary nation) and am willing to give him some faith for the moment, you should note who is sec. state and what she's doing, as well as what the Senate and House are up to.

As for Afghanistan, the report says this:

Develop a European strategy for Afghanistan. This might mean getting out, or getting further in, or just changing tack. But what it most directly means is starting to substitute European interests for Washington's smiles and frowns as the star to navigate by. This means a proper debate within the EU or among those most closely involved to determine just what Europe wants and needs from Afghanistan. The recent call by the European Big Three for an international conference may - may - imply a belated recognition.

The least we should have gotten by now is for the Americans to end OEF or slim it down to one or two thousand special forces. That would've been a realistic goal that would also have increased Europe's influence in Afghanistan.

You're cherry-picking.

by nanne (zwaerdenmaecker@gmail.com) on Mon Nov 2nd, 2009 at 03:32:31 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Power Void in Europe (none / 1)

You're cherry-picking.

You too :-) There are endless passages both before and after the above detailing American frustrations with Europe not acting in its own declared interests/not taking responsibility in Afghanistan. [In addition, I confused page numbers and pdf page numbers -- I was only one-sixth the way in and haven't read the above when writing my previous comment.]

_{*Lunatic*, n.

One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

by DoDo on Mon Nov 2nd, 2009 at 03:51:26 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Proteus (none / 1)

European inability to form foreign policy consensus as seen through American eyes -- interesting item #1:

...The transatlantic partnership does not need more summits, fora, or dialogues. The Prague summit at which President Obama was subjected to 27 interventions from the EU's assembled heads of state and government was an eye-opener for his administration: senior figures have made plain to us their dread that the Spanish initiative could lead to something called "the Madrid Process".
What is needed instead is serious European discussion of which issues currently really matter in transatlantic terms - and on which of those issues Europeans can present a united position to the Americans...

I'm not sure I understood this passage. I would think that a serious European discussion of which issues currently really matter in transatlantic terms would involve a lot of these dreaded summits, fora, or dialogues, only without the USA.

I don't think we can get around this messy state of affairs in the intergovernmental EU.

The methaphor in the comment title is developed later, I'll quote long:

The continuing inadequacy of formal EU-US dialogue is particularly exposed by the annual EU-US summits. These meetings normally bring together the US president and relevant cabinet members with the president of the European Commission, the head of state and/or government of the country that holds the European Council's rotating presidency, the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, relevant European commissioners and their equivalents from the presidency government, and sometimes those of the next government in line. To Americans, these summits are all too typical of the European love of process over substance, and a European compulsion for everyone to crowd into the room regardless of efficiency.12 Bush was so dismayed by his first summit experience at Gothenburg in 2001 that he promptly halved the meetings' frequency to once a year; administration sources are frank that Obama's encounter with all 27 European heads of state and government at the Prague summit in April 2008 left him incredulous.
As a result of this complex, compartmentalised relationship, Americans feel as if they are trying to deal with Proteus. The shape-shifting Europeans appear now as NATO allies; now as an EU that in turn sometimes appears as 27 states trying to act as one and sometimes one trying to act for 27; and now as individual states, each of whom expects its own relationship and access...

Being the committed anti-Atlanticist, I have the rebellious thought that on the long run, EU foreign policy self-paralysis will work towards Europe's de-facto exit from the American sphere of influence, earlier than any attempt to form a joint position in Europe's present state of self-denial and divided interests (e.g. say the real existing differences between say Poland's and Germany's interests in the relationship with Russia).

_{*Lunatic*, n.

One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

by DoDo on Mon Nov 2nd, 2009 at 04:10:16 PM EST

heh (4.00 / 2)

I have the rebellious thought that on the long run, EU foreign policy self-paralysis will work towards Europe's de-facto exit from the American sphere of influence, earlier than any attempt to form a joint position in Europe's present state of self-denial and divided interests

Salvation through excruciating boredom and indecisiveness. It may indeed work...

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes

by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Mon Nov 2nd, 2009 at 04:48:24 PM EST
[ Parent ]

in other words (4.00 / 2)

Democracy is such a pain!

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes

by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Mon Nov 2nd, 2009 at 04:53:55 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Power Void in Europe (4.00 / 3)

Watching you all debate these serious issues is truly inspiring for me. I can only defer to your deeper insights, wishing I had such understanding of the issues and solution paths.

The only comment i might add with a modicum of substance, is that Europe still seems to underestimate the degree of the fall of the US to even implement its own policies.

What i take from the debate is that one concept is certain, that Europe must indeed become more proficient in defining its own interests. What those interests are, remain open for debate, and remain beyond my ken.

And that Atlanticism should include Pacificiscm, because Europe is a better intermediary with China and Asia, the elephant in the room, than the US could ever be.

I go now back to my corner and read.

"Life shrinks or expands in proportion to one's courage." - Anaïs Nin

by Crazy Horse on Mon Nov 2nd, 2009 at 05:07:13 PM EST

Power Void in Europe | 21 comments (21 topical, 0 editorial, 0 hidden)

Go to: [ European Tribune Homepage : Top of page : Top of comments ]

Power Void in Europe

Top Diaries

What's Next, After the Slam?

Shock Election Loss Rutte IV In Senate Race

Honduras Establishes Close Ties with China

A Return to Normalcy?

A Grand Slam for Ireland?

NI Protocol: It's all over bar the shouting?

Recent Diaries

Struggle NWO Unipolar or Multilateralism

Neo-Nazi Marches Across Europe

Fascism Unites America, Israel and EU Neo-Nazis

What's Next, After the Slam?

Settler Extremism Blessed by Jerusalem Leaders

US Interference In Lebanon-Syria-Ira
q

City Agriculture - March 17, 2023

Shock Election Loss Rutte IV In Senate Race

Stalemate Endures, Pessimism Grows, Deaths Mount

Honduras Establishes Close Ties with China

A Grand Slam for Ireland?

Living In Spain and Social-Democracy

USA Censorship Act to Kill Disinformation

Flying Fortresses and Nuclear Threat

Universal Criticism Asylum Threshold EU Fortress

China Trade and Relations

SBU As a Terror Network

A Return to Normalcy?

Georgia and Foreign Agents or Spy Law

Nord Stream Blasts Timeline of Denial